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
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Henry Jackson Dobbin -





George Campbell D. D.

Published by J. Ritchie Edinburgh 15 May 1806.

THE
FOUR GOSPELS,
Translated from the Greek :
WITH
PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS,
AND
NOTES
CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY.

By GEORGE CAMPBELL, D.D. F. R. S. EDIN.
PRINCIPAL OF MARISCHAL COLLEGE, ABERDEEN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

THE THIRD EDITION,
WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS, AND A
STRIKING LIKENESS, OF THE AUTHOR.

ΜΟΝΗ ΟΥΤΕΟΝ ΤΗ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ.

EDINBURGH:

PRINTED AND SOLD BY J. RITCHIE.

Sold also by OGLE & AIKMAN, and GUTHRIE & TAIT, Edinburgh; M. OGLE,
and R. WILLIAMSON, Glasgow; E. LESSLIE, Dundee; J. BURDITT,
WILLIAMS & SMITH, and R. OGLE, London.

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TO THE
RIGHT REVEREND
JOHN DOUGLAS, D. D.
LORD BISHOP OF CARLISLE.

MY LORD,

THE trouble you were last year so good as to take, in perusing a considerable part of this work in manuscript, and the favourable sentiments you were pleased to express of what you had got time to peruse, have emboldened me to dedicate it to your Lordship. I mean not thus to bespeak your future patronage, or even approbation of the whole, when you shall become acquainted with it. That can be only as your better judgment shall direct. I well know that, if the book have no merit of its own, no patron whatever can long preserve it, or ought
to

to preserve it, if he could, from its natural fate, *oblivion*. But I am happy in this opportunity of expressing to the world my gratitude for the patronage you have already bestowed both on it and on its author. I am happy also to have it in my power to inscribe a work intended for promoting the best interests of mankind, the cause of truth and probity, to one who, to the satisfaction of the candid and judicious, has approved himself an able defender of the most important truths, as well as a successful detector of fraud and falsehood.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,


MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obliged
and most obedient servant,

GEORGE CAMPBELL.

ABERDEEN,
September 17. 1788.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.



	Pag.
SOME ACCOUNT of the Life and Writings of the Author.	
PREFACE,	ix

DISSERTATION I.

Observations on the language and Idiom of the New Testament, on the Diversity of Style, and on the Inspiration of the sacred Writers.	
PART I. The language and Idiom.	41
PART II. The Style and Inspiration.	57

DISSERTATION II.

The Causes to which the principal Differences in Languages are imputable; the Origin of the Changes produced on the Language and the Idiom of the Jews; the principal Difficulties to be encountered in translating the sacred Books.	
PART I. The Causes of the Differences in Languages.	63
PART II. The Origin of the Changes in the Idiom of the Jews.	70
PART III. The Difficulties found in translating the Scriptures.	76

DISSERTATION III.

Of the style of the Scripture History, particularly the Gospels.—Its Perspicuity defended against the Objections of Father Simon.	83
---	----

DISSERTATION IV.

Observations on the right Method of proceeding in the critical Examination of the Books of the New Testament. - - -	110
---	-----

DISSERTATION V.

Of the proper Version of some Names of principal
Import in the New Testament.

PART I. Of the Phrase ἡ βασιλεια τῶ θ̄ου, or τῶν ῡρανω.	134
PART II. Of the Name το ευαγγ̄ελιον. -	137
PART III. Of the Phrase ἡ καινη διαθηκη.	151
PART IV. Of the name ὁ Χριστος.	153

DISSERTATION VI.

Inquiry into the Differences in the Import of some
Words commonly thought synonymous.

PART I. Διαβολος, Δαιμων and Δαιμονιον.	164
PART II. Ἄδης and γ̄εννα.	180
PART III. Μετανοω and μεταμελομαι.	204
PART IV. Ἅγιος and ὁσιος.	213
PART V. Κηρυσσειν, ευαγγ̄ελιζειν, καταγγ̄ελειν, and διδασκειν.	228

DISSERTATION VII.

Inquiry into the Import of certain Titles of Ho-
nour occurring in the New Testament.

PART I. Κυριος. - - - -	241
PART II. Διδασκαλος, Rabbi. - - -	257

DISSERTATION VIII.

Observations on the Manner of rendering some
Words to which there are not any that perfect-
ly correspond in modern Languages.

PART I. Weights, Measures, and Coins. -	268
PART II. Rites, Festivals, and Sects. -	278
PART III. Drefs, Judicatories, and Offices. -	281

DISSERTATION XI.

Inquiry whether certain Names which have been adopted into most Translations of Scripture in the West, coincide in Meaning with the original Terms from which they are derived, and of which they are used as the Version.

PART I. Of Mystery.	-	-	-	298
PART II. Of Blasphemy.	-	-	-	306
PART III. Of Schism.	-	-	-	320
PART IV. Of Heresy.	-	-	-	326

DISSERTATION X.

The chief Things to be attended to in translating.
—A comparative View of the opposite Methods taken by Translators of Holy Writ.

PART I. The Things to be attended to in translating.	340
PART II. Strictures on Arias Montanus.	342
PART III. Strictures on the Vulgate.	351
PART IV. Strictures on Castalio.	359
PART V. Strictures on Beza.	372

DISSERTATION XI.

Of the Regard which, in translating Scripture into English, is due to the Practice of former Translators, particularly of the Authors of the Latin Vulgate, and of the common English Translation.

PART I. The Regard due to the Vulgate.	-	391
PART II. The Regard due to the English Translation.	-	42

DISSERTATION XII.

An account of what is attempted in the Translation of the Gospels, and in the Notes here offered to the Public.

PART I. The essential Qualities of the Version.	437
PART II. The readings of the Original here followed.	468
PART III. The Dialect employed.	483
PART IV. The outward Form of the Version.	493
PART V. The Notes.	504

SOME ACCOUNT
OF THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
THE AUTHOR.

GEORGE CAMPBELL, D. D. the author of the following Work, was the youngest of three sons of Mr COLIN CAMPBELL, one of the ministers of Aberdeen, a man of much respect and popularity. He was born on Dec. 25. 1719. He was deprived of his father, by his death, before he was nine years of age. He was educated at the grammar school, and afterwards at the Marischal College of Aberdeen. Even in youth, he was noted for studiousness and ability. Having been intended for the profession of the law, he served an apprenticeship with this view to a Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh; a circumstance which must have contributed to extend his general knowledge, and to increase the acuteness and ingenuity which he so eminently possessed.

While thus engaged, he attended the lectures on the law of Scotland, delivered by the late JOHN ERSKINE, Esq.* a necessary branch of education for this employment. It was then that an inclination arose in his mind, not very likely to be excited by it, of devoting himself to a very different object

VOL. I.

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during

* Father of the late Dr JOHN ERSKINE, one of the ministers of Edinburgh.

during his life. So much was he smitten with the precision and perspicuity of Mr ERSKINE'S lectures, and instructed by the information they contained, that he resolved to employ himself more entirely in the pursuits of literature, and made choice of the profession of a clergyman, to prepare himself for which, his studies were thenceforth directed.

He began to attend the theological lectures of Professor GOWDIE, at Edinburgh, before the conclusion of his apprenticeship, and became professedly a student of divinity at King's and Marischal Colleges, Aberdeen, in 1742.

He was licensed to preach by the presbytery of Aberdeen in 1746, but did not obtain a charge for nearly two years after this.

He was presented to the parish of Banchory Ternan, about seventeen miles from Aberdeen, in the presbytery of Kincardine-o'Neil, and ordained there in June 1748. In this parish, he laid the foundations of the following Work, which he continued to enlarge, improve, and correct, for forty years. While settled there, he married a lady of respectable parentage, and of great worth and talents, with whom he lived in mutual comfort till 1792, when he was deprived of her by death in her 73d year.

After having continued minister of this parish for nine years, he was removed to the town of Aberdeen in 1757. It was here that his distinguished abilities were so greatly improved and displayed, and the amiableness of his dispositions and character became generally known. He found associates in this situation in literary pursuits, with whom also he was united in the strictest friendship. Such were Dr REID, Dr JOHN GREGORY, and Dr BEATTIE, with several others. In 1759, he

was appointed Principal of Marischal College, in consequence of a presentation from the Crown. Previous to this, the public were not made acquainted with his talents. He had published indeed in 1752, a sermon preached before the synod of Aberdeen, on Matt. v. 13, 14. "Ye are the salt of the earth. Ye are the light of the world." But no one would have been led by the perusal of this discourse to have expected such works as he afterwards produced. The sentiments indeed are similar, but they are not set in that striking light, nor expressed with that chasteness and beautiful simplicity, which is so much the character of the style of his subsequent writings. It may be presumed that these were his own thoughts of this performance, as it is not included in the collection of his discourses in two volumes, published by him not long before his death.

Soon after his advancement, however, to his office in the University, he published, in 1762, that masterly dissertation on Miracles, first preached as a sermon before the synod of Aberdeen, which has been received with such universal admiration, and which even extorted unwilling acknowledgments from the author of the sophism which he so triumphantly refuted. It were indeed to have been wished that the Doctor, without deviating from the meekness and courteousness which are the duty of Christians in such circumstances, and which are proper means to lead the adversaries of the gospel to repentance, had, in this Work, been more sparing in the compliments he bestowed on Mr HUME. When the gross prostitution is considered of the eminent talents bestowed upon that celebrated writer; when the atheism, infidelity, and immoral sentiments are taken into view, propagated, and still spreading, by means of his works,

works, in the world, but especially among men of letters, or those who would be thought such, with the eternal ruin of so many, which must have been, and will be the effect of these; methinks the language of zeal and of benevolent indignation is dictated by the love of truth, and of our fellow-creatures, and might have mixed with the acute and convincing reasonings, which, in the opinion of all the world, have swept away the foundations of his pestilent fallacy as chaff before the wind*. This Essay has gone through three editions, has been translated into the French, Dutch and German languages, and must continue to be read as long as the subject of miracles is studied among men.

In 1771, Dr CAMPBELL was chosen, by the Town Council of Aberdeen, Professor of Divinity in the Marischal College; an office which he continued to fill, and the duties of which he performed with great ability and applause, for twenty-four years. To his engagements in these, we are indebted for a great part of the admirable Preliminary Dissertations prefixed to his Translation of the Gospels, and for the prelections on Ecclesiastical History, with which the Public have been favoured since his death. From the general view of these lectures given us by Mr SKENE KEITH, in his late account of his Life and Writings, they seem to have been so truly valuable, that it cannot but be much regretted that no other part of them was prepared for the press. Hopes indeed have been entertained that the part, On Pulpit Eloquence, might yet see the light; but these expectations have not hitherto been

* So little regard had Mr HUME for truth or consistency, that he continued to re-publish the Essay on Miracles, without any alteration, in every subsequent edition of his Works.

been gratified. The sentiments and instructions on that subject, occasionally introduced in his other works, render the publication of these, even though they were unfinished, a great *desideratum*.

His next publication was a Sermon preached before the Synod of Aberdeen on the 9th of April 1771. The subject was 2 Tim. i. 7. and the title of this discourse, 'The Spirit of the Gospel neither a Spirit of Superstition nor of Enthusiasm.' It extends to 123 pages 8vo. ; and whether we regard the critical examination of the text, or the liberal, enlarged, and scriptural views it contains, few discourses will so well reward a careful perusal. Those who have been charmed with the Preliminary Dissertations, will here find the same strain of thinking, and the same animated and free spirit which dictated these. The sermon was attacked by Papists, Nonjuring High Churchmen, and Methodists, and a considerable noise respecting it prevailed for some time ; but the author preserved to the last a dignified silence, and published no reply to the many invectives poured upon him.

One of his most important and masterly works was published in 1756, entitled, 'The Philosophy of Rhetoric,' in 2 vols. 8vo. The depth, the ingenuity, and the taste displayed in these volumes, established the character of their author as a philosopher and critic of the first rank. The title indeed does not at first suggest an idea of all the contents of the book, which embraces some of the most abstract parts of metaphysics, and pours the clearest light upon the most obscure of them. The principles of taste, of criticism and elocution, are here discussed with great discernment and originality, and the composition, throughout elegant and simple, though not every where unornamented, exemplifies the

the

the rules laid down by the author. The acute detection of various faults in writing, and the description of the qualities of that style which should be studied by those who are desirous of pleasing or impressing their hearers or readers, cannot be too closely attended to, especially by the young, and those who have not formed habits incapable of correction and improvement. It may perhaps recommend this work to some of our readers, and especially to those who are desirous, or preparing to preach the gospel of Christ, if we mention that this was a book which the late Dr ERSKINE held in the very highest admiration, and used often to recommend as far preferable to the lectures of Dr BLAIR, which, compared with it, though valuable, he always spoke of as a mere compilation.

In the same year, 1776, he also published a sermon which he had preached on the fast-day appointed by Government, during the American war. The subject is, the nature, extent, and duty of allegiance. It does not seem to have much connexion with the text, Prov. xxiv. 21. but is unquestionably handled with great ability, although perhaps objections might be made to some parts of it, not easily to be answered on the principles which Dr CAMPBELL adopted. A second edition in 12mo size, with the addition of many notes and illustrations, and with a short analysis of the whole, was printed at Aberdeen in 1778, and 6000 copies of it, at the desire of the late Dr TUCKER, the Dean of Gloucester, were circulated in America. The world are not now to be informed, that this measure had no success. In the preface, he expresses his apprehensions that the republican principles then disseminated might issue in the most direful calamities; but professes to expect, that the visionary de-
fences

fences of them would be examined and exposed, and so be abandoned by every body. Events have shewn that his predictions have in part been contradicted, and in part too fatally fulfilled, and that the desertion of republican theories has not put a stop to the calamities which the broaching and adoption of them produced.

Dr CAMPBELL'S next publication was a Sermon before the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, preached June 6. 1777, and printed soon afterwards. The subject is that striking passage, 1 Cor. i. 25. However frequently treated, it may be confidently said, that it was never illustrated in a more beautiful, simple and impressive manner. The doctrine of the cross—the character of the missionaries—the effects produced by their ministry—are admirably stated. The contrast between the measures of the apostles, and those of the church of Rome, is drawn by the hand of a master, and the argument for the truth of the gospel from its propagation and success, is deduced with such fairness, and wound up with such force, that, to every one who attends, it must be irresistible. Not a few popular prejudices are discussed in the course of his illustrations, and much occasional disquisition render it, independent of the main argument, and of the taste with which it is composed, a performance of great value.

It is singular that the publication immediately succeeding this should have been an Address to the People of Scotland upon the alarms that have been raised in regard to Popery. This was published in 1779, in consequence of a bill brought into Parliament, to abolish certain penalties to which professors of the Popish religion were subjected, by statutes enacted soon after the Revolution in 1688.

An outcry was raised, particularly in Scotland, on this subject, which afterwards led to the commission of great atrocities. Dr CAMPBELL had, in the two discourses already mentioned, expressed his most decided abhorrence of Popery, pointing out its opposition to the spirit of true Christianity, and had provoked its adherents in a high degree; but he considered the zeal against it prevailing at that time in this country, the means used to excite it, and the way in which it was expressed, as too similar in their nature and effects to the cause they opposed. Many wise and worthy men, equally friends with him to religious toleration, and averse to restrain false religion, *as such*, by temporal penalties, were yet however differently minded from the Doctor; and replies, some of them more, and others less temperate and able, were published to his Address, which without regard to its immediate object, must be allowed to contain much sound argument, most admirably expressed, equally dictated by just policy, as by the doctrine of the New Testament.

It is curious enough, that three and twenty years after the publication of this Address, he has been charged by the biographer of the late Dr GEDDES with ranking "among the bigots of Scotland, (as he thinks proper to call them), who did not conceive themselves safe while the remotest degree of favour was evinced towards Roman Catholics in any part of the island*." He is even represented by this writer as the author of a tract entitled, *A Vindication of this Opposition, &c.* although on the title-page of that tract, it appears that it was written in answer to his Address. Mr GOOD is so very ignorant, as to imagine that the Principal had afterwards

* *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of ALEX. GEDDES, L. L. D.* By JOHN MASON GOOD. Lond. 1803. p. 73.

afterwards changed his sentiments; in proof of which, he appeals to the "liberality and candour which blazes forth in every page of his Lectures on Ecclesiastical History." The truth is, that the sentiments of his Address and of his Lectures are not only perfectly consistent with each other, but that both appear to have been entertained by him at a very early period, and were stedfastly held and openly professed during his whole life.

In the same year, he published a Sermon preached at the Assizes at Aberdeen, at the request of the late Lord GARDENSTONE, the Judge. The subject was Prov. xiv. 35. "Righteousness exalteth a nation." In a very just and beautiful introduction, he adverts to the inconsistency and absurdity of libertines, (such libertines, alas! are the generality of mankind), who treat religion with contempt, consider it as a restraint, and represent it as an intolerable burden, while yet they maintain that its origin and reception upon earth is owing to the designs of politicians, who find it necessary to keep the people in subjection, and to add authority to the laws. Having made some pertinent animadversions on this subject, he proceeds to shew that Christianity conduces to the exaltation and felicity of the body politic in four different ways: 1st, By the tendency and extent of its laws; 2d, By the nature and importance of its sanctions; 3d, By the assistance it gives the civil magistrate, both in securing fidelity and in discovering truth; 4th, By the positive enforcement of equity and good government on the rulers, and of submission and obedience on the people. Each of these points he illustrates and proves in such a way "as oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd."

May we be permitted however to say, that much as we respect Dr CAMPBELL's Writings, we cannot assent to the conclusions on this subject, which are stated very largely in the latter part of the sermon.

The first of them is, that the secular power ought to give *all possible* countenance to religion, and to the ordinances of divine worship.—That such secular powers as believe the gospel, ought to give countenance to religion, and to the ordinances of God, is perfectly just, and that this will be their conduct, unless where the prejudices of certain systems mislead them, is undoubtedly true. But *that* countenance must be of a kind suitable to, and limited by the spirit and genius of religion, and calculated to promote its *proper* influence and prosperity. Dr CAMPBELL, in illustrating his second proposition, has justly observed, that “ religion operates solely by faith, and has no influence further than it is believed ” Should we desire then, or is it fit, that secular powers, who are not themselves Christians, assume a form of godliness, and become hypocrites, to promote the welfare of the community? God neither permits nor approves of any worship which is not conducted in sincerity and truth. To the wicked he says, “ What hast thou to declare my statutes, or to take my covenant in thy mouth ? ” The means which such would employ to promote what they may call Christianity, will never surely answer any end but that of corrupting it. It is true, religion is not without influence, even on those who do not cordially embrace it; and it is the instrument by this means, though indirectly, of no small advantage to civil communities, and to the world at large. But this is not an end to which either Jesus Christ or
his

his apostles applied it, nor are his disciples at liberty to promote this, although they may observe it taking place. Even false religion, so far as mixed with what is true, is, upon the whole, better for the world than Atheism, which excludes all regard to a supreme Governor upon earth, and acknowledges no unchangeable distinction between moral good and evil. But no Christian is at liberty, on that account, to afford it any countenance. They can produce good fruit only by making the tree good.—In the second conclusion from his premises, Dr CAMPBELL seems to have forgotten that he had proved only *the conduciveness* of religion to the prosperity and happiness of states. He here assumes, however, *its indispensable necessity for their support*, and reasons from this, that all who appear enemies to Christianity, are enemies to their country, as, no doubt, indirectly they are, although not amenable to the magistrate on that account. The whole which he has advanced on this head, is at variance with many parts of his Writings, and especially with the sentiments of his last work, the lectures on Ecclesiastical History; see particularly ch. xxv. Did he advert, that the great end of civil governments is protection and comfort in this life; that its great bond is self-interest; and, that the majority in all the kingdoms of this world, whether governors or governed, have been, and are influenced to study its welfare by no principle superior to this? Did he attend to the assurances which are contained in the Scriptures, that the church of God shall never be extinct; assurances, as he elsewhere says, ‘which do not stand in need of any engagements from kings or parliaments to fulfil them*?’ Did he consider, that whatever may come of false religion, or false professors

* Address in regard to Popery, &c. p. 12.

fessors of true religion, no weapon formed against his cause shall prosper, or finally prevail? Unquestionably if God had not a people upon earth, the world should ere this time have been as Sodom and Gomorrah, and when they are all gathered out, "the consumption decreed shall overflow in righteousness." It is indeed but too true, as he foreboded, that open atheism, and gross corruption of morals, have advanced with rapid progress during the twenty-five years which have passed since he published this discourse. Virtue, laws, liberties and constitutions have gone down together in general ruin. And what further miseries await the world, who at this period will venture to say? All this furnishes no proof of the possibility, and no argument for the necessity or obligation of promoting or protecting true religion, by departing from its spirit, or by employing the carnal weapons, which are requisite and proper in the kingdoms of this world.

The reader will forgive this digression. We have imbibed the spirit of Dr CAMPBELL'S Writings too deeply to encourage implicit faith even in them.

The last and greatest work which he published during his life, was the Translation, Dissertations, and Notes, the third edition of which is now presented to the Public. This elaborate performance first appeared about eighteen years ago, in two volumes 4to, and it gives us now great satisfaction to bring it within the reach of a class of readers, who could not formerly obtain it on account of the price. We may venture to say, that it has obtained the greatest approbation from those who are best qualified to judge of its merit and utility. The version we do not suppose to be every where faultless, or preferable to that in common use, and there may be a few instances in which the meaning

ing of the original is not expressed in the most exact and the plainest language. It must be owned however, that, in very many places, it seems far superior to the ordinary translation; and, in others, difficulties are removed which must greatly embarrass those who rigidly adhere to it. But the reader who is truly desirous of understanding the New Testament, will be agreeably disappointed, if he has considered it merely as a translation of the Gospels, an interpretation of difficult passages, and an introduction to these books. Independent of the numerous passages in other parts of the Scriptures illustrated and explained incidentally, the Preliminary Dissertations contain a fund of knowledge, which, rightly employed, will serve as a key to the whole New Testament, and to great part of the Old Testament; and he who properly uses it will be able, we may venture to say, to unlock treasures inaccessible to careless or ordinary readers. Though these volumes are not a commentary on Scripture, they enable every person of tolerable talents, who will apply himself to the subject, to become his own commentator; they qualify him for throwing off undue dependence on human authority and opinion, and to be satisfied in his own mind and judgment concerning the true and certain import of the dictates of the Spirit of God. To use Dr CAMPBELL's own comparison*, the scope of this book is to lead the student of the sacred writings to take them into his own hand, to furnish him with a supply of light, and to direct his attention to the comparison of one part with another. Though the character be old, familiarity and application will sooner surmount difficulties, than if he trusted to the eyes of other people,

* Mr SKENE KEITH's View of his Prelections, &c. Vol. I. P. 67.

people, and saved himself the expence of thought and reflection.

The first requisite for entering into the spirit of the Scriptures is, without doubt, to understand with certainty the meaning of words and phrases. It was well observed by Melancthon, 'that Scripture cannot be understood theologically, until it be known grammatically.' Just translation then must always be regarded as the most important service by those readers of the word of God, who do not thoroughly understand the languages in which it is written. Such was the well-founded sentiment of those learned men who have favoured us with a comparative view of the translations of it into no less than ten different languages, under the name of "the Polyglott," all of them prior to the date of any manuscripts at present known to exist. Destitute of some advantages enjoyed by these very early translators, we are yet possessed of some which did not belong to the learned men, who were employed two hundred years ago to produce the English version now in use. Great cause of gratitude to God as this translation, in many respects most excellent, presents, it must yet be owned, that the art of criticism, and the knowledge of languages, were, in their days, comparatively in their infancy. It cannot but be confessed, that many of their words and idioms are now obsolete and obscure, and that they themselves seem to have been uncertain about the import of some passages, mistaken in others, and have debased the dignity and propriety of not a few. Among those* who have undertaken since their time to render the New Testament into English, it will be generally allowed that Dr CAMPBELL far excels every one

* Mice, Whetham, Doddridge, Wells, Purver, Worsley, Wynne, Harwood, Wakefield, Newcome, Haweis, Scarlett, and others.

one of them in fidelity, perspicuity, and suitability to common use, as much as in elegance, dignity, and unaffected simplicity. We cannot help entertaining hopes, that this Work will not only be placed in more libraries than yet possess it, but that it will be found in general circulation among those who are desirous to search the Scriptures that they may obtain eternal life.

The last part of his Writings which has seen the light, are his Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, with an Essay on Christian Temperance and Self-denial. These lectures were published from his manuscript by GEORGE SKENE KEITH, Minister of Keith Hall, Aberdeenshire, about six years ago. They formed, as has been already mentioned, a part of his course of theological instruction, were transcribed and revised by himself, and had been improved, enlarged, and corrected every year during the whole time of his being engaged in delivering them. If it has been remarked with justice that it is not possible to say from his version of the Evangelists to what religious denomination he belonged, this holds still more true respecting these two most interesting volumes, which no one certainly should have expected from the pen of a Presbyterian clergyman. They consist of twenty-eight lectures, all of them composed in a bold and ardent style, and every where discovering the talents and erudition of the author. They are not intended to make persons acquainted with the facts of ecclesiastical history, who are ignorant of them, but to exhibit some of the chief of these as connected with the rise and progress of clerical usurpation. They are introduced with some just remarks on the sacred history contrasted with that of Josephus, with an account of the canon of Scripture,

ture, of the peculiar nature of the Jewish government, and of the origin and advancement of the Christian church. After this he proceeds to trace the gradual and insensible innovations of time, their causes and the manner of their operation. He marks the distinguishing character of things civil and sacred, and points out the evil of confounding them. A great part of his labours is bestowed in delineating the characters of the Papacy, the instruments of its establishment and security, and the progress and causes of its decline. The dreams of superstition vanish before him as he proceeds, and he has stormed and demolished the strongest fortresses of sacerdotal influence and authority. It must be remarked, however, that the field is after all imperfectly occupied. The corruptions of the gospel, and the fundamental doctrines and laws of Jesus Christ, as connected with the extent and success of a worldly hierarchy, are no where taken into view. The revival of what Luther called the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ**, is not mentioned; and its influence in circumscribing and consuming the power of the man of sin, is altogether unnoticed. It must also be owned, that the style of these lectures too often approaches the borders of levity; so that the perversions of Christianity which they record, and the vile arts employed to uphold them, may seem exposed rather to ridicule than to just abhorrence and detestation. It may also be observed, that if the Doctor had been better acquainted with the state of religious profession in his own country, he would scarcely have said, 'that in all the different religious sects, he had not found one which perfectly coincided with

* Justification by faith without works.

with the model of the apostolic church *.' Some such at least there certainly were and are, though perhaps too inconsiderable to attract his observation, resembling pretty closely the draught which he has himself exhibited of this model.

If he had considered too, how it came about that all the churches of apostolic times were so exactly alike in their government and discipline, he could scarcely have hazarded the remark, 'that if a particular form of polity had been essential to the church, it had been laid down in another manner in the sacred books †.' He does not appear to have adopted the primitive opinion: 'Constat id esse ab apostolis traditum quod apostolorum ecclesiis sacro sanctum;' nor to have believed that the directions of the apostles to the churches were the personal injunctions of their Master, or the infallible and unalterable dictates of his Holy Spirit. Deficient and imperfect in these respects as DR CAMPBELL'S Lectures may seem to some; anarchical, or even seditious and unfounded, as they may appear perhaps to others; they will continue, we doubt not, to be considered and studied as one of his most masterly works.

Pity it is that the Essay on Temperance and Self-denial should be the only specimen we possess of his Writings on moral subjects! Although it be less practical than might have been expected, and though the other Essays which he left behind him are unfinished, yet, as they appear to have been intended for the press, his friends would certainly perform an acceptable service by publishing them. Even the first sketches of such a master ought to be preserved, and would undoubtedly tend to the instruction of mankind.

Dr CAMPBELL was of a feeble constitution; the form of his body was unfavourable to health, and he was subject to frequent attacks of disease. He was rather of low stature, and stooped much; but his features were animated, agreeable and full of meaning, and his eye uncommonly expressive, especially when he was engaged in conversation or public speaking. His manners were amiable, mild and unostentatious, and his behaviour in company unassuming and attentive. The outline of his head, prefixed to these volumes, was taken at Edinburgh, when on his way to London in 1787. to publish his Translation. It is a most correct likeness, and no one who knew him at that time can fail to recognize the original.

He was seized with a violent illness in 1791, from which it was not expected that he could have recovered. His own expectations and the fears of his friends, however, were agreeably disappointed, and he was able to return to his former studies and engagements, though not with all his usual application. About four years after this, being sensible of decline both in body and mind, he resigned his professorship and his parish, and in no long time his office also of Principal of Marischal College. He was succeeded in both by the present incumbent, Dr W. L. BROWN, formerly of the University of Utrecht, and had a pension of L. 300 per annum assigned him by Government. A few months after this, March 31. he was affected with a paralytic stroke, was deprived of speech, and languished till the day of April 1796, when he died, beloved, esteemed, and regretted by all who had the pleasure of his acquaintance, and highly valued by great numbers who had never seen him, but had known him only in his works.

Edinburgh, Jan. 1. 1807.

PRE-

P R E F A C E.

IN compliance with a custom, which is not without its advantages, I purpose, in this place, to lay before the reader some account of the following work, its rise and progress, nature and design. To do so will, perhaps, be thought the more necessary, as there have been, in this and the preceding century, many publications on the Gospels, both abroad and at home, in some or other of which, it may be supposed, that all the observations of any consequence, which can be offered here, must have been anticipated, and the subject in a manner exhausted. I am not of opinion that the subject can be so easily exhausted as some may suppose. I do not even think it possible for the richest imagination to preclude all scope for further remark, or for the greatest acuteness to supersede all future criticism. On the other hand, it must be owned possible, that a man may write copiously on a subject, without adding to the stock of knowledge provided by those who wrote before him, or saying any thing which has not been already as well, or perhaps better, said by others. How far this is applicable to the present publication, must be submitted to the judicious and intelligent reader. In the mean time, it may be hoped that it will not be judged an unfair attempt at bespeaking his favour, to give him a brief account of the origin and preparation of the work now offered to his examination.

As far back as the year 1750, soon after I had gotten the charge of a country parish, I first formed the design of collecting such useful criticisms on the text of the New Testament, as should either occur to my own observation, or as I should meet with in the course of my reading; particularly, to take notice of such proposed alterations on the manner of translating the words of the original, as appeared not only defensible in themselves, but to yield a better meaning, or at least, to express the meaning with more perspicuity or energy. Having, for this purpose, provided a folio paper book, which I divided into pages and columns, corresponding to the pages and columns of the Greek New Testament which I commonly used, I wrote down there, in the proper place, as they occurred, such alterations on the translation as, in my judgment, tended to improve it, and could be rationally supported. And having divided the pages in the middle, I allotted the upper part of each for the

version, and the lower for *scholia*, or notes, containing the reasons (wherever it appeared necessary to specify reasons) of the changes introduced. In this way I proceeded many years, merely for my own improvement, and that I might qualify myself for being more useful to the people intrusted to my care. I did not assign to this occupation any stated portion of my time, but recurred to it occasionally, when any thing occurred in reading, or offered itself to my reflections, which appeared to throw light on any passage of the New Testament.

Things proceeded in this train, till I found I had made a new version of a considerable part of that book, particularly of the Gospels. The *scholia* I had added, were indeed very brief, being intended only to remind me of the principal reasons on which my judgment of the different passages had been founded. But soon after, from a change of circumstances and situation, having occasion to turn my thoughts more closely to scriptural criticism than formerly, I entered into a minute examination of many points concerning which I had thrown together some hints in my collection. On some of the points examined, I have found reason to change my first opinion: on others I have been confirmed in the judgment I had adopted. I have always laid it down as a rule in my researches, to divest myself, as much as possible, of an excessive deference to the judgment of men; and I think that in my attempts this way, I have not been unsuccessful. I am even confident enough to say, that I can with justice apply to myself the words of the poet:

Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri;

or rather the words of one much greater than he; I have learnt, in things spiritual to *call no man Master upon earth*. At the same time that I have been careful to avoid an implicit deference to the judgment of any man, I have been ready to give a patient hearing, and impartial examination, to reason and argument, from what quarter soever it proceeded. That a man differs from me on some articles, has given me no propensity to reject his sentiments on other articles; neither does the concurrence of his sentiments with mine on some points, make me prone to admit his sentiments on others. Truth I have always sought (now there is no respect of persons in this pursuit): and, if a man may pronounce safely on what passes within his own breast, I am warranted to say I have sought it in the love of truth.

It must be acknowledged that though a blind attachment to certain favourite names has proved, to the generality of mankind, a copious source of error; an overweening conceit of their own reason has not proved less effectual in seducing many who affect to be considered as rational inquirers. In these I have often observed a fundamental mistake, in relation to the proper province of the reasoning faculty. With them reason is held the standard of truth;

truth; whereas, it is, primarily, no more than the test or the touchstone of evidence, and in a secondary sense only the standard of truth. Now the difference between these two, however little it may appear, on a superficial view, is very great. When God revealed his will to men, he gave them sufficient evidence, that the information conveyed to them by his ministers, was a revelation from him. And it cannot be justly doubted that, without such evidence, their unbelief and rejection of his ministers would have been without guilt. *The works*, said our Lord, *which the Father hath given me to finish, bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me*, John v. 36. And again: *If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin*, John xv. 24. His works were sufficient evidence that what he taught was by commission from God; and without such evidence, he acknowledges their unbelief would have been blameless: whereas, on the contrary, having gotten such evidence, there was nothing further they were intitled to, and consequently their disbelief was inexcusable.

Some modern rationalists will say, ‘Is not the subject itself submitted to the test of reason, as well as the evidence?’ It is readily granted, that a subject may be possessed of such characters as are sufficient ground of rejecting it in point of evidence, and is, therefore, in this respect, submitted to the test of reason. If any thing were affirmed that is self-contradictory, or any thing enjoined that is immoral, we have sufficient internal evidence, that such things cannot proceed from the Father of lights, and the Fountain of good, which all the external proofs that could be produced on the other side, would never be able to surmount. The proofs, in that case, might confound, but could not rationally convince the understanding. We may, for example, venture to assert, that no conceivable evidence from without, could render the theology of Hesiod or Homer, in any degree, credible. Thus far, therefore, it will be allowed, that reason is intitled to examine and judge concerning the subject itself: for there may be something in the subject that may serve as evidence, either in its favour, or against it. At the same time it must be owned that, the more the subject is above the things which commonly fall under the discussion of our faculties, the narrower is the range of our reason; insomuch that, in things so far beyond our reach as those may be supposed to be which are conveyed by revelation from God, there is hardly any internal character that can be considered as sufficient to defeat a claim, otherwise well supported, but either, as has been said, absurdity or immorality.

Now here lies the principal difference between the impartial seekers of truth, whose minds are unbiassed on every side, and those who, under the appearance of exalting human reason, idolize all their own conceptions and prejudices. I speak not of those

those who reject revelation altogether ; but of those who, whilst they admit the truth of the Christian revelation in general, consider their own reason as competent to determine, and prejudge, as I may say, what it is fit for God, either to declare as truth, or to command as duty. Such people, for example, if they do not discover an useful purpose that any particular declaration in Scripture can answer, boldly conclude, in defiance of the clearest positive evidence, that it is not there : if they cannot divine the intention of Providence in the production of any being, or order of beings, of which there may be frequent mention in holy writ, they infer, that such being, or order of beings, notwithstanding the notice there taken of them, does not exist. They will not admit the reality of an operation of which they do not perfectly comprehend the manner, though the former may be a matter clearly revealed in Scripture, the latter not. Now, the rejection of the aid of reason altogether (the common error of fanatics of every denomination), and such a conviction as that now described of its all-sufficiency, are extremes which the judicious, but humble-minded Christian, will think it incumbent on him equally to guard against.

Indeed those deifiers of human reason, of whom I have been speaking, seem, all the while to mistake the proper province of reason. They proceed on the supposition that, from her own native stock, she is qualified for the discovery of truth : of all such truths, at least, as are of any consequence to a man to be acquainted with. The fact is nearly the reverse : for except those things which pass within our own minds, and which we learn solely from what is called consciousness, and except the deductions made from self-evident or mathematical axioms, all our information relating to fact, or existence of any kind, is from without. Hence all our knowledge of arts, science, languages ; of history, philosophy, and every thing in which human life is concerned. Do I, by this, mean to depreciate human reason as a thing of little consequence ? Far from it. Reason, I am sensible, is absolutely necessary to render us capable of that information from without, by which we are enabled to make so great progress in knowledge. For want of this power entirely, or at least in the requisite degree, how little, comparatively, is the greatest knowledge which the most sagacious of the brute creation can attain ? I cannot, therefore, be justly thought to derogate from a faculty which, by my hypothesis, constitutes the radical distinction between man and beast. Would a man be understood to depreciate that admirable organ of the body, the eye, because he affirmed, that unless the world, which is without the body, furnished us with light, our eyes could be of no service to us ? Reason is the eye of the mind : it is in consequence of our possessing it, that we are susceptible either of religion

gion or of law. Now the light by which the mental eye is informed, comes also from without, and consists chiefly in testimony, human or divine.

I would recommend it, therefore, to those who are accounted the most refined rationalists in religion to take the trouble to reflect a little, and inquire what is the method which they, and indeed all, must follow, in the acquisition of human knowledge. In natural history, for example, how insignificant would be our progress, if our conviction were to be regulated by the same maxims by which those men seem to regulate their faith in matters of revelation? If our not knowing the use of any thing were a sufficient reason for disbelieving its existence, how many animals, how many vegetables, how many inanimate substances, apparently useless, or even noxious, should we discard out of our systems of nature, inflexibly denying that they exist any where, except in the disordered imaginations of men? Nor should we make greater proficiency in the other branches of science. Of nothing have we clearer evidence than of this, that by means of the food which animals swallow, life is preserved, the body is nourished, the limbs gradually advance in strength and size, to their full maturity. Yet, where is the philosopher, where is the chemist, who can explain, or will pretend to understand, the process whereby the nourishment is converted into chyle, and the chyle into blood, and the blood into skin, and flesh, and bones and sinews?

Now if, in matters of science, merely human, our ignorance of the use, in the one case, and of the manner of operation, in the other, does not preclude our belief of the fact, a belief which ultimately rests, in most cases, on the testimony of our fellow-creatures; can we think it reasonable to be more shy of admitting a fact, on the testimony of God, when, in effect, we admit that sufficient ground is given us to conclude that we have his testimony? For I do not here argue with the deniers of revelation, but with those who, professing to believe it, reject its obvious meaning. Are we better acquainted with things divine than with things human? or with things eternal than with things temporal? Our Lord, in his conversation with Nicodemus, seemed to consider it as an acknowledged truth, that things earthly are more level to the natural capacity of man than things heavenly, John iii. 12. Yet how soon would an effectual stop be put to our progress in every branch, even of earthly science, were we to lay down as maxims, that the existence of any being, however well attested, whereof we cannot discover the use, is not to be believed; and that the production of an effect, if we do not comprehend the mode of operation in the cause, is incredible? The much greater part of all human knowledge, whether of things corporeal or things spiritual, things terrestrial, or things

things celestial, is originally from information. Revelation means no other than information from God; and whatever human knowledge we derive from the testimony of our fellow-mortals, which is more than ninety-nine parts in a hundred of all we are possessed of, is, if I may be allowed the expression, a revelation from man. In regard to both, we ought, no doubt, in the first place, to be satisfied that we have the proper testimony; but when this point is ascertained, I think it unaccountable to reject the obvious meaning of the divine testimony (which is indirectly to reject the testimony), on grounds which no judicious person would think sufficient to warrant him in rejecting the testimony of a man of character. If ye have not satisfactory evidence, that what claims to be the testimony of God is really such, ye are no doubt entitled to reject it. But do not first admit the testimony, and afterwards refuse your assent to what it manifestly implies; and that for such a reason as would prove no obstacle to your assent, on the information of a fellow-mortal. This is surely the reverse of what might be expected from a humble pious Christian. *For if we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater.* 1 John v. 9.

Besides, this conduct, in rejecting the obvious sense of the divine testimony, is the more inexcusable, as the circumstance on which the rejection is founded, is such as the whole analogy of nature leads us to expect in all the works of the Creator. If, in every part of the creation, we find that there are many creatures, the purpose of whose existence we cannot investigate; and that there are hardly any natural productions in which, though, from experience, we may discover the cause, we can trace its operation; it is but just to conclude, that this unsearchableness to human faculties, is a sort of signature impressed on the works of the Most High, and which, when found in any thing attested as from him, ought to be held at least a presumption in favour of the testimony.

But though nothing can be more different from an implicit adoption of all the definitions, distinctions and particularities of a sect, than the general disposition of the rationalist; there is often a great resemblance in their methods of criticising, and in the stretches which they make for disguising the natural interpretation of the sacred text. Each is, in this, actuated by the same motive, namely, to obtrude on others that interpretation which suits his favourite hypothesis. And, if we may say of the one, that he is too foolish to be improved by teaching; we may, with equal justice, say of the other, that he is too wise to attend to it. Revelation, surely, was never intended for such as he. Our Lord said to the Pharisees, that he came not *to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance*, Mat. ix. 13. We may, with like reason, say, he came not to instruct the *learned*, but the *ignorant*. Nay he, in effect,
says

says fo himself. It was to *babes* in knowledge, not to *sages*, that the things of God were revealed by him, Math. xi 25. The disposition of children, so often recommended as necessary for our giving a proper reception to the Gospel, and obtaining admission into the kingdom, refers as clearly to the teachable temper of children, free from prepossessions and self-conceit, as to their humility and innocence. How strongly is this sentiment expressed by the Apostle: *If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise*, 1 Cor. iii. 18. The judicious and candid will not mistake me, as, in matters of religion, decrying the use of reason, without which, I am sensible, we cannot proceed a single step; but as pointing out the proper application of this faculty.

In what concerns revelation, reason has a two-fold province; first, to judge whether what is presented to us as a revelation from God, or, which is the same thing, as the divine testimony to the truth of the things therein contained, be really such or not; secondly, to judge what is the import of the testimony given. For the former of these, first, the external evidences of Christianity offer themselves to our examination, prophecy, miracles, human testimony; and then the internal, arising from the character of the dispensation itself, its suitableness to the rational and moral nature of such a creature as man. As to the second point, the meaning of the revelation given; if God has condescended to employ any human language in revealing his will to men, he has, by employing such an instrument, given us reason to conclude that, by the established rules of interpretation in that language, his meaning must be interpreted. Otherwise the use of the language could answer no end, but either to confound, or to deceive. If the words of God were to be interpreted by another set of rules than that with which the grammar of the language, founded in general use, presents us; with no propriety could it be said, that the divine will is revealed to us, till there were a new revelation furnishing us with a key for unlocking the old. This consideration points to the necessity of the grammatical art, and of criticism, by means of which, readers, especially of a distant age and country, must arrive at the requisite proficiency in the language. As to both these, it is evident that the sacred writers address themselves to our reason. *Why*, said our Lord, Luke xii. 57. *even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?* And the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. x. 15. *I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.* With the first, the evidences of the truth of our religion, I am not here concerned. The great design of this work is, to deliver with plainness, in our own tongue, a very essential part of what was, more than seventeen centuries ago, communicated in another tongue, to the inhabitants of countries remote from ours. It was, in order the more effectually

to answer this end, particularly, to remove all prejudices and prepossessions which might prove obstructions in the way, that I determined, on reflection, to add to the Version, the Preliminary Dissertations, and the Notes.

The necessary aids for acquiring the knowledge of an ancient and foreign tongue, are more or fewer, according to the circumstances of the case. The distance of time and place, and the great difference, in respect of customs, manners, and sentiments, between those to whom the sacred writers first addressed themselves, and the present inhabitants of this island, could not fail to occasion our meeting with some difficulties. And, although it cannot be justly doubted, that a good deal of light has been thrown on some points, by the labours of former critics; it can as little be denied that, by the same means, many things have been involved in greater darkness. In other critical inquiries, wherein religion is not concerned, there is little to bias the judgment in pronouncing on what side the truth lies. But where religion is concerned, there are often, not only inveterate prejudices, but secular motives, to be surmounted, to whose influence few can boast an entire superiority. Besides, I shall have an opportunity to observe, in the sequel, that, in what relates to this subject, there has come a gradual change on the meaning of many words, consequent on the changes which have been gradually introduced into the church, in religious ceremonies, modes of government, and formularies of doctrine. Old names are given to things comparatively new, which have, by insensible degrees, arisen out of the old, and have at last supplanted them.

To trace such changes with accuracy, is an essential quality of philology. A translator, when he finds that the words used by former translators, though right at first, have since contracted a meaning different from that in which they were originally employed, sees it necessary, that he may do justice both to his author and to his subject, to substitute such terms as, to the best of his judgment, are adapted to convey those sentiments, and those only, intended by the author. When a change is made from what people have been long accustomed to, it is justly expected that the reason, unless it be obvious, should be assigned. Hence arises the propriety of *scholia*, or notes, both for vindicating the version, and for supplying further information, which, if not necessary to all, is, to most readers, highly useful. The frequent allusions to rites, customs, and incidents, well known to the natives of the writer's country, and to his contemporaries, render such occasional illustrations, as can be given in the notes, very expedient for those of distant lands and ages. It is not on account of any peculiar obscurity in sacred writ, that more has been judged requisite in this way, with regard to it than with regard to any other writings; but partly on account of certain peculiarities in the case, and partly

partly on account of the superior importance of the subject. Of both these I shall have occasion to take notice in the Preliminary Dissertations. There is a further use in bringing additional light for viewing these subjects in, though we admit that the light absolutely necessary was not deficient before. To brighten our perceptions is to strengthen them; and to strengthen them, is to give them a firmer hold of the memory, and to render them more productive of all the good fruits that might naturally be expected from them. The most we can say of the best illustrations which, from the knowledge of Christian antiquity, critics have been enabled to give the sacred text, is like that which the ingenious author of *Polymetis* says, in regard to the utility of his enquiries into the remains of ancient sculpture and painting, for throwing light upon the classics. "The chief use," says he, *Dialogue VI.* "I have found in this sort of study, has not been so much in discovering what was wholly unknown, as in strengthening and beautifying what was known before. When the day was so much overcast just now, you saw all the same objects that you do at present; these trees, that river, the forest on the left hand, and those spreading vales to the right: but now the sun is broke out, you see all of them more clearly, and with more pleasure. It shows scarce any thing that you did not see before; but it gives a new life and lustre to every thing that you did see."

But it cannot be denied, that, on this subject, many things have been advanced, in the way of illustration, which have served more to darken, than to illuminate, the sacred pages. I have great reason to think that, in my researches into this matter, I have been impartial; but, whether I have been successful, is another question: for, though partiality in the method of conducting an enquiry, sufficiently accounts for its proving unfruitful, the utmost impartiality will not always ensure success. There are more considerations which, in a work of this kind, must be taken into view, than even readers of discernment will at first have any apprehension of. Several of the changes here adopted, in translating both words and idioms, will, I know well, upon a superficial view, be judged erroneous; and many of them will doubtless be condemned as frivolous, which, it is to be hoped, will, on deeper reflection, be admitted, by well informed judges, both to be more apposite in themselves, and to render the matter treated more perspicuous.

In illustrating the principles on which some of the changes here made are founded, a great deal more, in the way of critical discussion, was found necessary, in order to do justice to the argument, than could, with propriety, be thrown into the notes. A conviction of, this, first suggested the design of discussing some points more fully in preliminary dissertations. This, however,

is not the only use which these discourses were intended to answer. Though there has appeared, since the revival of letters in the West, a numerous list of critics on the Bible, little has been done for ascertaining the proper, and, in some respect, peculiar, rules of criticising the sacred books; for pointing out the difficulties and the dangers to which the different methods have been exposed, and the most probable means of surmounting the one, and escaping the other. Something in this way has been attempted here. Besides, I have been the more free in applying my philological remarks in these discourses, to various passages in the other apostolical writings, as I had a more extensive view in translating, when I first engaged in it, than that to which at last I found it necessary to confine myself.

I have endeavoured, in the interpretations given, to avoid, with equal care, an immoderate attachment to both extremes, *antiquity* and *novelty*. I am not conscious that I have in any instance, been inclined to disguise the falsity of an opinion, because ancient, or with partial fondness, hastily to admit its truth, because new. That an opinion is the opinion of the multitude is, to some, a powerful recommendation; to others it appears an infallible criterion of error; to those who are truly rational it will be neither. There are, indeed, many cases wherein antiquity and universality are evidences of some importance. It has been, all along, my intention never to overlook these circumstances, where they could be urged with propriety; for certain it is, that singularity is rather an unfavourable presumption. But I hope that, with the help of some things which are treated in the Preliminary Dissertations, the intelligent and candid reader will be convinced, that nowhere have I more effectually restored the undisguised sentiments of antiquity, than where I employ expressions which, at first sight, may appear to proceed from the affectation of novelty. I have, to the utmost of my power, observed the injunction which God gave to the Prophet Jeremiah, Jer. vi. 16. I have *stood in the ways*; I have *looked and asked for the old paths*. And if, in this research, I have, in any instances proved successful; men of discernment will, I am persuaded, be sensible, that nowhere have I been luckier in conveying the genuine conceptions of the most venerable antiquity, than in those places which, to a superficial examination, will appear, in point of language, most chargeable with innovation. The very command, to look and to ask for the old paths, implies that it may happen that the old paths are deserted, consequently untrodden, and known, comparatively, to very few. In that case, it is manifest that the person who would recommend them, runs the risk of being treated as an innovator. This charge, therefore, of affecting novelty, though very common, must be, of all accusations, the most equivocal; since, in
certain

certain circumstances, nothing can more expose a man to it, than an inflexible adherence to antiquity.

I may, in this work, have erred in many things; for to err is the lot of frail humanity; and no merely human production ever was, or ever will be, faultless. But I can say, with confidence, that I have not erred in any thing essential. And wherefore am I thus confident? Because I am conscious that I have assiduously looked and asked for the old paths; that I have sought out the good way; that I might, at all hazards, both walk therein myself, and recommend it to others: and because I believe the word of the Lord Jesus: *Whosoever will do the will of God, shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.* John vii. 17. This I think a sufficient security, that no person, who is truly thus minded, shall err in what is essential. In what concerns the vitals of religion, rectitude of disposition goes farther, even to enlighten the mind, than acuteness of intellect, however important this may be, in other respects. But the exercise of no faculty is to be despised, that can be rendered, in any degree, conducive to our advancement in the knowledge of God. Nay, it is our duty to exert every faculty in this acquisition, as much as possible.

In an age like the present, wherein literary productions are so greatly multiplied, it is not matter of wonder, that readers, when they hear of any new work, enquire about what, in modern phrase, is called the *originality* of the thoughts, and the beauties of style it possesses. The press teems daily with the labours of the learned. Plenty in this, as in every other commodity, makes people harder to be pleased: hence it happens that authors are sometimes tempted, for the sake of gratifying the over-nice and fastidious taste of their readers, to affect paradoxes, and to say things extravagant and incredible, being more solicitous about the newness, or even the uncommonness, than about the truth of their sentiments. Though I cannot help thinking this preference injudicious, whatever be the subject, it is highly blameable in every thing wherein religion or morals are concerned. To this humour, therefore, no sacrifice can be expected here. The principal part of the present work is translation. A translator, if he do justice to his author and his subject, can lay no claim to originality. The thoughts are the author's: The translator's business is to convey them unadulterated, in the words of another language. To blend them with his own sentiments, or with any sentiments which are not the author's, is to discharge the humble office of translator unfaithfully. In the translation here offered, I have endeavoured to conform strictly to this obligation. As to the remarks to be found in the Dissertations and Notes, nothing was farther from my purpose than, in any instance, to sacrifice truth to novelty. At the same time I will, on the other

hand,

hand, frankly acknowledge that, if I had not thought myself qualified to throw some light on this most important part of holy writ, no consideration should have induced me to obtrude my reflections on the Public. If I have deceived myself on this article, it is, at the worst, a misfortune which appears to be very incident to authors. But, if some readers, for different readers will think differently, should find me, on some articles, more chargeable with the extreme of novelty, than with that of triteness of sentiment; I hope that the novelty, when narrowly examined, will be discovered, as was hinted above, to result from tracing out paths which had been long forsaken, and clearing the ancient ways of part of the rubbish in which, in the tract of ages, they had unhappily been involved. Those who are profoundly read in theological controversy, before they enter on the critical examination of the divine oracles, if they have the discernment to discover the right path which their former studies have done much to prevent, and if they have the fortitude to persevere in keeping that path, will quickly be sensible, that they have more to unlearn, than to learn; and that the acquisition of truth is not near so difficult a task, as to attain a superiority over rooted errors and old prejudices.

As to the exposition of the text, where there is thought to be any difficulty, it is seldom that any thing new can be reasonably expected. If, out of the many discordant opinions of former expositors, I shall be thought, by the judicious, to have generally chosen the best (that is, the most probable), I have attained, in regard to myself, my utmost wish. On this article, the exercise of judgment is requisite, much more than of ingenuity. The latter but too often misleads. In adopting the interpretation of any former translator or expositor, I commonly name the author, if at the time he occur to my memory; but not when the exposition has been so long, and is so generally, adopted, that it would be difficult to say from whom it originated. Let it be observed, also, that when no person is named, I do not claim to be considered as the discoverer myself. A person will remember to have heard or read a particular observation or criticism, though he does not recollect from whom, or in what book; nay, more, to reading and conversation we doubtless owe many sentiments, which are faithfully retained, when the manner wherein they were acquired is totally forgotten.

For my own part, I do not pretend to much reading in this way. I have not been accustomed to read whole commentaries. My way is (what I recommend to others, especially students), to consult them only occasionally, when, in reading, I meet with any difficulty; and not even then, till after other helps, particularly the various readings, the ancient versions, the context, and the use of the sacred writers in other passages, have been, with the

the aid of concordances, in vain recurred to. Some seem to make the whole study of Scripture merely an exercise of memory; in my opinion it consists much more in the exercise of judgment and reflection. It is only thus that we can hope to attain that acuteness, and preserve that impartiality, in judging, which will secure us against calling any *man father upon earth*. In this way, we shall avail ourselves of the services of the best expositors, on different, and even opposite, sides, without subjecting ourselves to any. We may expect to meet, in all of them, with faults and imperfections: but, if I can safely reason from experience, I do not hesitate to say, that the least dogmatical, the most diffident of their own judgment, and moderate in their opinions of others, will be ever found the most judicious. Those, on the contrary, who are either the idolaters of their own reason, or blindly devoted to that of some favourite doctor, to whom they have implicitly resigned their understandings, display as often the talent of darkening a clear passage, as of enlightening a dark one. However I am far from thinking that even such may not be sometimes consulted with advantage. Considerable abilities are often united in the same person with considerable defects. And whatever a man's prepossessions in point of opinion may be, there are some things in Scripture which cannot be said to have any relation to them. In regard to all such, it may justly be expected, that learning and talents will produce some light. There are few, therefore, who have really the advantages of literature and abilities, who, whatever be the party or system to which they have attached themselves, may not occasionally prove useful aids.

For the readings here adopted, I have been chiefly indebted to the valuable folio edition of the Greek New Testament published by Mill, and that published by Wetstein, but without blindly following the opinion of either. In the judgments formed by these editors, with respect to the true reading, they appear to be in extremes, the former often acquiesces in too little evidence, the latter requires too much. This, at least, holds in general. But whether I agree with, or differ from, either, or both of these, about any particular reading by which the sense is affected; that every intelligent reader may judge for himself, I commonly assign my reason in the notes. I do not, therefore, mean to enter farther into the subject, or to examine the critical canons on which they found, or the opinions they have given on the comparative excellence of different manuscripts and versions. What has been written on this subject by Simon, Bengelius, Michaelis, and others, render any discussion here the less necessary.

For the ancient versions, where it appeared proper, I have had recourse to Walton's Polyglot; of some, as the Syriac, the Gothic,

Gothic, or as it is now with greater probability accounted, the Frankish, the Anglo-Saxon, the modern Greek, and the Vulgate, I have copies, as well as of all the modern translations quoted in this work. All the late English translations, of any account, I had provided. There is indeed one, or perhaps two, that I have not met with, about which, to say the truth, from the accounts I have had of their plan and method, and from some specimens, I have not felt much solicitude. I am, however, far from saying that these may not also have their use, and be, in expressing some things, luckier than versions which are, on the whole, superior.

As to the language, particularly of the version itself, simplicity, propriety, and perspicuity, are the principal qualities at which I have aimed. I have endeavoured to keep equally clear of the frippery of Arias, and the finery of Castalio. If I have hazarded, on any occasion, incurring the censure of the generality of readers, on account of the diction, I am certain it is in those places where, from a desire of conveying neither more nor less than the exact thought of the author, I have ventured to change some expressions to which our ears have been long accustomed. But on this point I mean to say nothing further in this place. The reasons on which I have proceeded, in such alterations, are fully explained in the preliminary discourses, which I consider as so necessary to the vindication of many things in the translation, that I do not wish the judicious reader, if, in any degree, acquainted with the original, to read the Version, till he has given these Dissertations a very attentive and serious perusal.

As I have never yet seen a translation of the Bible, or of any part of it, into any language I am acquainted with, which I did not think might be, in several places, altered for the better, I am not vain enough to imagine that the version here presented to the public will, by any class of readers, be accounted faultless. Part of this work has long lain by me in manuscript; for I may justly say of it what Augustin, if I remember right, says of one of his treatises, *Juvenis incboavi, senex edidi*. Now, in that part I have been making corrections, or at least alterations, every year; and I have no reason to doubt that, if it were to lie longer by me, I should still be altering and correcting. As I am not an implicit follower of any man, because I think no man can plead an exemption from either faults in practice, or errors in opinion, I am, at the same time, far from arrogating to myself a merit which I refuse to acknowledge in others. It is not difficult to make me distrust my own judgment, and impartially re-examine my own reasoning. I say *impartially*, because I am conscious that I have often, in this manner, revised what I had advanced, when I found that it was objected to by a person of discernment;

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and, in consequence of the revival, I have been convinced of my mistake. I will venture to promise therefore, that I shall give all due attention to any criticisms or remarks, candid or uncandid, which shall be made on any part of this work. Criticisms made in an uncandid manner may, as to the matter of them, be well founded, and, on that account, deserve attention. But if there appear neither reason in the matter of the criticism, nor candour in the manner of producing it, the most prudent part in an author is to let it pass without notice.

If the language of the translation, in the second volume, shall be thought not unsuitable, and sufficiently perspicuous, I have, in what concerns the expression, attained my principal object. The rest, I imagine, will be intelligible enough to those who are conversant in questions of Christian antiquities and criticism. Sensible of the disadvantages, in point of style, which my northern situation lays me under, I have availed myself of every opportunity of better information, in regard to all those terms and phrases in the version, of which I was doubtful. I feel myself under particular obligations on this account to one gentleman, my valuable friend and colleague, Dr Beattie, who, though similarly situated with myself, has, with greater success, studied the genius and idiom of our language; and of whom it is no more than justice to add, that the acknowledged purity of his own diction is the least of his many qualifications as an author. But if, notwithstanding all the care I have taken, I shall be found in many places to need the indulgence of the English reader, it will not much surprize me. One who often revises and alters, will sometimes alter for the worse; and, in changing, one has not always at hand a friend to consult with. The apology which Irenæus, bishop of Lyons in Gaul, in the second century, makes for his language, in a book he published in defence of religion, appears to me so candid, so modest, so sensible, and at the same time so apposite to my own case, that I cannot avoid transcribing and adopting it:—"Non autem exquires a nobis qui apud Celtas commoramur, et in barbarum sermonem plerumque avocamur, orationis artem quam non didicimus, neque vim conscriptoris quam non affectavimus, neque ornamentum verborum, neque suadellam quam nescimus: sed simpliciter et vere et idiotice, ea quæ tibi cum dilectione scripta sunt, cum dilectione percipies; et ipse augeas ea penes te, ut magis idoneus quam nos, quasi semen et initia accipiens a nobis; et in latitudine sensus tui, in multum fructificabis ea, quæ in paucis a nobis dicta sunt; et potenter afferes iis qui tecum sunt, ea quæ invalide a nobis relata sunt."—*Adversus Hæreses, Lib. i. Prefatio.*

Need I, in so late and so enlightened an age, subjoin an apology for the design itself, of giving a new translation of any part of Scripture? Yet there are some knowing and ingenious men,

who seem to be alarmed at the mention of translation, as if such an attempt would sap the very foundations of the Christian edifice, and put the faith of the people in the most imminent danger of being buried in its ruins. This is no new apprehension. The same alarm was taken so early as the fourth century, when Jerom was employed in preparing a new translation of the Bible into Latin; or, at least, in making such alterations and corrections on the old Italic, as the original, and the best Latin manuscripts, should appear to warrant. The people in general exclaimed; and even the learned were far from applauding an attempt which, in their judgment, was so bold and so dangerous. I do not allude to the abuse thrown out by Ruffinus, because he was then at variance with Jerom on another account; but even men, who were considered as the lights of the age, were not without their fears. Augustin, in particular, who admired the profound erudition of Jerom, and had a high esteem of his talents, yet dreaded much, that the consequence of such an undertaking would prove prejudicial to the authority of Scripture, and did not hesitate to express his disapprobation in very strong terms. That interpreter, however, persevered, in spite of the greatest discouragements, the dissuasion of friends, the invectives of enemies, and the unfavourable impressions which, by their means, were made upon the people. The version was made and published; and those hideous bugbears of fatal consequences, which had been so much descanted on, were no more heard of.

Luckily, no attempt was made to establish the new version, by public authority. Though Damasus, then bishop of Rome, was known to favour it, the attempt to obtrude it upon the people, would probably have awaked such a persecution against it, as would have stifled it in the birth. On the contrary, its success was left entirely, as it ought to be, to the efficiency of its own merit. In consequence of this, the prejudice very soon subsided: many of those who were at first declared enemies of the undertaking, were entirely reconciled to it. Augustin, himself, came to be convinced that it was guiltless of those horrors which his warm imagination had foreboded. Nay, he did not scruple to recur to it for aid, in explaining the Scriptures. The version, thus quietly introduced about the end of the fourth, or the beginning of the fifth, century, and left to its fate, to be used by those who liked it, and neglected by those who disliked it, advanced in reputation every day. The people very soon, and very generally, discovered that, along with all the simplicity they could desire, it was, in every respect, more intelligible, and, consequently, both more instructive, and more agreeable, than the old. The immediate effect of this general conviction, was greatly to multiply the copies, which proved, in a very few centuries, the total extinction of the Italic, formerly called the Vulgate,

gate, version, and the establishment of the present Vulgate, or Jerom's translation in its room. To make this sudden revolution, which is a matter of so much importance, better understood by the unlearned, it is proper to observe, that it was in consequence of no law of the church, or indeed of any Christian country, that the old Italic first, and the present Vulgate afterwards, were used in churches in the offices of religion. Such matters were regulated in every individual church, by the bishop and presbyters of that church, as appeared most for the edification of the people. Now the general and growing reputation of the new version, made it soon supplant the old. As it was not to any law of church or state, that the Italic owed its promotion at first; so it required no law of either to make it give place quietly to a better version. After this of Jerom had come gradually to obtain every where the preference, and to be used in private families by individuals, it might be expected that so general an approbation would gradually usher it into the churches. For an authoritative sentence, of either pope or council, in favour of any translation, was a thing unheard of till the 16th century, when the decree of the council of Trent was obtained in favour of the present Vulgate. Now the Vulgate, we may observe by the way, had been, for ages before, by the tacit consent of all ranks, in full possession of all the prerogatives conferred by that council.

But, though the introduction of a new translation produced none of those terrible consequences which had been presaged; though, on the contrary, by rendering the style of Scripture purer, as well as more perspicuous, it came soon to be read by the people with greater pleasure and improvement; yet it must be owned, that the clamour and jealousies that had been raised on this subject, were productive of one very unfavourable effect upon the interpreter. Though it did not make him desist from his undertaking, it made him prosecute it with a timidity which has proved hurtful to the work itself. Many things which, by the old interpreter, had been improperly rendered; many things which had been obscurely, or even unintelligibly expressed, Jerom, through dread of the scandal which too many changes might occasion, has left as he found them. We have, therefore, the utmost reason to conclude, that to this cause alone it is imputable, that the present Vulgate is not greatly superior to what we find it. Jerom was strongly impressed with a sense of the danger to which his attempt exposed him. This appears from many parts of his writings; particularly from his letter to Pope Damascus, prefixed to the Translation of the Gospels:—"Periculosa presumptio," says he, "judicare de cæteris, ipsum ab omnibus judicandum: senis mutare linguam, et canescentem mundum ad initia retrahere parvulorum. Quis, enim, doctus pariter vel

“ indoctus ; cum in manus volumen assumpserit ; et a faliva quam
 “ semel imbibit, viderit discrepare, quod lestitat ; non statim
 “ erumpat in vocem, me falsarium, me clamans esse sacrilegum,
 “ qui audeam aliquid in veteribus libris, addere, mutare, corri-
 “ gere.”

How dismal were the apprehensions which were entertained immediately after the Reformation, on account of the many translations of Scripture which came in quick succession, one after another ! Have men’s fears been justified by the effect ? Quite the reverse. The violent concussion of parties at the Reformation produced, as might have been expected, a number of controversies, which were, for some time, hotly agitated ; but the greater part of these were in being before those versions were made. And if a few have arisen since, many have subsided, which once made a great noise, and produced a great ferment in the church. Nothing will be found to have conduced more to subvert the dominion of the metaphysical theology of the schoolmen, with all its interminable questions, cobweb distinctions, and wars of words, than the critical study of the sacred Scriptures, to which the modern translations have not a little contributed. Nothing has gone farther to satisfy reasonable men that, in many of the profound disputes of theologians, revelation could not, with justice, be accused of giving countenance to either side. Yet no disputes have been productive of more rancour in the disputants, or been carried on with greater virulence, than those which are merely verbal.

It has been said, that the introduction of different translations tends to unsettle men in their principles, particularly with regard to the authority of sacred writ, which, say they, is made to speak so variously in these productions. For my part, I have not discovered that this is, in any degree, the effect. The agreement of all the translations, as to the meaning in every thing of principal consequence, makes their differences, when properly considered, appear as nothing. They are but like the inconsiderable variations in expression which different witnesses, though all perfectly unexceptionable, employ in relating the same fact. They rather confirm men’s faith in Scripture, as they shew, in the strongest light, that all the various ways which men of discordant sentiments have devised of rendering its words, have made no material alteration, either on the narrative itself, or on the divine instructions contained in it. People are at no loss to discover, that the difference among interpreters lies chiefly in this, that one renders the account of things which that book exhibits, more intelligible, more perspicuous, or even more affecting, than another. These differences are, I acknowledge, of great moment to readers ; they are such as may shew one version to be greatly superior to another in point of use ; yet, as they are
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all compatible with justness of representation in every thing essential to the historical and didactic parts of the work, they are so far from affecting the credibility of the whole, that they serve not a little to confirm it. A gentleman, who knows neither Greek nor Hebrew, but understands Latin, and several modern tongues, told me once, he had read the New Testament in different languages, and that he had reaped considerable benefit from the practice in more ways than one; particularly in this, that those versions served as vouchers for the fidelity of one another, by their concurrence in every thing essential in that book; for when it was considered that the translators were not only men of different nations, but of hostile sects, Roman Catholics, church of England men, Lutherans, Calvinists, Remonstrants, &c. their perfect harmony on all material points, is the best pledge we could desire of their veracity.

Of nearly the same kind and consequence have been the fears which even judicious men have entertained about the publication of the various readings of the Scriptures. These readings are tremendous only when considered in a general view, and when we are told of the number they amount to. Nothing serves more to undeceive us, than to consider them in detail, and fairly examine those collections. I will acknowledge, for one, that I believe I should not have been easily persuaded till I made the experiment, that the authority of Scripture could be so little injured by them. The actual collection is, therefore, of great consequence for satisfying candid and reasonable men, that there is nothing in them so formidable as the vague and general representations of their number and weight would lead men to conclude. Now, if such a man as Dr Whitby, a man of distinguished learning and abilities, was alarmed at Mill's publication, as dangerous to the cause, not only of Protestantism, but of Christianity itself, we need not be surprised that men of inferior talents, and less acquainted with the science of criticism, should look on the edition of the Old Testament by Kennicot, or of the New by Mill, or by Wetstein, as, at least, a very hazardous experiment. Yet, now that the experiment has been made, is there any appearance of those evils which have been dreaded from it? I am not sensible that there is. It is true, that Kennicot's publication of the Old Testament is so recent, that we have scarcely yet had time to discover its consequences; but if we may judge from the reception given to the New, we have no ground to fear them. Mill's work has been now in the hands of the Public for more than half a century, and Wetstein's for not much less. Yet it is not in my power to discover that, in the judgment of any reasonable man, or even in the judgment of the people, the cause of Christianity has suffered by these publications. I know that the most enlightened readers have judged them to
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be, in many respects, of service to the cause ; and the opinion of the most enlightened, where there is no interference of secular motives, or of violent measures, will always prove at last the opinion of the generality.

Soon after Mill's edition appeared, which was about the beginning of the last century, the various readings of the New Testament became a topic for declamation to sceptics and free-thinkers. There needed but a little time, in which men might canvass those variations, to convince every person who reflected, that there was nothing terrible in the case. Accordingly, he would now be deemed but a sorry advocate for the infidel hypothesis, who should have recourse to an argument which, if allowed to have any validity, would subvert our belief in all history whatever, as well as in that of the gospels ; for the writings of the Old and New Testament have not been exposed to more hazards from transcribers, than other ancient writings. Now, if any one should say, We can believe nothing in ancient history, on account of the variations to be found in the different editions and manuscripts of the different authors, no man of common sense would think him fit to be argued with. Yet there is one reason, without recurring to a miraculous interposition, to think, that we have more security of a faithful transmission of the Scriptures, than of any composition merely human. The supposed sacredness of the former, serves as a guard to them, and makes at least the greater part of transcribers afraid to take those freedoms with them which they would, without scruple, take with other writings. The excessive, nay, even superstitious scrupulosity, which has given rise to so many absurdly literal versions of Scripture, is a strong presumption of the truth of what I say.

Those who consider religion as no other than a political engine, have reason, I own, to be alarmed. But those, on the contrary, who are persuaded that the religion of Jesus is founded in truth, and consequently divine, are inexcusable in their fears of canvassing it as much as possible. It is falsehood, not truth ; it is guilt, not innocence, which studiously excludes the light, and flies examination. This our reason teaches ; this our religion also teaches. *For whosoever doth evil, says our Lord, John iii. 20, 21. hateth the light, and shunneth it, lest his deeds should be detected. But he who obeyeth the truth, cometh to the light, that it may be manifest that his actions are agreable to God.* Fears of this kind, in these latter ages, (for from the beginning they were not), originated with the Romanists. The Protestants thought they saw clearly the reason of their apprehensions on this subject, and were not surpris'd at them. The measures employed by the party were all of a piece, and not badly suited to the end they had in view. Such were their *index expurgatorius*, their inquisitions, their licensers of books, their prohibitions, and
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other methods, for discouraging translations of the Scriptures, and for preventing the people's becoming acquainted with them. Of such measures the secret springs, as well as the manifest tendency, furnished ample matter of declamation to the adversaries of the Romish establishment.

It is not with pleasure that I add, but impartiality obliges me, for it is too true, that when matters in any place took such a turn, as to throw the secular power into the hands of any party of such adversaries, those of that party too often betrayed a propensity to recur to some of the measures they had before so universally and so loudly reprobated. We may, however, now, with some confidence, affirm, that it is rather too late a period in the age of the world to think of such odious expedients. By the invention of printing, and by the many discoveries and improvements which have extended the intercourse of nations, the acquisition of knowledge is, at present, so much facilitated and accelerated, in all civilized countries, that it will not be checked in its progress, nor will truth be overborne, by those expedients which were found fully sufficient for the purpose formerly. Nay, so evident is this become, that even that formidable power which so long made ignorance a principal engine of government, seems compelled at length to shift her ground, and to appear among the foremost in patronizing what must conduce to the furtherance of knowledge.

It is little more than two centuries since the authenticity of the Vulgate version was formally affirmed, by a decree of the council of Trent. Immediately after that sentence, it appears to have been the prevalent opinion of zealous Romanists, that that translation ought to be considered as inspired, and consequently as absolutely faultless. On this account, the champions of the party did not hesitate to exalt it far above the original, which, though they acknowledged to have been inspired, they affirmed to have been, since that time, miserably corrupted in passing through the hands of collators and copists. In about a century after, how much more moderate the opinions, even of Romanists, were become, appears sufficiently from what we are informed of on this subject in Simon's Critical History. The high style, so common with former theologians and controvertists, was heard no more. All moderate and judicious Romanists were ashamed of it. The prevalent opinion of such was then, what no reasonable Protestant will dissent from at this day, that, in every thing essential to the faith and practice of a Christian, it was a good version, and might be safely used. "*Opinionum commenta delet dies.*" Let not the hand of power interfere; let there be neither bribes nor terrors to bias the mind on either side; and men of the most opposite factions will soon become reasonable, and learn to understand one another. Free and fair discussion will

will ever be found the firmest friend to truth. At the time I speak of, the most moderate of the Roman Catholic party were, however, convinced that, in deference to the council's declaration, every true son of the church, who purposed to translate the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, for the use of the people, ought to translate from the Vulgate version only. What then would those people have thought of a new translation into Latin, by one of their own priests, from the original Hebrew and Greek? They had some specious grounds, I acknowledge, for considering it as presumptuous, at least in the appearance which it has, of setting up the opinion of an individual, in opposition to the declared judgment of the church. Yet, in little more than half a century after the publication of the Critical History, another priest of the oratory undertook, and, with the Pope's approbation, executed a new translation of the Old Testament from the original into Latin, in which he corrects the errors of the Vulgate, with as much freedom as any candid Protestant could have done. Is there not reason then to say, that Rome seems to have changed her measures? How great was the encouragement which was given lately by the most eminent personages in that church, to the labours of an English Protestant, who undertook to give the Public a more correct edition of the Hebrew Scriptures, with the various readings, than the Christian world had enjoyed before?

But if Rome, from whatever motive it may arise, shall now, at length, judge it proper to contribute to the advancement of knowledge, and assist in furnishing the world with light and information; is it incumbent on Protestants, in opposition to all their former maxims, to do their utmost to withhold the light, and involve matters, as much as possible, in darkness? Might it not, in that case, be justly concluded, that they were actuated, not by the love of truth, but by the spirit of faction; and that they had become at last enemies to the light, finding, upon further inquiry, that the light was no friend to their cause? As no judicious Protestant can seriously think that there is ground for suspecting this, let not any one act as if he suspected it. If there were ground for suspicion, this itself would be an additional reason for inquiry; unless we are absurd enough to be more attached to a sect than to truth; and to have more of that bigotry, and implicit faith, which are of the essence of superstition, than we have of genuine religion, which is ever found a reasonable service, and as completely amiable as the other is hateful.

Yet, is there not, even in some who are the friends of truth, and the friends of freedom, who, in religion, as in other matters, would give scope to inquiry and communication; a sort of jealousy, on the article of translation, which makes them less equitable, less candid, judges, in regard to it, than in regard to any other

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other matter that comes under their discussion? They are jealous for the honour of the common version; and though they are far from ascribing any supernatural power to the translators, they are afraid of the detection of any error which might make that version sink in the opinion of the people. ‘This,’ say they, ‘could not be productive of a good effect, either on the faith of the nation, or on their practice; for, as the people cannot be supposed nice in distinguishing, their Bible and their religion are to them the same thing. By discrediting the one, ye injure the other; and, by introducing questions about the proper rendering of a particular passage, ye weaken the effect of the whole.’ As there is some plausibility in this method of arguing, I beg leave to offer a few more thoughts on the subject.

In every question relating to fact, where experience may be had, our safest recourse is to experience. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, many Latin translations of the Bible, of very different characters, have been published. Can we justly say that, by means of these, the authority of Scripture, among those who do not understand the original, but are readers of those versions, has been weakened, and scepticism has been promoted? I do not think that, with any shadow of reason, this can be asserted. If people will but reflect, they will soon be sensible, that it is not among the readers of Scripture, either in the original, or in translations, that those evils chiefly abound. But there are many other species of reading, and many other causes to be traced, by which the effects above mentioned may be amply accounted for. To me it is evident, that of all sorts of reading and study, that of the Scriptures is the most innocent of those evil consequences. So the sacred writers, themselves, have thought, by whom this reading is often and warmly recommended, and not only reading the Scriptures, but searching into them, and meditating on them. Now, those who seriously comply with these injunctions, will never reject any aid by which they may be enabled to discover what lies deeper than the surface; so, also, have thought those pious men celebrated in Scripture, as having drawn much profit and delight from this exercise. I would not say so much for the reading of theological controversy; yet I would not that men, who liked this species of reading, were restrained from using it. The accidental bad consequences which may accrue to individuals, from any literary pursuit, are of no consideration, compared with the general advantage resulting from the liberty of search, and free communication of knowledge. No person would think it better for the world that all men were enslaved, because some men make a very bad use of their freedom.

On the first publication of Erasmus’ translation of the New Testament into Latin, much offence was taken by many, and
dismal

dismal apprehensions were entertained of the hurt it would do to the cause of religion and Christianity. Even men who were esteemed both moderate and judicious, seemed to think that it was, at least, a hazardous experiment. The experiment, however, has been tried, not only by him, but by several others since his time. Yet there is not one, as far as I can learn, who has pretended to deduce from that, or any other translation, the irreligion and incredulity of the times.

To come to our own case; Have the attempts which have been made in this island, I may almost say, since the days of Wickliff, to translate the Scriptures into English, ever been found to lessen their authority? I have not heard this affirmed by any body. Yet every new version altered, and pretended to correct, many things in those which had preceded. But whatever may be the private judgment of individuals, concerning the comparative merit of the different translations, we cannot discover any traces of evidence, that their number did, in the smallest degree, derogate from the veneration for holy writ generally entertained by the people. Against the common translation, in use at present, which was made and authorised in the beginning of the reign of James the First, there were precisely the same exceptions taken, founded in the like apprehensions of pernicious consequences. Whoever will consult the preface of that translation, and read the paragraph which is titled on the margin, *The speeches and reasons both of our brethren and of our adversaries against this work*; will be surprised to find how much they coincide with what has been thrown out, of late, against any new attempt of the same kind. It is remarkable that, from the days of Jerom to the present, the same terrible forebodings have always accompanied the undertaking, and vanished on the execution, insomuch that the fatal effects predicted, have never afterwards been heard of.

Now, to take the matter in another view; the cause assigned is nowise adequate to the effect. If the different ways of rendering one passage may make the unlearned doubtful with regard to the meaning of that passage, the perfect harmony of the different interpreters, as far as regards the sense, in many more passages; nay I may justly say, in every thing that can be considered as essential in the history and doctrine, serves as the strongest confirmation of these in particular. The different translators are like so many different touchstones. Those truths which can stand such numerous trials, are rendered quite indubitable. I know not any, even of the common people that are possessed of an ordinary measure of understanding, who need to be told, that it is in the meaning, and not in the sound, that the doctrine of the Gospel lies: or, as the English translators have well expressed it: "Is the kingdom of God become words or syllables? Why
" should

“ should we be in bondage to them, if we may be free ?” When people find those translations, though differing in words, yet in every thing material, agreeing in sense, they prove to them, as was hinted before, like so many different witnesses, each in his own style, and in his own manner, attesting the same things, the great truths of our religion. They are witnesses, who perfectly agree in the import of their testimony : their differences in expression, far from derogating, in the judgment of any sensible reader, from their veracity, serve to establish it, and, consequently, prove confirmations of the facts attested. Various translations are, therefore, upon the whole, much better calculated for confirming, than for weakening, the faith of the unlearned.

Has the margin, in the English Bible, which, in a very great number of passages, gives every reader his choice of different translations, ever been found to endanger the faith of the people ? or, has it ever been suggested to have the same tendency with the arguments of the deists ? Yet what should more readily, upon the principles of those gentlemen with whom I am arguing, have produced this effect, than the confession (for their margin manifestly implies no less) of those learned men who were employed in the work, of the numerous doubts which they had to encounter in the execution. They have honestly told their doubts, and, as far as I know, were never suspected of having done any hurt to the cause by this ingenuous conduct. On the other hand, I am sorry to observe men of knowledge, discernment, and probity, appearing in support of measures which seem to proceed on the supposition, that a sort of dissingenuous policy must be used with the people for the defence of the truth. However necessary dissimulation and pious frauds, as they are called, may be for the support of false, I have never seen them of any service to true religion. If not treacherous, they are dangerous allies at the best.

That one version expresses the sentiment more intelligibly, more perspicuously, or more emphatically than another, will indeed occasion its being read with more pleasure, and even more profit ; but it will never, on that account, be considered by any as giving a contradictory testimony. Yet it is such opposition of evidence that is the only circumstance which can affect the veracity of holy writ, and consequently the credit given to it by the people. And surely whatever can, on the contrary, be rendered conducive to the emolument of the reader, cannot be prejudicial to the cause of religion, or disrespectful to the word of God, which does not consist in the words of any translation, but in the dictates of the divine Spirit.

The words of a translation that has been long in common use, have an advantage, of which they cannot be of a sudden divested. The advantage results from this very circumstance, that it

has been long in general use, and men are familiarized to its expressions. But, notwithstanding this, it may have considerable faults; it may, in several places, be obscure; and, though it should very rarely convey a false sense, it may be often ambiguous. In this case, a new version will be of great utility, if it were but for rendering the old more intelligible. For my part, I shall think my labour more than sufficiently recompensed, if, by the pious and the impartial, I shall be judged to express no extravagant opinion, and to form no pre-umptuous hope, when I say, in the words which Erasmus employed on a similar occasion: “*Illa [Vulgata editio] legatur in scholis, canatur in templis, citetur in conscientibus, nullus obstat. Illud ausim polliceri, quibus quis hanc nostram domi legerit, suam rectius intellecturus.*” — Erasmus. in Apolog.

Some perhaps are ready to interpose, ‘If translations were to be used only as private helps for understanding the Scriptures, as commentaries and paraphrases are used, they would not be objected to; but what has alarmed the minds of men on this article, is that, of late, some attempts have been made to persuade the public of the need there is for a new and more correct translation of the Bible, with the sanction of the higher powers, for the use of churches.’ As to any project of this kind, I can say very little, as I know not, in particular, what is projected. At the same time I must acknowledge that, in the general view, it appears to me a very delicate point. To establish a version of Scripture by human authority, to be used by the people (without any regard had to their sentiments) in the public service of God, to the express exclusion of every other version, is a measure, about the propriety of which, at any time, I am far from being satisfied. The public use of particular translations of the Bible in the churches, oriental and occidental, for many centuries, took its rise solely from the general use in private; and to this private use, no doubt, the favourable opinion of the pastors, such especially as were eminent for piety and learning, greatly contributed. But then, the effect was produced gradually and tacitly; in consequence of which, it appeared the result of the people’s free choice, though not formally declared, well enough understood. It was in this way, certainly, that the old Italic first came into use in the Latin church; and it was in this way, from the growing predilection of the people, that the present Vulgate came at length to supplant it. It was fortunate for the success of Jerom’s version, that no sanguine patron stood forth to push it into notice, and that no law was made commanding its reception, and prohibiting the public use of the Italic. Though mens opinions and attachments, even in matters which do not so deeply affect them as religion, cannot, at the command of a superior, be changed in a moment, the same effect will often, by proper means,

be produced in a gentle and gradual manner. When the Italic was first introduced, there was probably no other Latin translation of any account. In consequence of this, and of that desire of religious instruction, which universally animated the primitive Christians, they would receive it with joy. To read it to them, would be highly to gratify them; for we ought to reflect, that books were then matters of very difficult acquirement, compared to what they are now. But when the introduction of one book was the dispossession of another to which they had been long accustomed, and were, from habit, warmly attached, the case was very different. Yet even this effect, which it is probable would not have been produced by stronger measures, was silently, and (as it were) imperceptibly, brought about by time. If, in some places, tumults were occasioned by the change, this, I suspect, when impartially examined, will be found imputable more to the rashness and imprudence of the pastors, than to any want of docility in the people. Immediately after the Reformation, the opportunity was very favourable for procuring, among those who favoured the measures of the Reformers, a welcome reception to any version of the Bible into the vulgar tongue, which had the approbation of the heads of the party. If gratified in the thing chiefly wanted, they would not be critical as to the mode of introduction; and if, from the changes in their rulers, there had been some changes in relation to the Scriptures to be read in the congregation; what was established, in some places, was of so short continuance, that the mind could hardly be said to be pre-occupied by it.

But the case, at present, is widely different. Learning is in more hands. Critics are multiplied. The press is open; and every cavil, as well as every argument, is quickly circulated. Besides, the prepossession in favour of the translation to which we have been so long habituated, is, at this day, very strong. Add to all this, that the religious, as well as the civil, rights of mankind were never better understood; the genuine principles of toleration had never greater influence. How then should we be affected, upon hearing that we are commanded, under pains and penalties, by our superiors, to read, and cause to be read, in our churches, such a particular translation of the Bible only, and never more to admit into the sacred service, that version to which we have been hitherto all our lives accustomed, and for which we have contracted a high veneration. For my part, I will not dissemble the matter. I should think such a measure exceedingly incongruous to the spirit of that religion which the legislators perhaps intended to serve by it; and no less unseasonable, in respect of the age and country wherein we live. I perfectly agree with Tertullian, that religion and coercion of any kind, are utterly incompatible. “*Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est,*
“*unicuique*

“unicuique quod putaverit, colere.” Again: “Nec religionis est cogere religionem, quæ sponte suscipi debeat, non vi.” I cordially subscribe to the sentiment of Lactantius, who deems it essential to the value of every thing in religious service, in respect both of the object and of the mode, that it be voluntary: “Nihil est tam voluntarium quam religio, in qua si animus facientis averfus est, jam sublata, jam nulla est.” Nor does it make any difference in the nature of the thing, whether the power that would compel us be called civil or ecclesiastical.

But is there nothing then which can, with propriety, be attempted by the higher powers, spiritual or temporal, for promoting the success of an accurate translation of the Bible? The utmost which, in my judgment, can be done, if such a version should in any future period be offered to the Public, is to remove the obstructions which those powers have heretofore raised to prevent its introduction, and to permit (not command) the use of it wherever it shall be found agreeable to the people, and judged by the pastors to be edifying. In the reign of Christian charity, which subsisted in times truly primitive and apostolical, it was not necessary that the limits of jurisdiction and authority should be so accurately ascertained as afterwards, when love began to give place to ambition and secular prospects. Esteem and love are unsuspecting. In such a state of things, the opinion of no persons would go so far with the congregation as that of their pastors; nor would the pastors know any motive so powerful as that of contributing to the edification of the people. ‘But,’ it will be objected, ‘to leave things in this manner, would appear like giving a sanction to different translations at the same time.’ If it should, I can perceive no absurdity in such a sanction; no evil consequence that would follow from it. In fact, would it be any more, with respect to the whole Bible, than that which has long obtained in England, with regard to one considerable book, the Psalms, of which two very different versions, one in the Bible, the other in the Common Prayer, have equally the sanction of the higher powers? Are the people ignorant of this difference? Those who know any thing of the religion of the country, who read their Bible at home, and attend the service of the church, know it perfectly. Yet I have not heard that any private Christian was scandalized at it; much less, that any one pretended to deduce from this cause the libertinism and infidelity of the times. Yet, in no part of Scripture would the people have so many opportunities of remarking the variations, as in that book, which they hear in church not seldomer than twelve times a-year. So much cannot be said of any other part of the sacred volume, the New Testament being read only thrice a-year, and the Old Testament but once. If the people were so easily alarmed as some seem to imagine, how has it happened that the striking dif-
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ference between the two authorised translations above mentioned, have not, long ere now, raised a clamour, either against the common translation, or against the Common Prayer?

I should not have thought it necessary to say any thing on this head, if the subject had not been started of late, and warmly agitated (I believe with the best intentions on both sides) by some learned and worthy men. As my sentiments on the subject do not entirely coincide with those of either party, I thought it incumbent to add the explanation now given. The publishing of a new translation is not to be considered as implying a condemnation of any that preceded. This was objected to those employed by James the First, in preparing the translation used at present; and the reply which those translators made to their opponents in this business, as it had served Jerom before them, and served them, will equally serve me, or any translator, who shall afterwards bestow his time and labour in the same way. “We answer them,” say they, “with St Hierom, *Do we condemn the ancient? In no case; but, after the endeavours of them that were before us, we take the best pains we can in the house of God.* As if he said, Being provoked, by the example of the learned that lived before my time, I have thought it my duty to assay whether my talent in the knowledge of the tongues may be profitable, in any measure, to God’s church, lest I should seem to have laboured in them in vain, and lest I should be thought to glory in men (although ancient) above that which was in them.” So said those worthy men, who, as they did not think themselves precluded from making improvements on the valuable labours of their predecessors, shew sufficiently that they did not consider their own labours as superseding all attempts at still farther improvements, by those who should come after them.

The due consideration of the progressive state of all human knowledge and arts, will ever be unfriendly to the adoption of any measure which seems to fix a barrier against improvement, and to say to science, *Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther.* And if, in matters merely of science, such measures would prove hurtful, how much more in any thing wherein religion is concerned? My opinion, therefore, on this question, I freely acknowledge, favours the removal of all legal restraints, as much as possible, and not barely the change of the object. Indeed, this will be found the natural result of the argument, as it has heretofore been conducted. There is not a topic, which the present adversaries of an improved translation in English employ now, which was not with the same plausibility employed against Jerom’s Latin translation, called the Vulgate, at present in universal use in the Latin church, and which was not also employed against the English translation of James the First, that very ver-
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sion for which our adversaries on this article now so strenuously contend. On the other hand, there was not any plea which Jerom urged in support of his attempt, or which the English translators urged in support of theirs, that will not equally serve the purpose of any present or future well-meant attempt of the like kind, and consequently that does not strike against every measure which might effectually preclude any such attempt in time to come.

There are only two differences in point of circumstances, between us and the inhabitants of this island, in the beginning of the last century, which impartiality obliges me to mention, and which, as they render more delicacy requisite in these days than was necessary in those, if attended to, may prevent men from concluding too hastily, that those measures cannot fail of success now, which have succeeded formerly. Though some versions had been publicly authorized before that of James the First, none of them had been of near so long standing as that which is in use at present; and consequently the people's attachment to any one of them was not so much strengthened by habit, as the present attachment to the English Bible may be supposed to be. An alteration, therefore, in respect of the public use, might be a much more difficult attempt now than it was then. The other difference arises from the consideration that the spirit of liberty is much higher at present in the nation, than it was at that period; the rights of conscience are better understood, and the absurdity, as well as tyranny, of employing coercion in matters of religion, are almost universally acknowledged.

All these considerations, whilst they give the utmost encouragement to the study of biblical criticism, show sufficiently the danger of all measures that can be justly accounted compulsory, in a matter that so nearly affects the rights of conscience. For my own part, it is enough for me, that common sense assures me, that, if God condescends to speak to us mortals, it is our duty to attend to what he says; and if, in any writing, he has revealed his will to us, it is our duty carefully to read that writing, and do our utmost rightly to understand it. The language of the Christian revelation, we quickly see, concurs with that of reason, in enjoining this practice; nay, it excites us still more strongly, by the example it sets before us, of those who have found much comfort and improvement in it. Can I require stronger motives to induce me to make God's word the subject of my study and meditation, day and night? And if I have reason to think that, by the blessing of Heaven, I have been, in some measure, successful in this application of my time, does not our common Christianity, one of the great commandments of which is, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*, oblige me, for the benefit of others, to communicate any lights I may have received

received from this exercise? When they are communicated, I have discharged a Christian duty. The reception will be such as it pleases Providence to give them.

Though, in these volumes, I have not affirmed any thing, as my opinion, which did not at the time, and does not still, appear to me probable; and though many things, in them, appear certain, I desire nothing to be admitted, by the reader, upon my affirmation: my wish is, that every thing may be candidly and deliberately examined; that my reasons, which I commonly give, where the subject requires it, may be impartially weighed, and the opinion adopted, or rejected, as the reader, on due reflection, shall find cause. If to make profelytes by the sword, is tyranny in rulers, to resign our understanding to any man, and receive, implicitly, what we ought to be rationally convinced of, would be, on our part, the lowest servility. Now, *tyranny* and *servility*, how much soever adapted to the genius of worldly domination, are by no means suited to the heavenly character of Christ's kingdom. The only means the gospel itself permits us to employ, for promoting this spiritual power, is *persuasion*, which operates upon the understanding, and, by it, upon the will and affections: the great engine of secular dominion is *force*, which, without regarding understanding, will, or affections, lays hold of the body. The language of our Lord to his hearers was, *If any man WILL come under my guidance; ΕΙ ΤΙΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΟΠΙΣΘΑ ΜΕ ΕΛΘΕΙΝ*. Nothing is obtruded or forced upon the unwilling. Now, as the great source of the infidelity of the Jews, was a notion of the temporal kingdom of the Messiah, we may justly say, that the great source of the corruption of Christians, and of their general defection, foretold by the inspired writers, has been an attempt to render it, in effect, a temporal kingdom, and to support and extend it by earthly means. This is that spirit of Antichrist, which was so early at work, as to be discoverable even in the days of the apostles.

Every thing, therefore, here, is subjected to the test of Scripture and sound criticism. I am not very confident of my own reasonings. I am sensible that, on many points, I have changed my opinion, and found reason to correct what I had judged formerly to be right. The consciousness of former mistakes, proves a guard to preserve me from such a presumptuous confidence in my present judgment, as would preclude my giving a patient hearing to whatever may be urged, from reason or Scripture, in opposition to it. TRUTH has been, in all my inquiries, and still is, my great aim. To her I am ready to sacrifice every personal consideration; but am determined not, knowingly, to sacrifice her to any thing. To Lucian's advice to the historiographer, *ΜΟΝΗ ΘΥΤΕΟΝ ΤΗ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ*, which I have inscribed in the title, it is my intention sacredly to adhere.



PRELIMINARY
DISSERTATIONS.

DISSERTATION THE FIRST.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LANGUAGE AND IDIOM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, ON THE DIVERSITY OF STYLE, AND ON THE INSPIRATION OF THE SACRED WRITERS.

PART I.

The Language and Idiom.

IF the words and phrases employed by the apostles and evangelists, in delivering the revelation committed to them by the Holy Spirit, had not been agreeable to the received usage of the people to whom they spoke, their discourses, being unintelligible, could have conveyed no information, and consequently would have been no revelation to the hearers. Our Lord and his apostles, in publishing the gospel, first addressed themselves to their countrymen the Jews; a people who had, many ages before, at different periods, been favoured with other revelations. To those ancient Jewish revelations, now collected into one volume, Christians give the name of the Old Testament; and thereby distinguish them from those apostolical and evangelical writings, which, being also collected into one volume, are called the New Testament. In the latter dispensation, the divine authority of the former is presupposed and founded on. The knowledge of what is contained in that introductory revelation, is always presumed in the readers of the New Testament, which claims to be the consummation of an economy of God for the salvation of man; of which economy the Old Testament acquaints us with the occasion, origin, and early progress. Both are therefore intimately connected. Accordingly, though the two Testaments are written in different languages, the same idiom prevails in both; and in the historical part at least, nearly the same character of style.

§ 2. As the writings of the Old Testament are of a much earlier date, and contain an account of the rise and first establishment, together with a portion of the history of the nation to whom the gospel was first promulged, and of whom were all its first missionaries and teachers, it is thence unquestionably that we must learn, both what the principal facts, customs, doctrines, and precepts are, that are alluded to in the apostolical writings, and what is the proper signification and extent of the expressions used. Though the New Testament is written in Greek, an acquaintance with the Greek classics (that is, with the writings of profane authors in that tongue in prose and verse) will not be found so conducive to this end, as an acquaintance with the ancient Hebrew Scriptures. I am far from denying that classical knowledge is, even for this purpose, of real utility; I say only, that it is not of so great utility as the other. It is well known that the Jews were distinguished by all Pagan antiquity, as a nation of the most extraordinary and peculiar manners; as absolutely incapable of coalescing with other people, being actuated, especially in matters wherein religion or politics were thought to be concerned, by the most unrelenting aversion to every thing foreign, and the most violent attachment to every thing national. We cannot have a clearer evidence of the justness of this character, than their remaining to this day a distinct people, who, though they have been for many ages scattered over the face of the earth, have never yet been blended in any country with the people amongst whom they lived. They are, besides, the only wandering nation that ever existed, of which this can be affirmed.

§ 3. Before the tribes of Judah and Benjamin returned from captivity in Babylon to the land of their fathers, their language, as was inevitable, had been adulterated, or rather changed, by their sojourning so long among strangers. They called it Hebrew, availing themselves of an ambiguous name*. It is accordingly always called Hebrew in the New Testament. This, though but a small circumstance, is characteristic of the people, who could not brook the avowal of changing their language, and adopting that of strangers, even when they could not avoid being conscious of the thing. The dialect which they then spoke might have been more properly styled Chaldee, or even Syriac, than Hebrew. But to give it either of these appellations, had appeared to them as admitting what would always remind both themselves and others of their servitude. After the Macedonian conquests, and the division which the Grecian empire underwent among the commanders, on the death of their chief,

* Hebrew was ambiguous, as it might denote either the language spoken on the other side of the river (that is *Euphrates*, which is commonly meant when no river is named) or the language of the people called *Hebrews*. Preface to Matthew's Gospel, § 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

chief, Greek soon became the language of the people of rank through all the extensive dominions which had been subdued by Alexander. The persecutions with which the Jews were harassed under Antiochus Epiphanes, concurring with several other causes, occasioned the dispersion of a great part of their nation throughout the provinces of Asia Minor, Assyria, Phenicia, Persia, Arabia, Lybia, and Egypt; which dispersion was in process of time extended to Achaia, Macedonia, and Italy. The unavoidable consequence of this was in a few ages, to all those who settled in distant lands, the total loss of that dialect which their fathers had brought out of Babylon into Palestine. But this is to be understood with the exception of the learned who studied the oriental languages by book. At length a complete version of the Scriptures of the Old Testament was made into Greek; a language which was then, and continued for many ages afterwards, in far more general use than any other. This is what is called the Septuagint or version of the *Seventy* (probably because approved by the Sanhedrim), which was begun (as has been said) by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, for the use of the Alexandrian library. At first no more than the Pentateuch was translated, which was soon followed by a version of the other books. This is doubtless the first translation that was attempted of the Sacred Writings.

§ 4. It will readily be imagined that all the Jews who inhabited Grecian cities, where the oriental tongues were unknown, would be solicitous to obtain copies of this translation. To excite in them this solicitude, patriotism would concur with piety, and indeed almost every motive that can operate upon men. In one view their Bible was more to them than ours is to us. It is religion alone, I may say, that influences our regard; whereas their sacred books contained not only their religious principles and holy ceremonies, but the whole body of their municipal laws*. They contained an account of their political constitution, and their civil history, that part especially which is most interesting, the lives of their Patriarchs, and the gradual advancement of that family from whom they gloried to be descended; the history of their establishment as a nation; the exploits, victories, and conquests of their ancestors; the lives and achievements of their kings and heroes, prophets and reformers. Nay, more, the Scriptures might also be justly considered as a collection of the writings, both profane and poetical, of all the most eminent authors their country had produced. A copy of such a version was therefore, in every view we can take of it, an inestimable treasure to every Jew who understood Greek, and could not read the original. And hence we may easily conceive that the copies would soon be greatly multiplied, and widely scattered.

§ 5.

* See Lowth, De Sacra Poësi Hebræorum, Præl. viii.

§ 5. Let us attend to the consequences that would naturally follow. Wherever Greek was the mother-tongue, this version would come to be used not only in private in Jewish houses, but also in public in their schools and synagogues, in the explanation of the weekly lessons from the law and the prophets. The style of it would consequently soon become the standard of language to them on religious subjects. Hence would arise a certain uniformity in phraseology and idiom among the Grecian Jews, wherever dispersed, in regard to their religion and sacred rites, whatever were the particular dialects which prevailed in the places of their residence, and were used by them in conversing on ordinary matters.

§ 6. That there was, in the time of the apostles, a distinction made between those Jews who used the Greek language and the Hebrews, or those who spoke the language of Palestine and of the territory of Babylon, which they affected to call Hebrew, is manifest from the Acts of the apostles. There (Acts vi. 1. &c.) we are informed, that *there arose a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrews, because their widows were neglected in the daily ministrations*. That those Grecians were Jews, is evident from the history; for this happened before Peter was specially called to preach the gospel to Cornelius and his family, who were the first fruits of the Gentiles to Christ. Besides, though the word *Grecian* made use of in our translation is synonymous with *Greek*, yet the term employed in the original is never applied in the New Testament to Pagan Greeks, but solely to those Jews who had resided always or mostly in Grecian cities, and consequently whose common tongue was Greek. The Gentile Greeks are invariably called in Scripture Ἕλληνες, whereas the term used in the place quoted is Ἑλληνισταί, a word which even in classical authors does not mean Greeks, but *imitators of the Greeks, or those who write or speak Greek*; being a derivation from the word ἑλληνίζειν, *to speak Greek, or imitate the Greeks*. The term occurs only thrice in the New Testament, that is in two other passages of the Acts beside that now quoted. One of these is (Acts ix. 29.) where we are told that Saul, also called Paul after his conversion, being at Jerusalem, *disputed against the Grecians, προς τους Ἑλληνιστας*, who went about to slay him. This also happened before the conversion of Cornelius, and consequently before the gospel was preached to any Gentile; but, as at their festivals, there was a general concourse of Jewish people at Jerusalem from all the parts of the world into which they were dispersed, a considerable number of those Hellenists or Grecizers, as in our idiom we should be apt to term them, must have been present on that occasion. The only other passage is where we are told, (Acts xi. 20.) that some of those being Cypriots and Cyrenians, who were scattered abroad on the persecution that arose about Stephen,

spoke

spoke unto the Grecians (προς τους Ἑλληνας) at Antioch, preaching the Lord Jesus. Whether this was before or after the baptism of Cornelius, recorded in the foregoing chapter, is not certain; but one thing is certain, that it was before those disciples could know of that memorable event. Concerning the others who were in that dispersion, who were probably Hebrews, we are informed in the verse immediately preceding, that in all those places, Phenicia, Cyprus and Antioch, through which they went, they preached the word to none but Jews.

§ 7. The learned Basnage makes a principal handle of this passage for supporting an opinion, which had been advanced before by Beza, that by the *Hellenists* is meant *the proselytes to Judaism*, they being contrasted here not with the *Hebrews*, but with the *Jews*. But let it be observed, that the word *Jew* was not always, in those days, used in the same sense. Most commonly indeed it referred to the nation, in which sense it was synonymous with Israelite. A man of Jewish extraction was not the less a Jew, because he was neither a native nor an inhabitant of Judea, and understood not a syllable of its language. Sometimes, however, it referred to the country, in which acceptation it belonged particularly to the inhabitants of Judea or Palestine, including those neighbouring regions wherein the same tongue was spoken. That the Samaritans (though mortally hated as schismatics) were comprehended in this application of the term Jew, is evident from what we learn from the Acts, (ch. viii. 5. &c.) where we are informed of their being converted by Philip, and receiving the gifts of the Holy Spirit by the hands of Peter, some time before the conversion of Cornelius, the first fruits of the Gentiles. Nay sometimes, in a still more limited signification, it regarded only the inhabitants of the district belonging to the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had anciently constituted the kingdom of Judah. In this sense we understand the word as used by the evangelist John, chap. vii. 1. *After these things Jesus walked in Galilee; for he would not walk in Jewry (Ἰουδαία, Judea) because the Jews sought to kill him.* Yet Galilee was a part of Judea in the larger and even more common acceptation of the word, and the Galileans, of whom were the apostles, were, in every sense except this confined one, Jews as well as the others. The same distinction is made between Judea and Galilee by Matthew, ch. ii. 22. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the term *Jews* in the passage under examination, ought to be understood in the second sense above mentioned, as equivalent to Hebrews.

A little attention to the case puts this conclusion beyond a doubt. Why should they, in preaching the gospel, make a distinction between *Jews* and *proselytes*, persons who had received the seal of circumcision, and subjected themselves, without re-
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serve, to the Mosaic yoke? The law itself made no distinction; nay, it expressly prohibited the people from making any. *When a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the passover to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it, and he shall be as one that is born in the land; for no uncircumcised person shall eat thereof. One law shall be to him that is home-born, and to the stranger that sojourneth among you.* Exod. xii. 48, 49. See also Numb. xv. 14, 15, 16. 29. This last phrase (though sometimes used with greater latitude) became a common periphrasis for a proselyte. We find accordingly, that though a question arose early in the church, and was for a time hotly agitated, concerning the lawfulness of admitting the uncircumcised to baptism (for such was Cornelius, though no idolater), there is no hint given that the smallest doubt was entertained concerning the admission of proselytes who had already embraced the Jewish ritual, and were circumcised. So far from it, that the keenest advocates for uniting Judaism with Christianity, insisted only that the Gentile converts might be circumcised, and compelled to join the observance of the law of Moses to their faith in Christ. Where then could be the difficulty of receiving those who were already disciples of Moses, and had been circumcised? It will perhaps be retorted, "If the Christians could have no scruple to preach to proselytes, still less could they have to preach to those native Jews, who differed in nothing from their brethren in Palestine but in language." True, indeed, they could have no scruple; but those who came at that time to Antioch, were not all qualified for preaching in Greek, for all had not the gift of tongues. And the historian has rendered it evident that the want of the language was the reason they did it not, having observed that those who came thither and preached to the Hellenists, were men of Cyprus and Cyrene, places where Greek was the prevailing tongue.

In regard to the murmuring mentioned in the sixth chapter, which gave rise to the appointment of deacons, nothing can be more improbable than Beza's hypothesis. The number of the proselytes of righteousness, as they are sometimes called, could not be great; for though several, like Cornelius, had been gained over from Paganism to the worship of the true God, few, comparatively, were induced to adopt the Mosaic ceremonies. Now, converts of the first sort were still by the Jews accounted heathens, and had access to no part of the temple inaccessible to Gentiles. Of the Jewish proselytes, it was a part only that was converted to Christianity; and of that part, those who were both widows and indigent, could not surely be a great proportion. Further, if by Hellenists be meant proselytes, where was the occasion for classing them separately from the Jews, or for so much as enquiring who was a Jew by birth, and who a proselyte? It

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was not agreeable, as we have seen, either to the spirit or to the letter of the law, to make so invidious, not to say odious, a distinction; and if not to the law, still less, if possible, to the gospel. Whereas the distinction, on the other hypothesis, being founded on their using different languages, was not barely convenient, but necessary. They were classes of people who could not be addressed in the same tongue; and, for this reason, it was probably found expedient to employ different agents in supplying them. Certain it is, they were in the constant practice of assembling in different synagogues; for in Jerusalem there were Greek synagogues for the accommodation of the Hellenists of different nations, who came thither either occasionally, or to attend the great festivals, as well as Hebrew synagogues for the use of the natives. Such were most of those mentioned in the Acts, ch. vi. 9. the Cyrenian synagogue and the Alexandrian, the Cilician and the Asian.

That Nicolas, one of the deacons elected on that occasion, was a proselyte, is a circumstance of no moment in this question. If four, or even three of the seven, had been of that denomination, it might have been pleaded with some plausibility, that there must have been in this a design of destroying in the proselytes all suspicion of partiality. As it was, had it been they who murmured, it would have rather increased than diminished their jealousy, to find that they had gotten only one of their own class chosen for six of the other. This therefore must be considered as a circumstance merely accidental. As to that singular conceit of Vossius, that the Hellenists were those who favoured the doctrine of submission to a foreign yoke, as it is destitute alike of internal credibility and external evidence, it requires no refutation.

§ 8. So much for the distinction that obtained in those days between Hebrew Jews and Grecian Jews, or Hellenists; among the latter of whom, the version of the Seventy was in constant use. The Greek had been for ages a sort of universal language in the civilized world, at least among people of rank and men of letters. Cicero had with truth said of it, (*Pro Archia Poeta*) at the time when Rome was in her glory and Greece declining—*“Græca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus: Latina suis finibus, exiguè sane continentur.”* This continued to be the case till the time of the publication of the Gospel, and for some centuries afterwards. As the Greek was then of all languages the best understood, and the most generally spoken throughout the empire, the far greater part of the New Testament, which contained a revelation for all mankind, was originally written in that tongue. I say, the far greater part, because some critics are of opinion that the gospel of Matthew (see the preface to that gospel) and the epistle to the Hebrews, were originally written in
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that dialect of the Chaldee, which was then the language of Jerusalem, and by Jewish writers called Hebrew. It must be remembered that all the penmen of the New Testament were Jews—the greater part Hebrews, not Hellenists; but whether they were Hebrews or Hellenists, as they wrote in Greek, the version of the Seventy would serve as a model in what concerned propriety of expression on religious subjects. It was, besides, the idiom which would be best understood by all the converts to Christianity from among their brethren the Jews, wheresoever scattered, and that whereby their writings would more perfectly harmonize with their own Scriptures, which the whole of that people had in so great and deserved veneration; for let it be observed that, though the Jews afterwards came to lose entirely their respect for the Septuagint, and even to depreciate it as an unfaithful, as well as inaccurate translation; this change of their sentiments was the mere effect of their disputes with the Christians, who, in arguing from it, went to the opposite extreme—considered it as the immediate work of inspiration—and, in every instance wherein it differed from the original Hebrew, with which they were unacquainted, gave it the preference, treating the latter as a compilation which had been corrupted by the Jews, in spite to Christianity. But of the high esteem which this people once entertained for that version, particularly about the time of the publication of the gospel, their own writers, Philo and Josephus, are the most unexceptionable witnesses.

§ 9. From the conformity and peculiarity in language above taken notice of, some critics, in order to distinguish the idiom of the Septuagint and New Testament from that of common Greek, have termed it Hellenistic; not with exact propriety, I acknowledge, if we regard the etymology of the word, but with justness sufficient for the purpose of characterising the peculiar phraseology of those writings. The disputes raised on this subject by Salmasius and some others are scarcely worth naming, as they will, upon examination, all be found to terminate in mere disputes about words. I readily admit, that this speciality of diction is properly not a peculiar language, nor even a peculiar dialect, in the same sense as the *Attic*, the *Ionic*, the *Eolic*, and the *Doric*, are called different dialects; for there are in it no peculiarities in the inflexions of either nouns or verbs. In strictness of speech, the peculiarity does more properly constitute a difference of idiom, than either of language or of dialect. The phraseology is Hebrew, and the words are Greek. This singular manner in the ancient translators, is to be considered as partly intentional, and partly accidental: partly intentional, because, from the scrupulous, I may even say, superstitious, attachment of the Jews not only to the words, but to the letters and syllables, to every jot and tittle, of the original, they would be led

to attempt a manner of translating so fervilely literal, as is always incompatible with purity in the language into which the translation is made;—partly accidental, because, even without design, a person speaking or writing a foreign language, frequently mingles in his speech the idioms of his native tongue. One source of the peculiarities in idiom, may have arisen from this circumstance, that the translators, though Jews, were Alexandrians. In a language spoken, as Greek was then, in many distant countries, all independent of one another, there inevitably arise peculiarities in the acceptations of words in different regions. Perhaps we ought to impute to this, that sometimes terms have been adopted by the Seventy which appear to us not the most apposite for rendering the import of the original, such as *διαθήκη* for *ברית* *berith*, and *ὁσιος* for *חַסִּיד* *chafid*. But whatever be in this, the habit which the apostles and evangelists had of reading the Scriptures, and hearing them read, whether in the original, or in the ancient version, would, by infecting their style, co-operate with the tendency which, as natives of Palestine, they would derive from conversation, to intermix Hebraisms and Chaldaisms in their writings.

§ 10. It is not to be dissembled, that the sacred penmen of the New Testament have, especially in modern times, had some strenuous advocates, both among foreigners and amongst our own countrymen, who have, in my opinion, with more zeal than judgment, defended their diction, as being, when judged by the rules of grammar and rhetoric, and the practice of the most celebrated writers in Greece, altogether pure and elegant. They seem to suspect, that to yield, even on the clearest evidence, a point of this nature, though regarding ornaments merely human and exterior, might bring dishonour on inspiration, or render it questionable. I cannot help thinking that these people must have very indistinct ideas on this subject, and may be justly said to incur the reproof which Peter, on a memorable occasion, received from his Master—that *they savour more the things of men than the things of God*, Matt. xvi. 23. Are words of any kind more than arbitrary signs? And may not the same be said with justice of phrases and idioms? Is there a natural fitness in one word or phrase more than in another, for denoting the thing signified? Is not the connection between sounds and ideas merely artificial—the result of human, though tacit conventions? With regard to those rules which constitute purity in the language of any country, what are they, in effect, but the conventions which have happened to obtain among the natives, particularly those of the higher ranks? Vulgarisms, and foreign idioms, which may obtain among strangers, and those of the lower ranks, have no more natural unfitness to convey the sense which they that use them intend to convey by them, than the terms and phrases

which, in consequence of the preference given by their superiors, may be regarded as elegancies. It may be as reasonably objected against our religion, that the persons by whom it was propagated, were chosen from what men, in high life, account the dregs of the people, as that the Holy Spirit should accommodate himself to the language of those who were actually chosen. Nay, language as well as dress being in fact no more than a species of mode, it may with as good reason be maintained, that the ambassadors whom Christ sent for promulgating his doctrine, should have been habited like gentlemen, and men of fashion, as that they should have spoken the dialect of such. Splendid style had no more connection with the purpose of their mission than splendid apparel. The cloth which they wore, how coarse forever, answered all the essential purposes of clothing; the same may be said of the language which they spoke. And if it be argued, that good language would create greater respect to their persons, and closer attention to what they said, and consequently would contribute to its making a deeper impression; as much may be affirmed, with truth, of a genteel appearance both of person and of dress. Nothing serves more powerfully to quash curiosity and expectation, and consequently to destroy attention, than such an external figure as generally accompanies poverty and ignorance, and suggests a total want of the advantages of education, and more especially, of that indispensable advantage which the fashionable world calls *seeing good company*.

But these very disadvantages or defects, both in speech and in outward figure, are assigned by the inspired writers as the reasons of God's preference, whose thoughts are not our thoughts, nor are our ways his ways. Paul argues, that the success of the preachers of the gospel, in spite of the absence of those accomplishments in language then so highly valued, was an evidence of the divine power and energy with which their ministry was accompanied. He did not address them, he tells us, 1 Cor. i. 17. *with the wisdom of words*—with artificial periods and a studied elocution, *lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect*;—lest to human eloquence that success should be ascribed which ought to be attributed to the divinity of the doctrine, and the agency of the Spirit, in the miracles wrought in support of it. There is hardly any sentiment which he is at greater pains to enforce. He *used none of the enticing or persuasive words of man's wisdom*. Wherefore?—*That their faith might not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God*, 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5. Should I ask, What was the reason why our Lord Jesus Christ chose for the instruments of that most amazing revolution in the religious systems of mankind, men perfectly illiterate, and taken out of the lowest class of the people? your answer to this will serve equally for an answer to that other question—Why did the
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Holy Spirit chuse to deliver such important truths in the barbarous idiom of a few obscure Galileans, and not in the politer and more harmonious strains of Grecian eloquence? I repeat it, the answer to both questions is the same—That it might appear, beyond contradiction, that the excellency of the power was of God, and not of man*.

§ 11. There are some collateral purposes which Providence has effected by the same means. One is, that the writings of the New Testament carry, in the very expression and idiom, an intrinsic and irresistible evidence of their authenticity. They are such as, in respect of style, could not have been written but by Jews, and hardly even by Jews superior, in rank and education, to those whose names they bear. And what greatly strengthens the argument is that, under this homely garb, we find the most exalted sentiments, the closest reasoning, the purest morality, and the sublimest doctrine. The homeliness of their diction, when criticised by the rules of grammarians and rhetoricians, is what all the most learned and judicious of the Greek fathers frankly owned. And is it modest in us, petty critics of modern times, to pretend to be nicer judges of purity and elegance in the Greek language, than Origen and Chrysostom, whose native tongue it was; and who, besides, were masters of uncommon skill, as well as fluency, in that language? I have heard of a French critic who undertook to demonstrate that Aristotle did not understand Greek, nor Livy Latin. There is hardly an opinion so paradoxical or absurd as not to find some admirers. What wonder then that we should meet with people who esteem a Pfochinus and a Blackwall † better judges of Greek than the greatest orators among the Grecians, and maintain that Paul's style, in spite of his own verdict, is as classical as Plato's. The writings of the ancient Greeks have been rummaged for the discovery of words and phrases, which, in the import given them, might appear to resemble what has been accounted Hebraism or Syriaism in the New Testament. The success of such endeavours

* Those who desire to see this argument treated as it affects infidels (who make a handle of the badness of the style to discredit revelation) may consult the late Bishop of Gloucester's *Doctrine of Grace*, B. 1. ch. viii, ix, and x. I here consider the question chiefly as affecting some well-meaning but mistaken Christians. It may be proper further to observe, that the opinion of the very acute and learned author of the work above mentioned, does not, on the subject of inspiration laid down in ch. vii. in every thing coincide with that here supported. A distinction is made by him, not only between the style and the sentiments, but between the sentiments of greater and those of less moment, in the several books. The latter distinction leads to a controversy which is quite foreign from my argument, and with which for that reason I have not meddled.

† A. Blackwall, author of "The Sacred Classics defended and illustrated."

vours has been far from giving satisfaction to readers of discernment. It will readily be acknowledged, by the impartial, that several idioms in the New Testament have been mistaken for Oriental, which may be as truly denominated Grecian. But there remains a much larger number of those brought under that class, concerning which there can be no reasonable doubt*.

§ 12. The methods by which our opponents, on this article, support their hypothesis are, I say, unsatisfactory. There are such negligencies in the style, even of the best writers, as to render it unsafe to pronounce on the goodness of an expression which we have only once met with, though in a celebrated author. Much less ought a singular phrase found in one single classic, similar to an idiom frequent in the New Testament, to be accounted evidence that the idiom was in general, and approved, use, which always determines purity in every tongue. The singularity, in the one case, opposed to the frequency in the other, should lead us to a very different conclusion. The evidence cannot be more satisfactory which arises from a particular turn of expression occurring in some poetical work, and coinciding with an idiom current in the New Testament, which is written

* The very first words of the gospel, Βιβλος γενεσεως, for *genealogy* or *lineage*, are one example amongst hundreds that might be produced. How many meanings are given to the word σαρξ, *flesh*, in that sacred volume, for which you will not find a single authority in any profane writer? Beside the original meaning of the word universally admitted, it denotes sometimes the whole body considered as animated, as in Matt. xxvi. 41. *The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak*—This may indeed be thought to be of all the deviations from the proper sense, the most defensible on classical and rhetorical principles, being not an unnatural synecdoché of the part for the whole.—Secondly, It sometimes means a human being, as in Luke iii. 6. *All flesh shall see the salvation of God*;—sometimes, 3dly, a person's kindred collectively considered, as in Rom. xi. 14. *If by any means I may provoke to emulation them which are my flesh*;—sometimes, 4thly, any thing of an external or ceremonial nature, as opposed to that which is internal and moral, as in Gal. iii. 3. *Having begun in the spirit, are ye now made perfect by the flesh?*—sometimes, 5thly, the sensitive part of our nature, the seat of appetite, as in 2 Cor. vii. 1. *Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit*, where there can be no doubt that the pollutions of the flesh must be those of the appetites, being opposed to the pollutions of the spirit or those of the passions. 6thly, and lastly, It is employed to denote any principle of vice and moral pravity of whatever kind. Thus among *the works of the flesh* (Gal. v. 19, 20, 21.) are numbered not only *adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, drunkenness, and revellings*, which all relate to criminal indulgences of appetite, but *idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, and murders*, which are manifestly vices of a different kind, and hold more of the diabolical nature than of the beastly. Now, for any of the six meanings above mentioned, except perhaps the first, as to which I will not be positive, we may defy those critics to produce classical authority. Yet no man accustomed to the oriental idiom, and the style of the sacred writers, can mistake the sense in any of the passages quoted.

written in prose. We know that the Greek poetry had a peculiar dialect, and many peculiar words; and that their poets were, by the laws of their versification, allowed a latitude in this respect, with which their prose writers were not indulged: nor is there any thing that their critics more loudly condemn, as favouring of artifice and affectation, than what may be called a poetic phraseology in prose. Let it not be imagined that I think the sacred penmen chargeable with any thing affected or artificial in their phraseology. There is no character of style for which they are more distinguishable than the reverse. But what would be justly denominated artificial, affected, and foreign in a native of Attica, might be the result of the most undefigning and natural simplicity in an inhabitant of Palestine, because conformable to the idioms of his native language. Further, a strong resemblance, in an expression admitted to be classical, will not suffice for removing the charge of foreign idiom from the resembling but different expression. In most cases, nothing less than identity will serve*. Recourse to synonyms, analogy, and etymology,

* I shall illustrate this by an example in regard to which every English reader can with safety be more decisive than even men of literature are qualified to be in regard to an example taken from a dead language. In a letter during the late war from the captain of a French privateer to the magistrates of a seaport demanding a contribution, and threatening in case of non-compliance to destroy the town, there was this expression, "I will *make* my duty." No Englishman, we are certain, would have expressed himself so, unless he had done it for a disguise. Yet I can easily conceive that a foreigner, who has learned our language only by book, might speciously maintain, that the expression, so far from being a Gallicism, is unexceptionable English. "Is it not," he would argue, "common to say, I will do my duty? Now, if this expression be classical, where is the impropriety in substituting one synonymous word for another?" And to show that *do* and *make* are synonymous, he might urge, first, that in most other tongues one word serves for both. Thus each of them is rendered into Latin, *facere*; into Italian, *fare*; into French, *faire*. Secondly, though he had not found in any English book the identical phrase, to *make* duty, he could produce expressions in which there is an entire similarity. To *make* court, to *make* obeisance, are both good; nay, it strengthens the argument, that to *do* obeisance, is also used in the same signification. Shakespear says, "What *make* they there?" which is equivalent to, What *do* they there? Dryden speaks of "the faults he had made;" though doubtless the more usual expression would have been, "the faults he had done." Now, from the first principles of analogy, we are warranted to conclude, that if *making* a fault be proper to express *doing* wrong, *making* a duty is proper to express *doing* right. All this is very plausible, and would probably be sufficient to convince most strangers, but would only extort a smile from an intelligent native, on whom a thousand such arguments could make no impression. Yet I will venture to affirm that, if there be no solidity in this reasoning, nine tenths of what has been so pompously produced to show that the supposed Hebraisms of the New Testament are in the genuine idiom of the Greek tongue, are no better than arrant trifling. It was to triflers of this sort that Chrysostom said very appositely, Ἰνα μὴ καταγελασθῆτε ἕτα διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς Ἕλληνας, ἐπειδὴν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς

mology, is necessary and often successful in discovering the sense of an obscure expression, whereof nothing less than the use of good authors will warrant the propriety or elegance. Sufficient evidence in the one case, is often no evidence in the other.

§ 13. Blackwall * admits freely that there are many Hebraisms in the New Testament, at the same time asserting that they are real beauties, which add both vigour and ornament to the expression. In this opinion, if he was serious, I believe that, upon examination, we shall not be found to differ. Abstracting from that lowest kind of beauty in language, which results from its softness and harmony, considered as an object to the ear, every excellency of style is relative, arising solely from its fitness for producing, in the mind of the reader, the end intended by the writer. Now in this view it is evident, that a style and manner may, to readers of one denomination, convey the writer's sentiments with energy as well as perspicuity, which, to those of a different denomination, would convey them feebly, darkly, and, when judged by their rules of propriety, improperly. This I take to have been actually the case with the writers of the New Testament. I speak particularly of the historical books. I look upon the language of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, as better adapted to the readers for whose use the Gospels and Acts were at first composed, than the language of Plato or Demosthenes would have been.

I should at the same time think it unreasonable to deny, that the latter must have been more intelligible to an Athenian, and much more pleasing, nervous, and animated than the former. Nay, if such a one had even denominated the idiom of the New Testament *barbarous*, I should not have thought it an unpardonable offence. The word indeed sounds harshly; but we know that from the mouths of native Greeks it could only mean that the idiom of that book is not conformable to the rules of their grammarians and rhetoricians, and to the practice of their writers of reputation; a concession which we may easily make them, without derogating in the least from the apostles and evangelists—a concession which (as was observed before) the most learned and oratorical of the Greek fathers did not scruple to make.

αγων ης, καταγορευμεν αποσελαν ως αμαδαν, η γαρ κατηγορια αυτη ευκαιριον.
Chryl. Hom. 3. in 1 Cor. i. "That we may not render ourselves ridiculous arguing thus with Grecians, for our dispute is with them; let us accuse the apostles of being illiterate, for this accusation is an encomium." Origin goes still farther, and says, Ουκ ασυνκισθητοι οι αποστολοι τυγχανοντες των εν οις προσκοπιται, φασιν ιδιωται ειναι τω λογω, αλλ' ετη γνωσει.
Philoc. c. 4. "The apostles, not insensible of their own defects, profess themselves to be of the vulgar in speech, but not in knowledge."

* Sacr. Class. Part I. Ch. i.

make. In such cases it is evident, that a native of common sense is a much better judge than a learned foreigner*.

§ 14. I expressed myself dubiously of Blackwall's seriousness in affirming that the Oriental idioms, with which the sacred authors abound, are highly ornamental to their compositions; because nothing can be plainer than that he is indefatigable in controverting their claims to the greater part of those ornaments. I cannot think he would have willingly injured them; yet it is impossible not to perceive, that he is at infinite pains, though on the most frivolous pretents †, to divest them of almost every beauty of this sort ascribed to them by others! I desire only to restore to them the merit, of which he has not very consistently, though I believe with a pious intention, endeavoured to strip them. This critic did not consider, that when he admitted any Hebraisms in the New Testament, he in effect gave up the cause. That only can be called a Hebraism in a Greek book, which, though agreeable to the Hebrew idiom, is not so to the Greek. Nobody would ever call that a Scotticism, which is equally in the manner of both Scots and English. Now, such foreign idioms as Hebraisms in Greek, Grecisms in Hebrew, or Latinisms in either, come all within the definition of barbarism, and sometimes even of solecism—words which have always something relative in their signification; that turn of expression being a barbarism or a solecism in one language, which is strictly proper in another—and I may add, to one set of hearers which is not so to another. It is then in vain for any one to debate about the application of the names *barbarism* and *solecism*.

To do so is at best but to wrangle about words, after admitting

* Hardly any foreigner of the last century has been more conversant with English men and English books than Voltaire. Yet his knowledge of our language, on which I have been told he piqued himself not a little, has not secured him from blundering when he attempted to write it. In a letter to the Parisians, prefixed to his comedy *L'Ecossaise*, which he thought proper to introduce to the world as a translation, he quotes the following sentence as part of a letter he had received from the English author: "You have quite impoverished the character of Wasp; and you have blotted his chastisement at the end of the drama." An Englishman might have guessed what he meant by the first clause, but must have remained in total darkness about the second, if he had not explained himself by subjoining the translation. *Vous avez affaibli le caractère de Frelon; et vous avez supprimé son châtiment à la fin de la pièce.* An explanation not less necessary to many of his English readers than to his French.

† The following is a specimen, Vol. II. Part I. ch. ii. § 2. "Καταβολή κοσμοῦ in the sacred writers, seemed to some gentlemen conversant in these studies unexampled in the old Grecians. Indeed it is very rare; but it is found in the lofty Pindar, (Nem. Od. 2.) *Καταβολὴν ἱερῶν ἀγωνίων.*" A most extraordinary way of proving that the phrase *Καταβολή κοσμοῦ* is not unexampled in the old Grecians. About the noun *Καταβολή* no doubt was ever made, nor was any doubt made about *Κοσμος*; the question was solely about the phrase.

ting all that is meant by them. The apostle Paul, less scrupulous, does not hesitate, by implication, to call every tongue barbarous to those who do not understand it. *If I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to him that speaketh; and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian to me*, 1 Cor. xiv. 11. Nor does it make any difference, as appears from the whole of the apostle's argument, even if what is spoken be spoken by the Spirit. Surely, with equal reason, we may say of those foreign idioms in any tongue, which render what is said unintelligible or even obscure to the natives, that in respect of them they are barbarisms. Nor is it, I think, denied by any judicious person, that there are some idiomatical expressions in the New Testament which must have puzzled those who were absolute strangers to the language of holy writ*. My intention in observing this, is chiefly to show, that if we would enter thoroughly into the idiom of the Septuagint, we must accustom ourselves to the study, not only of the original of the Old Testament, but of the dialect spoken in Palestine between the return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans; for this last, as well as the Hebrew, has affected the language both of the old Greek translation and of the New Testament. But of this, more afterwards.

§ 15. Such is the origin and the character of the idiom which prevails in the writings of the apostles and evangelists, and the remarkable conformity of the new revelation we have by them, though written in a different language, to the idiom of the old. It has been distinguished in the former by the name Hellenistic, not with critical accuracy, if regard be had to the derivation of the word, but with sufficient exactness, if attention be given to the application which the Hebrews made of the term Hellenist, whereby they distinguished their Jewish brethren who lived in Grecian cities and spoke Greek. It has been by some of late, after

* Take the two following for examples: Οὐκ ἀδυνατεῖτε παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ παν ῥημα, Luke i. 37. and ἕκ ἀνθρώπου πᾶσα σαρκίς, Matt. xxiv. 22. phrases which in my apprehension would not have been more intelligible to a Greek author than Arabic or Persian would have been. Ρημα for thing, παν ἕκ and πᾶσα ἕκ for no or none, σαρκίς for person, &c. would to him, I suspect, have proved insurmountable obstacles. Indeed the vulgar translation of the last phrase is no more Latin than the original is classical Greek. *Non fiet salva omnis caro*, which we may venture to affirm would have been no better than a riddle to Cicero or Cæsar. Castalio has expressed the sense in proper Latin, *Nemo prorsus evaderet*. Our translators have not unfitly kept in their version the one Hebraism *flesh* for person, to which our ears are by scriptural use familiarised, and not less fitly rejected the other saying, *No flesh should be saved*; for every body must be sensible that if they had preserved also the other idiom in English, and said, *∴ flesh should not be saved*, the sense would have been totally altered. This is but a small specimen, not the hundredth part of what might be produced on this subject.

after father Simon of the *Oratory*, more properly termed the Greek of the synagogue. It is acknowledged that it cannot strictly be denominated a separate language, or even dialect, when the term dialect is conceived to imply peculiarities in declension and conjugation. But, with the greatest justice, it is denominated a peculiar idiom, being not only Hebrew and Chaldaic phrases put in Greek words, but even single Greek words used in senses in which they never occur in the writings of profane authors, and which can be learnt only from the extent of signification given to some Hebrew or Chaldaic word, corresponding to the Greek in its primitive and most ordinary sense. This difference in idiom constitutes a difficulty of another kind from that which is created by a difference in dialect; a difficulty much harder to be surmounted, as it does not affect the form of the words, but the meaning.

§ 16. It is pertinent, however, to observe that the above remarks on the Greek of the New Testament, do not imply that there was any thing which could be called idiomatical or vulgar in the language of our Lord himself, who taught always in his mother tongue. His apostles and evangelists, on the contrary, who wrote in Greek, were, in writing, obliged to translate the instructions received from him into a foreign language of a very different structure, and for the use of people accustomed to a peculiar idiom. The apparently respectful manner in which our Saviour was accosted by all ranks of his countrymen, and in which they spoke of his teaching, shows that he was universally considered as a person of eminent knowledge and abilities. It was the amazing success of his discourses to the people, in commanding the attention and reverence of all who heard him, which first awaked the jealousy of the Scribes and Pharisees.

PART II.

The Style and Inspiration.

WE are not however to imagine, that because all the writers of the New Testament wrote in the idiom of the synagogue, there is no discernible diversity in their styles. As the same language admits a variety of dialects, and even of provincial and foreign idioms, so the same dialect and the same idiom is susceptible of a variety of styles. The style of Paul has something peculiar, by which, in my opinion, there would be no difficulty in distinguishing him from any other writer. A discerning reader would not readily confound the style of Luke with that of either of the

evangelists who preceded him, Matthew or Mark ; and still less, I imagine, would he mistake the apostle John's diction for that of any other penman of the New Testament. The same differences of style will be discovered by one who is but moderately conversant in Hebrew in the writers of the Old Testament. In it we have still greater variety than in the New. Some of the books are written in prose and some in verse : and in each the differences between one book and another are considerable. In the book of Job, for instance, the character of the style is remarkably peculiar. What can be more dissimilar in this respect, though both are excellent in their kind, than the towering flights of the sublime Isaiah, and the plaintive strains of the pathetic Jeremiah ? In the books of Scripture we can specify the concise style and the copious, the elevated and the simple, the aphoristic and the diffuse.

The difference, I own, is not so remarkable in translations as in the original. The reason will be evident on a little reflection. Every man, and consequently every translator, has his peculiar diction and manner, which will rarely fail to affect, not only his own compositions, but also the versions he makes from other authors. In every version of the Bible, therefore, wherein the different books have the same translator, there will be more or less of an assimilating quality, by which the works translated are brought, in point of expression, to bear some resemblance to the ordinary style of the translator. Now, by being all brought nearer the same thing, they are brought nearer one another. Translation, therefore, is a sort of leveller. By its means, generally, not always, (for some can adapt themselves to different styles more easily than others), the lofty is depressed, the humble elevated, the looser strains are confined, and the laconic rendered more explicit. The learned reader will be sensible of the justness of this remark, when he reflects how much more distinguishable the styles of the sacred penmen above mentioned are in their own language, than even in the best translations extant. Add to this, that if, of any two sacred authors who differ greatly in their style, we compare together some passages, as they are rendered in the same translation, we shall commonly find the sameness of the translator's style more remarkable in them all, than the differences there may be of the styles of the authors. We shall be oftener at a loss to discover in the quotations (if the recollection of the sentiments do not assist us) Isaiah and Amos, Matthew and John, than to recognize Castalio and Beza, the Vulgate and Junius. Every translator, however, is not equally chargeable with this fault. I think none indeed so much as Castalio.

§ 2. But it may be asked; How is this diversity in the diction of the sacred penmen reconcilable with the idea of inspiration ? Is not the style of all inspired writers the same, as being the style

style of the same Spirit by which they were alike directed? That in some sense the style of all those writers is the style of the Holy Spirit, who spoke by them, and was the same in them all, is not to be denied; but that the Holy Spirit should always employ the same style in conveying celestial truths to men, is no more necessary than that he should always use the same language. People do not sufficiently advert, when they speak on this subject, to the difference between the expression and the sentiment, but strangely confound these, as though they were the same; yet no two things can be more widely different. The truths implied in the sentiments, are essential, immutable, and have an intrinsic value: the words which compose the expression, are in their nature circumstantial, changeable, and have no other value than what they derive from the arbitrary conventions of men. That the Holy Spirit would guide the minds of the sacred penmen in such a manner as to prevent their adopting terms unsuitable to his design, or which might obstruct his purpose; and that in other respects he would accommodate himself to their manner and diction, is both reasonable in itself, and rendered unquestionable by the works themselves, which have the like characteristic differences of style that we find in other literary productions.

Can it be accounted more strange that the Holy Spirit should; by the prophet Amos, address us in the style of a shepherd, and by Daniel in that of a courtier, than that by the one he should speak to us in Hebrew, and by the other in Chaldee? It is as reasonable to think, that the Spirit of God would accommodate himself to the phraseology and diction, as to the tone of voice and pronunciation, of those whom he was pleased to enlighten; for it cannot be denied, that the pronunciation of one person in uttering a prophecy might be more articulate, more audible, and more affecting than that of another—in like manner as one style has more harmony, elegance, and perspicuity than another. Castalio says justly, “*Res dictat Spiritus, verba quidem et linguam loquenti aut scribenti liberam permittit**,” which is to the same purpose with what Jerom had said more than a thousand years before—“*Nec putemus in verbis scripturarum evangelium esse, sed in sensu †.*” Allow me to add the testimony of a late writer of our own—than whom none has done more to make men apprehend the meaning, and relish the beauties of the sacred poetry: “*Hoc ita sacris vatibus tribuimus, ut nihil derogemus Divini Spiritus afflatui: etsi suam interea vim propriam cujusque scriptoris naturam atque ingenio concedamus. Neque*
“*enim*

* “The Spirit dictates the things, leaving the words and language free to the speaker or the writer.” *Defensio contra Beza.*

† “Let us not imagine that the gospel consists in the words of Scripture, but in the sense.” *Comment. in Epist. ad Gal. cap. i.*

“enim instinctu divino ita concitatur vatis animus, ut profinās
 “obruatur hominis indoles : attolluntur et eriguntur, non extin-
 “guuntur aut occultantur naturalis ingenii facultates ; et quan-
 “quam Mosis, Davidis, et Isaiæ, scripta semper spirent quiddam
 “tam excelsum tamque cœleste, ut plane videantur divinitus
 “edita, nihilo tamen minus in iis Mosem, Davidem, et Isaiam,
 “semper agnoscimus *.”

§ 3. In this there was an eminent disparity between the prophets of God and those among the Pagans, said to be possessed of the spirit of *Python*, or spirit of divination. These are reported to have uttered their predictions in what is called ecstasy or trance, that is, whilst they underwent a temporary suspension both of their reason and of their senses. Accordingly they are represented as mere machines, not acting but acted upon, and passive like the flute into which the musician blows. This is what has been called organic inspiration. In imitation of one remarkable class of these, the forcerers and soothsayers among the Jews (who, like those of the same craft among Pagans, reaped considerable profit from abusing the credulity of the rabble), had acquired a wonderful mode of speaking in which they did not appear to employ the common organs of speech, and were thence termed *εγγαστριμοῖσι*, *ventriloqui* belly-speakers. It is in allusion to this practice that Isaiah denominates them *the wizzards*, viii. 19. that peep and that mutter, whose speech seemed to rise out of the ground, and to whisper out of the dust, xxix. 4.

Totally different was the method of the prophets of the true God. The matter, or all that concerned the thoughts, was given them : what concerned the manner, or enunciation, was left to themselves. The only exception the Rabbis mention is Balaam, whose prophecy appeared to them to have been emitted in spite of himself. But this case, if it was as they imagine, which may be justly doubted, was extraordinary. In all other cases the prophets had, when prophesying, the same command over their own actions, over their members, and organs, as at other times. They might speak or forbear ; they might begin and desist when they pleased ; they might decline the task assigned them, and disobey the divine command. No doubt when they acted thus, they sinned very heinously, and were exposed to the wrath of Heaven. Of the danger of such disobedience we have two signal examples, in the prophet who was sent to prophesy against the altar erected by Jeroboam at Bethel, and in the prophet Jonah.

But that men continued still free agents, and had it in their power to make a very injudicious use of the spiritual gifts and illuminations which they received from above, is manifest from the regulations on this subject, established by the apostle Paul in
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the church of Corinth. The words wherewith he concludes his directions on this topic are very apposite to my present purpose. *The spirits of the prophets*, says he, 1 Cor. xiv. 32. *are subject to the prophets*. Such is the difference between those who are guided by the Spirit of truth, and those who are under the influence of a spirit of error. There is, therefore, no reason to doubt, that the sacred writers were permitted to employ the style and idiom most familiar to them, in delivering the truths with which they were inspired. So far only they were overruled in point of expression by the divine Spirit, that nothing could be introduced tending in any way to obstruct the intention of the whole. And sometimes, especially in the prediction of future events, such terms would be suggested, as would, even beyond the prophet's apprehension, conduce to further that end. The great object of divine regard, and subject of revelation, is things, not words. And were it possible to obtain a translation of Scripture absolutely faultless, the translation would be in all respects as valuable as the original.

§ 4. But is not this doctrine, it may be said, liable to an objection also from the gift of tongues conferred on the apostles and others for the promulgation of the gospel? In the languages with which those primitive ministers were miraculously furnished, it may be objected, they could not have any style of their own, as a style is purely the effect of habit, and of insensible imitation. This objection, however, is easily obviated: First, as they received by inspiration those tongues only whereof they had previously no knowledge, it is not probable; at least it is not certain, that this gift had any place in the writings of the New Testament: that in most of them it had not, is manifest. But, 2dly, if in some it had, the most natural supposition is, first, that the knowledge of the tongue, wherewith the Holy Ghost inspired the sacred writers, must have been in them precisely such a knowledge and such a readiness in finding words and expressions, as is in others the effect of daily practice. This is even a necessary consequence of supposing that the language itself, and not the words of particular speeches (according to Dr Middleton's notion *), was the gift of the Spirit: 2dly, That their acquaintance with the tongue, supernaturally communicated, must have been such as would render their teaching in it best adapted to the apprehensions of the people with whom they would be most conversant, or such as they would have most readily acquired among them in the natural way. Now on this hypothesis, which appears on many accounts the most rational, the influence of habit, of native idiom, and of particular genius and turn of thinking, would be the same on the writer's style as though he had acquired the language in the ordinary way.

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* Essay on the Gift of Tongues.

As to the hypothesis of the author above mentioned, it is not more irrational in itself, than it is destitute of evidence. It is irrational, as it excludes the primary use, the conversion of the nations, for which, by the general acknowledgment of Christians in all ages, the gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles, and represents this extraordinary power as serving merely to astonish the hearers; the only purpose, according to him, for which it ever was exerted. And as to evidence, the great support of his system is an argument which has been sufficiently considered already, the defects of the style of the sacred writers, when examined by the rules of the rhetoricians, and the example of the orators of Athens. For, because Cicero and the Greek philosophers were of opinion, that if Jupiter spoke Greek, he would speak like Plato, the learned doctor cannot conceive that a style so unlike Plato's as that of the evangelists, can be the language of inspiration, or be accounted worthy of God. It was not, we find, peculiar to the Greeks, or to the apostolic age, to set too high a value on the words which man's wisdom teacheth. Nor was it only in the days of Samuel, that men needed to be taught that *the Lord seeth not as man seeth*, 1 Sam. xvi. 7.

DISSERTATION THE SECOND.

THE CAUSES TO WHICH THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGES ARE IMPUTABLE; THE ORIGIN OF THE CHANGES PRODUCED ON THE LANGUAGE AND THE IDIOM OF THE JEWS, AND THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTIES TO BE ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSLATING THE SACRED BOOKS.

PART I.

The Causes of the Differences in Languages.

WHEN we compare one tongue with another, if we enter critically into the genius and powers of each, we shall find that neither the only nor the chief difference is that which is most obvious; and consists in the sounds or words employed, the inflexions, the arrangement, and the construction. These may soon be learnt from a tolerable grammar, and are to be considered as affecting only the form of the language. There are others, which more intimately affecting its spirit, it requires a nicer discernment to distinguish. These serve much more to characterise both the language and the people who speak it. Indeed, the knowledge of one of these has a great effect in advancing the knowledge of the other. We may say with the greatest justice, that as, on the one hand, the real character of a nation will not be thoroughly understood by one who is a perfect stranger to their tongue; so, on the other, the exact import of many of the words and combinations of words made use of in the language, will never be perfectly comprehended by one who knows nothing of the character of the people, who is totally unacquainted with their history, religion, law, polity, arts, manners, and customs. Whoever, therefore, would be a proficient in either kind, must be a student in both. It is evident, that the particulars enumerated; or whatever regards the religion, the laws, the constitution, and the manners of a people, operate powerfully on their sentiments; and these have a principal effect, first on the associations of ideas formed in their minds in relation to character and to whatever is an object of abstract reflection; secondly,

on the formation of words, and combination of phrases, by which these associations are expressed. But this will be better understood from what follows.

§ 2. There are certain words in every language to which there are other words perfectly corresponding in other languages. There are certain words in every language which but imperfectly correspond to any of the words of other languages. There are certain words in every language, to which there is nothing in some other languages in any degree correspondent. I shall exemplify these three classes in Greek, Latin, and English, which will sufficiently illustrate my meaning.

§ 3. In all languages, the words whereby the obvious productions of nature, and the plainest distinctions of genera and species known to the people are signified, correspond respectively to one another. Thus to the Greek words ἥλιος, σελήνη, ὄρνις, δένδρον, αἶτος, ἀμπελος, λίθος, the Latin words *sol, luna, avis, arbor, aquila, vitis, lapis*, and the English, *sun, moon, bird, tree, eagle, vine, stone*, are perfectly equivalent in signification; and we are sure that we can never mistake in rendering the Greek word ἥλιος, wherever it occurs, into Latin by the word *sol*, and into English by the word *sun*. The same thing holds true of the other terms in the three languages, taken severally in the order in which I have placed them.

To this class we must add the names of natural and obvious relations, as πατήρ, μητήρ, υἱός, θυγατήρ, ἀδελφός, ἀδελφή, to which the Latin words *pater, mater, filius, filia, frater, soror*, and the English words *father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister*, perfectly correspond.

To the same class we ought also to assign those words whereby the most common and necessary productions of the mechanic arts are expressed; for though, in different countries, and distant ages, there are considerable differences in the fashion and appearance of their productions, we attend solely, in translating, to the principal uses which a piece of work was intended to answer. Consequently, when in these we find an entire coincidence, we, without further examination, pronounce the names equivalent. Thus οἶκος, ναῦς, κλίνη, in Greek, and *domus, navis, lectus*, in Latin, answer sufficiently to *house, ship, bed*, in English, on account of the coincidence in use of the things signified, notwithstanding the less important differences in structure and workmanship.

These, however, are not entirely on the same footing with natural objects, in which there is every where, and in every age, a more perfect uniformity. The names βιβλίον, *liber, book*, are in most cases suited to one another. But as the books of the ancients were in outward form and construction very different from ours, when we find any thing advanced concerning βιβλίον in Greek, or *liber* in Latin, with an evident allusion to the outward make,

make, we know that the English word *book* is not a proper version. Thus the words *υρανός απεχωρισθη ως βιβλιον ελισσομενον*, Rev. vi. 14. if rendered, "heaven departed as a book that is rolled up," would not be intelligible, though nothing conveys a more distinct image than the words in the original. Their books consisted of long scrolls, commonly of parchment, sewed or pasted together, and fastened at the ends to two rollers. Our translators properly therefore employed here the more general word *scroll*, which perfectly conveys the meaning. Again, the word *βιβλιον* occurs in an application wherein the term *book* could not be rightly apprehended by a mere English reader: *βιβλιον γεγραμμενον εσωθεν και οπισθεν*, Rev. v. 1. in the common version, *a book written within and on the back-side*. To such a reader, the last term thus applied would be understood to mean the cover, which is not very fit for being written on, and could, besides, contain no more than might have been contained in one additional leaf, though the book had consisted of a thousand leaves. Now the long scrolls or books of the ancients were seldom written but on one side, here said to be *εσωθεν*, *within*, because that side was turned inwards in rolling. When any of these scrolls was written on both sides, it contained twice as much as if written in the usual way*. The chief intention of the prophet in mentioning this circumstance, must have been to signify that this volume was replete with information, and that its contents were not to be measured by its size. But notwithstanding the exceptions in a few particular cases, the names of the common productions of the most necessary arts, may be considered as so far at least corresponding to each other in most languages, as not to throw any difficulty worth mentioning in the way of a translator.

§ 4. The second class above mentioned, is of those words which in one language do but imperfectly correspond to any of the words of another language compared with it. Of this kind will be found, if properly attended to, most of the terms relating to morals, to the passions and matters of sentiment, or to the objects of the reflex and internal senses, in regard to which it is often impossible to find words in one language that are exactly equivalent to those of another. This holds in all languages less or more, according as there is more or less uniformity in the constitution, religion, and laws, of the nations whose languages are compared; on which constitution, religion, and laws, as was observed, the sentiments, manners, and customs of the people in a great measure depend. Herein consists one principal difficulty, which translators, if persons of penetration, have to encounter. Finding it sometimes impossible to render fully the sense of their

VOL. I.

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author,

* A book executed in this manner the Greeks called *οπισθογραφο*, which is thus expressed by Juvenal, "*Scriptus et in tergo*," Sat. 1.

author, they are constrained (if I may borrow a term from the mathematicians) to do the best they can by approximation.

To come to examples: To the Greek words *αρετη, σωφροσυνη, εγκρασεια, φρονησις, ελεος*, the Latin words *virtus, temperantia, continentia, prudentia, misericordia*, are not entirely equivalent; still less the English words *virtue, temperance, continence, prudence, mercy*: for though these last are manifestly formed from the Latin words, one would think, that by being adopted into another country, they had all more or less changed their nature with the climate. Those persons whose knowledge in such matters is but superficial, will not enter readily into these sentiments. They are accustomed to consider certain words in the different languages as respectively correspondent. The grammars, lexicons, and common translations, lead them to conclude so, and they enquire no further. But those who are conversant with authors of reputation in these different tongues, will need no arguments to convince them of the truth of what has been advanced.

Who knows not that the Latin word *virtus* would, in many instances, be but weakly, not to say improperly, rendered by the English word *virtue*; as that word in Roman authors comes often nearer the import of what we call *valour* or *fortitude*, sometimes even *brute force*? We should not readily ascribe *virtue* to wild beasts; yet Tacitus so applies the term *virtus*: “*Fera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviscuntur.*” And if some of our words have too great latitude of signification to answer always to their Latin etymons, some have, on the contrary, too little. For example, the English word *temperance* is too confined in meaning to answer to the Latin *temperantia*, which implies moderation in every desire, and is defined by Cicero in one place, “*moderatio cupiditatum rationi obediens**;” and in another, “*temperantia est quæ in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis, rationem ut sequamur, monet†.*” Now all that is implied in the English word is almost only that species which he denominates “*temperantia in victu.*” And though the differences may not be so considerable in all the other related words above mentioned, it were easy to shew that they cannot in every instance be made to tally.

It requires indeed but a very small skill in languages to enable us to discover that etymology is often a very unsafe guide to the proper acceptation of a term. It will not be doubted that the Latin word *sobrius* is the root of the English word *sober*, and their term *honestum* of our term *honesty*; but every body knows that the related words in the two languages will not always answer to each other. Nay, to shew in the strongest manner how much more difficult it is than is commonly imagined, to apprehend

* De Fin. l. ii.

† De Fin. l. i.

hend the precise import and proper application of words of this order in dead languages, I shall transcribe a short passage from the fourth book of the Tusculan Questions, where the author explains the generic word *ægritudo*, with the various names of species comprehended under it. Amongst other observations are the following: “*Ægritudo est opinio recens mali presentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur. Ægritudini subjiciuntur angor, mœror, dolor, luctus, ærumna, afflictatio: angor est ægritudo premens, mœror ægritudo flebilis, ærumna ægritudo laboriosa, dolor ægritudo crucians, afflictatio ægritudo cum vexatione corporis, luctus ægritudo ex ejus qui carus fuerat, interitu acerbo.*” “Let any one,” says D’Alembert *, “examine this passage with attention, and say honestly, whether, if he had not known of it, he would have had any idea of these nice shades of signification here marked; and whether he would not have been much embarrassed, had he been writing a dictionary, to distinguish with accuracy the words *ægritudo, mœror, dolor, angor, luctus, ærumna, afflictatio*. If Cicero, the greatest philosopher as well as orator that ever Rome produced, had composed a book of Latin synonyms, such as that which Abbé Girard did of French; and if this work had but now for the first time been produced in a circle of modern Latinists, I imagine it would have greatly confounded them, in shewing them how defective their knowledge is of a subject of which they thought themselves masters.”

I have brought this quotation, not to support D’Alembert’s opinion, who maintains that it is impossible for any modern to write Latin with purity; but only to shew how much nicer a matter it is than is commonly supposed, to enter critically into the peculiarities of a dead language. It might be easily shewn, were it necessary, that distinctions like those now illustrated in the nouns, obtain also in the verbs of different languages. Under this class those words also may be comprehended which are not barely the names of certain things, or signs of particular ideas, but which express also the affection or disposition of the speaker towards the thing signified. In every language we shall find instances wherein the same thing has different names, which are not perfectly synonymous; for though there be an identity of subject, there is a difference of manner, wherein the speaker appears affected towards it. One term will convey the idea with contempt, another with abhorrence, a third with some relish, a fourth with affection, and a fifth with indifference. Of this kind are the diminutives and amplificatives which abound so much in the Greek and Italian languages.

It is this principally which justifies Girard’s observation, that there

* Sur l’Harmonie des Langues, et sur la Latinité des Modernes.

there are much fewer words in any language which are in all respects synonymous than is commonly imagined. And it is this which makes the selection of apposite words so much and so justly the study of an orator: for when he would operate on the passions of his hearers, it is of the last consequence, that the terms he employs not only convey the idea of the thing signified, which may be called the primary use; but that along with it, they insinuate into the minds of the hearers the passion of the speaker, whatever it be, love or hatred, admiration or contempt, aversion or desire. This, though the secondary use of the word, is not the less essential to his design. It is chiefly from the associated affection that these different qualities of synonymous words taken notice of by Quintilian must be considered as originating: "Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significant, quod *συνομιμα* vocatur, jam sunt alia aliis honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora, vocaliora." The last is the only epithet which regards merely the sound. The following will serve for an example of such English synonyms, *public speaker, orator, declaimer, haranguer, bolder-fortb*. The subject of them all is the same, being what the first expression, *public speaker*, simply denotes; the second expresses also admiration in the person who uses it: the third conveys disapprobation, by hinting that it is the speaker's object rather to excite the passions, than to convince the judgment; the fourth is disrespectful, and the fifth contemptuous.

But there is a difference in words called synonymous, arising from the customary application, even when they imply little or nothing of either sentiment or affection. The three words, *death, decease, demise*, all denote the same thing. The first is the simple and familiar term; the second is formal, being much employed in proceedings at law; the third is ceremonious, and scarcely used of any but princes and grandees. There are also some words peculiar to poetry, some to burlesque, which it is needless here to specify. From these observations we learn, that in writings where words of this second class frequently occur, it is impossible, in a consistency with either perspicuity or propriety, to translate them uniformly by the same terms, like those of the first. For, as has been observed, they are such as do not perfectly correspond with the terms of a different tongue. You may find a word that answers exactly to the word in question in one acceptation, that will not suit it in another; though for this purpose some other term may be found equally well adapted.

It was too servile an attempt in the first translators of the Old Testament (at least of the Pentateuch, for the whole does not appear to have been translated at one time, or by the same persons) at this rigid uniformity in rendering the same Hebrew words by
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the same Greek words, which has given such a peculiarity of idiom to the style of the Septuagint, and which, issuing thence as from its fountain, has infected more or less all the writings of the New Testament. I might observe further, that there are some words in the original by no means synonymous, which have been almost uniformly rendered by the same term, partly perhaps through not adverting sufficiently to some of the nicer differences of signification, partly through a desire of avoiding, as much as possible, in the translation, whatever might look like comment or paraphrase. Of this I shall have occasion to take notice afterwards.

§ 5. The third class above mentioned is of those words in the language of every nation which are not capable of being translated into that of any people, who have not a perfect conformity with them in those customs which have given rise to those words. Such are the names of weights, measures, and coins, which are for the most part different in different countries. There is no way that a translator can properly take in such cases, but to retain the original term, and give the explanation in the margin. This is the way which has actually been taken, perhaps in all the translations of the Old Testament. To substitute for the original term a definition or circumlocution, if the word frequently occur, would encumber the style with an offensive multiplicity of words, and awkward repetitions, and thereby destroy at once its simplicity, vivacity, and even perspicuity. In this class we must also rank the names of the particular rites, garments, modes, exercises, or diversions, to which there is nothing similar among those into whose language the version is to be made. Of this class there are several words retained in the common English translation; some of which, by reason of their frequency, have been long since naturalized amongst us; as *synagogue*, *sabbath*, *jubilee*, *purim*, *ephod*, *homer*, *ephah*, *shekel*, *gerah*, *teraphim*, *urim* and *thummim*, *phylacteries*, *cherubim*, *seraphim*, and a few others.

Beside these, often the names of offices, judicatories, sects, parties, and the like, scarcely admit of being transferred into a version in any other manner. It must be owned, however, that in regard to some of these, especially offices, it is a matter of greater nicety than is commonly imagined, to determine when the name ought to be rendered in the translation by a term imperfectly corresponding, and when it ought to be retained. What makes the chief difficulty here is, that there are offices in every state and in every constitution, which are analogous to those of other states and constitutions in many material circumstances, though they differ in many others. It is not always easy to say whether the resemblances or the peculiarities preponderate. If the former, the word ought to be translated, if the latter, it ought to be retained. The inconveniency of an excess in the first way
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is, that it may lead the reader into mistakes; that of an excess in the second is, that it occasions obscurity, and by the too frequent interperfection of uncouth and foreign words, gives the appearance of barbarism to a version.

It may be said however, in general, that the latter is the safer error of the two. Not only does the speciality of the case afford a sufficient apology for the use of such words; but if either the dignity of the nation, which is the subject, or our connection with the people, or interest in their history, shall familiarize us to their institutions and customs, the barbarism of the terms will vanish of course. Who considers now these names of Roman magistracies, *consul, pretor, edile, censor, questor, dictator, tribune*, as barbarous? Yet they are not the names of offices amongst us correspondent or similar to those among the Romans. To have employed instead of them, *mayor, alderman, sheriff, &c.* we should have justly thought much more exceptionable. I have heard of a Dutch translator of Cesar's Commentaries, who always rendered *consul, burgomaster*, and in the same taste the names of all the other officers and magistrates of Rome. A version of this kind would appear to us ridiculous.

§ 6. It is almost unnecessary to observe, that the two last are the only classes of words wherein the student will find any thing that can greatly puzzle him. A mere school-boy, with the help of his grammar and lexicon, may acquire all that is requisite for the just interpretation of the words of the first class. Those of the third, it is manifest, are not to be understood by us without a previous knowledge of the religious and political constitutions of the country, together with their ceremonies and usages; and those of the second, which is the matter of the greatest delicacy of all, cannot be thoroughly apprehended without an acquaintance with the national character, that is, the prevalent cast of mind, manners, and sentiments of the people. So much is necessary in order to be master of the language of any country; hen of so much importance it is, in order clearly to comprehend the style of Scripture, to be well acquainted with whatever concerns the Jewish nation.

P A R T II.

The Origin of the Changes in the Idiom of the Jews.

IT is true that, as the New Testament is written in Greek, it must be of consequence that we be able to enter critically into the ordinary import of the words of that tongue, by being familiarized to the genius and character of those who spoke it.
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But from what has been observed, it is evident that, though in several cases this knowledge may be eminently useful, it will not suffice; nay, in many cases, it will be of little or no significance. Those words, in particular, which have been in most familiar use with the old interpreters, and have been current in the explanations given in the Hellenistical synagogues and schools, have, with their naturalization among the Israelites, acquired in the Jewish use, if I may be allowed the expression, an infusion of the national spirit. Though the words therefore are Greek, Jewish erudition is of more service than Grecian, for bringing us to the true acceptation of them in the sacred writings. Would you know the full import of the words *ἀγιασμος*, for example, and *δικαιοσυνη* in the New Testament? It will be in vain to rummage the classics. Turn to the pages of the Old Testament. It will avail little to recur to the Greek roots *ἅγιος* and *δικη*. Examine the extent given to the signification of the Hebrew roots *שָׁרָף* *kadasb*, and *צַדִּיק* *tsadak*, which have given occasion to the introduction of those Greek terms into the translation of the Seventy.

§ 2. Classical use, both in Greek and in Latin, is not only in this study sometimes unavailable, but may even mislead. The sacred use and the classical are often very different. We know the import of the word *sanctitas* in the Vulgate and in ecclesiastical writers, and that it answers exactly enough to our own word *sanctity* derived from it. Yet from Cicero's account, it is plain that, in modern European tongues, we have no word corresponding to it in its primitive and classical use. "*ÆQUITAS*," says he, "*tripartita dicitur esse. Una ad superos deos, altera ad manes, tertia ad homines pertinere; prima pietas, secunda sanctitas, tertia justitia nominatur* *." According to him, therefore, the Latin word *sanctitas* imports equity or suitable regards towards the infernal gods.

But in no instance does the classical sense of a word differ more from that which it has invariably in the sacred pages, than in the term *κακότης*, which with the former is always expressive of a bad quality, with the latter of a good. With us it is a virtue, with them it was a vice. Nor can it be justly affirmed that the word expressed the same disposition of mind with Pagans, as with Jews and Christians, and that the only difference was in the opinion of judgment formed concerning this disposition; that the former looked upon it with a favourable eye, the latter with an unfavourable. For this is far from being the case. The quality of which it is expressive in classical use is totally different from that which it expresses in the sacred writings. In the first it corresponded exactly to, and was commonly translated by, the Latin *būmilitis*, which in profane authors always conveys a bad meaning, and

* Topica,

and denotes such a feeble, mean and abject temper, as is the very reverse of that fortitude, that superiority to death, shame, and pain, which the law of Christ so peremptorily exacts, and with which the faith of Christ so powerfully inspires the genuine disciple. *Ταπεινότης*, the abstract, is comprised by Aristotle* under *μικροψυχία*, pusillanimity; or, as explained by lexicographers, “animus demissus et abjectus;” and contrasted to *μεγαλοψυχία*, magnanimity, “*animi celsitudo*.” And to evince that the Latin term, in heathen authors, has the same meaning with the Greek, I need no better authority than that of Cicero, who says †, “Succumbere doloribus, eosque *humili* animo imbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi, multi parentes, multi amicos, nonnulli patriam, plerique autem seipsos penitus perdiderunt.” To this he opposes, “Robustus animus et excelsus, qui omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem con-temnit,” &c. The temper of mind here condemned by Cicero every Christian will condemn as much as he; and the application of the term *humilis* to this temper is a demonstration, that with him the word was the sign of an idea very different from that of which it has since, in conformity to the style of the Italic translation, been made the sign by ecclesiastical authors.

We may observe, by the way, that the English word *humility*, though borrowed directly from the Latin, conveys not the classical, but the scriptural sense of the word *ταπεινότης* or *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, which Cassialo, over zealous for the Latinity of his style, never renders *humilitas*, but always *modestia*. This word, *modestia*, however, does not express adequately the sense of the original. *Modesty* relates only to the opinion of men, *humility* relates also and principally, to the unerring judgment of God; and includes such a combination of qualities as no species of polytheism could give a foundation for. It implies, along with a modest self-diffidence, a sense of unworthiness in the sight of God, accompanied with a profound veneration of his perfections. Accordingly piety, meekness, and modesty, make, if I may so express myself, the principal figures in the groupe. So far from involving any thing of that weak timidity and irresolution expressed in the passage quoted from the philosopher, as comprehended in the classical sense of the term *humilis*; it on the contrary, implies, in every situation, a submission to the will of Heaven without repining or reserve, founded in a consciousness of one's own ignorance of what is best upon the whole, and an unshaken confidence in the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, by whose providence all events are over-ruled.

This is one of those terms which, in the mouth of a Jew or a Christian, an idolater, could not comprehend, till he had previously acquired some notion of the Biblical theology. To some people

* *Ἡερί ἀριτών και κακιών.*

† De Finibus, l. 1.

people it may appear strange, that so much knowledge should be thought necessary for qualifying one to understand the words in current use in any language. But to those more deeply versed in these matters, there will be nothing surprising in the remark. They will be sensible that the modern names, *pedantry*, *galantry*, *foppery*, *coquetry*, *prudery*, and many others, could not be translated into any ancient language, otherwise than by circumlocutions. Montesquieu * observes of what is called *honour* in the monarchies of Europe, that it is unknown, and consequently unnamed in the despotisms of Asia, and that it would even be a matter of some difficulty to render the term, as understood by Europeans, intelligible to a Persian.

§ 3. I should not have been so particular on the different acceptations of some words as used by Jews and by Pagans, but in order to illustrate more effectually that important proposition, that Scripture will ever be found its own best interpreter; and to evince what was remarked before, that the manners and sentiments of a people being closely connected with their constitution and customs, sacred and civil, have a powerful influence on the language, especially on those combinations of ideas, which serve to denote the various *phases* (pardon the unusual application of the term) both of virtue and of vice, as displayed in the characters of individuals. For though some traces of all the virtuous and all the vicious qualities of which human nature is susceptible, will perhaps be found in every country, these qualities are greatly diversified in their appearance, inasmuch as they invariably receive a kind of signature or peculiar modification from the national character. One plain consequence of this doctrine has been already considered, namely, that there will be a diversity in the associated ideas classed under the appellatives, and consequently in the genius of the languages, wherever there is a diversity of character in the nations which use them.

§ 4. I am now going to exemplify another consequence of this doctrine, which is, that the language of the same people will vary from itself, or, to speak more properly, from what it was in a former period, when the people themselves undergo a material alteration from what they were, in any of the respects above mentioned. Indeed it is manifest, that if a nation should continue at the same precise degree of advancement in the sciences and arts both elegant and useful, should undergo no variation in their form of government, religion, and laws, and should have little or no intercourse with foreigners, their language and idiom would in all essential characters remain the same. These two, language and idiom, though often confounded, I have had occasion to discriminate before. The distinction deserves our attention the more, as some of the causes mentioned operate more

* L'Esprit des Loix, liv. iii. ch. 8. Lett. Pers. 86.

upon the one, and others more upon the other : and as one of them may be even totally altered, whilst the other is retained. This was accordingly the case with the Jewish nation.

§ 5. During the Babylonish captivity, the Jews scattered through the Assyrian provinces lost irrecoverably, in consequence of the mixture with strangers so much superior to them in number and consideration, their vernacular dialect. But in consequence of their attachment to their religion (which included their polity and law) ; in consequence of their inviolable regard to their own customs, and of their detestation both of the customs and of the arts of the heathen ; in consequence of their veneration for the sacred books, and their never hearing any other than a literal version of them in the public offices of religion, they still in a great measure preserved the idiom ; insomuch that if the Chaldee of Jerusalem was not as different from the Chaldee of Babylon as the Greek of the synagogue was from the Greek of the classics, the only assignable reason perhaps is, that the idiom of the Hebrew and that of the Chaldee were originally more akin to each other, than the idiom of the Greek was to either. Now the idiom keeps a much firmer hold of the mind than the words, which are mere sounds, do, and which, compared with the other, may be considered as but the body, the material part of a language, whereof the idiom is the soul.

Though the Jewish tongue therefore became different, their idiom was nearly the same I say nearly so ; hence we infer, that the knowledge of the style and idiom of the Old Testament must throw light upon the New ; but it was not entirely the same. Hence we conclude the utility of knowing the state of the rabbinical and traditionary learning of that people in the days of our Saviour, this being the most effectual means of illustrating those particulars wherein the idiom of the New Testament differs from that of the Old. It was indeed impossible that such an intercourse with strangers as extirpated their language, should not be productive of some effect on their notions of things, sentiments, and manners. And changes produced in the sentiments and manners of a people never fail to shew themselves in their writings.

§ 6. But if what happened during their captivity had some effect on these, what followed after their return to Judea had a much greater. The persecutions they endured under the Grecian empire, on account of their religion, did, as is often the case, greatly endear it to them, and make them consider it in a light, in which (whatever may be said of individuals) they seem never as a nation to have considered it in before. It became more an object and a study to them. Sensible how little their perseverance secured to them the temporal advantages held forth in the letter of the law, they became fond of attending to those
spiritual

spiritual and sublime interpretations, both of the law and of the prophets, which served to fortify the mind against all secular losses and misfortunes, and inspire it with hope in the immediate views of torture and of death. Besides, the intercourse which, from the time of the Macedonian conquests, they unavoidably had with the Greeks, introduced insensibly into their manner of treating religion, an infusion of the philosophic spirit, with which they had before been utterly unacquainted.

The Greeks were perhaps the most inquisitive, the most ingenious, and the most disputatious people that ever appeared upon the earth. The uncommon importance which the Jews attributed to their religious peculiarities, both in doctrine and in ceremonies, and their abhorrence of the ceremonies of other nations, with whom they would have no intercommunity in worship, could not fail to provoke the scrutiny and contradiction of a people at once so acute and so conceited as the Greeks. The Jews also in self-defence began to scrutinize and argue. On examining and comparing, they perceived in a stronger light than ever, the inexpressible futility and absurdity of the mythology of the Greeks, and the noble simplicity, purity, and sublimity of their own theology. The spirit of inquiry begot among them, as might have been expected, the spirit of dogmatizing, a spirit quite unknown to their ancestors, though many centuries had elapsed from their establishment in Canaan to the period of which I am speaking. One of the first consequences of the dogmatical spirit was a division into factions and sects.

In this state we find them in the days of our Lord; the whole nation being split into Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes. Now of such party distinctions there is not a single vestige in the Old Testament. The dogmatists on the different sides would have recourse to different theories, the theories would give rise to particular phrases, by which the peculiar opinions of the partizans would be expressed, and even to particular applications of the words and phrases to which they had been accustomed before. Hence the usefulness of understanding their differences, and tenets, and manner of expounding sacred writ.

§ 7. But though the differences in opinions and modes of exposition which prevailed in the different sects, do not much affect the style of the Historical part of the New Testament, which in its nature gives less occasion for introducing subtleties in speculation, and was written by men who, from their education, cannot be supposed to have entered much into the polemical discussions of those days, they may reasonably be supposed to affect the style of the epistolary writings, especially of Paul, who was an adept in all the Jewish learning of the age. Indeed we learn from Philo, Josephus, and the talmudical writers, that their literati at that period were become fond of assigning a moral significance

nificance and purpose to all the ritual observances of the law, and of applying the words and phrases relating to these in a certain figurative and mystical manner. That in their mode of application they would often be whimsical, I do not deny; but that the New Testament itself gives ground to think that their ceremonies and carnal ordinances, as the apostle calls them, Heb. ix. 10. were intended to adumbrate some spiritual and more important instructions, appears to me uncontrovertible.

But whatever be in this, it must be allowed to be a matter of some moment, that we form a right notion of the different dogmas and prevailing taste of the time. The reason is evident. The sacred writers, in addressing those of their own nation, would doubtless, in order to be understood, adapt themselves, as their great Master had done before them, to the prevailing idiom and phraseology. Now this is to be learned only from the common usages, and from the reigning modes of thinking and reasoning which distinguished the people in that age and nation.

P A R T I I I .

The Difficulties found in translating the Scriptures.

IT can scarcely admit a doubt, that as every language has in it something peculiar, and as the people of every nation have customs, rites, and manners wherein they are singular; each tongue will have its special difficulties, which will always be the greater to strangers, the more remote the customs, rites, and manners of the nation are from the customs, rites, and manners of other nations: for in the same proportion the genius of the tongue will differ from that of other tongues. If so, it is no wonder that the distinguishing particularity of the Jews in constitution, sentiments, ceremonies, and laws, should render it more difficult to translate with justness from their language, than to translate from the language of any people who, in all the respects aforementioned, do not so remarkably differ from others.

It may be proper here to point out more particularly where difficulties of this kind will be found principally to lie. It is evident that they will not at all affect the construction of the sentences, or the inflexions of the words. The analogy of the language, and its whole grammatical structure, may be very simple and easily acquired, whatever be the customs of the people, or how extraordinary soever they may appear to us. Further, simple narration is not that kind of writing which will be much affected by those difficulties. The nouns which occur in

it are generally of the first class, mentioned in the preceding part of this Dissertation. And in these, from the principles formerly explained, the interpreter will not often meet with any thing to retard his progress. If the narrative be of matters which concern the community at large, as in civil history, there will no doubt be frequent recourse to the words of the third class. But in regard to these, the method of adopting the original term, established by universal practice, and founded in necessity, whereby translators extricate themselves when correspondent terms cannot be found, does in effect remove the difficulty. And even when words of the second class occur, as will sometimes happen, there is a greater probability that the context will ascertain their meaning in an historical work, than there is where they occur in any other kind of writing, such as the didactic, the declamatory, the proverbial or aphoristic, and the argumentative.

This is the first difficulty proper to be mentioned, arising from difference of manners, a difficulty which cannot be said to affect the sacred writings peculiarly, otherwise than in degree. It is always the harder to reach in a version the precise signification of the words of the original, the wider the distance is in sentiments and manners, between the nation in whose language the book is written, and the nation into whose language it is to be translated.

§ 2. The second difficulty I shall take notice of arises from the penury of words in the ancient oriental languages, at least in the Hebrew, a natural consequence of the simplicity of the people, the little proficiency made by them in sciences and arts, and their early withdrawing themselves, on account of religion, from the people of other nations. The fewer the words are in any language, the more extensive commonly is the signification given to every word; and the more extensive the signification of a word is, there is the greater risk of its being misunderstood in any particular application; besides, the fewness of words always obliges writers of enlarged minds, for the sake of supplying the deficiency, frequently to recur to metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, catachresis, and other rhetorical tropes. These accordingly are always found to abound most in the scantiest tongues. Now the frequent use of tropes occasions an unavoidable obscurity and sometimes ambiguity in the expression.

§ 3. A third difficulty arises from the penury of books extant in the genuine ancient Hebrew, there being no more than the books of the Old Testament, and not even all these. When we consider the manner in which the knowledge of any language, even of our native tongue, is acquired, we find it is solely by attending to the several ways in which words are used in a vast variety of occurrences and applications, that the precise meaning is ascertained. As it is principally from conversation in our
mother

mother-tongue, or in any living language which we learn from those who speak it, that we have occasion to observe this variety, so it is only in books that we have occasion to observe it, when employed in the acquisition of a dead language. Consequently, the fewer the books are, there is the greater risk of mistaking the sense, especially of those words that do not frequently occur. This has given rise to doubts about the meaning of some words, even of the first class, to wit, the names of a few natural objects, as plants, animals, and precious stones, which occur but very rarely in Scripture, and in passages where sufficient light cannot be had from the context.

§ 4. It may indeed be said that, as the writers of the New Testament employed not the Hebrew but the Greek language in their compositions, neither of the two remarks last mentioned can affect them, however they may affect the penmen of the Old. The Greek is indeed a most copious language, and the books written in it are very numerous. But whoever would argue in this manner must have forgotten, what has been fully evinced in the former Dissertation, that though the words, the inflection, and the construction in the books of the New Testament are Greek, the idiom is strictly Hebraical; or at least he must not have reflected on the inevitable consequences of this doctrine, one of which is, that the Hebraistic Greek, or Greek of the synagogue, as it has been called, will, in a great measure, labour under the same inconveniencies and defects with the tongue on which its idiom is formed. Another consequence is, that the scarcity of books in the language which is the parent of the idiom, is in effect a scarcity of the lights that are necessary, or at least convenient for the easier discovery of the peculiarities of the idiomatic tongue formed upon it. The reason of both is obvious; it is from that language we must learn the import of the phrases, and even sometimes of particular words, which otherwise would often prove unintelligible.

§ 5. The fourth difficulty which the interpreter of the Bible has to encounter, arises from the nature of the prophetic style, a style highly figurative, or, as some critics have thought proper to denominate it, symbolical. The symbolical or typical is, in my apprehension, very much akin to what may be called the allegoric style. There is, however, this difference: the symbols employed in prophecy have, like the Egyptian hieroglyphs, acquired a customary interpretation from the established use in that mode of writing, and are seldom or never varied; whereas the allegory is more at the discretion of the writer. One consequence of this is, that in the former there is not required the same exactness of resemblance between the symbols, or the types and their antitypes, as is required in allegory. The reason is obvious. The usual application supplies the defects in the first; whereas,

whereas, in the second, it is solely by an accuracy of resemblance that an allegory can be distinguished from a riddle.

This difficulty however in the prophetic style, may be said more strictly to affect the expounder of the sacred oracles than the translator. For in this mode of writing there are two senses exhibited to the intelligent reader; first, the literal, and then the figurative; for, as the words are intended to be the vehicle of the literal sense to the man who understands the language, so the literal sense is intended to be the vehicle of the figurative to the man whose understanding is exercised "to discern the things of the Spirit." It is to such therefore in a particular manner, that whatever is written in the symbolic style in the New Testament is addressed. Our Lord, to distinguish such from the unthinking multitude, calls them those who have ears to hear. *Who so hath ears to hear, says he, let him hear*, Matt. xi. 15. xiii. 9. Mark iv. 9. Luke viii. 8. The same expression is also used in the Apocalypse, (Rev. ii. 7. 11. 17. 29.) a book of prophecies. And it deserves to be attended to, that Jesus Christ never employs these words in the introduction or the conclusion of any plain moral instructions, but always after some parable or prophetic declarations figuratively expressed. Now it is with the literal sense only that the translator, as such, is concerned. For the literal sense ought invariably to be conveyed into the version, where, if you discover the antitype or mystical sense, it must be, though not through the same words, through the same emblems, as you do in the original.

This also holds in translating allegory, apologue, and parable. A man may render them exactly into another tongue, who has no apprehension of the figurative sense. Who can doubt that any fable of Esop or Phedrus, for example, may be translated with as much justness by one who has not been told, and does not so much as guess the moral, as by one who knows it perfectly? Whereas the principal concern of the expounder is to discover the figurative import. In the New Testament indeed there is only one book, the Apocalypse, written entirely in the prophetic style: and it must be allowed that that book may be accurately translated by one who has no apprehension of the spiritual meaning. However, in the greater part both of the historical and of the epistolary writings, there are prophecies interspersed. Besides, some knowledge in the diction and manner of the prophets is necessary for the better apprehension of the application made in the New Testament, of the prophecies of the Old, and the reasonings of the apostles in regard to those prophecies.—Indeed it may be affirmed in general, that for translating justly what is of a mixed character, where the emblematic is blended with the historical, some knowledge of the mystic ap-
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plications is more essential, than for translating unmixed prophecy, allegory, or parable.

§ 6. I shall mention as the cause of a fifth difficulty in the examination, and consequently in the right interpretation of the Scriptures, that before we begin to study them critically, we have been accustomed to read them in a translation, whence we have acquired a habit of considering many ancient and oriental terms, as perfectly equivalent to certain words in modern use in our own language, by which the other have been commonly rendered. And this habit, without a considerable share of knowledge, attention, and discernment, is almost never perfectly to be surmounted. What makes the difficulty still the greater is, that when we begin to become acquainted with other versions beside that into our mother-tongue—suppose Latin, French, Italian; these, in many instances, instead of correcting, serve but to confirm the effect. For in these translations we find the same words in the original, uniformly rendered by words, which we know to correspond exactly, in the present use of those tongues, to the terms employed in our own translation.

I hope I shall not be so far misunderstood by any as to be supposed to insinuate, by this remark, that people ought to delay reading the Scriptures in a translation, till they be capable of consulting the original. This would be to debar the greater part of mankind from the use of them altogether, and to give up the many immense advantages derived from the instructions contained in the very worst versions of that book, for the sake of avoiding a few mistakes, comparatively small, into which one may be drawn even by the best. A child must not be hindered from using his legs in walking, on pretence that if he be allowed to walk, it will be impossible always to secure him from falling. My intention in remarking this difficulty, is to show first that those early studies, however proper and even necessary in Christians, are nevertheless attended with this inconveniency, that at a time when we are incompetent judges, prepossessions are insensibly formed on mere habit or association, which afterwards, when the judgment is more mature, cannot easily be surmounted; 2dly, to account in part, without recurring to obscurity in the original, for the greater difficulty said to be found in explaining holy writ, than in expounding other works of equal antiquity; and, 3dly, to awake a proper circumspection and caution in every one who would examine the Scriptures with that attention which the ineffable importance of the subject merits.

But, in order to set the observation itself in relation to this fifth difficulty in the strongest light, it would be necessary to trace the origin, and give as it were the history of some terms, which have become technical amongst ecclesiastical writers, pointing out the changes which in a course of ages they have insensibly undergone.

undergone. When alterations are produced by slow degrees, they always escape the notice of the generality of people, and sometimes even of the more discerning. For a term once universally understood to be equivalent to an original term whose place it occupies in the translation, will naturally be supposed to be still equivalent, by those who do not sufficiently attend to the variations in the meanings of words, which the tract of time and the alterations in notions and customs thence arising, have imperceptibly introduced. Sometimes etymology too contributes to favour the deception. Is there one of a thousand, even among the readers of the original, who entertains the smallest suspicion that the words, *blasphemy, heresy, mystery, schism*, do not convey to moderns precisely the same ideas which the Greek words *βλασφημία, αίρεσις, μυστηριον, σχισμα*, in the New Testament, conveyed to Christians in the times of the apostles? Yet that these Greek and English words are far from corresponding perfectly, I shall take an occasion of evincing afterwards*. The same thing may be affirmed of several other words, and even phrases, which retain their currency on religious subjects, though very much altered in their signification.

§ 7. The sixth and last difficulty, and perhaps the greatest of all, arises from this, that our opinions on religious subjects are commonly formed, not indeed before we read the Scriptures, but before we have examined them. The ordinary consequence is, that men afterwards do not search the sacred oracles in order to find out the truth, but in order to find what may authorise their own opinions. Nor is it indeed otherwise to be accounted for, that the several partizans of such an endless variety of adverse sects (although men who on other subjects appear neither weak nor unfair in their researches) should all, with so much confidence, maintain that the dictates of holy writ are perfectly decisive in support of their favourite dogmas, and in opposition to those of every antagonist. Nor is there in the whole history of mankind a clearer demonstration than this, of the amazing power of prejudice and prepossession.

It may be said, that interest often warps men's judgment, and gives them a bias towards that side of a question in which they find their account; nay, it may even be urged further, that in cases in which it has no influence on the head, it may seduce the heart, and excite strenuous combatants in defence of a system which they themselves do not believe. I acknowledge that these suppositions are not of things impossible. Actual instances may be found of both. But for the honour of human nature, I would wish to think that those of the second class now mentioned, are far from being numerous. But whatever be in this, we certainly have, in cases wherein interest entirely out of the ques-

tion, nay, wherein it appears evidently on the opposite side, irrefragable proofs of the power of prepossession, infomuch that one would almost imagine that, in matters of opinion, as in matters of property, a right were constituted merely by pre-occupancy. This serves also to account in part for the great diversity of sentiments in regard to the sense of Scripture, without recurring to the common plea of the Romanists, its obscurity and ambiguity.

§ 8. Thus the principal difficulties to be encountered in the study of Biblical criticism are six, arising, 1st, from the singularity of Jewish customs; 2dly, from the poverty (as appears) of their native language; 3dly, from the fewness of the books extant in it; 4thly, from the symbolical style of the prophets; 5thly, from the excessive influence which a previous acquaintance with translations may have occasioned; and, 6thly, from prepossessions, in what way soever acquired, in regard to religious tenets.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION THE THIRD.

OF THE STYLE OF THE SCRIPTURE HISTORY, PARTICULARLY THE GOSPELS.—ITS PERSPICUITY DEFENDED AGAINST THE OBJECTIONS OF FATHER SIMON.

FROM what has been evinced in the preceding discourse, it will not improbably be concluded that the style of holy writ, both of the New Testament and of the Old, of the historical books as well as of the prophetic and the argumentative, must be generally obscure and often ambiguous. So much, and with so great plausibility and acuteness, has been written by some learned men, in proving this point, that were a person, before he ever read the Scriptures, either in the original or in a translation, to consider every topic they have employed, and to observe how much, in regard to the truth of such topics, is admitted by those who cannot entirely acquiesce in the conclusion, he would infallibly despair of reaping any instruction that could be depended on from the study of the Bible, and would be almost tempted to pronounce it altogether unprofitable.

What can exceed the declarations to this purpose of the celebrated Father Simon, a very eminent critic, and probably the greatest oriental scholar of his age? "We ought," says he*, "to regard it as unquestionable, that the greater part of the Hebrew words are equivocal, and that their signification is *entirely* uncertain. For this reason, when a translator employs in his version the interpretation which he thinks the best, he cannot say absolutely that that interpretation expresses truly what is contained in the original. There is *always* ground to doubt whether the sense which he gives to the Hebrew words be the
" true

* Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. iii. ch. ii. On doit supposer comme une chose constante, que la plus part des mots Hebreux sont equivoques, et que leur signification est *entierement* incertaine. C'est pourquoi lors qu'un traducteur employe dans sa version l'interpretation qu'il juge la meilleure, on ne peut pas dire absolument, que cette interpretation exprime au vrai ce qui est contenu dans l'original. Il y a *toujours* lieu de douter, si le sens qu'on donne aux mots Hebreux est le veritable, puis qu'il y en a d'autres qui ont *autant* de probabilit .

“ true sense, because there are other meanings which are *equally* “ probable.” Again *, “ They (the Protestants) do not consider “ that even the most learned Jews doubt almost every where “ concerning the proper signification of the Hebrew words, and “ that the Hebrew lexicons composed by them, commonly con- “ tain nothing but uncertain conjectures.” Now, if matters were really as here represented, there could be no question that the study of Scripture would be mere loss of time, and that, whatever might be affirmed of the ages of the ancient prophets, it could not be said at present, that there is any revelation extant of what preceded the times of the apostles. For a revelation which contains nothing but matter of doubt and conjecture, and from which I cannot raise even a probable opinion that is not counterbalanced by opinions equally probable, is no revelation at all. How defective, on this hypothesis, the New Testament would be, which every where presupposes the knowledge and belief of the Old; and in many places, how inexplicable without that knowledge, it is needless to mention.

§ 2. It would not be easy to account for exaggerations so extravagant in an author so judicious, and commonly so moderate, but by observing that his immediate aim, whereof he never loses sight, throughout his whole elaborate performance, is to establish TRADITION as the foundation of all the knowledge necessary for the faith and practice of a Christian. *Scripture* doubtless has its difficulties; but we know at least what and where it is. As for *tradition*, what it is, how it is to be sought, and where it is to be found, it has never yet been in the power of any man to explain to the satisfaction of a reasonable inquirer. We are already in possession of the former, if we can but expound it. We cannot say so much of the latter, which, like Nebuchadnezzar’s dream, we have first to find, and then to interpret.

I am not ignorant that Simon’s principal aim has been represented by some of his own communion, particularly Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, as still more hostile to religion, than from the account above given we should conclude it to be. That celebrated and subtle disputant did not hesitate to maintain that, under the specious pretext of supporting the authority of the church, this priest of the Oratory undermined Christianity itself, a proceeding which in the end must prove fatal to an authority that has no other foundation to rest upon. The Bishop accordingly insists that the general tendency of his argument, as appears in every part of the work, is to insinuate a refined Socinianism, if not an universal

* Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. iii. ch. iv. Ils n’ont pas pris garde, que même les plus scavans Juifs doutent presque par tout de la signification propre des mots Hebreux, et que les dictionnaires qu’ils ont composés de la langue Hebraïque ne contiennent le plus souvent que de conjectures incertaines.

universal scepticism. Certain it is, that the ambiguous manner often adopted by our critical historian, and the address with which he sometimes eludes the expectation of his readers, add not a little probability to the reasoning of this acute antagonist. When to any flagrant misinterpretation of a portion of Scripture mentioned in his work, we expect his answer from a critical examination of the passage, we are silenced with the tradition and authority of the church, urged in such a way as evidently suggests that without recurring to her decision, there is no possibility of refuting the objections of adversaries, or discovering the truth; and that our own reasonings unchecked by her, if they did not subvert our faith altogether, would infallibly plunge us into all the errors of Socinus. Thus most of his discussions concerning the import of the sacred text conclude in an alternative which, whilst it conceals his own sentiments, bewilders his readers. The purport is, 'If ye will be rational, ye must soon cease to be Christians; and if ye will be Christians, ye must (wherever religion is concerned) cease to be rational.' This alternative of faith or reason, though not expressed in so many words, is but too plainly implied in those he uses. If for *Christian* he had substituted *Roman Catholic*, or even any one denomination of Christians, the sentiment would not have been so generally controverted. As it is, he offers no other choice, but to believe every thing, how absurd soever, on an authority into the foundations of which we are not permitted to enquire, or to believe nothing at all. The Critical History has accordingly been observed to produce two contrary effects on readers of opposite characters. Of the weak and timid, it often makes *implicit believers*: of the intelligent and daring, it makes *free-thinkers*. To which side the author himself leaned most, it would perhaps be presumptuous to say. But as his personal character and known abilities were much more congenial to those of the latter class than to those of the former, it was no wonder that he fell under suspicion with some shrewd but zealous Catholics, who looked on his zeal for tradition as no better than a disguise. But this only by the way. I mean not to consider here what was his real and ultimate scope in the treatise above mentioned; it is enough for my purpose to examine his professed intention, which is to support tradition by representing Scripture as, in consequence of its obscurity, insufficient evidence of any doctrine.

That Simon's assertions above quoted are without bounds hyperbolic, can scarcely be doubted by any person who reflects. Of the prophetic writings I am not now to speak, though even, with regard to them, it were easy to shew that such things could not be affirmed in an entire consistency with truth. As to the historical books, I hope to prove, notwithstanding all that has been evinced on one side and admitted on the other, that they are

in general remarkable for perspicuity. It is true that our knowledge of the tongue, for the reasons above mentioned, is defective; but it is also true, that this defect is seldom so great as materially to darken the history, especially the more early part of it.

§ 3. The first quality for which the sacred history is remarkable, is simplicity. The Hebrew is a simple language. Their verbs have not, like Greek and Latin, a variety of moods and tenses, nor do they, like the modern languages, abound in auxiliaries and conjunctions. The consequence is, that in narrative they express by several simple sentences, much in the way of the relations usual in conversation, what in most other languages would be comprehended in one complex sentence of three or four members. Though the latter method has many advantages in respect of elegance, harmony and variety, and is essential to what is strictly called style, the former is incomparably more perspicuous. Accordingly we may often observe, that unlettered people who are very attentive to a familiar story told in their own homely manner, and perfectly understand it, quickly lose attention to almost any written history, even the most interesting, the history contained in the Scriptures alone excepted. Nor is the sole reason of this exception because they are more accustomed to that history than to any other, though no doubt this circumstance contributes to the effect; but it is chiefly because the simplicity of the diction brings it to the level of ordinary talk, and consequently does not put the minds of people who are no readers so much to the stretch as what is written, even in the least laboured style of composition, in any modern tongue, does in regard to those acquainted with the tongue.

§ 4. Take for an example of the simplicity here meant, the first paragraph of Genesis, consisting of five not long verses, and containing not fewer than eleven sentences. The common punctuation does not indeed make them so many. But that is of no moment. When sentences are very short, we usually separate them by semicolons, sometimes by commas; but that is a complete sentence, in whatever way pointed, which conveys a meaning fully enunciated, and intelligible independently of what precedes or what follows; when what precedes, and what follows, is also intelligible, independently of it. 1. *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.* 2. *And the earth was without form and void.* 3. *And darkness was upon the face of the deep.* 4. *And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.* 5. *And God said, Let there be light.* 6. *And there was light.* 7. *And God saw the light, that it was good.* 8. *And God divided the light from the darkness.* 9. *And God called the light day.* 10. *And the darkness be called night.* 11. *And the evening and the morning were the first day.* This is a just representation

sentation of the strain of the original. A more perfect example of simplicity of structure we can nowhere find. The sentences are simple; the substantives are not attended by adjectives, nor the verbs by adverbs, no synonyms, no superlatives, no effort at expressing things in a bold, emphatical, or uncommon manner.

In order to judge of the difference of this manner from that of ordinary compositions, we need only compare with it Castalio's version of the passage into Latin, wherein all, except the first sentence and the last, and consequently nine of those above recited, are comprised in one complicated period. "1. Principio creavit Deus cœlum et terram. 2. Quum autem esset terra iners atque rudis, tenebrisque effusum profundum, et divinus spiritus sese super aquas libraret, jussit Deus ut existeret lux, et extitit lux; quam quum videret Deus esse bonam, lucem secrevit a tenebris, et lucem diem, et tenebras noctem appellavit. 3. Ita extitit ex vespere et mane dies primus." Compare with this the version of the same passage in the Vulgate, which is literal like the English. "In principio creavit Deus cœlum et terram. Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebræ erant super faciem abyssi: Et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas. Dixitque Deus, Fiat lux. Et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona. Et divisit lucem a tenebris. Appellavitque lucem diem, et tenebras noctem. Factumque est vespere et mane dies unus." The difference between these in point of perspicuity, is to an ordinary hearer extremely great. So much depends on the simplicity of structure, necessarily arising in some degree from the form of the language. Nothing is more characteristic of the simple manner than the introduction of what was spoken, directly in the words of the speaker; whereas in the periodic style we are informed obliquely of its purport. Thus what is in the Vulgate, "*Dixit Deus, Fiat lux,*" is in Castalio, "*Jussit Deus ut existeret lux.*"

§ 5. But beside this, there is a simplicity of sentiment, particularly in the Pentateuch, arising from the very nature of the early and uncultivated state of society about which that book is conversant. This renders the narrative in general extremely clear and engaging. Simple manners are more easily described than manners highly polished and refined. Being also adapted to the ordinary ranks of people and to all capacities, they much more generally excite attention, and interest the heart. It has been remarked, not unjustly, that though no two authors wrote in languages more widely different, both in genius and in form, than Moses and Homer, or treated of people who in their religious opinions and ceremonies were more opposite than were the Hebrews and the Greeks, we shall hardly find any who resemble one another more than these writers, in an affecting and perspicuous

cus simplicity, which suits almost every taste, and is level to every understanding. Let it be observed, that in this comparison I have no allusion to imagery, or to any quality of diction, except that above mentioned. Now nothing contributes more to this resemblance than this circumstance which they have in common, that both present to our view a rude, because little cultivated, state of human beings and politics. The passions and the motives of the men recorded by them, display themselves without disguise. There is something wonderfully simple and artless even in the artifices related in their writings. If nature be not always exhibited by them naked, she is dressed in a plain decent garb, which, far from disguising, accommodates her, and shews her to advantage. Natural beauties please always and universally; artificial ornaments depend for their effect on mode and caprice. They please particular persons only or nations, and at particular times. Now, as the writers above mentioned, though in many respects very dissimilar, resemble each other in this species of simplicity, they also resemble in a certain native perspicuity invariably resulting therefrom.

§ 6. Homer is thought by many the most perspicuous writer in Greek; yet in respect of idiom and dialect he is so peculiar, that one is less assisted to understand him by the other compositions in the language, than to understand any other Greek writer in prose or verse. One would almost think that the only usage in the tongue which can enable us to read him is his own. Were we therefore to judge from general topics which might plausibly be declaimed upon, we should conclude that the Iliad and the Odyssey are among the darkest books in the language; yet they are in fact the clearest. In matters of criticism it is likewise unsafe to form general conclusions from a few examples, which may be pompously displayed, and, when brought into view together, made appear considerable, but are as nothing in number, compared with those with which it is possible to contrast them.

§ 7. Indeed most of Simon's instances, in support of his doctrine of the impenetrable darkness of Scripture, appear to me rather as evidences of the strait he was in to find apposite examples, than as tolerable proofs of his opinion. For my part, I frankly own that, from the conviction I had of the profound erudition and great abilities of the man, I was much more inclined to his opinion before, than after the perusal of his proofs. At first I could not avoid suspecting that a man of his character must have had something extraordinary, to which I had not attended, to advance, in support of so extraordinary a position. I was at the same time certain that, as it was a point he had much at heart to enforce, the proofs he would bring from examples in support of it, would be the strongest he could find.

Let

Let us then consider some of the principal of these examples. What pains has he not taken to shew that *בָּרָא*, *bara*, does not necessarily imply, *to make out of nothing*? But if it do not, can any man consider this as an evidence of either the ambiguity or the obscurity of Hebrew? The doctrine that God made the world out of nothing, does not rest upon the import of that verb, but on the whole narration, particularly on the first verse of Genesis, compared with those which follow; whence we learn that God first made the chaotic matter, out of which he afterwards formed the material beings whereof the world is composed. But passing this; for I mean not here to inquire into the grounds of that article, but into the obscurity of Scripture; who sees not that the original term is not more ambiguous or more obscure than those by which it is rendered into other languages? Is *ποίησθαι*, or even *κτίσθαι*, in Greek, *creo* in Latin, or *create* in English, more definite? Not in the least, as we may learn from the common dictionaries of these languages. In regard even to the scriptural use of the English word, God, in the two first chapters of Genesis, is said, in the common version, to have *created* those very things, of which we are also told, that he formed them out of the ground and out of the water. Are these languages then (and as much may be said of all the languages I know) perfectly ambiguous and obscure? "It is," says Simon*, "the tradition of the synagogue and of the church, which limits the vague meaning of these first words of Genesis." But if words be accounted *vague*, because they are general expressions, under which several terms more special are included, the much greater part of the nouns as well as the verbs, not of the oriental tongues only, but of every tongue, ancient and modern, must be denominated *vague*. Every name must be so that is not a proper name; the name of a species, because applicable to many individuals; more so the name of a genus, because applicable to many species; and still more so, the name of a class or order, because applicable to many genera.

Would it not be an abuse of words to say that a man spoke vaguely, equivocally, or darkly, who told me that he had built a *house* for himself, because the verb *to build* does not suggest what the materials of the building were, whether stone, or brick, or wood, to any of which it may be equally applied; and because the noun *house* may equally denote a house of one story, or of seven stories, forty feet long, or four hundred? As far as the information went, the expression was clear and unequivocal. But it did not preclude the possibility of farther information on the subject. And what single affirmation ever does preclude this? Are we informed of nothing when we are told that God *made all things*? And if it should be added *out of nothing*, would not

* Réponse aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Hollande, ch. 16.

this be accounted additional information, and not the removal of any obscurity in the foregoing? Would we not judge in the same manner, should a man, after acquainting us that he had built his house, add, that it was of marble, seventy feet long, and three stories high? yet there would be still scope for further enquiry, and further information. Is a man told nothing who is not told every thing? And is every word obscure or ambiguous, that does not convey all the information that can be given upon the subject? This way of proving, adopted by our learned critic, is indeed a novelty of its kind.

§ 8. Another of his examples is the word *סבא* *tsaba**, rendered by the Seventy *κοσμος*, in the Vulgate *ornatus*, and by our translators *host*. Though this word be admitted to be equivocal taken by itself, as most nouns in every language are, its import in this passage is clearly ascertained by the context to be metaphorical. Whether therefore it be rendered *host* with the English interpreters, *κοσμος* with the Greek, or *ornatus* with the Latin, it makes no conceivable variation in the sense. Nobody, in reading our translation, ever thinks of an army of men, in the literal acceptation, mustered in the sky. Nor is the diversity at all material, when the purport of the whole sentence is considered, between the different versions which have been given of the two Hebrew words *תבו* *thobu*, and *תבו* *bobu*†. All concur in making them expressive of a chaos.

§ 9. As to the version, which, according to him, may be given to the three first verses of Genesis ‡, making of five or six simple sentences one complex period, little more is necessary than to remark, that its very want of simplicity in such a book, written in so early an age, is a very strong presumption against it, being not less unsuited to the time of the historian, than it is to the genius of the language. In what respect he could call it literal, or agreeable to the grammatical sense, I do not know; since it evidently departs from the ordinary import, as well as the usual construction of the words, and that not for giving light to a passage otherwise obscure (which may reasonably excuse a small deviation from the letter), but for involving in darkness what is expressed

* Gen. ii. 1. The whole verse is in the common version: *Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them.*

† Rendered in the English translation, *without form and void* Gen. i. 2.

‡ The version is, "Avant que Dieu crea le ciel et la terre, que la terre étoit sans forme, &c. que les tenebres étoient, &c. et que l'esprit de Dieu. &c. Dieu dit que la lumiere soit," &c. Literally in English, *Before that God created the heavens and the earth, that the earth was without form and void, that darkness was upon the face of the deep, and that the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters; God said, Let there be light, and there was light.* Hist. Crit. de V. T. liv. iii. ch. iii. He mentions also another rendering: "Au commencement que," &c. But this seems only a more awkward way of expressing the same thing.

expressed perspicuously. It is, besides, quite arbitrary. The copulative is thrice rendered "*Que,*" *that*; the fourth time it is omitted; and what follows is in the perfect of the indicative, the preceding clauses being in the potential or subjunctive mood. Now I may venture to affirm, that no conceivable reason can be assigned, why this clause should be made choice of for the direct affirmation, and not any of those preceding or following in the paragraph.

Add to all this, that to make בראשית *bereshith*, a conjunction, and render it "*priusquam,*" *avant que*, is not only without, but against Biblical authority. ראשית *beginning*, is a very common noun, and joined with the prepositive ב signifying *in*, occurs in four places beside this. In these it is uniformly rendered as here, "αρχη" in the Septuagint, and *in principio* in the Vulgate, and cannot, in a consistency with the words connected, be rendered otherwise. In the Targum or Chaldee paraphrase of Onkelos on the books of Moses, which in point of antiquity comes next to the Septuagint, it is rendered בקרמין *in principiis*, in conformity to every other known translation.

The opinion of Grotius and some learned Rabbis, unsupported by either argument or example, nay, in manifest contradiction to both, is here of no weight. Scriptural usage alone must decide the question. These commentators (with all deference to their erudition and abilities be it spoken) being comparatively modern, cannot be considered as ultimate judges in a question depending entirely on an ancient use, whereof all the evidences that were remaining in their time, remain still, and are as open to our examination, as they were to theirs. In other points where there may happen to be in Scripture an allusion to customs or ceremonies retained by the Jews, but unknown to us, the case is different. But nothing of this kind is pretended here. It is therefore needless to enter further into particulars. What has been produced above will serve for a specimen of the evidence brought by Father Simon, of the obscurity of the Hebrew Scriptures. And I imagine that, by the like arguments, I might undertake to prove any writing, ancient or modern, to be vague, ambiguous, and obscure.

§ 10. That some things, however, in the sacred history, not of great consequence, are ambiguous, and some things obscure, it was never my intention to question. But such things are to be found in every composition, in every language. Indeed, as the word *perspicuous* is a relative term (for that may be perspicuous to one which is obscure to another), it must be allowed also that the dead languages have, in this respect, a disadvantage, which is always the greater, the less the language is known. As to the multiplicity of meanings sometimes affixed to single words, one would be at a loss to say what tongue, ancient or modern, is
 most

most chargeable with this blemish. Any person accustomed to consult lexicons will readily assent to what I say. In regard to English (in which we know that it is not impossible to write both unambiguously and perspicuously), if we recur to Johnson's valuable Dictionary for the signification of the most common terms, both nouns and verbs, and overlook, for a moment, our acquaintance with the tongue, confirmed by long and uninterrupted habit, we shall be surpris'd that people can write intelligibly in it, and be apt to imagine that, in every period, nay, in every line, a reader will be perplexed in selecting the proper, out of such an immense variety of meanings as are given to the different words*. In this view of things, the explanation of a simple sentence will appear like the solution of a riddle.

§ 11. But no sooner do we return to practice, than these imaginations, founded merely on a theoretical and partial view of the subject, totally disappear. Nothing can be more pertinent, or better founded, than the remark of Mr le Clerc, "That a word, which is equivocal by itself, is often so clearly limited to a particular signification by the strain of the discourse, as to leave no room for doubt." Nor has Simon paid a due regard to this most evident truth, though he pretends, in answering that writer, to have been aware of it †. He could not otherwise have run into such exaggerations as these: "The signification of the greater part of the Hebrew words is *entirely* uncertain;" and "a translator cannot say absolutely that his interpretation expresses truly what is contained in the original, there being *always* ground to doubt, because there are other meanings which are *equally* probable;" absurdities which it were easy to confute from his own work, were this the proper place.

§ 12. It may be asked in reply, But is not the poverty of the Hebrew tongue, of which the obscurity and the ambiguity seem to be the natural consequences, acknowledged by all impartial critics? In some sense it is, and I have acknowledged it very amply; but it deserves our notice, that much more has been inferred from this than there is foundation for. The language of a people little advanced in civilization, amongst whom knowledge of any kind has made but inconsiderable progress, and the arts of life are yet rude and imperfect, can hardly be supposed copious. But it is not sufficiently weighed, on the other hand, that if their words be few, their ideas are few in proportion. Words multiply with the occasions for employing them. And if, in modern languages, we have thousands of names to which we can find

* Thus to the noun *word* Johnson assigns 12 significations—to *power* 13. and to *foot* 16. The verb, *to make*, has, according to him, 66 meanings, *to put*, 50, and *to take*, which is both neuter and active, has 134. This is but a small specimen in nouns and verbs; the observation may be as amply illustrated in other parts of speech.

† Réponse aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Holl. ch. xvi.

find none in Hebrew corresponding, we shall discover, upon inquiry, that the Hebrews were ignorant of the things to which those names are affixed by us as the signs.

Knowledge precedes, language follows. No people have names for things unknown and unimagined, about which they can have no conversation. If they be well supplied in signs for expressing those things with which they are, either in reality or in imagination, acquainted, their language, considered relatively to the needs of the people who use it, may be termed copious; though, compared with the languages of more intelligent and civilized nations, it be accounted scanty. This is a scantiness, which might occasion difficulty to a stranger attempting to translate into it the writings of a more polished and improved people, who have more ideas, as well as words, but would never be felt by the natives; nor would it hurt in the least the clearness of their narratives, concerning those matters which fall within the sphere of their knowledge. There is no defect of signs for all the things which they can speak or write about, and it can never affect the perspicuity of what they do say, that they have no signs for those things whereof they have nothing to say, because they know nothing about them.

Nay, it may be reasonably inferred, that in what is called a scanty language, where the signs are few, because the things to be signified are few, there is a greater probability of precision than in a copious language, where the requisite signs are much more numerous, by reason of the multiplicity of things to be represented by them. The least deviation from order will be observed in a small company, which would be overlooked in a crowd. The source of much false reasoning on this head, is the tendency people have to imagine that, with the same extent of subject which might have employed the pen of an ancient Greek, the Hebrews had perhaps not one fourth part of their number of words. Had this been the case, the words must indeed have been used very indefinitely; but as the case really stood, it is not so easy to decide, whether the terms (those especially for which there is most occasion in narrative) be more vague in their signification in Hebrew, than in other languages.

§ 13. But to descend from abstract reasoning to matters of fact, which in subjects of this kind are more convincing, "It is false," says Le Clerc, "that there is always ground to doubt whether the sense which one gives to the Hebrew words be the true sense; for, in spite of all the ambiguities of the Hebrew tongue, all the interpreters of Scripture, ancient and modern, agree with regard to the greater part of the history, and of the Jewish religion." Le Clerc is rather modest in his assertions; but in fact he was too much of Simon's opinion on this article,

as appears particularly from his Prolegomena to the Pentateuch*. Otherwise he might have justly asserted that the points rendered doubtful by the obscurity or the ambiguity of the text, bear not to those which are evident, the proportion of one to an hundred in number, and not of one to a thousand in importance. Let it be observed, that I speak only of the doubts arising from the obscurity of Scripture; for, as to those which may be started by curiosity concerning circumstances not mentioned, such doubts are, on every subject, sacred and profane, innumerable. But, in questions of this sort, it is a maxim with every true and consistent Protestant, that the faith of a Christian is not concerned.

Simon's reply is affectedly evasive. At the same time that it in fact includes a concession subversive of the principles he had advanced, it is far short of what every person of reflection must see to be the truth. He tells us that "he never doubted that "one might understand Hebrew well enough to know *in gross* "and *in general*, the Biblical histories; but this *general* and *confused* knowledge does not suffice for fixing the mind in what "regards the articles of our belief †." Now what this author meant by *knowing in gross* and *in general*, which is a more vague expression than any I remember in the Pentateuch, I will not attempt to explain; but it is not in my power to conceive any kind of knowledge, gross or pure, general or special, deducible from a writing wherein "there is *always* ground to doubt whether the sense assigned be the true sense, because there are other "meanings which are *equally* probable." There is in these positions a manifest contradiction. When the probabilities in the opposite scales balance each other, there can result no knowledge, no, nor even a reasonable opinion. The mind is in total suspense between the contrary but equal evidences.

§ 14. But, to be more particular, what historical point of moment recorded in Genesis, is interpreted differently by Jews of any denomination, Pharisees, Sadducees, Karaites, or even Samaritans? Let it be observed, that I speak only of their literal or grammatical interpretations of the acknowledged text, and neither of their interpolations, nor of their mystical expositions and allegories, which are as various as men's imaginations; for with these it is evident that the perspicuity of the tongue is no way concerned. Or is there one material difference, in what concerns the history, among Christians of adverse sects, Greeks, Romanists and Protestants, or even between Jews and Christians? This
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* Diff. I. ch. vi.

† "Mr Simon n'a jamais douté qu'on n'eut assez de connoissance de la "langue Hebraïque pour savoir *en gross* et *en general* les histoires de la "Bible. Mais cette connoissance *general* et *confuse* ne suffit pas pour arrêter l'esprit dans ce qui regarde les points de notre creance." Reponse aux Sentimens de quelq. Theol. de Holl. ch. xvi.

book has been translated into a great many languages, ancient and modern, into those of Asia, Africa and Europe. Is not every thing that can be denominated an event of consequence similarly exhibited in them all? In all we find one God, and only one, the Maker of heaven and earth, and of every thing that they contain. From all we learn, that the world was made in six days, that God rested the seventh. All agree in the work of each day, in giving man dominion over the brute creation, in the formation of the woman out of the body of the man, in the prohibition of the tree of knowledge, in man's transgression and its consequences, in the murder of Abel by his brother Cain, in the deluge, in the preservation of Noah's family, and of the animal world, by the ark, in the confusion of tongues, in the histories given of the patriarchs.

It were tedious, I had almost said endless, to enumerate every thing. Take the story of Joseph for an example, the only one I shall specify. In what version of that most interesting narrative, oriental or occidental, ancient or modern, Jewish or Christian, Popish or Protestant, is any thing which can be justly called material, represented differently from what it is in the rest? Do we not clearly perceive in every one of them the partiality of the parent, the innocent simplicity of the child, the malignant envy of the brothers, their barbarous purpose so cruelly executed, their artifice for deceiving their father, the young man's slavery in Egypt, his prudence, fidelity, piety, chastity, the infamous attempt of his mistress, and the terrible revenge she took of his virtuous refusal, his imprisonment, his behaviour in prison, the occasion of his release, Pharaoh's dreams, and Joseph's interpretation, the exaltation of the latter in Egypt, the years of plenty and the years of famine, the interviews he had with his brothers, and the affecting manner in which he at last discovered himself to them? Is there any one moral lesson that may be deduced from any part of this history, (and none surely can be more instructive), which is not sufficiently supported by every translation with which we are acquainted? Or is this coincidence of translations, in every material circumstance, consistent with the representations which have been given of the total obscurity and ambiguity of the original? The reverse certainly.

§ 4. Nor is it necessary, in this inquiry, to confine one's self to the points merely historical, though, for brevity's sake, I have done it. Permit me only to add in a sentence, that the religious institutions, the laws and the ceremonies of the Jews, as far as they are founded on the express words of Scripture, and neither on tradition, nor on traditionary glosses, are, in every thing material, understood in the very same way by both Jews and Christians. The principal points on which the Jewish sects differ so widely from one another, are supported, if not by the oral tradi-
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tive law, at least by mystical senses, attributed by one party, and not acquiesced in by others, to those passages of Scripture, about the literal meaning whereof all parties are agreed.

§ 16. Yet our critic will have it, that our knowledge of these things is *confused* and *general*. He had granted more, as we have seen, than was compatible with his bold assertions above quoted; and therefore to disguise a little the inconsistency of those assertions with the concession now made, he encumbers it with the epithets *confused* and *general*. But let the fact speak for itself. Had there been any source of confusion in the original, was it possible that there should have been such harmony in translations made into languages so different, and by men who, in many things that concern religion, were of sentiments so contrary? But if this knowledge be *confused* and *general*, I should like to be informed what this author, and those who think as he does, would denominate *distinct* and *particular*. For my part, I have not a more distinct and particular notion of any history, I ever read in any language, than of that written by Moses. And if there has not been such a profusion of criticism on the obscurities and ambiguities which occur in other authors, it is to be ascribed solely to this circumstance, that what claims to be matter of revelation, awakens a closer attention, and excites a more scrupulous examination, than any other performance which, how valuable soever, is infinitely less interesting to mankind. Nor is there a single principle by which our knowledge of the import of sacred writ, especially in what relates to Jewish and Christian antiquities, could be overturned, that would not equally involve all ancient literature in universal scepticism.

§ 17. Some perhaps will be ready to conclude from what has been advanced, that all new translations of Scripture must be superfluous, since the language is so clear, that no preceding translator has missed the sense in points of consequence. It is indeed true that no translator, that I know, has missed the sense in points of principal consequence, whether historical events, articles of faith, or rules of practice; inasmuch that we may with Brown safely desire the sceptic *, “to chuse which he should like best or worst among all the controverted copies, various readings, manuscripts, and catalogues, adopted by whatever church, sect, or party; or even any of the almost infinite number of translations made of these books in distant countries and ages, relying on it as amply sufficient for all the great purposes of religion and Christianity.”

Yet it is not to be argued that, because the worst copy or translation contains all the essentials of religion, it is not of real consequence, by being acquainted with the best, to guard against errors which, though comparatively of smaller moment, and not

subversive

* Essays on the Characteristics, Ess. iii. Sect. iii.

subversive of the foundation, impair the integrity, and often injure the consistency, as well as weaken the evidence of our religious knowledge. Although the most essential truths are the most obvious and accessible to the unlearned, as well as to the learned, we ought not to think lightly of any advances attainable in the divine science. There is a satisfaction which the well-disposed mind receives from an increase of knowledge, that of itself does more than repay all the labour employed in the acquisition. If this hold even in ordinary subjects, how much more in the most sublime? There is, besides, such a symmetry of parts in the divine institution we have by Jesus Christ, that a more thorough acquaintance with each part serves to illustrate the other parts, and confirm our faith in the whole. And whatever in any degree corroborates our faith, contributes in the same degree to strengthen our hope, to enhance our love, and to give additional weight to all the motives with which our religion supplies us, to a pious and virtuous life.

These are reasons which ought to weigh with every Christian, and the more especially, as the most minute examination will never be found an unprofitable study, even to the most learned. It is with the good things of the Spirit, as with what are called the good things of life; the most necessary are the most common, and the most easily acquired. But as, in regard to the animal life, it would be a reproach on those possessed of natural abilities, through torpid indolence, to look no further than mere necessaries, not exerting their powers for the attainment of those conveniencies whereby their lives might be rendered both more comfortable to themselves; and more beneficial to others; it is beyond compare more blame-worthy to betray the same lazy disposition, and the same indifference, in what concerns the spiritual life. Barely to have faith, does not satisfy the mind of the pious Christian, whose ambition it is to be rich in faith. To have received of the celestial grace is not enough, in point either of acquirement or of evidence, to him whose ardent and daily desire it is to grow in grace, and in the comforts of God's Spirit. Now, to make progress in divine knowledge, is (if I may be allowed the similitude) to improve the soil in which faith, and hope, and charity, and all the graces of the Spirit, must be sown and cultivated.

§ 18. But to return to the style of the sacred history, from which I fear this controversy, though exceedingly important, and intimately connected with the subject, has made me digress too far; there is another species of simplicity, beside the simplicity of structure, and the simplicity of sentiment above mentioned, for which, beyond all the compositions I know in any language, Scripture history is remarkable. This may be called simplicity of design. The subject of the narrative so engrosses the attention

of the writer, that he is himself as nobody, and is quite forgotten by the reader, who is never led by the tenor of the narration so much as to think of him. He introduces nothing as from himself. We have no opinions of his, no remarks, conjectures, doubts, inferences; no reasonings about the causes or the effects of what is related. He never interrupts his reader with the display of either his talents or his passions. He makes no digressions; he draws no characters; he gives us only the naked facts, from which we are left to collect the character. The utmost he does in characterising, and that but seldom, is comprised in a very few words. And what is thus said is not produced as his opinion, either of the person or of the thing, but as the known verdict of the time, or perhaps, as the decision of the Spirit. No attempt to shine by means of the expression, composition, or sentiments. Plainness of language is always preferred, because the most natural, the most obvious, and the best adapted to all capacities. Though in style by no means slovenly, yet in little points, as about those grammatical accuracies which do not affect the sense and perspicuity of the sentence, rather careless than curious.

§ 19. Now in the last of the three sorts of simplicity enumerated, our Lord's biographers particularly excel. This quality, or something akin to it, has been much and justly celebrated in some pagan writers, in Xenophon, for instance, among the Greeks, and Cesar among the Latins. It were easy however to show, were it a proper subject of discussion here, that the difference between these and the sacred penmen, especially the evangelists, is very considerable. In respect of the first species of simplicity mentioned, simplicity of structure, the difference of the genius of the Greek language from that of the Hebrew, must no doubt occasion some difference in the manner of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, from that of Moses; but the identity of idiom explained in a former discourse, (Diff. I. Part i.) occasions still a strong resemblance between them. If Genesis, therefore, may be justly said to possess the first rank for simplicity of composition in the sentences, the gospels are certainly entitled to the second. But even these are not, in this kind, entirely equal among themselves. John and Matthew have it in a higher degree than Mark and Luke.

As to the second species, simplicity of sentiment, arising chiefly from the uncultivated state of society in the period and country about which the history is conversant; the change of times, which was doubtless very great, as well as the difference of subject, would necessarily confer the first degree here also upon the former. But in what was denominated simplicity of object or design, the evangelists, of all writers, sacred and profane, appear the foremost. Their manner is indeed in some respects peculiar
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and unrivalled. It may not be amiss to consider a little the circumstances which gave occasion to this diversity and peculiarity.

§ 20. For this purpose I beg leave to lay before the reader the few following observations. 1st, I observe, that the state and circumstances of things were, before the times of the apostles, totally changed in Palestine from what they had been in the times of the patriarchs. The political alterations gradually brought upon the country, by a succession of revolutions in government, which made their condition so very unlike the pastoral life of their wandering forefathers, are too obvious to need illustration. 2dly, Their intercourse with strangers of different nations, to some of which they had been successively in subjection, had, notwithstanding their peculiarities in religion, introduced great changes in manners, sentiments, and customs. In our Saviour's days we find the nation divided into religious sects and political parties; the former of which had their respective systems, schools, and patrons among the learned. Each sect had its axioms or leading principles, and its particular mode of reasoning from those principles. Now there is not a single trace of any thing similar to this in all the Old Testament history. 3dly, As the *great* object of our Lord's ministry, which is the *great* subject of the Gospels, was to inculcate a doctrine and morality with which none of their systems perfectly coincided; and as, by consequence, he was opposed by all the principal men of the different factions then in the nation, the greater part of his history must be employed in relating the instructions which he delivered to the people and to his disciples, the disputes which he had with his antagonists, and the methods by which he recommended and supported his doctrine, exposed their sophistry, and eluded their malice.

This must give a colour to the history of the Messiah, very different from that of any of the ancient worthies recorded in the Old Testament; in which, though very instructive, there is comparatively little delivered in the didactic style, and hardly any thing in the argumentative. A great deal of both we have in the Gospels. It ought not here to pass unnoticed, that it is more in compliance with popular language, than in strict propriety, that I denominate his manner of enforcing moral instruction, *arguing*. Our Lord, addressing himself much more to the heart than to the head, and, by his admirable parables, without the form of argument, convincing his hearers, that the moral truths he recommended are conformable to the genuine principles of our nature, in other words, to the dictates of conscience and the common sense of mankind, commands from the impartial and the considerate an unlimited assent. Accordingly, when a similitude or an example is made to supply the place of argument, in support of a particular sentiment, he does not formally deduce

the conclusion, but either leaves it to the reflections of his hearers, or draws it from their own mouths by a simple question. This, without the parade of reasoning, is, in practical subjects, the strongest of all reasoning. After candidly stating an opposite case, it is appealing for the decision, not to the prejudices or the passions, but to the natural sense of good and evil, even of his adversaries. 4thly, As our Lord's history is occupied, partly with what he said, and partly with what he did, this occasions in the Gospels a twofold distinction of style and manner: first that of our Saviour, as it appears in what he said; secondly, that of his historians, as it appears in their relation of what he did. I shall consider briefly how the different sorts of simplicity above mentioned, may be applied to each of these.

§ 21. As to the simplicity of structure, it may be said in a very eminent degree to belong to both. It is in itself regarded more as a quality of narration, but is by no means excluded from the other kinds of composition. Besides, in our Lord's discourses, particularly his parables, there is a great deal of narrative. Simplicity of sentiment appears more in the dialogue part, and in the teaching, than in the narration, which is almost confined to what is necessary for information and connection. It may be objected, that our Lord's figurative manner of teaching is not perfectly compatible with simplicity. But let it be observed, that there is a simplicity of manner in the enunciation of the sentiments directly signified, which a piece of writing that admits a figurative or allegorical meaning, is as susceptible of, as one that admits only a literal interpretation. Greece has not produced a more genuine specimen of this than we have in the Apologues of Esop, which are all nevertheless to be understood figuratively. In Cebes's Table, which is an allegory, there is great simplicity of diction. It is only with the expression of the literal or immediate sentiment, that this quality is concerned. And nothing surely can in this particular exceed the parables of our Lord. As these are commonly in the style of narration, they are susceptible of the same simplicity of structure, as well as of sentiment, with the historian's narrative, and are, in this respect, hardly distinguishable from it.

But the third sort mentioned belongs peculiarly to the historian. In our Lord's discourses, though the general and ultimate object is the same throughout, namely the honour of God by the recovery of men, the particular and immediate object varies with the subject and occasion. At one time it is to instruct his hearers in one important doctrine or duty, at another time in another; sometimes to refute one error, at other times another; now to rebuke what is wrong, then again to encourage in the practice of what is right. We have all the variety of threats and promises, prohibitions and precepts, rebukes and consolations, explanation
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and refutation, praise and blame. These undoubtedly require a considerable variety in the style and manner. Now there is occasion for nothing of this kind in the narrative. The historians with whom we are here concerned, do, in their own character, neither explain nor command, promise nor threaten, commend nor blame, but preserve one even tenor in exhibiting the facts entirely unembellished, reporting, in singleness of heart, both what was said, and what was done, by their Master, likewise what was said, and what was done, to him, by either friends or enemies. Not a syllable of encomium on the former, or of invective against the latter. As to their Lord himself, they appear to regard his character as infinitely superior to any praise which they could bestow: and as to his persecutors, they mingle no gall in what they write concerning them; they do not desire to aggravate their guilt, in the judgment of any man, either by giving expressly, or by so much as insinuating, through the severity of their language, their opinion concerning it.

§ 22. Nay, which is more remarkable, the names of the high-priest and his coadjutor, of the Roman procurator, of the tetrarch of Galilee, and of the treacherous disciple, are all that are mentioned of the many who had a hand in his prosecution and death. In regard to the four first, it is manifest that the suppression of the names, had the facts been related, would have made no difference to contemporaries; for in offices of so great eminence possessed by single persons, as all those offices were, the official is equivalent to the proper name, which it never fails to suggest; but such a suppression would have made to posterity a material defect in the history, and greatly impaired its evidence. In regard to the fifth it is sufficient to observe, that without naming the traitor, justice could not have been done to the eleven. Whereas of those Scribes and Pharisees who bargained with Judas; of the men who apprehended Jesus, of the officer who struck him on the face at his trial, of the false witnesses who deposed against him, of those who afterwards spat upon him, buffeted and mocked him, of those who were loudest in crying, *Away with him; crucify him; not this man but Barrabbas*; of those who supplied the multitude with the implements of their mockery, the crown of thorns, the reed, and the scarlet robe; of those who upbraided him on the cross with his inability to save himself; or of the soldier who pierced his side with a spear; no name is given by any of the historians.

It may be said, 'The names have not been known to them.' This may have been true of some of their names, but cannot be supposed to have been true of them all, and that, with regard not to one, two, or three, but to all the four evangelists. The witnesses must have been persons of the country, and at least occasional hearers of our Lord. It was no doubt chiefly the people
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of Jerusalem who tumultuously demanded his execution, who derided him with the title of Messiah, and who insulted him even on the cross. Curiosity on such occasions leads men to enquire about persons who act a principal part in a scene so tragical; and that the disciples were not beyond the influence of this motive, is evident from the whole of the story. The names of the Roman soldiers concerned in this transaction might have been unknown to them, and probably little minded by them; but the actions of their countrymen must have excited another kind of emotion, as it more nearly affected all his followers.

Now this reserve in regard to the names of those who were the chief instruments of his sufferings, is the more observable, as the names of others to whom no special part is attributed, are mentioned without hesitation. Thus Malchus, whose ear Peter cut off, and who was immediately after miraculously cured by Jesus, is named by John; but nothing further is told of him than that he was present when our Lord was seized, and that he was a servant of the high-priest. Simon, the Cyrenian, who carried the cross, is named by no fewer than three of the evangelists; but we are also informed that in this service he did not act voluntarily, but by compulsion. Joseph, of Arimathea, and Nicodemus, are the only members of the Sanhedrim, except the high priest, who are mentioned by name; but they were the only persons of that body who did not concur in condemning the Son of God, and who, though once fearful and secret disciples, assumed the resolution to display their affection at a time when no one else ventured openly to acknowledge him. Our Lord's biographers, whilst they are thus far ready to do justice to merit, avoid naming any man, without necessity, of whom they have nothing to say that is not to his dishonour. To the virtuous and good they conciliate our esteem and love, an effectual method of raising our admiration of virtue and goodness, and exciting in us a noble emulation; but our contempt and hatred they direct against the crimes, not against the persons of men; against vices, not against the vicious: aware that this last direction is often of the most dangerous tendency to Christian charity, and consequently to genuine virtue. They shewed no disposition to hold up any man to the Christians of their own time, as an object of either their fear or their abhorrence, or to transmit his name with infamy to posterity.

Though this holds principally in what concerns the last great catastrophe, it appears in some degree in every part of the history. Except in the case of Herodias, which, from the rank of the personages concerned, must have been a matter of notoriety and public scandal, and therefore required a more public reprehension, the names are never mentioned, when what is related reflects disgrace on the persons. Of the Scribes and Pharisees
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who watched our Lord, and, on different occasions, dissembling esteem, assailed him with captious and ensnaring questions, of those who openly ascribed his miracles to Beelzebub, called him a madman, a demoniac, and what they accounted worse than either, a Samaritan, who accused him of associating with the profligate, of Sabbath-breaking, of intemperance and blasphemy, of those Sadducees who by their sophistry vainly attempted to refute the doctrine of the resurrection, of those enraged Nazarenes, his fellow-citizens who would have carried him by force to a precipice, that they might throw him down headlong, no names are ever mentioned; nor is the young but opulent magistrate named, who came to consult him as to what he must do to obtain eternal life; for though there were some favourable symptoms in his case, yet as, by going away sorrowful, he betrayed a heart wedded to the world, the application did not terminate to his honour. But of Simon the Pharisee, who invited our Lord to his house, and who, though doubtful, seemed inclinable to learn, of Jairus, and Bartimeus, and Zaccheus, and Lazarus, and his sisters Mary and Martha, and some others, of whose faith, repentance, gratitude, love and piety, the most honourable testimony is given, a very different account is made.

Some may object, that this conduct in the first disciples is imputable to a weak and timid policy. They were afraid to raise against themselves powerful enemies, whose vengeance might prove fatal to their persons, and ruinous to their cause. It happens luckily for silencing this pretext, that, in other things, they gave the most unequivocal proofs of their fortitude; besides, that the exceptions above mentioned include almost all the persons possessed of such authority, civil or sacred, united with such a disposition as could render their resentment an object of terror to those who were obnoxious to it. That the difference thus marked between the evil and the good is, on the contrary, in the true spirit of their Master, might be inferred, as from several other passages, so in particular, from that similitude wherein the rewards and punishments of another state are so well exemplified. A name is given to the poor man who was conveyed by angels to Abraham's bosom; the other, who was consigned to torments, is distinguished solely by the epithet *rich*. A particularity from which we may learn an instructive lesson of modesty and caution in regard to names, when what truth compels us to say is to the disadvantage of the persons, and that it sufficeth that we consider particular punishments as suited to particular actions, without referring them to known individuals, or leading the thoughts of others to refer them.

But as to the penmen themselves, and their fellow-disciples, in recording their own faults, no secret is made of the names. Of this the intemperate zeal of the sons of Zebedee on one occasion, and

and their ambition and secular views on another, the incredulity of Thomas, the presumption of Peter, and his lamentable defection in the denial of his Master, not to mention the prejudices and dulness of them all, are eminent examples. These particulars are all related by the sacred historians with the same undistinguished plainness which they use in relating the crimes of adversaries; and with as little endeavour to extenuate the former, as to aggravate the latter. Nor have they, on the other hand, the remotest appearance of making a merit of their confession. In one uniform strain, they record the most signal miracles and the most ordinary events. In regard to the one, like persons familiarized to such exertions of power, they no more express themselves either with hesitancy or with strong asseverations, than they do in regard to the other. Equally certain of the facts advanced, they recite both in the same unvaried tone, as faithful witnesses, whose business it was to testify, and not to argue.

§ 23. Hence it happens, that that quality of style which is called *animation*, is in a manner excluded from the narrative. The historians speak of nothing, not even the most atrocious actions of our Lord's persecutors, with symptoms of emotion; no angry epithet, or pathetic exclamation, ever escapes them; not a word that betrays passion in the writer, or is calculated to excite the passions of the reader. In displaying the most gracious, as well as marvellous, dispensation of Providence towards man, all is directed to mend his heart, nothing to move his pity, or kindle his resentment. If these effects be also produced, they are manifestly the consequences of the naked exposition of the facts, and not of any adventitious art in the writers, nay not of any one term, not otherwise necessary, employed for the purpose.

I am sensible that to those who are both able and willing to give these writings a critical examination, hardly in any translation does this peculiarity appear so much as it does in the original. Most readers consider *animation* as an excellency in writing; and in ordinary performances it no doubt is so. By interesting them strongly in the events related, it rouses and quickens their attention. Unanimated simplicity, on the contrary, they call flatness, if not insipidity of manner. In consequence of this general sentiment, when two words occur to a translator either of which expresses the fact, but one of them does it simply, without any note of either praise or blame, the other with some warmth expressive of censure or approbation; he very naturally prefers the latter as the more emphatical and affecting. Nor will he be apt to suspect that he is not sufficiently close to the original, if the action or thing alluded to be truly signified, though not entirely in the same manner. Such differences, even good translators, though not insensible of them, are apt to overlook, excusing themselves with the consideration, that words in all respects corresponding

responding in two tongues which differ widely from each other, are not always to be found.

But to explain myself by examples, without which a writer is often but indistinctly understood, in rendering *ὁ παραδὸς αὐτοῦ*, Matt. x. 4. into Latin; of the two verbs, *tradere* to deliver up, and *prodere* to betray, most translators would prefer the latter as the more animated. Yet in reality, the former is more conformable to the simplicity of the sacred author, who satisfies himself with acquainting us with the external fact, without characterising it, or insinuating his own opinion; otherwise the term would have been *produs* not *paradus*. Again, the demonstrative *ὁτος*, Matt. xii. 24. may be rendered into English either *this man*, or *this fellow*. But in the last expression, a degree of contempt is suggested, which is not in the first, nor in the original. See the notes on both passages.

§ 24. Let it be observed, that in excluding animation, I in a great measure confine myself to the narrative, or what proceeds immediately from the historians. In the discourses and dialogues wherein their Master bears the only, or the principal part; the expression, without losing aught of its proper simplicity, is often remarkable for spirit and energy. There is in these an animation, but so chastised by candour and strict propriety, as to be easily distinguished from what is often so termed in other compositions.

Yet here too the language has sometimes suffered in the very best translations, and that not so much through the fault of translators, as in consequence of the difference of genius found in different tongues. Some of the epithets employed by our Lord against his antagonists, have not that asperity which all modern versions appear to give them. The Greek word *ὑποκριτής*, for example, as metaphorically used in Scripture, has more latitude of signification than the word *hypocrite* formed from it, as used in modern tongues. The former is alike applicable to all who dissemble on any subject or occasion; the latter is in strictness applied only to those who, in what concerns religion, lead a life of dissimulation. It must be owned that it is to persons of this character that it is ofteneft applied in the Gospel; but the judicious philologist hardly needs to be informed, that the more the signification of a word is extended, the more vague and general it becomes, and consequently, if a reproachful epithet, the softer. The word *ψευδής*, in like manner, has not that harshness in Greek that *liar* has in English. The reason is the same as in the former instance; for though often properly rendered *liar*, it is not limited to what we mean by that term. Every man who tells or teaches what is false, whether he know the falsehood of what he says or not, is what the sacred authors justly denominate *ψευδής*, a *false speaker*; but he is not what we call a *liar*, unless

he knows it to be false, and deceives intentionally. For this reason I have, in some instances, Matt. xxii. 18. John viii. 55. considered it as no more than doing justice to the spirit of the original, to soften the expression in the common version, though otherwise unexceptionable.

On the other hand, the evangelists, in their own characters, are rarely other than mere narrators, without passions or opinions. In this, as I have said, they differ from Moses and the other historians of the Old Testament, who, though justly celebrated for native simplicity of manner, have not hesitated briefly to characterize the most remarkable persons and actions whereof they have occasion to speak. Without pretending to account entirely for this difference of manner in writers who spoke by the same Spirit, I shall only submit to the judicious reader the following considerations, which appear to indicate a singular propriety in the modest reserve of our Lord's biographers.

Moses, and the other writers of the Old Testament Scriptures, were all prophets, a character with which, considered in a religious light, no merely human character can be compared. None therefore could be better authorized than they, to pronounce directly on the quality both of the agents and of the actions mentioned in their histories. In this view of the matter, they had no superior, even in the most eminent personages whose lives they recorded. An unreserved plainness of censure or approbation was in them therefore becoming, as it entirely suited the authority with which they were vested. But was not the situation of the evangelists, it may be asked, the same in this respect, as they also wrote by inspiration? It is true they were inspired, and at least equally entitled to the prophetic character with any who preceded them; but they were not entirely in the same situation. In the Old Testament, the sacred penmen were the mouth of God to the people. In the gospels, the writers appear solely as Christ's humble attendants, selected for introducing to the knowledge of others this infinitely higher character, who is himself in a super-eminent sense the mouth, the oracle of God. It is this subordinate part of ushers which they professedly act. Like people struck with the ineffable dignity of the Messiah whom they serve, they lose no opportunity of exhibiting him to the world, appearing to consider the introduction of their own opinion, unless where it makes a part of the narration, as an impertinence. As modest pupils in the presence of so venerable a teacher, they lay their hand upon their mouth, and, by a respectful silence, shew how profound their reverence is, and how strong their desire to fix all the attention of mankind upon him. They sink themselves, in order to place him in the most conspicuous point of view: they do more; they, as it were, annihilate themselves, that Jesus may be all in all. Never could it be said of

any preachers with more truth than of them, that they preached not themselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord. Deeply impressed with their Master's instructions, and far from affecting to be called Rabbi, or to be honoured of men as fathers and teachers in things divine, they never allowed themselves to forget that they had only one Father who is in heaven, and only one teacher, the Messiah. The unimpassioned, yet not unfeeling manner, wherein they relate his cruel sufferings, without letting one harsh or severe epithet escape them, reflecting on the conduct of his enemies, is as unexampled as it is inimitable, and forms an essential distinction between them and all who have either gone before or followed them, literate or illiterate, artful or artless, sceptical or fanatical. For if, in the latter classes, the illiterate, the artless, and the fanatical, fury and hatred flame forth, wherever opposition or contradiction presents them with an occasion; the former, the literate, the artful, and the sceptical, are not less distinguishable for the supercilious and contemptuous manner in which they treat the opinions of religionists of all denominations. The manner of the evangelists was equally removed from both. Add to this, that without making the least pretences to learning, they no where affect to depreciate it; but, on the contrary, shew a readiness to pay all due regard to every useful talent or acquisition.

§ 25. From all that has been said I cannot help concluding that, if these men were impostors, agreeably to the infidel hypothesis, they were the most extraordinary the world ever produced. That they were not philosophers and men of science, we have irrefragable, I had almost said, intuitive evidence; and of what has hitherto been found invariably to mark the character of fanatics and enthusiasts of all religions, we do not discover in them a single trace. Their narratives demonstrate them to have been men of sound minds and cool reflection. To suppose them deceived in matters which were the objects of their senses; or, if not deceived, to suppose such men to have planned the deception of the world, and to have taken the method which they took to execute their plan, are alike attended with difficulties insurmountable. The Christian's hypothesis, that they spoke the truth, and were under the influence of the Divine Spirit, removes at once all difficulties, and in my judgment (for I have long and often revolved the subject), is the only hypothesis which ever will, or ever can, remove them. But this only by the way.

§ 26. Concerning the other qualities of style to be found in these writings, I acknowledge I have not much to add. Simplicity, gravity, and perspicuity, as necessarily resulting from simplicity, are certainly their predominant characters. But as in writings it is not always easy to distinguish the qualities arising from the thought, from those arising merely from the expression,

I shall consider, in a few sentences, how far the other properties of good writing, commonly attributed to the style, are applicable to the evangelists. In what concerns harmony, and qualities which may be called merely superficial, as adding only an external polish to their language; about such, if we may judge from their writings, they do not appear, as was hinted before, to have had any the smallest solicitude. To convey the sense (the only thing of importance enough to be an object to them) in the most familiar, and consequently in the most intelligible terms to their readers, seems to have been their highest aim in point of style. What concerned the sound alone, and not the sense, was unworthy of their attention.

In regard to elegance, there is an elegance which results from the use of such words as are most in favour with those who are accounted fine writers, and from such an arrangement in the words and clauses, as has generally obtained their approbation. This is still of the nature of *varnish*, and is disclaimed, not studied, by the sacred authors. But there is also an elegance of a superior order, more nearly connected with the sentiment; and in this sort of elegance they are not deficient. In all the oriental languages great use is made of tropes, especially metaphor. The Scriptures abound with them. When the metaphors employed bear a strong resemblance, and the other tropes are happily adapted to the subjects they are intended to represent, they confer *vivacity* on the writing. If they be borrowed from objects which are naturally agreeable, beautiful, or attractive, they add also *elegance*. Now of this kind, both of *vivacity* and of *elegance*, the evangelists furnish us with a variety of examples. Our Lord illustrates every thing (agreeably to the use of the age and country) by figures and similes. His tropes are always apposite, and often borrowed from objects naturally engaging. The former quality renders them *lively*, the latter *elegant*. The ideas introduced are frequently those of corn-fields, vineyards, and gardens. The parables are sometimes indeed taken from the customs of princes and grandees, but oftener from the life of shepherds and husbandmen. If those of the first kind confer dignity on the examples, those of the second add an attraction, from the pleasantness of images which recal to the fancy, the thoughts of rural happiness and tranquillity. And even in cases where propriety required that things disagreeable should be introduced, as in the story of the rich man and Lazarus, the whole is conducted with that seriousness and chaste simplicity of manner, which totally exclude disgust. We may justly say, therefore, that the essential attributes of good writing are not wanting in these histories, though whatever can be considered as calculated for glitter and ostentation, is rather avoided than sought.

§ 27. Upon the whole, therefore, the qualities of the style
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could not, to those who were not Jews, nor accustomed to their idiom, serve at first to recommend these writings. The phraseology could hardly fail to appear to such, awkward, idiomatical, and even vulgar. In this manner it generally did appear to Gentile Greeks, upon the first perusal. But if they were, by any means, induced to give them a second reading, though still not insensible of the peculiarity, their prejudices and dislike of the idiom rarely failed to subside. A third commonly produced an attachment. The more they became acquainted with these books, the more they discovered of a charm in them, to which they found nothing comparable or similar in all that they had learnt before, inasmuch that they were not ashamed, nay, they were proud, to be taught by writers for whose persons and performances they had formerly entertained a sovereign contempt. The persecutors of the church, both Jews and Pagans, perceived, at last, the consequences of conniving at the study of the Scriptures, and were therefore determined to make it their principal object to effect the suppression of them, particularly of the Gospels. But the more this was attempted, the more were the copies multiplied, the more was the curiosity of mankind excited, and the more was the inestimable treasure of divine knowledge they contained, circulated. Early, and with avidity, were translations demanded, in almost every known tongue. Those Christians who had as much learning as to be capable, were ambitious of contributing their share in diffusing amongst all nations, the delight, as well as the instruction, which the study of these books conveyed into the soul. Nor was this admiration of the divine writings to be found only among the vulgar and the ignorant. It is true, it originated among them; but it did not terminate with them. Contrary to the common course of fashion, which descends from the higher ranks to the lower, it arose among the lowest classes, and ascended to the highest. Not only nobles and senators, but even philosophers and men of letters, the pupils of sophists and rhetoricians, who by the prejudices of their education would be most shocked with the inelegancies, the vulgarisms, and even the barbarisms (as they would account them) of the sacred writers, found a secret and irresistible attraction, which overcame all their prepossessions, and compelled them to acknowledge, that no writers could so effectually convey conviction to the understanding, and reformation to the heart, as these poor, homely, artless, and unlettered Galileans.

DISSERTATION THE FOURTH.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RIGHT METHOD OF PROCEEDING IN THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BOOKS OF THE NEW TESTA- MENT.

IT was remarked in a foregoing Dissertation, (Diff. I. Part ii. § 1.) that, notwithstanding the sameness both of the language and of the idiom employed by the penmen of the New Testament, there is a sensible diversity in their styles. The first general rule, therefore, which demands the attention of him who would employ himself in searching the Scriptures, is to endeavour to get acquainted with each writer's style, and, as he proceeds in the examination, to observe his manner of composition, both in sentences and in paragraphs, to remark the words and phrases peculiar to him, and the peculiar application which he may sometimes make of ordinary words; for there are few of those writers who have not their peculiarities in all the respects now mentioned. This acquaintance with each can be attained only by the frequent and attentive reading of his works in his own language.

§ 2. The second general direction is to enquire carefully, as far as is compatible with the distance of time and the other disadvantages we labour under, into the character, the situation, and the office of the writer, the time, the place, and the occasion of his writing, and the people for whose immediate use he originally intended his work. Every one of these particulars will sometimes serve to elucidate expressions otherwise obscure or doubtful. This knowledge may in part be learnt from a diligent and reiterated perusal of the book itself, and in part be gathered from what authentic, or at least probable, accounts have been transmitted to us concerning the complement of the canon.

§ 3. The third and only other general direction I shall mention, is, to consider the principal scope of the book, and the particulars chiefly observable in the method by which the writer has purposed to execute his design. This direction, I acknowledge, can hardly be considered as applicable to the historical books, whose purpose is obvious, and whose method is deter-
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mined by the order of time, or at least by the order in which the several occurrences recorded have presented themselves to the memory of the compiler. But in the epistolary writings, especially those of the apostle Paul, this consideration would deserve particular attention.

§ 4. Now to come to rules of a more special nature. If, in reading a particular book, a word or phrase occur which appears obscure, perhaps unintelligible, how ought we to proceed? The first thing undoubtedly we have to do, if satisfied that the reading is genuine, is to consult the context, to attend to the manner wherein the term is introduced, whether in a chain of reasoning, or as belonging to a historical narration, as constituting some circumstance in a description, or included in an exhortation or command. As the conclusion is inferred from the premises; or as from two or more known truths, a third unknown or unobserved before may fairly be deduced; so from such attention to the sentences in connection, the import of an expression, in itself obscure or ambiguous, will sometimes with moral certainty be discovered. This, however, will not always answer.

§ 5. If it do not, let the second consideration be, whether the term or phrase be any of the writer's peculiarities. If so, it comes naturally to be enquired, what is the acceptation in which he employs it in other places? If the sense cannot be precisely the same in the passage under review, perhaps, by an easy and natural metaphor or other trope, the common acceptation may give rise to one which perfectly suits the passage in question. Recourse to the other places wherein the word or phrase occurs in the same author, is of considerable use, though the term should not be peculiar to him.

§ 6. But thirdly, if there should be nothing in the same writer that can enlighten the place, let recourse be had to the parallel passages, if there be any such, in the other sacred writers. By parallel passages I mean those places, if the difficulty occur in history, wherein the same or a similar story, miracle, or event, is related; if in teaching or reasoning, those parts wherein the same doctrine or argument is treated, or the same parable propounded; and if in moral lessons, those wherein the same class of duties is recommended. Or, if the difficulty be found in a quotation from the Old Testament, let the parallel passage in the book referred to, both in the original Hebrew and in the Greek version, be consulted.

§ 7. But if in these there be found nothing that can throw light on the expression, of which we are in doubt, the fourth recourse is to all the places wherein the word or phrase occurs in the New Testament, and in the Septuagint version of the Old, adding to these the consideration of the import of the Hebrew or Chaldaic word whose place it occupies, and the extent of signification, of
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which in different occurrences such Hebrew or Chaldaic term is susceptible.

§ 8. Perhaps the term in question is one of those which very rarely occur in the New Testament, or those called ἀπαξ λεγομένα, only once read in Scripture, and not found at all in the translation of the Seventy. Several such words there are. There is then a necessity, in the fifth place, for recurring to the ordinary acceptation of the term in classical authors. This is one of those cases wherein the interpretation given by the earliest Greek fathers deserves particular notice. In this verdict, however, I limit myself to those comments wherein they give a literal exposition of the sacred text, and do not run, as is but too customary with them, into vision and allegory. There are so many advantages which people have for discovering the import of a term or phrase in their mother-tongue, unusual perhaps in writing, but current in conversation, above those who study a dead language, solely by means of the books extant in it, that no reasonable person can question that some deference is in such cases due to their authority.

Ye will observe, that in regard to the words or phrases, whereof an illustration may be had from other parts of sacred writ, whether of the Old or of the New Testament, I should not think it necessary to recur directly to those primitive, any more than to our modern expounders. My reason is, as the word or phrase may not improbably be affected by the idiom of the synagogue, the Jewish literature will be of more importance than the Grecian, for throwing light upon the passage. Now this is a kind of learning with which the Greek fathers were very little acquainted. Whereas, on the other hand, if the term in question rarely, or but once, occur in the New Testament, and never in the version of the Old, there is little ground to imagine that it is affected by the idiom of the synagogue, but the greatest reason to suppose that it is adopted by the sacred penmen in the common acceptation.

I think it necessary to add here another limitation to the reference intended to the ancient Greek expositors. If the doubtful passage have been produced in support of a side, in any of the famous controversies by which the Christian church has been divided, no regard is due to the authority, whatever may be due to the arguments, of any writer, who lived at, or soon after, the time when the controversy was agitated. If you know the side he took in the dispute, you are sure beforehand of the explanation he will give of the words in question. Nothing blinds the understanding more effectually than the spirit of party, and no kind of party-spirit more than bigotry under the assumed character of religious zeal.

§ 9. In regard to the use to be made of the Fathers for assist-
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ing us to understand the Scriptures, there are two extremes, to one or other of which the much greater part of Christians show a propensity. One is an implicit deference to their judgment in every point on which they have given an opinion, the other is no regard at all to any thing advanced by them. To the first extreme the more moderate Romanists, and those Protestants who favour pompous ceremonies and an aristocratical hierarchy, are most inclined; and to the second, those Protestants, on the contrary, who prefer simplicity of worship and the democratical form in church government. But these observations admit many exceptions. As to the Papists, in the worst sense of the word, those who are for supporting even the most exorbitant of the papal claims, the manifest tendency whereof is to establish an ecclesiastical despotism, the aim of their doctrine, in spite of the canons, has long been to lessen, as much as possible, our reverence of the Fathers. What was said by Friar Theatin, an Italian, in a public disputation at Paris with some French divines, in presence of the Pope's nuncio and many prelates, may be justly considered as spoken in the spirit, and expressive of the sentiments of the whole party. When his antagonist Baron, a Dominican, urged the testimonies of several Fathers, in direct opposition to the doctrine maintained by the Italian, the latter did not recur to the chimerical distinctions of the Sorbonists, but making light of that long train of authorities, replied contemptuously, "As to what concerns the authority of the Fathers, I have only to say with the church, *Omnes sancti patres orate pro nobis*;" an answer which, at the same time that it greatly scandalized the Galican doctors, was highly approved by the nuncio, well knowing that it would be very much relished at Rome. So similar on this head are the sentiments of the most opposite sects. Nor is this the only instance wherein the extremes approach nearer to each other, than the middle does to either. I may add, that an unbounded respect for the Fathers was, till the commencement of the sixteenth century, the prevalent sentiment in Christendom. Since that time their authority has declined apace, and is at present, in many places, totally annihilated.

I own that, in my opinion, they of former generations were in one extreme, and we of the present are in another. The Fathers are not entitled to our adoration, neither do they merit our contempt. If some of them were weak and credulous, others of them were both learned and judicious. In what depends purely on reason and argument, we ought to treat them with the same impartiality we do the moderns, carefully weighing what is said, not who says it. In what depends on testimony, they are, in every case wherein no particular passion can be suspected to have swayed them, to be preferred before modern interpreters or annotators. I say not this to insinuate that we can rely more on

their integrity, but to signify that many points were with them a subject of testimony, which, with modern critics, are matter merely of conjecture, or at most of abstruse and critical discussion. It is only from ancient authors, that those ancient usages, in other things as well as in language, can be discovered by us, which to them stood on the footing of matters of fact, whereof they could not be ignorant. Language, as has been often observed, is founded in use; and ancient use, like all other ancient facts, can be conveyed to us only by written testimony. Besides, the facts regarding the import of words (when controversy is out of the question) do not, like other facts, give scope to the passions to operate; and if misrepresented, they expose either the ignorance or the bad faith of the author to his contemporaries. I do not say, therefore, that we ought to confide in the verdict of the Fathers as judges, but that we ought to give them an impartial hearing as, in many cases, the only competent witnesses. And every body must be sensible that the direct testimony of a plain man, in a matter which comes within the sphere of his knowledge, is more to be regarded than the subtle conjectures of an able scholar who does not speak from knowledge, but gives the conclusions he has drawn from his own precarious reasonings, or from those of others.

§ 10. And even as to what is advanced not on knowledge but on opinion, I do not think that the moderns are in general entitled to the preference. On controverted articles of faith, both ought to be consulted with caution, as persons who may reasonably be thought prejudiced in favour of the tenets of their party. If, in this respect, there be a difference, it is entirely in favour of the ancients. An increase of years has brought to the church an increase of controversies. Disputes have multiplied, and been dogmatically decided. The consequence whereof is, that religion was not near so much moulded into the systematic form for many centuries, as it is in these latter ages. Every point was not in ancient times so minutely discussed, and every thing, even to the phraseology, settled in the several sects, with so much hypercritical and metaphysical, not to say sophistical, subtlety, as at present. They were, therefore, if not entirely free, much less entangled with decisions merely human, than more recent commentators; too many of whom seem to have had it for their principal object, to bring the language of Scripture to as close a conformity, as possible, to their own standard, and make it speak the dialect of their sect. So much for the preference I give to the ancient, particularly to the Greek, expounders of Scripture, when they confine themselves to the grammatical sense; and so much for the regard to which I think the early Christian writers justly entitled.

§ 11. To the aid we may have from them, I add that of the ancient

ancient versions, and last of all that of modern scholiasts, annotators, and translators. In the choice of these we ought to be more influenced by the acknowledged learning, discernment, and candour of the person, than by the religious denomination to which he belonged, or the side which, on contested articles, he most favoured. So far from limiting ourselves to those of one sect, or of one set of tenets, it is only by the free use of the criticisms and arguments of opposite sides, as urged by themselves, that undue prepossessions are best cured, or even prevented. We have heard of poisons which serve as antidotes against other poisons of opposite quality. It will be no inconvenient consequence of the use of interpreters addicted to adverse parties, if their excesses serve mutually to correct one another.

§ 12. But I am aware that some will be astonished that, among the assistances enumerated for interpreting the Scriptures, I have made no mention of two helps much celebrated by writers of almost all denominations. These are *the analogy of the faith*, and *the etymology of the words*. It will no doubt be proper now to enquire impartially, what aid, in the interpretation of dark and doubtful passages, may reasonably be sought for and expected from these.

§ 13. First, of the analogy of the faith. As far as I can collect from the import of the terms, what is meant by proposing this as a rule of interpretation in every dubious case, it should be, that when a passage appears ambiguous, or is susceptible of different interpretations, that interpretation is always to be adopted which is most conformable to the whole scheme of religion, in respect both of doctrines and of precepts, delivered in the sacred oracles. Now, there can be no question that, if the enquirer be previously in the certain knowledge of that whole scheme, this rule is excellent, and, in a great measure, supercedes the necessity of any other. But let me ask him, or rather let him ask himself, ere he proceed, this simple question, What is the reason, the principal reason at least, for which the study of Scripture is so indispensable a duty? It is precisely, all consistent Protestants will answer, that thence we may discover what the whole scheme of religion is. Are we then to begin our examination with taking it for granted that, without any enquiry, we are perfectly acquainted with this scheme already? Is not this going to Scripture, not in order to learn the truths it contains, but in order to find something that may be made to ratify our own opinions?

If no more were meant by making the analogy of the faith the rule of interpreting, than that, where an expression is either dark or equivocal, an interpretation were not to be adopted, which would contradict the sentiments of the writer, manifestly declared in other passages perfectly clear and unequivocal; this is no more than what candour would allow in interpreting any
 profane

profane author, who seems to have enjoyed the exercise of his reason; nay, though the rule were extended to what should be found clearly contained in any other sacred writer, it would be but of little significance as an help in the explanation of the holy oracles. For it is only the uncontroverted truths, about which there has never arisen any doubt in the church, that ought to be comprehended in the phrase, *the analogy of the faith*, when proposed in this manner as a canon to direct us in the interpretation of Scripture.

‘But why,’ say you, ‘should we confine the meaning to the ‘uncontroverted truths?’ Attend a little, and you must perceive that what I have now advanced, is almost self evident. When I recur to holy writ, my view is, or ought to be, that I may know what it teaches; more especially that, as its doctrine is so variously represented by different sects, I may thence discover, amid such a multiplicity of jarring sentiments, where the truth lies. My purpose manifestly is, by the Scripture, to judge concerning all such controverted sentiments, and not, by a particular set of controverted sentiments, previously and therefore inconsiderately adopted, to determine concerning the sense of Scripture. This would not be judging the parties by the law, but resolving to judge of the import of the law by the interpretation that shall be given by one of the parties, whom we have contracted a strong inclination to favour. Surely such a conduct in a civil judge would be universally pronounced incompatible with every principle of reason and justice. And is not at least as great a deference due from the devout Christian to the divine oracles, as is due from the secular judge to the law of his country?

§ 14. In vain do we search the Scriptures for their testimony concerning Christ, if, independently of these Scriptures, we have received a testimony from another quarter, and are determined to admit nothing as the testimony of Scripture, which will not perfectly quadrate with that formerly received. This was the very source of the blindness of the Jews in our Saviour’s time. They searched the Scriptures as much as we do; but, in the disposition they were in, they would never have discovered what that sacred volume testifies of Christ; (see John v. 39, 40. in this Translation, with the note upon it.) Why? because their great rule of interpretation was *the analogy of the faith*; or, in other words, the system of the Pharisean scribes, the doctrine then in vogue, and in the profound veneration of which they had been educated. This is that veil by which the understandings of that people were darkened, even in reading the law, and of which the apostle observed, that it remained unremoved in his day, and of which we ourselves have occasion to observe, that it remains unremoved in ours.

And is it not precisely in the same way that the phrase is used
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by every sect of Christians, for the particular system or digest of tenets for which they themselves have the greatest reverence? The Latin church, and even the Greek, are explicit in their declarations on this article. With each, *the analogy of the faith* is their own system alone. And that different parties of Protestants, though more reserved in their manner of speaking, aim at the same thing, is undeniable; the same, I mean, considered relatively to the speakers, for absolutely considered, every party means a different thing. When a Lutheran tells you, "You are to put no interpretation on any portion of Scripture, but what perfectly coincides with *the analogy of the faith*," list him ever so little on the import of this phrase, and you shall find, that if he mean any thing, it is, that you are to admit no exposition that will not exactly tally with the system of his great founder, Luther. Nor is he singular in this. A Calvinist has the same prepossession in favour of the scheme of Calvin, and an Arminian of that of Arminius. Yet they will all tell you with one voice, that their respective doctrines are to be tried by Scripture, and by Scripture alone. *To the law and to the testimony*, is the common cry; only every one of them, the better to secure the decision on the side he has espoused, would have you previously resolve, to put no sense whatever on the law and the testimony, but what his favourite doctor will admit. Thus they run on in a shuffling circular sort of argument, which, though they studiously avoid exposing it, is, when dragged into the open light, neither more nor less than this: "You are to try our doctrine by the Scripture only. But then you are to be very careful that you explain the Scripture solely by our doctrine." A wonderful plan of trial, which begins with giving judgment, and ends with examining the proof, wherein the whole skill and ingenuity of the judges are to be exerted in wrestling the evidence so as to give it the appearance of supporting the sentence pronounced beforehand.

'But,' say some, 'is not this mode of interpretation warranted by apostolical authority? Does not Paul, Rom. xii. 6. in speaking of the exercise of the spiritual gifts, enjoin the prophets to prophesy, *κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως*, according to the proportion of faith, as our translators render it, but as some critics explain it, according to the analogy of the faith?' Though this exposition has been admitted into some versions*, and adopted by Hammond and other commentators, and may be called literal, it is suited neither to the ordinary meaning of the words, nor to the tenor of the context. The word *ἀναλογία* strictly denotes proportion, measure, rate, but by no means that complex notion conveyed

* Port Royal and Sacy, though translating from the Vulgate, which says, *secundum rationem fidei*, have rendered the clause, *selon l'analogie et la regle de la foi*.

conveyed in the aforesaid phrase by the term *analogy*, which has been well observed by Whitby to be particularly unsuitable in this place, where the apostle treats of those who speak by inspiration, not of those who explain what has been thus spoken by others. The context manifestly leads us to understand *αναλογια πισεως*, v. 6. as equivalent to *μετρον πισεως*, v. 3. And for the better understanding of this phrase, *the measure of faith*, it may be proper to observe, 1. That a strong conviction of any tenet, from whatever cause it arises, is in Scripture sometimes termed *faith*. Thus in the same Epistle, Rom. xiv. 22. the apostle says, *Hast thou faith? have it to thyself before God*. The scope of his reasoning shews that nothing is there meant by *faith*, but a conviction of the truth in regard to the article of which he had been treating, namely, the equality of days and meats, in point of sanctity, under the gospel dispensation. The same is evidently the meaning of the word, v. 23 *Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin*; where, without regard to the morality of an action abstractly considered, that is concluded to be sin which is done by one who doubts of its lawfulness; 2dly, As to spiritual gifts, prophecy and inspiration in particular, they appear to have been accompanied with such a faith or conviction that they came from the Spirit, as left no room for hesitation. And indeed it is easy to perceive that something of this kind was absolutely necessary to enable the inspired person to distinguish what proceeded from the Spirit of God, from what was the creature of his own imagination. It was observed before, (Diff. 1. Part ii. § 3.) that the prophets of God were not acted upon like machines, in delivering their predictions, as the diviners were supposed to be among the heathen, but had then, as at other times, the free use of their faculties, both of body and mind. This caution is therefore with great propriety given them by the apostle, to induce them to be attentive in prophesying not to exceed the precise measure allowed them, (for different measures of the same gift were committed to different persons), and not to mingle aught of their own with the things of God's Spirit. This distinction, he tells them, they have it in their power to make, by means of that lively faith with which the divine illumination is accompanied. Though a sense somewhat different has been given to the words by some ancient Greek expositors, none of them, as far as I remember, seems to have formed a conception of that sense, which, as was observed above, has been given by some moderns.

So much for what is commonly understood by *the analogy of the faith*, so unanimously recommended as a rule of interpretation, but so discordantly applied; and so much for the regard that is due to it:

§ 15. Another ordinary method of explaining is, by entering, on every occasion, into a minute and nice examination of the etymology

mology of the principal words employed in the sentence. This, though generally carried to excess, neither proceeds from the like partial prepossessions as the former, nor is so hazardous in its consequences. There are cases wherein no reasonable person can doubt, that the signification of a word may be fully ascertained from the knowledge we have of the meaning of the etymon; for instance, in verbal nouns expressing the action signified by the verb, as *κριμα*, *judgment*, from *κρινειν*, *to judge*, or the actor, as *κριτης*, *a judge*, from the same root; in concretes from abstracts, as *αληθινος*, *true*, from *αληθεια*, *truth*; or conversely, abstracts from concretes, as *δικαιοσυνη*, *justice*, from *δικαιοις*, *just*. In compositions also analogically formed, the sense of the compound term may often be certainly known, by the import of the simple terms of which it is composed. Thus, no man will hesitate a moment to pronounce from etymology, that *φιληδοιος* must mean, *a lover of pleasure*, and *φιλοθεος*, *a lover of God*; though these words occur but once in the New Testament, and never in the Greek version of the Old. In matters so obvious, the bare knowledge of the rudiments of the language renders the mention of any rules, save those of grammar, unnecessary, almost as much as for determining the import of the future tense of a verb from that of the present, or the signification of the passive voice from that of the active. There are instances, however, wherein the verb in the passive form undergoes an additional change of meaning, beside what the analogy of the language requires.

§ 16. But there are a great many cases wherein, if I may be allowed the expression, the pedigree of the derivative or of the compound, cannot be deduced with equal clearness; and there are many cases wherein, though its descent may be clearly traced, we should err egregiously, if we were to fix its meaning from that of the primitive or root. As to the first, that we should not hastily decide concerning the import of an obscure or unusual term, from that of another better known, but of whose relation to the former we are uncertain, is indeed manifest. But even often, where the connection is unquestionable, the sense of the one does not ascertain the signification of the other. It will not be improper to give a few illustrations of this doctrine, as I know nothing in which modern critics are more frequently misled, than in their reasonings from etymology. I shall exemplify this remark first in simple words, and afterwards in compound.

§ 17. The Greek word *τραγικος*, from *τραγος*, *a goat*, if it occurred very seldom in Greek authors, and if in the few places where it occurred, the words in connection did not suffice for ascertaining the sense, and if the custom which gave rise to the common acceptation of that term had never been related by any ancient writer, nobody, by the aid of etymology, could have imagined

imagined the meaning to be that which we know certainly that it is. As much may be said of the word *καμικος*, from *καμη*, a *village*. By neither should we have been led to think of poetry or any of its species. To the Greek word *καμικος*, the Latin *paganus* answers exactly in being similarly derived from a primitive of the same signification. But it is very far from corresponding in sense. Nor does it, in the use which soon became universal among Christians, correspond better with its etymon *pagus*. When Christianity became very general throughout the empire, as all the churches were in the cities and great towns, where the bishops had their residence, the Christians found a convenience in living near their place of worship, which made them mostly resort to the cities or their suburbs. Those who were attached to the ancient idolatry, not having the same motive for preferring the towns, and probably liking better, when Christianity came to have the ascendant, to associate with one another, lived generally in the villages. Hence *villager* and *idolater* became synonymous. This sense of the Latin *paganus* has passed into modern tongues. The Italians say *pagano*, the French *payen*, and the English *pagan*, to denote the same character. The English word *villain*, in low Latin *villanus*, a farmer, a villager, though nearly coinciding in etymology, has come gradually by use to signify a worthless unprincipled man. Thus the three words *καμικος* in Greek, *paganus* in Latin, and *villain* in English, though evidently so conformable in etymology, that they ought all to denote the same thing, namely *villager*, have, for many ages, both lost that signification, and acquired others in which they do not in the least resemble one another. If the use, in these languages, should ever come to be very little known, and the history of the nations nearly lost, we may form a guess at the absurdities in explaining those terms into which men would be misled by etymology. *קדשה* *kedeshah*, in Hebrew, signifies a *barlot*, a word manifestly sprung, according to the invariable rules of that language, from *קדש* *kadash*, to *sanctify*. What could give rise to so strange a deviation from the primitive meaning, it is perhaps now impossible to discover.

In process of time, words in every tongue vary from their original import, in consequence of the gradual influence of incidental causes, and the changes in manners and sentiments which they occasion. Hence the word *זרה* among the Hebrews, which denoted no more at first than a female stranger, came at last to signify a common prostitute; and is almost always used in this sense by Solomon in the Book of Proverbs. The origin of this application may indeed be easily traced from their laws. The women of that occupation among them were all foreigners, no daughter of Israel being permitted to follow so infamous a profession. It is an observation of Cicero, if I remember right,
that

that the word *hostis* with them anciently meant *foreigner*, which, having been given at first, through delicacy, as a milder name for people with whom they were at war, became, through long-continued use, the proper appellation for *enemy*. By the like gradation doubtless amongst us, the word *knave*, from denoting servant, has degenerated into the sign of a character distinguished more for turpitude of manners, than for meanness of condition. It would not be so easy to divine how the word *beholden*, the passive participle of the verb *to behold*, came, from signifying *seen* or *perceived*, to denote *indebted*. Innumerable examples of this kind might be mentioned.

§ 18. But from simple words to proceed, as I proposed, to compounds; were we to lay it down as a principle, that the combined meanings of the component parts will always give us the sense of the compound, we should conclude that the Greek word πανεργος is equivalent to the English poetic word *omnific*, to which it exactly corresponds in etymology; yet nothing can be more different in signification. The former is always adopted in a bad, the latter in a good sense. Hardly any rule in the composition of Greek words holds more uniformly than that the adverb εν gives the addition of a good quality to the word with which it is joined; yet the term ενανδρις which, if any faith were due to etymology, should mean a virtuous and worthy man, denotes generally a *simpleton* or *fool*. The Greek word αυταρχεια exactly corresponds, in respect of the signification of its component parts, to the English word *self sufficiency*: yet the former has a good meaning, and denotes *contentment*; the latter, except when applied to the Deity, has invariably a bad meaning, and signifies *arrogance*. Sometimes the sense of one of the words in composition is totally lost, the compound term being applied in a manner which excludes it. Thus the word οικοδομω ought to signify, *to build a house*, but it is not only construed with ταφος, a *sepulchre*, (which by metaphor may indeed be called a house, being the receptacle of the dead), but with θυιασηριον, *altar*, χαρακωσις, *bulwark*, and several other terms which, in no sense, proper or figurative, can be denominated *houses*. Such anomalies, both in derivation and in composition, are to be found in all tongues, inasmuch that often etymology points to one meaning, and use to another. Were we to mind the indication of the former, the English word *always* ought to be rendered into Latin *ownimodo* and not *semper*; our verb, *to vouchsafe*, should denote, *to give one a protection*, or *to insure one's safety*, and not *to deign* or *condescend*. The inseparable preposition *re* in English commonly denotes *again*, but *to reprove* is not *to prove again*, *to recommend* is not *to commend again*; nor does *to remark* mean, *to mark again*. As little can these be explained by the aid of the adverb *back*, like the verbs *to recal* and *to return*.

§ 19. In the above examples I have confined myself to terms whose meaning, though an exception from the rules of analogy, is incontrovertible; my principal object being to evince, to the satisfaction of every intelligent reader, that the sense of words is often totally different from that to which the etymology points, and that consequently in all the cases wherein use cannot be discovered, and wherein the context does not necessarily fix the meaning, the conviction which arises from etymology alone is considerably inferior to that which arises either from known use, or from the words immediately connected. But, before I dismiss this topic, I shall offer some criticisms on a few passages of the New Testament, which may appear, on a superficial view, more controvertible, in order to shew with how much caution we ought to proceed in rendering a compound word in one language, by one in another similarly compounded; and that even though the original term be not, like those above specified, an exception, in respect of meaning, from the common rules of analogy.

The word διψυχος, used by the apostle James, compounded of δις, signifying in composition *double* or *twice*, and ψυχη, *soul, mind, spirit*, could not, one would at first imagine, be more properly or literally rendered, than by the similar English compound *double-minded*. But this, though in some sense it may be called a literal version, is a mis-translation of the word, inasmuch as it conveys a sense entirely different. Yet the meaning of the original term is analogical; only there are different ways wherein the mind or soul may be charged with duplicity. One is, when it sometimes leans to one opinion, sometimes to the contrary; another is, when it secretly harbours passions and opinions the reverse of those which it openly professes. No two meanings can be more different; the first is certainly the import of the Greek word, the second of the English, which is justly explained by Johnson, *deceitful, insidious*. To recur to the passage itself, James i. 8. Ἄνη διψυχος ἀκταστατος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτης, in the common translation, *A double minded man is unstable in all his ways*; first, the sentiment itself may suggest a doubt of the justness of the version. There appears no immediate connection between deceitfulness and inconstancy. The deceitful are often but too stable in a bad course. The doubleness expressed in the English word does not imply sudden changes of any kind; but solely that the real motives of conduct and the outward professions disagree, or that the person intends one thing, whilst he professes another. Now who sees not that, in respect of both the intention and the profession, he may be very steady? Fickleness is not remarkably an attendant on hypocrisy. When I examine the context, I find nothing there that relates to sincerity or the conformity that ought to subsist between a man's words and his thoughts; but I am led directly by it to think of constancy in

right principles, as the apostle had been, in the preceding words, urging the necessity of unshaken faith. This verse, if *διψυχος* be understood to mean unsteady in the belief of the truth, perfectly coincides with, and supports the apostle's argument, implying that inconstancy in principles produces inconstancy in the whole conduct, than which no sentiment can be clearer.

To recur, however, to some of the other rules of criticising above mentioned (not as necessary in the present instance, but for the sake of illustration), and first to Scriptural usage: I find, on enquiry, that there is only one other passage in the New Testament wherein the word occurs. It is in the same epistle, but the expression there is too general to ascertain the import of the term in question. As the word is not to be found in the Septuagint, nor even in the Apocrypha, there is reason to believe that it is not affected by the idiom of the synagogue. I therefore apply to common use, and find that the word uniformly denotes *doubtful, fluctuating* in respect of one's judgment. All its conjugates in like manner support this meaning; *διψυχια* is *doubt or hesitancy*, *διψυχισα*, *to doubt, to hesitate*. If we apply to the ancient Greek expositors, they all interpret it in the same way. And as this is none of the passages whereon any of their theological controversies were founded, we can give them the greater credit. I shall only transcribe the explanation given by Ecumenius*, which is to this effect: “*Διψυχος ανηρ* is a man of unsettled and fluctuating sentiments, too solicitous about the present to attain the future, too anxious about the future to secure the present, who driven hither and thither in his judgment of things, is perpetually shifting the object, who this moment would sacrifice all for eternity, and the next would renounce any thing for this transient life.” The sense of the apostle's expression may be therefore justly given in these words: *A man unsteady in his opinions, is in all his actions inconstant.*

§ 20. To the above example I shall add a few of the most common of all kinds of composition, a preposition and a verb in familiar use. My intention is chiefly to show, that a deviation in interpreting, small to appearance, even such as is apt to be overlooked by a reader deceived by the correspondence of the themes, is often sufficient to pervert the sense, either by rendering the expression totally unmeaning, or by giving it a wrong meaning. The verb *οραω*, *to see*, is common; *προ* in composition generally answers to the English inseparable preposition *fore*. The verb, therefore, *προοραω*, or, in the middle voice, *προοραομαι*, should mean analogically, one would imagine, *to foresee*: It is accordingly

* *Διψυχον ανδρα, τον ανιπερσειον, τον ασκηρικτον λεγει, τον μητε προς τα μελλοντα παρως, μητε προς τα παροντα ασφαλως ηδρασμενον, αλλα τηδε κακεισε αγραμενον και περιφερεισμενον, και ποτε μεν των μελλοντων, ποτε δε των παροντων αντεχορεισμενον.*

ingly in one place, Acts ii. 25. so rendered, *I foresaw the Lord always before my face*, in Greek, *προωραμην τον Κυριον ενωπιον μου δια παντος*. The words are a quotation from the Psalms, xvi. 8. and are literally copied from the Septuagint.

It will naturally occur to an attentive English reader to enquire, What is the meaning of the word *foresaw* in this passage? Foresight has a reference to the future; whereas the Psalmist is speaking of things as present: for, though it is true that the words relate to the Messiah, who was many centuries posterior to David, they are not announced in the form of a prediction. David, in speaking, personates the Messiah, of whom he was an eminent type, and ascribes as to himself what, in the sublimest sense, was applicable only to that illustrious descendent. It is, as it were, Christ who speaks. The Lord he represents as always before him, not as *to be* in some future period before him, adding *be it*, not *he will be*, on my right hand. In regard to the compound verb, it occurs only in one other passage of the New Testament, to be considered afterwards, and in no place of the Septuagint, except that above quoted. But, on examining more closely the import of the simple words, we discover that the Greek preposition may relate to place as well as to time, and that it is often merely what grammarians call *intensive*; that is, it does not alter the sense of the simple verb to which it is prefixed, it only renders the expression more emphatical. Thus the verb *προωραω* is as literally rendered *prospicio* as *prævideo*, and has been in this passage more fitly rendered so by Beza. It may be objected that this explanation produces a pleonasm in the sentence, as it is immediately added, *ενωπιον μου*, *before me*. But such pleonasms are not uncommon in Scripture. Thus, Rom. viii. 26. Το πνευμα υπερεντυχηκει υπερ ημων. Matt. vii. 24. 26. 'Οστις ακοδαμησε την οικιαν αυτου. Rev. xiv. 2. Φωνην ηκουσεν κηδερωδων κηδερευζοντων εν ταις κηδεραις αυτων. The last four words in this verse are plainly implied in the participle. The phrase which occurs oftener than once, *υποποδιον των παδων αυτου*, is chargeable with the like redundancy. Add to all this, that the Hebrew word here translated *προωραω* by the Seventy, never signifies *to foresee*, but *to place, to set*. In this passage, being applied to the mind, it denotes the Psalmist's, or rather the Messiah's fixed attention on God as always with him.

The other passage in which this verb occurs is also in the Acts, xxi. 29. Ηταν προωρακατες Τροφιμον τον Εφεσιον εν τη πολει συν αυτω. Here the connection, without other resource, shews sufficiently that the simple verb *ωραω* means literally *to see*, and the preposition *προς* *before*, in respect of time, not of place, and yet that *προωραω* does not imply *to foresee*, but *to see before*. The difference lies here. The former is to see or perceive an event before it happen, the latter denotes only to see either person or thing before
the

the present time, which alone can be the sense of this passage, and which is therefore rightly rendered by our translators, *They had seen before with him, in the city, Trophimus an Ephesian.* To have said, "They had foreseen with him," would have totally marred the sense. But our translators have not always been equally attentive.

§ 21. I shall add an example, not unlike the former, in the verb προγνωσκω, though the difficulty, with regard to it, arises as much from the signification of the simple verb, as from that of the preposition. Paul says, Rom. xi. 2. Ουκ αποστειλει ο Θεος τον λαον αυτου ον προγνω, which our translators render, *God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew.* The last clause in this version conveys to my mind no meaning whatever. To *foreknow* always signifies to know some event before it happen; but no event is here mentioned, so that we are at a loss to discover the object of the foreknowledge mentioned. Is it only the existence of the people? Even this is not explicitly said; but if this were the writer's intention, we should still be at a loss for the sense. There is nothing in this circumstance which distinguishes God's people from any other people, for the existence of all were equally foreknown by him; whereas here something peculiar is plainly intended, which is suggested as a reason to prevent our thinking that God would ever totally cast them away. Though nothing, to appearance, can answer more exactly than the English *foreknew* does to the Greek προγνω, it in reality labours under a double defect. The first is the same which was observed in the preceding paragraph, in rendering the preposition; for there is the same difference between *knowing before* and *foreknowing*, that there is between *seeing before* and *foreseeing*. Our translators have, on some occasions, shown themselves sensible of the difference. Accordingly they render προγνωσκοντες με αναθεν, Acts xxvi. 5. *which knew me from the beginning*, not *foreknew me*. The example above quoted from the twenty-first chapter of the Acts, is a similar instance.

The prepositions in the two languages, though nearly, are not perfectly correspondent, especially in composition. With us the inseparable preposition *fore*, prefixed to *know*, *see*, *tell*, and *show*, always relates to some event which is *known*, *seen*, *told*, and *shewn*, before it happen; whereas the Greek preposition προ does not necessarily relate to an event, and signifies no more than *before this time*. The difference in these idioms may be thus illustrated. A friend introducing a person with whom he supposes me unacquainted, says, *This is such a man.* I make answer, *I knew him before.* I should speak nonsense if I said, *I foreknew him.* Yet in Greek I might say properly προγνω.

Another instance wherein our interpreters have shown an attention to this distinction, we have in the second epistle to the Corinthians,

Corinthians, vii. 3. where they translate the word *προεφησα* very properly, *I have said before*. Every reader of discernment must perceive that it would have been absurd to render it in that place, *I have foretold*.

But to return to the passage under review in the epistle to the Romans: it was observed, that the common version of the word *προεγνω*, in that passage, labours under a double defect. It is not, in my judgment, barely in translating the preposition that the error lies, but also in the sense assigned to the verb compounded with it. That God knew Israel before, in the ordinary meaning of the word *knowing*, could never have been suggested as a reason to hinder us from thinking that he would ever cast them off; for, from the beginning, all nations and all things are alike known to God. But the verb *γινωσκω*, in Hellenistic use, has all the latitude of signification which the verb *גָּדַל* *jadang* has, being that whereby the Seventy commonly render the Hebrew word. Now the Hebrew word means not only *to know*, in the common acceptation, but *to acknowledge* and *to approve*. Nothing is more common in Scripture than this use. "The Lord *knoweth*, *γινωσκει*, "the way of the righteous," Psalm i. 6. that is, *approveth*. "Then I will profess unto them, I never *knew* you," *εγνων*, *acknowledged* you for mine, Matt. vii. 23. "If any man love "God, the same is *known* of him," 1 Cor. viii. 3. *εγνωσται*, *acknowledged*. If, therefore, in the passage under examination, we understand in this way the verb *γινωσκω*, adding the import of the preposition *πρε*, *before*, *formerly*, *heretofore*, the meaning is both clear and pertinent: "God hath not cast off his people whom heretofore he acknowledged."

I shall just add a sense of the verb *προγινωσκω*, as used by the apostle Peter, 1 Pet. i. 20, different from both the former. The verb *γινωσκω* in classical use often denotes *to decree*, *to ordain*, *to give sentence* as a judge, and therefore *προγινωσκω*, *to foreordain*, &c. It is in this sense only we can understand *Προεγνωσμενη πρε καταβολης κοσμου*, which our interpreters have rightly rendered "*foreordained*, before the foundation of the world." But they have not so well translated the verbal noun *προγνωσις* in the second verse of the chapter, *foreknowledge*, which renders the expression indefinite and obscure, not to say, improper. It ought, for the same reason, to have been *predetermination*. The same word, in the same signification, occurs in the Acts, chap. ii. 23. where it is also improperly rendered *foreknowledge*.

§ 22. It may be thought that, in the composition of substantives, or of an adjective and a substantive in familiar use, there is hardly a possibility of error, the import of both the simple words being essential to the compound. But this is not without exception, as *βαμολοχος*, *συκοφαντης*, *χειροτονια*, and many others, evince. It is indeed very probable, that the import of such terms origi-
nally

nally was what the etymology indicates. But in their application, such variations are insensibly introduced by custom, as sometimes fix them at last in a meaning very different from the primary sense, or that to which the component parts would lead us.

I shall bring for an example a term about which translators have been very little divided. It is the word *σκληροκαρδια*, always rendered in the common version *hardness of heart*. Nothing can be more literal, or, to appearance, more just. *Σκληροκαρδια* is compounded of *σκληρος* *hard*, and *καρδια* *heart*. Nor can it be denied that these English words, taken severally, are, in almost every case, expressive of the full sense of the Greek words, also taken severally. Yet there is reason to suspect that the Greek compound does not answer to the meaning constantly affixed by us to *hardness of heart*, or, in one word, *hardheartedness*. Let us recur to examples. In Matt. xix. 8. we read thus, “Moses, because of *the hardness of your hearts*, προς την σκληροκαρδιαν υμων, “suffered you to put away your wives.” Now these terms, *hardness of heart*, with us always denote cruelty, inhumanity, barbarity. It does not appear that this is our Lord’s meaning in this passage. And though the passage might be so paraphrased, as would give a plausibility to this interpretation, I do not recollect that this vice of cruelty, as a national vice, was ever imputed to them by Moses; though he often charges them with incredulity, obstinacy, and rebellion. As there is nothing, however, in the context, that can be called decisive, I recur to the other passages in the New Testament wherein the word is found. These are but two, and both of them in Mark’s Gospel. One of them is, x. 5. where the same occurrence is recorded as in the passage of Matthew above referred to. In these two parallel places, there is so little variation in the words, that the doubt as to the meaning of this term must equally affect them both. The other passage is, xvi. 14. in the account given of our Lord’s appearances to his disciples after his resurrection. “Afterwards he appeared unto the eleven, as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with *their unbelief and hardness of heart*, την απισιαν αυτων και σκληροκαρδιαν, because they believed not them which “had seen him after he was risen.” Nothing can be clearer than that the word here has no relation to *inhumanity*, as this great event gave no handle for displaying either this vice or the contrary virtue. Some commentators, after Grotius, render it here *incredulity*, making our Saviour express the same fault by both words *απισια* and *σκληροκαρδια*. I do not say that the use of such synonymas is without example in Scripture; though I would not recur to them where another interpretation were equally natural, and even more probable. I think, therefore, that by the first of these terms the effect is meant, and by the second

second the cause ; that is, their stiff and untractable temper, their indocility or perverseness. Now this is a fault with which the Jews are frequently upbraided by Moses. Besides, this interpretation perfectly suits the sense of both passages. In that first quoted, as well as in this, the connection is evident. “Moses, because of your untractable disposition, permitted you to divorce your wives ;” lest, by making the marriage tie indissoluble, ye had perversely renounced marriage altogether, saying, as some of the disciples did, “If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry.” The sense *unbelief*, which Grotius puts upon it, is rather more forced in that passage than the common acceptation. Castalio renders it very properly *pervicacia*.

If, for further satisfaction, I recur to the Septuagint, I find invariably a connection with *perverseness*, never with *inhumanity*. Where we read in English, Deut. x. 16. “Circumcise the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiff necked,” the Seventy have it, Περιτεμεισθε την σκληροκαρδιαν υμων, και τον τραχηλον υμων & σκληρυνητε ετι. Here the opposition of the members in the sentence, which, in the Oriental taste, gives the same command, first in the positive form, and then in the negative, renders the meaning indubitable. The adjective *σκληροκαρδιος* is used in the book of Proverbs, xvii. 20. for perverse or untractable. Ὁ σκληροκαρδιος, in Hebrew, בל שרץ *gbakefsh leb*, & συναντα αγαθοις ; rendered justly in the Vulgate, “Qui perversi cordis est, non inveniet bonum ;” in English, “He that hath a froward heart, findeth no good.” There is another example of this adjective in Ezek. iii. 7. which appears to me decisive. The verse runs thus in our version : “The house of Israel will not hearken unto thee ; for they will not hearken unto me, for all the house of Israel are impudent and *hardhearted* ;” Φιλονεικοι εστι και σκληροκαρδιοι. It is plain, from the context, that nothing is advanced which can fix on them the charge of inhumanity ; but every thing points to their indocile and untractable temper. In like manner, when the verb *σκληρυνω* is followed by *την καρδιαν*, the meaning is invariably either to *become*, or to *render refractory, rebellious*, not *cruel* or *inhumane*. This is evidently the sense of it as applied to Pharaoh, whose obstinacy the severest judgments hardly could surmount. And can any person doubt that the meaning of the Psalmist, when he says, Psal. xcv. 7, 8. *To day if ye shall hear his voice, μη σκληρυνητε τας καρδιας υμων*, is, *be not contumacious* or *stiff-necked, as in the provocation* ? It is impossible either to recur to the history referred to, Numb. xiv. or to the comment on the passage in the epistle to the Hebrews, Heb. iii. and iv. and not perceive this to be a full expression of the sense. *Hardhearted*, therefore, in our language, which stands always in opposition to *tenderhearted* or *compassionate*, is not a just

just translation, though, in some sense, it may be called a literal translation, of *καληροκαρδίας*.

§ 23. If we enquire a little into the figurative significations given to the simple word *καρδία* by the sacred penmen, we shall find their application of the compound to *contumacy* or *indocility*, as natural as ours is to *cruelty* and *unfeelingness*. Let it be observed then that, though the Greek word *καρδία*, when used in the proper sense for the part of the body so denominated, is equivalent to the English word *heart*, it is not always so when used metaphorically. With us it is made by figure to stand, sometimes for *courage*, sometimes for *affection*, of which it is considered as the seat; but hardly ever, that I remember, for *understanding*. To denote this faculty, we sometimes speak of a good or a bad *head*; we also use the term *brain*. This, and not the *heart*, we regard as the seat of intelligence and discernment. Yet this was a frequent use of the term *heart* among the ancients, not the Hebrews only, but even the Greeks and the Romans. *καρδία* in Greek, even in the best use, as well as *cor* in Latin, are employed to denote discernment and understanding. Hence, the word *cordatus* in Latin, for *wise, judicious, prudent*.

For the present purpose it suffices to produce a few instances from Scripture, which will put the matter beyond a doubt. For the sake of brevity, I shall but just name the things attributed to the heart, referring to the passages in the margin; that from them every person may judge of the figurative application. First, then, intelligence is ascribed to it, Matt. xiii. 15. also reasoning, Mark ii. 6. likewise blindness, Mark. iii. 5. &c.* doubts, Mark xi. 23. faith, Rom. x. 10. thought, Acts viii. 22. comparison, Luke ii. 19. reflection, *ibid.*; in short, all that we commonly consider as belonging to the intellectual faculty, are applied in Scripture to the heart, a term which, in figurative style, is used with very great latitude. In this view of the metonymy, *καληροκαρδίας* comes naturally to signify *indocile, untractable*, of an understanding so hard, that instruction cannot penetrate it. Of similar formation is the term *thick skulled* with us. But the sense is not entirely the same. This implies mere incapacity, that an untoward disposition.

§ 24. Here it may not be improper to suggest a caution, for preventing mistakes, not only in the interpretation of Scripture, but in that of all ancient writers. Though a particular word in a modern language, may exactly correspond with a certain word in a foreign or a dead language, when both are used literally and properly, these words may be very far from corresponding when used metaphorically, or when affected by any trope whatever.

VOL. I.

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* The term is *καρωτις*, *callousness*, rendered *hardness* in the common translation, but which as often means *blindness*, and is so rendered Rom. xi. 25. Eph. iv. 18. A sense here more suitable to the context.

Nor does this remark hold in any thing more frequently than in that sort of metonymy so common amongst every people, whereby some parts of the body, especially of the entrails, have been substituted to denote certain powers or affections of the mind, with which they are supposed to be connected. The opinions of different nations and different ages, on this article, differ so widely from one another, that the figurative sense in one tongue is a very unsafe guide to the figurative sense in another. In some instances they seem even to stand in direct opposition to each other. The *spleen* was accounted by the ancient Greeks and Romans the seat of mirth and laughter; by us moderns it is held (I suppose with equal reason) the seat of ill-humour and melancholy. When, therefore, it is evident that the name is, in one of those ancient languages, used not properly, but tropically, what some would call a literal translation into a modern tongue, would, in fact, be a misrepresentation of the author, and a gross perversion of the sense*.

§ 25. I shall add but one other example, of the misinterpretation of a compound word, arising from the apparent, rather than the real, import of its etymology. The word *ὁμοιοπαθης* occurs twice in the New Testament. The first time is on occasion of the miraculous cure of the lame man by Paul and Barnabas at Lystra. When the people would have offered sacrifice to the apostles, supposing them to be two of their gods, Jupiter and Mercury, they no sooner heard of their intention, than they rent their clothes, and ran in among the people, crying out and saying (as in the common translation), "Sirs, why do ye these things? we also are men of like passions with you," Acts xiv. 15. *ὁμοιοπαθεις ὑμιν*. The other occasion of the words occurring, is where the apostle James said, as our translators render it, "Elias was a man subject to like passions as we are, *ὁμοιοπαθης ἡμιν*, "and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain," James v. 17. From which passages I have heard it gravely inferred, that a superiority over the passions is hardly to be expected from the influence

* I had occasion to consider a little this subject in another work, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book III. Chap. I. Sect. II. Part I. I there took notice of a remark of Cornutus on these words of the first satire of Persius: "Sum petulanti splene cachinno." Which, as it is much to my present purpose, and not long, I shall here repeat. "Physici dicunt homines splene ridere, felle irasci, jecore amare, corde sapere, et pulmone jactari." To the same purpose, I find in a very ancient piece, called the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, supposed to be the work of a Christian of the first century, the following sentiment in the Testament of Naphtali, introduced for the sake of illustrating that God made all things good, adapting each to its proper use. *καρδιαν εις φρονησιν, ἡπαρ προς θυμον, χολην προς πικριαν, εις γελωτα σπληνα, νεφρος εις πανουργιαν*. Grab. Spicil. patrum I. Secul. T. 1. Ed. 2. p. 212. This, though differing a little from the remark made by the commentator on Persius, perfectly coincides in what regards the heart and the spleen.

fluence even of the most divine religion, or the most distinguishing lights of the Spirit; since sacred writ itself seems, in this respect, to put Jews, Christians, and Pagans, nay prophets, apostles, and idolatrous priests, and people, all upon a level.

But this arises merely from the mistranslation of the word ὁμοιοπαθής, concerning which I beg leave to offer the following remarks: 1st, I remark that it is found only twice in the New Testament, does not occur in the version of the Seventy, and but once in the Apocryphal writings, where it is applied to the earth, Wisd. vii. 3. in which there is nothing analogous to human passions, though there is some analogy to human sufferings and dissolution; and that therefore we have no reason, agreeably to an observation lately made, § 8. to consider this term as affected by the idiom of the synagogue. 2dly, If we recur to classical use, we find that it implies no more than *fellow mortal*, and has no relation to what, in our language, is peculiarly called *passion*: and, 3dly, That with this, the etymology rightly understood, perfectly agrees. The primary signification of παθός in Greek, and of the unclassical term *passio* in Latin, is *suffering*; the first from πασχειν, the second from pati to suffer. Thence they are adopted to denote calamity, disease, and death; thence also they are taken sometimes to denote those affections of the mind which are in their nature violent, and are considered as implying pain and suffering; nay, the English word *passion* is in this manner applied (but it is in a sort of technical language) to the death and sufferings of our Lord.

Now, as to the term ὁμοιοπαθής, in the manner in which it is rendered by our interpreters, the argument employed by the apostles to the Lycaonians loses all its force and significance. The Pagans never denied that the gods whom they adored were beings of like passions with themselves; nay, they did not scruple to attribute the most disgraceful, and the most turbulent passions to their deities. And as little as any were the two divinities exempted whom they supposed Paul and Barnabas to be; but then they always attributed to them a total exemption from mortality and disease. It would have been therefore impertinent to say to idolaters, who mistook them for gods, "We are subject to the like passions with you;" for this their priests and poets had uniformly taught them both of Jupiter and of Mercury. But it was pertinent to say, "We are your fellow-mortals," as liable as you to disease and death. For, if that was the case with the two apostles, the people would readily admit, they were not the gods they took them for. Indeed this was not only the principal, but, I may almost say, the sole distinction they made between gods and men. As to irregular lusts and passions, they seem even to have ascribed them to the celestials in a higher degree, in proportion, as it were, to their superior power. And,

in regard to the application to Elijah, in the other passage quoted, let it not be thought any objection to the interpretation here given, that the prophet was translated, and did not die; for all that is implied in the apostle's argument is, that his body was naturally mortal and dissolvable as well as ours; a point which was never called in question, notwithstanding his miraculous deliverance from death. I shall only add, that the explanation here given is entirely conformable to the version of those passages in the Vulgate, and to that of all the other translations, ancient and modern, of any name.

§ 26. From all that has been said on this topic, it is evident that, in doubtful cases, etymology is but a dangerous guide; and, though always entitled to some attention, never, unless in the total failure of all other resources, to be entirely rested in. From her tribunal there lies always an appeal to *use*, in cases wherein use can be discovered, whose decision is final, according to the observation of Horace,

Quem pœnes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi.

I have been the more particular on this head, because etymology seems to be a favourite with many modern interpreters, and the source of a great proportion of their criticisms. And indeed it must be owned that, of all the possible ways of becoming a critic in a dead or a foreign language, etymology is the easiest. A scanty knowledge of the elements, with the aid of a good lexicon, and a plausible fluency of expression, will be fully sufficient for the purpose. I shall add a few instances in this taste from some modern translations of the New Testament; though I am far from insinuating that the above mentioned qualifications for criticising, were all that the authors were possessed of. Some of them, on the contrary, have, in other instances, displayed critical abilities very respectable. But where is the man who, on every occasion, is equal to himself? The word *εσπλαγχισθη*, Matt. ix. 36. is rendered, by the Gentlemen of Port Royal, *Ses entrailles furent emues de compassion*, on which Wynne seems to have improved in saying, *His bowels yearned with compassion*. *Ευδοκησεν*, Rom. xv. 26, 27. is rendered by the former, *ont resolu avec beaucoup d'affection*. *Δεσις ενεργημενη*, James v. 16. is translated by Doddridge, *Prayer wrought by the energy of the Spirit*. *Σκηνωσει*, Rev. vii. 15. by Diodati, *Tendera un padiglione*. *Χειροτονησαντες*, Acts xiv. 23. by Beza, *cum ipsi per suffragia creassent*, and *κληρονομησασι*, Matt. v. 5. *hereditario jure obtinebunt*. The Vulgate too, sometimes without necessity, but more rarely, adopts the same paraphrastical method. For those examples above referred to, which occur in the Gospel, see the notes on the places.

DISSERTATION THE FIFTH.

OF THE PROPER VERSION OF SOME NAMES OF PRINCIPAL IMPORT
IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE religious institution of which the Lord Jesus is the author, is distinguished in the New Testament by particular names and phrases, with the true import of which it is of great consequence that we be acquainted, in order to form a distinct apprehension of the nature and end of the whole. A very small deviation here may lead some into gross mistakes, and conceal from others, in a considerable degree, the spirit which this institution breathes, and the discoveries which it brings. I think it necessary, therefore, to examine this subject a little, in order to lay before the critical, the judicious and the candid, my reasons for leaving, in some particulars which at first may appear of little moment, the beaten track of interpreters, and giving, it may be said, new names to known things, where there cannot be any material difference of meaning. The affectation of rejecting a word, because old, if neither obscure nor obsolete, and of preferring another, because new, if it be not more apposite or expressive, is justly held contemptible; but, without doubt, it would be an extreme on the other side, not less hurtful, to pay a greater veneration to names, (that is, to mere sounds), than to the things signified by them. And surely a translator is justly chargeable with this fault, who in any degree sacrifices propriety and that perspicuity which, in a great measure, flows from it, to a scrupulous (not to say superstitious) attachment to terms, which, as the phrase is, have been consecrated by long use. But of this I shall have occasion to speak more afterwards.

The most common appellation given to this institution, or religious dispensation, in the New Testament, is, ἡ Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, or τῶν ἁγίων; and the title given to the manifestation of this new state, is most frequently τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας, &c. and sometimes, when considered under an aspect somewhat different, ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη. The great Personage himself, to whose admini-

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stration the whole is entrusted, is, in contra-distinction to all others, denominated ὁ Χριστός. I shall, in this discourse, make a few observations on each of the terms above mentioned.

PART I.

Of the Phrase ἡ Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ τῶν οὐρανῶν.

IN the phrase ἡ Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ τῶν οὐρανῶν, there is a manifest allusion to the predictions in which this economy was revealed by the prophets in the Old Testament, particularly by the prophet Daniel, who mentions it in one place, ch. ii. 44. as a *kingdom*, βασιλεία, which the God of heaven would set up, and which should never be destroyed; in another, ch. vii. 13, 14. as a kingdom to be given, with glory and dominion over all people, nations and languages, to one like a son of man. And the prophet Micah, ch. iv. 6, 7. speaking of the same era, represents it as a time when Jehovah, having removed all the afflictions of his people, would reign over them in Mount Sion thenceforth even for ever. To the same purpose, though not so explicit, are the declarations of other prophets. To these predictions there is a manifest reference in the title, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ τῶν οὐρανῶν, ἢ simply, ἡ βασιλεία, given in the New Testament, to the religious constitution which would obtain under the Messiah. It occurs very often, and is, if I mistake not, uniformly in the common translation, rendered *kingdom*.

§ 2. That the import of the term is always either *kingdom*, or something nearly related to kingdom, is beyond all question; but it is no less so, that, if regard be had to the propriety of our own idiom, and consequently to the perspicuity of the version, the English word will not answer on every occasion. In most cases βασιλεία answers to the Latin *regnum*. But this word is of more extensive meaning than the English, being equally adapted to express both our terms *reign* and *kingdom*. The first relates to the time or duration of the sovereignty; the second, to the place or country over which it extends. Now, though it is manifest in the gospels, that it is much oftener the time than the place that is alluded to; it is never, in the common version translated *reign*, but always *kingdom*. Yet the expression is often thereby rendered exceedingly awkward, not to say absurd. Use indeed softens every thing. Hence it is that, in reading our Bible, we are insensible of those improprieties which, in any other book, would strike us at first hearing. Such are those expressions which apply motion to a kingdom, as when mention is made of its *coming*, *approaching*,

approaching, and the like; but I should not think it worth while to contend for the observance of a scrupulous propriety, if the violation of it did not affect the sense, and lead the reader into mistakes. Now this is, in several instances, the certain consequence of improperly rendering βασιλεια *kingdom*.

§ 3. When βασιλεια means *reign*, and is followed by τῶν οὐρανῶν, the translation *kingdom of heaven* evidently tends to mislead the reader. Heaven, thus construed with kingdom, ought, in our language, by the rules of grammatical propriety, to denote the region under the kingly government spoken of. But finding, as we advance, that this called the *kingdom of heaven* is actually upon the earth, or, as it were, travelling to the earth, and almost arrived, there necessarily arises such a confusion of ideas as clouds the text, and by consequence weakens the impression it would otherwise make upon our minds. It may be said indeed, that the import of such expressions in Scripture is now so well known, that they can hardly be mistaken. But I am far from thinking that this is the case. Were it said only that they are become so familiar to us that, without ever reflecting on the matter, we take it for granted that we understand them; there is no sentiment to the justness of which I can more readily subscribe. But then the familiarity, instead of answering a good, answers a bad purpose, as it serves to conceal our ignorance, even from ourselves. It is not therefore the being accustomed to hear such phrases, that will make them be universally, or even generally, apprehended by the people. And to those who may have heard of the exposition commonly given of them, the conception of the kingdom of heaven, as denoting a sort of dominion upon the earth, a conception which the mind attains indirectly, by the help of a comment, is always feebler than that which is conveyed directly by the native energy of the expression. Not but that the words βασιλεια τῶν οὐρανῶν are often rightly translated *kingdom of heaven*, being often manifestly applied to the state of perfect felicity to be enjoyed in the world to come. But it is equally evident that this is not always the meaning of the phrase.

§ 4. There are two senses wherein the word *heaven* in this expression may be understood. Either it signifies the place so called, or it is a metonymy for God, who is in Scripture sometimes by periphrasis denominated, *He that dwelleth in heaven*. When the former is the sense of the term οὐρανοί, the phrase is properly rendered *the kingdom of heaven*; when the latter, *the reign of heaven*. Let it be remarked in passing, in regard to the sense last given of the word οὐρανοί as signifying *God*, that we are fully authorized to affirm it to be Scriptural. I should have hardly thought it necessary to make this remark, if I had not occasionally observed such phrases as *the assistance of heaven*, and *addressee to heaven*, criticised and censured in some
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late performances, as favouring more of the Pagan or the Chinese phraseology, than of the Christian. That they are perfectly conformable to the latter, must be clear to every one who reads his Bible with attention. Daniel, in the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, says, chap. iv. 26. *Thy kingdom shall be sure unto thee, after that thou shalt have known that the Heavens do rule.* The prophet had said in the preceding verse, *Seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men.* Thus he who is denominated the *Most High* in one verse, is termed *the Heavens* in the following. The Psalmist Asaph says of profligates, Psal. lxxiii. 9. *They set their mouth against the Heavens; that is, they vent blasphemies against God.* The phrase in the New Testament ἡ βασιλεια των υραων, is almost as common as ἡ βασιλεια τς Θεις. And though it may be affirmed that the regimen in the one expresses the proprietor of the kingdom, in the other the place; it is evident that this does not hold always. In parallel passages in the different Gospels, where the same facts are recorded, one of these expressions is used by one Evangelist, and the other as equivalent by another. Nay, the phrase ἡ βασιλεια των υραων, is adopted when it is manifest that the place of dominion suggested is earth, not heaven; and that therefore the term can be understood only as a synonyma for *Σεις*. The prodigal says to his father, Luke, xv. 18. 21. *Father, I have sinned against Heaven and before thee; that is, against God and thee.* Otherwise, to speak of sinning against an inanimate object, would be exceedingly unsuitable both to the Christian theology and to the Jewish. *The baptism of John*, says our Lord, Matt. xxi. 25. *whence was it? from Heaven, or of men? From Heaven, that is, from God.* Divine authority is here opposed to human. This difference, however, in the sense of *υρανος*, makes no difference to a translator, inasmuch as the vernacular term with us admits the same latitude with the Hebrew and the Greek.

§ 5. That βασιλεια ought sometimes to be rendered *reign*, and not *kingdom*, I shall further evince when I illustrate the import of the words κηρυσσω, ευαγγελιζω, and some others. Isaiah, Daniel, Micah, and others of the Prophets, had encouraged the people to expect a time, when the Lord of hosts should reign in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, when the people of God should be redeemed from their enemies, and made joyful in the Messiah their King. It was this happy epoch which was generally understood to be denominated by the phrases βασιλεια τς Θεις, and βασιλεια των υραων, *the reign of God*, and *the reign of Heaven*: the approach of which was first announced by the Baptist, afterwards by our Lord himself and his Apostles. βασιλεια is applicable in both acceptations, and it needs only be observed that, when it refers to the time, it ought to be rendered *reign*, when to

the place, *kingdom*. For this reason, when it is construed with the verb κηρυσσα, ευαγγελιζω, καταγγελλω, or the noun ευαγγελιον, it ought invariably to be *reign*, as also when it is spoken of as come, coming, or approaching.

§ 6. The French have two words corresponding to ours, *regne*, *reign*, and *royaume*, *kingdom*. Their interpreters have often fallen into the same fault with ours, substituting the latter word for the former; yet, in no French translation that I have seen, is this done so uniformly as in ours. In the Lord's prayer, for example, they all say, *ton regne vienne*, not *ton royaume*, thy *reign* come, not thy *kingdom*. On the other hand, when mention is made of entrance or admission into the βασιλεια, or exclusion from it, or where there is a manifest reference to the state of the blessed hereafter; in all these cases, and perhaps a few others, wherein the sense may easily be collected from the context, it ought to be rendered *kingdom*, and not *reign*.

§ 7. There are a few passages, it must be acknowledged, in which neither of the English words can be considered as a translation of βασιλεια strictly proper. In some of the parables, (Mat. xviii. 23.) it evidently means administration, or method of governing; and in one of them, (Luke xix. 12. 15.) the word denotes royalty or royal authority, there being a manifest allusion to what had been done by Herod the Great, and his immediate successor, in recurring to the Roman senate, in order to be invested with the title and dignity of King of Judea, then dependent upon Rome. But where there is a proper attention to the scope of the place, one will be at no loss to discover the import of the word.

PART II.

Of the Name το Ευαγγελιον.

I PROCEED to enquire into the meaning of the word το ευαγγελιον. This term, agreeably to its etymology, from ευ bene and αγγελια *nuncium*, always in classical use, where it occurs but rarely, denotes either good news, or the reward given to the bearer of good news. Let us see what ought to be accounted the Scriptural use of the term. Ευαγγελιον and ευαγγελια occur six times in the Septuagint in the Books of Samuel and Kings. I reckon them as one word, because they are of the same origin, are used indiscriminately, and always supply the place of the same Hebrew word פְּרָשָׁה *besbarab*. In five of these, the meaning is *good news*;

in the sixth, the word denotes the reward given for bringing good news. In like manner, the verb *ευαγγελιζειν*, or *ευαγγελιζεσθαι*, which occurs much oftener in the Septuagint than the noun, is always the version of the Hebrew verb *בשר* *basbar*, *leta annunciare*, to tell good news. It ought to be remarked also, that *ευαγγελιζω* is the only word by which the Hebrew verb is rendered into Greek; nor do I know any word in the Greek language that is more strictly of one signification than this verb. In one instance, the verbal *בשר* *mebasber*, is indeed used for one who brings tidings, though not good, 1 Sam. iv. 17. but in that place the Seventy have not employed the verb *ευαγγελιζω*, or any of its derivatives. One passage, (2 Sam. i. 20.) wherein the Septuagint uses the verb *ευαγγελιζομαι*, has also been alleged as an exception from the common acceptation. But that this is improperly called an exception, must be manifest to every one who reflects that the total defeat of the Israelitish army, with the slaughter of the king of Israel and his sons, must have been the most joyful tidings that could have been related in Gath and Askelon, two Philistine cities. The word occurs several times in the prophets, particularly in Isaiah, and is always rendered in the common version, either by the phrase *to bring good tidings*, or by some terms nearly equivalent. It is sometimes also so rendered in the New Testament, Luke i. 19. ii. 10. viii. 1. Acts xiii. 32. Rom. x. 15. 1 Theff. iii. 6.

§ 2. Now let it be observed that, when the word is introduced in the gospels, it is generally either in a quotation from the prophets, or in evident allusion to their words. Thus *πτωχοι ευαγγελιζονται*, which our translators render, *To the poor the gospel is preached*, Matt. xi. 5. Luke vii. 22. the whole context shews to be in allusion to what is said by the prophet Isaiah, chap. lxi. 1. in whom the corresponding phrase is rendered, *preach good tidings to the meek*. But nothing can be more to my purpose, than that noted passage where we are told, Luke iv. 18, 19. that the place in Isaiah was read by our Lord in the synagogue of Nazareth. The words in the common translation of the Gospel are these, *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel, ευαγγελιζεσθαι, to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord*. Now I cannot help observing of this passage, that the meaning would have been more perspicuously conveyed, and its beauty and energy would have been better preserved, if our translators had kept closer to the manner in which they had rendered it in the Old Testament. There the term *ευαγγελιζεσθαι* is rendered, *to preach good tidings*. And though it is certain, agreeably to our Lord's declaration, that the gospel, with its spiritual blessings, are here held

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held forth to us, it is still under the figure of temporal blessings, and therefore it is very improperly introduced by its distinguishing appellation into the version, which ought to convey the literal, not the figurative sense of the original.

Ευαγγελιζομαι πτωχοις, *to bring good tidings to the poor* or afflicted, agreeably to the extensive signification of the Hebrew word, is the general title of the message, and comprehends the whole. It is explained by being branched out into the particulars which immediately follow. For, if it be asked, What is the good tidings brought to the afflicted? the answer is, a cure to the broken-hearted, deliverance to the captives, sight to the blind. It is the Lord's jubilee which brings freedom to the slave, acquittance to the debtor, and relief to the oppressed. Now that the gospel is herein admirably delineated, is manifest. But still it is presented to us under figures, and therefore to mention it by its peculiar title in the midst of the figurative description, is to efface, in a great measure, that description; it is to jumble injudiciously the sign and the thing signified. It is, as if one should confound in an apologue or parable, the literal sense with the moral, and assert of the one what is strictly true only of the other; by which means no distinct image would be presented to the mind. Or it is, as when a painter supplies the defects in his work by labels, and, instead of a picture, presents us with a confused jumble, wherein some things are painted, and some things described in words. But it is not in our version only, but in most modern translations, that this confusion in rendering this beautiful passage has appeared.

§ 3. I shall add but one other instance of a quotation from the prophets: Ὡς ἄραιοι οἱ ποδες των ευαγγελιζομενων ειρηνην, των ευαγγελιζομενων τα αγαθα, Rom. x. 15. In the common version, as quoted in the New Testament, *How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things.* It would have been better here also, on many accounts, to keep closer to the original in Isaiah, ch. lii. 7. whence the passage was taken, and to translate it thus: "How beautiful are the feet of
" them who bring the joyful message of peace, the joyful news
" of good things;" at the same time, we acknowledge it is with a particular allusion to that spiritual peace, and those eternal good things, procured to us by Jesus Christ. But the beauty and energy of the allusion and implied similitude are destroyed, or rather, there is no more allusion or similitude in the words, when the characteristic description intended by the prophet is in a manner thrown aside, and in its stead is inserted the name appropriated to the dispensation. This at least is in part done; for the prophet's figures are neither totally laid aside, nor totally retained. Instead of imitating his simplicity of manner, they have made a jumble of the sense implied, and the sense expressed.

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For this purpose they have rendered the same word (which is repeated in the two clauses) in one clause, *preach the gospel*, according to the sense justly supposed to be figured by it; in the other clause, *bring glad tidings*, according to the letter. I can see no reason for this want of uniformity, unless perhaps the notion that *the gospel of good things* sounded more awkwardly than *the gospel of peace*.

§ 4. The prophet's design undoubtedly was, to deliver it as an universal truth amply confirmed by experience, that the message of peace and prosperity to those who had been oppressed and afflicted by the ravages of war, and its various unhappy consequences, was so charming, that it could transform a most disagreeable into a pleasing object. The feet of those who had travelled far in a hot country, through rough and dusty roads, present a spectacle naturally offensive to the beholder; nevertheless, the consideration that the persons themselves are to us the messengers of peace and felicity; and that it is in bringing this welcome tidings they have contracted that fordid appearance, can in an instant convert deformity into beauty, and make us behold with delight this indication of their embassy, their dirty feet, as being the natural consequence of the long journey they have made. A thought somewhat similar occurs in Horace, (Lib. ii. Ode i.) who, speaking of victors returning with glory from a well-fought field, exhibits them as—*Non indecoro pulvere sordidos*. The poet perceives a charm, something decorous, in the very dust and sweat, with which the warriors are smeared, and which serve to recal to the mind of the spectator, the glorious toils of the day; thus, things in themselves ugly and disgusting, share, when associated in the mind with things delightful, in the beauty and attractions of those things with which they are connected. But this sentiment is lost in the common version; for it might puzzle the most sagacious reader to devise a reason why the feet in particular of the Christian preacher should be declared to excel in beauty.

§ 5. Now, in all the passages quoted from the prophets, it appears so natural, and so proper every way, to give them in the words which had been used in translating the prophecies, when the words in the New Testament will bear the same version, that one is at a loss to conceive what could move the translators to depart from this rule. Ought they, where no ground is given for it in the original, either to make the sacred penmen appear to have misquoted the prophets, or to make the unlearned reader imagine, that the Scriptures used by them differed from those used by us, where there is not in fact any difference? Let it be observed that I say, when the words in the New Testament will bear the same version with those in the Old; for I am not for carrying this point so far as some translators have done, who, when

when there is a real difference in the import of the expressions, are for correcting one of the sacred writers by the other. This is not the part of a faithful translator, who ought candidly to represent what his author says, and leave it to the judicious critic to account for such differences as he best can. But it is surely a more inexcusable error to make differences where there are none, than to attempt to cover them where there are. Now, as it was never pretended that, in the passages above quoted, the Hebrew word was not justly translated by the Seventy, and that the sense of both was not justly expressed by the phrase which our translators had employed in the version of the prophets, they had no reason for adopting a different, though it were a synonymous phrase, in rendering the passage when quoted in the New. What shall we say then of their employing an expression which conveys a very different meaning?

§ 6. I shall produce one example, which, though no quotation, yet, having a direct reference to a promise often mentioned in the Old Testament, and made originally to the patriarchs, ought to have been interpreted in the most comprehensive way. Our translators, by not attending to this, have rendered a passage otherwise perspicuous perfectly unintelligible. *Και γαρ εγωμ ενχηλιζουμενοι, καθαπαρ κκεινοι*; in the common version, *For unto us was the gospel preached as well as unto them*, Heb. iv. 2. He had been speaking of the Israelites under Moses in the wilderness. This sounds strangely in Christian ears. That the gospel has been preached to us, needs no affirmation to convince us: our only difficulty is, to understand in what sense the gospel, or religious institution of Jesus Christ, was preached to those who lived and died before his incarnation. Yet it seems here to be supposed that we all know that the gospel was preached to them, but need to be informed that it has ever been preached to ourselves. Had it been said, *For unto them was the gospel preached as well as unto us*, we should have discovered a meaning in the sentence, though we might have been at a loss to conceive in what respect it is defensible. But as it stands, we are no less puzzled about the meaning, than about the truth of the observation. Now, the literal and proper translation of the word *ενηχιζουμεναι*, in an instant removes every difficulty. *For unto us the good tidings are published which were published to them*. What these good tidings are, is evident from the context. It is the promise of rest to God's people. It had been shewn by the apostle, in the preceding chapter, that the promise first made to the patriarchs was not, if I may so express myself, exhausted by the admission of the Israelites into the land of Canaan; that, on the contrary, we learn, from a threat in the Psalms against the rebellious, that there was still a nobler country and superior happiness men had to look for, of which the earthly Canaan was

but

but a figure; that therefore we ought to take warning, from the example of those whose carcases fell in the wilderness, to beware lest we also forfeit, through unbelief, that glorious inheritance, the rest that yet remains for the people of God. Now, as the promises conveying the good news of rest, were originally made to the fathers, and to Israel, according to the flesh, it was pertinent to take notice that we are equally interested in them, and that this good news of rest in a happy country afterwards to be enjoyed, is declared to us as fully as ever it was to them. This sense, though clearly the apostle's, is totally effaced by the misinterpretation of the word *ευηγγελισμενοι*. The Vulgate has, in this place, kept clear of the glaring impropriety in the English version. It has simply, "Etenim et nobis nuntiatum est quem-admodum et illis." Their common way, however, is different.

§ 7. In other places, most modern translators have been misled, in this article, by implicitly following the Vulgate, which first set the bad example of translating those passages differently in the Old Testament and in the New. In the passage quoted from Paul, and by him from Isaiah, Erasmus has very well preserved both the import of the word, and the conformity to the way in which it had been always justly rendered in the prophet. "Quam speciosi pedes annuntiantium pacem, annuntiantium bona!" To the same purpose Castalio, who has taken this way, which Erasmus had not done, of rendering also the words read by our Lord in the synagogue, "Me ad læta pauperibus nuntianda misit." In the other places above referred to, Castalio follows the common method. "Pauperes evangelium docentur." Erasmus, in rendering the passage quoted from Matthew, has endeavoured to comprehend both ways. "Pauperes lætum accipiunt evangelii nuntium." He has in this been copied by the translation of Zurich. This method is quite paraphrastical. It does not favour of the simplicity of the evangelical style. If *ευηγγελιον* mean *lætum nuntium*, why did he add *evangelii*? And if it do not mean *lætum nuntium*, what had these words to do in the version? And if the Latin *evangelium* is of the same import with the Greek *ευηγγελιον*, the sentence is a mere tautology; as if he should say, *The poor receive the good news of glad tidings*. And if the import of the adoptive Latin word *evangelium*, which is in fact the case, be different from that of the Greek, which is fully interpreted by the two words *lætum nuntium*, *evangelii* is a mere interpolation. The words of the original are general, and have equal latitude of signification with the Latin *lætum nuntium*, or the English *good news*. The addition of the word *evangelii* limits the sense, in a way which the Prophet's expression does not warrant. Nor does an interpreter's opinion concerning the completion of the prophecy (however true, nay, however certain, that opinion be) entitle him to express

press the prediction with greater speciality of meaning than has been done by his author. Erasmus does not seem himself to have been entirely satisfied with this circumlocution, as he has rendered the same words in Luke in the common way, and in this also has been followed by the Tigurine translator. Beza has in all the passages above referred to, (except that in which the Vulgate was right) followed the Vulgate, and has been followed by most of the early Protestant translators.

§ 8. Some may imagine, that I am here pleading for what, on other occasions, I have shown no partiality to, a translation of the words servilely literal or etymological. But, let it be observed, that I am never for tracing, in the translation, the etymology of the words of the original, when the etymology does not give the just import of the words, according to the received use at the time when the speeches or dialogues related were spoken, or when the book was composed. The Greek verb *εὐαγγελίζω*, when first used by the evangelists, or the Hebrew *בשר בשר* *basbar*, when used by the prophets, or the Syriac *ܫܒܪ* *subar*, as most probably used by our Lord and his apostles, conveyed to their countrymen only one and the same idea, which is precisely what the phrase *to bring good tidings* conveys to us. The appropriation of the word to the religious institution called the Gospel, is of a later date, and has gradually arisen out of the former usage. When etymology and use perfectly coincide, as they often do, we cannot be too literal in our interpretations; when they differ, which does not seldom happen, the latter is to be followed, and not the former.

In some respects similar, though apparently contrary, to the above objection, is that of those who urge that our term *gospel*, in its Saxon etymology is an exact counterpart to the Greek *εὐαγγέλιον*, being compounded of two words, which conjoined denote *good news*. But the only pertinent question is, in this case, Is this the present meaning of the English word *gospel*? The first objectors would assign to the Greek word *εὐαγγέλιον*, a sense which it had not during our Lord's ministry, but which it acquired soon after; the second would put upon the English word *gospel*, a sense which it once had, but now has not. That this is the case is evident.

Should one, for example, bring us word* that an end is put to hostilities, and that the powers at war have at last agreed upon a peace, ought we, in reporting this intelligence, to say, that one had come preaching to us the gospel of peace? Whoever should express himself thus, would, I am afraid, be thought to talk both absurdly and profanely. At least he would be said to employ a very bold and far-fetched metaphor. Yet not the metaphorical, but the proper expression, in the language of the apostles,

* This was written towards the end of the American war.

bles, would be, *ευαγγελισατο ημιν ειρηνη*, or even *εκηρυσεν ημιν το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης*. Josephus, in his History of the Jewish War, lib. iii. ch. 34. acquainting us that Titus sent to his father the good news of his taking Tarichea, says, *Τιτος δε εκπεμψας τινα των ιππειων ευαγγελιζεταιαι τω πατρι το εργον*. How would it sound in our ears to render it, *preached to his father the gospel of the action*? Nothing can be a stronger evidence that the Greek phrases above mentioned, and the English *preached the gospel*, are not equivalent. All, therefore, that can be concluded from the primitive import of the word *gospel*, in a different, though related, language, is that, in the Anglo-Saxon, not the English, version of the New Testament, the word *ευαγγελιον* was rightly so translated. Certain it is, however, that the error remarked in the English version, runs through all the modern translations, as well as the Vulgate which gave it birth, and is a remarkable instance of the truth of an observation formerly made, (Diff. iii. § 6.) that sometimes, by consulting other versions, we may be confirmed in an error, instead of having it corrected. Indeed the old Latin translation has served in many things, as will appear more fully afterwards, as a model to the translators in the West.

§ 9. But, though the noun *ευαγγελιον* was equally unequivocal with the verb *ευαγγελιζω*, in its acceptation in the Old Testament, and commonly in the Evangelists, it must be owned that, from its original signification, it came insensibly afterwards to vary and receive other meanings, in the way I shall now attempt to explain. The word occurs very often in the New Testament, where, as it is a term of principal importance, its different significations deserve to be investigated with the greatest accuracy. That the radical signification, *good news*, is not only the most common, but, in some respect, a concomitant of every other meaning affixed to the word, must be evident to every one who is conversant with the original. Yet this allusive concomitance, if I may so express myself, is an advantage which cannot be obtained in a translation. As use, which governs language, will not bend to our inclinations, we must change the word in the version, when the import of the original name is so far different, that the same term, in another language, will not answer; yet, by changing it, we may lose the emphasis, which results from the allusion to the primitive and predominant application of the word. It will sometimes happen, in a train of reasoning, where the same word is used in the original in different, but related senses, that the change of the corresponding term in the version will hurt perspicuity, and yet may be necessary, because the same word in another language, whose idiom does not admit the same extent of signification, would hurt it more.

§ 10. The first meaning of the word then in the New Testament, especially in the Gospels, is, as has been observed, *good*
news,

news, a signification which, though always implied, is not always what is chiefly intended; and therefore the word cannot, without a sacrifice of propriety, be uniformly rendered so. The name, from being expressive of an eminent quality in the dispensation introduced by the Messiah, and from being most frequently applied to it, came gradually to serve as a name for the dispensation itself. When it is thus employed, it is in our tongue properly rendered *gospel*. This is the second meaning of the word. Of the other senses which it has in Scripture, I shall take notice afterwards. The two above mentioned are the chief. And, first, I shall consider the cases wherein that which I call the literal and primitive signification ought to be retained.

§ 11. First, then, this sense ought to be retained in the version, when the word *εὐαγγέλιον* is construed with a noun serving to limit or explain its nature, as *το εὐαγγέλιον της ειρηνης*, *the good news of peace*, *το εὐαγγέλιον της βασιλειας*, *the good news of the reign*. It was observed, on the explanation of the word *βασιλεια*, that the Christian economy was foretold under the denomination of *the reign of God*, and *the reign of Heaven*; and I may add, in the typical language of the Psalms, *the reign of David*. Now there were, about the time of our Saviour's appearance, many who, from the predictions of the prophets and signs of the times, waited, with pious confidence, for the consolation of Israel, that is, for the coming of the Lord's Messiah, and the commencement of his glorious reign. This was the great subject of comfort to them, amidst all the distresses and oppressions, personal or political, under which they groaned. For how erroneous soever the prevalent notions concerning the person of the Messiah, and the nature of his reign were, they agreed in this, that they exhibited him as a deliverer, in whose time the principal grievances of the nation were to be redressed; and, in consequence of this, the people looked forwards with faith and hope, but not without a mixture of impatience, to that long-deferred, as they then thought, but happy era, the mission and consequent reign of the Messiah. Freedom to the slave, release to the prisoner, pardon to the convict, could not be more welcome, or afford matter of greater joy, than the tidings, well authenticated, that that blessed period, spoken of in raptures by their prophets, and described in the most glowing colours of eastern poetry, was at length arrived. Hence it is not improbable that, even some time before the birth of Jesus, this much wished event came to be denominated, by those who expected it, perhaps the majority of the nation, *the good news* (being such in an eminent manner), and more explicitly *the good news of the reign of God*, that is, of the *new* dispensation that would obtain under the promised Messiah.

§ 12. A number of such like phrases, borrowed from the Prophets, and from the Psalms, relating to this event, had become

current among the people, and were adopted both by our Lord and by John his harbinger. Thus the Messiah himself is styled, ὁ ἐρχομενος, *he that cometh*, not *he that should come*, as it is less properly rendered in the common version, it being an abbreviation of that expression of the Psalmist, cxviii. 26. *He that cometh in the name of the Lord*. Now it is manifest that, when first the Baptist, then our Lord himself, and lastly his apostles, in his life-time, announced publicly the approach of this reign, they announced what the generality of the people would immediately, and without difficulty, apprehend. I do not mean that they would understand the nature of the reign or spiritual dominion to be established, for this is what few or none did; but that they would immediately understand it to relate to the accession of the Messiah, their great deliverer, to that sovereignty with which they had learnt from the prophets, and from the scribes, that he was to be invested. The dispensation, therefore, is properly ushered in with an authoritative call to all men to amend their lives, and prepare for the reign of the Messiah, the expectation and joy of God's people, just about to commence. Nothing, therefore, could be more suitable, and, though alarming to the wicked, nothing could be more consolatory to the pious, at the time the nation was in subjection to a foreign and oppressive yoke, than such seasonable information. Nothing consequently can be better accommodated to what must have been the sentiments and prospects of the people at that time, or can more accurately express the full import of the original, κηρυσσων το ευαγγελιον της βασιλειας του Θεου, than this literal and plain version, *Proclaiming the glad tidings of the reign of God*. This conveys to us, at this moment, the same ideas which, in those circumstances, must have been conveyed by the words of the sacred historian, into the mind of every Jewish reader at the time.

§ 13. On the contrary, the expression in the vulgar translation, *preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God*, must have been to such a reader unintelligible; as even to us, when we abstract from the familiarity occasioned by custom, which is apt to impose upon us, it appears both obscure and improper. Castalio, in one place, (Matt. iv. 23.) departs, if possible, still farther from the sense, rendering it *regium publicans evangelium*, “publishing the “royal gospel.” Not to mention the futility of the term *royal*, applied in a way which renders it a mere expletive, the very subject published, ἡ βασιλεια, *the reign*, is jostled out to make room for a splendid but unmeaning epithet. Our Lord, we find from the Evangelists, spoke to his countrymen in the dialect of their own Scriptures, and used those names to which the reading of the Law and the Prophets, either in the original, or in the versions then used, had familiarized them. Our translators, and indeed most European translators, represent him as using words
which,

which, even in their own translations of the Old Testament, never occur, and to which, in fact, there is nothing there that corresponds in meaning. The people had all heard of the reign of the Messiah, to be established in the latter times, and considered the arrival of that period as the happiest tidings with which they could be made acquainted. But of the *Gospel* they had never heard before. "What is this you call the *Gospel*?" they would naturally ask; "and what does *the Gospel of a kingdom mean*?" These are words to which our ears are strangers. No mention is made of such things in the Law, in the Prophets, or in the Psalms.

§ 14. Now, if the terms must have been altogether unintelligible to Jews, they are, even to us Christians, both obscure and improper. First, obscure, because indefinite. It does not appear easy in such circumstances, as those under consideration, to assign a precise meaning to the word *Gospel*. We commonly understand by it the whole religious institution of Jesus, including both doctrines and precepts. Nothing can be plainer than that this is not the meaning of the term here. The very words which were preached or promulgated, are expressly mentioned, and comprised in a single sentence; *Μετανοείτε, ἡγίαι γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*. Besides, the apostles, who, in our Lord's life-time, received this commission, were not yet qualified for teaching the system of doctrine implied under the name *gospel*, because, in fact, they did not know it themselves. They had then no notion of a Messiah but as a temporal prince and mighty conqueror, or of his kingdom but as a secular monarchy, more extensive than, but of the same nature with those which had preceded, to wit, the Assyrian, the Persian, the Macedonian empires, or that which was in being at the time, the Roman. Not one of their hearers could have been more prejudiced than the apostles themselves were at that time, against a suffering Saviour, who was to expire in agonies and infamy on the cross.

Now, let people but coolly reflect, and then put the question to themselves; If we set aside these important truths, the death, and consequently the resurrection of Jesus Christ, his victory over the enemies of our salvation, and his purchase of spiritual and eternal blessings by his blood; of all which the apostles were then ignorant, and against most of which, when first informed of them, they were as much prejudiced as any Pharisee, what will remain of that which we denominate the *Gospel*, in contradistinction to Judaism? The doctrine of the *Gospel* is manifestly what the apostles were not qualified to teach, till they were enlightened by the descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, after our Lord's ascension. Nay, they were, after his resurrection, when they knew more than formerly, expressly commanded, before they should attempt to teach that doctrine, to wait the promised

promised illumination from above, Acts i. 4. 8. But they had been, long before, sufficiently qualified to announce the approach of this dispensation, and to warn men to forsake their sins, and to prepare for the appearance of their Lord and King. Further, if the term *gospel* here be rather indefinite, how does this addition, *of the kingdom*, serve either to illustrate or to limit the import of that term? And an addition, which answers neither of these purposes, cannot fail still farther to darken it.

§ 15. But, secondly, that expression in our language is, in those instances, also improper; because there is no meaning which use has affixed to the English word *gospel*, that expresses the sense of the original. And, as it has been shewn that our term does not there suit the word *εὐαγγέλιον*, I mean afterwards to shew that the word *preaching* does not exactly convey the sense of *κηρυσσάν*. At the same time it is acknowledged, on the other hand, that the word *εὐαγγέλιον* is, in many places in the epistles of Paul, rightly rendered *gospel*. But this is manifestly, as has been shewn, a secondary sense of later date.

§ 16. I observed, that when the word *εὐαγγέλιον* is construed with a noun serving to limit or explain its nature, it ought to be rendered *good news*. But every regimen is not to be understood as serving this purpose. Thus, when it is followed with *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, with *τῷ Κυρίῳ*, or *τῷ Θεῷ*, which denote the author, it is justly regarded as a name for the dispensation, and properly rendered *Gospel*. In the phrase *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῷ Χριστῷ*, not preceded by *Ἰησοῦ*, the regimen may denote either the author or the subject. In the first view, it is *the gospel of Christ*, that is, instituted by him; in the second, *the good news of the Messiah*, that is, concerning him. There are, perhaps, a few other cases in which the choice may be a matter of indifference. But, in most cases, the regimen ascertains the sense. Thus, *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς εἰρήνης*, Eph. vi. 15. can be no other than *the good news of peace*. The addition plainly indicates the subject. For the same reason, *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Acts xx. 24. is *the good news of the favour of God*; *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ἡμῶν*, Eph. i. 13. *the good news of your salvation*. The words in the common version, *the gospel of your salvation*, are mere words, and convey no meaning to English ears.—The second case wherein the word always may, and commonly should, be rendered *good news*, and not *gospel*, is when it is construed with *κηρυσσῶ*, I *proclaim* or *publish*. The justness of this observation will be manifest, from what I shall afterwards observe on the import of that verb in the Gospels and Acts.

§ 17. The third case is, when it clearly refers to a different subject from what is commonly with us denominated the gospel. Under this, perhaps, may be ranked some of the examples which also come under the first case mentioned. For instance, *τὸ εὐαγγέ-*
λίον

αγγελια της σωτηριας υμων, *the good news of your salvation*. For here the tidings to which the apostle refers, was not the embassy itself of peace by Jesus Christ, but it was the cordial reception which the Ephesians had given to that embassy, and which was to him who loved them, good news, because a pledge of their salvation. Under the same case also, in my opinion, we ought to class that famous passage in the Apocalypse, xiv. 6, 7. *I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel* (so are the words εχοντα ευαγγελιον αιωνιον rendered in the common version) *to preach to them that dwell on the earth; and to every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people, saying with a loud voice, Fear God and give glory to him, for the hour of his judgment is come, and worship him, &c.* My reasons are, first, we are expressly informed what the angel had to proclaim, κηρυσσειν, which is all contained in the 7th verse, and relates to a particular event long posterior to the first propagation of the gospel, namely, the vengeance God would take on the persecutors of his church, expressed in these words, *The hour of his judgment is come*. The rest of the verse is to be understood merely as a warning naturally suggested by the occasion. Nor let it be urged, that the approach of the hour of judgment looks rather like bad news than good. It frequently holds, that the tidings which to one are the most doleful, are to another the most joyous. The visions and prophecies of that Book are all directed to the churches of Christ, and intended for their use. To crush their enemies was to relieve the churches; the defeat of the one was the victory of the other. Secondly, what the angel had to promulgate, is not called το ευαγγελιον, as the word is almost uniformly used, when referring to the Christian dispensation, but simply ευαγγελιον, not *the gospel*, the institution of Christ—not that which is emphatically styled *the good news*, but barely *good news*. It is styled αιωνιον, everlasting, with the same propriety, and in the same latitude, as things of long duration, or of permanent consequences, are often in Scripture so denominated.

§ 18. Again, let it be observed, that by the English word *gospel*, we do not always mean precisely the same thing. The predominant sense is doubtless the religious institution of Jesus Christ. But this is not invariably its meaning. Early in the church the word ευαγγελιον was employed to denote, and, in one passage of the New Testament, actually denotes, the history of the life, teaching, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. It is in this sense that the four histories or narratives, written by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, containing memoirs of that extraordinary Personage, have, from the earliest antiquity, been titled, ευαγγελια, *Gospels*. The word is thus used by Mark, i. 1. Αρχη τε ευαγγελιου Ιησου Χριστου, *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ*. I confess, however, that it would not be easy to decide, whether

whether this ought to be accounted part of the sacred text, or a title afterwards prefixed (as were the names of the penmen by some of the first transcribers) which may have been inadvertently admitted into the text. But whether this application be scriptural or not, it is very ancient, and has obtained universally in the church. The English word has precisely the same application. It may be proper here to remark, that though the Greek word *εὐαγγέλιον* has been adopted by the Syriac interpreters, yet, in the historical part, they admit it only into the titles of the four Gospels, in the sense last mentioned, and into the first verse of Mark's Gospel, where the sense is the same. Their use of the Greek word in these places, is exactly similar to the use which our translators have made of the words of the Septuagint, *Genesis* and *Exodus*, which serve for names to the two first books of the Pentateuch, but which they have never employed in the body of the work, where the words *γενεσις* and *εξοδος* occur in that version. Thus, in every other passage of the Gospels and Acts, *εὐαγγέλιον* is rendered *ܫܒܪܝܬܐ* *sabartha*, a plain Syriac word of the same signification and similar origin. In this the Syriac interpreters appear to have acted more judiciously than the Latin, as they have been sensible of the impropriety of darkening some of the plainest, but most important declarations, by the unnecessary introduction of an exotic term which had no meaning, or at least not the proper meaning in their language. In Paul's Epistles, I acknowledge, they have several times adopted the Greek word; but let it be observed that, in these, the term *εὐαγγέλιον* is frequently employed in a different sense. This has in part appeared already, but will be still more evident from what immediately follows.

§ 19. The fourth sense of *εὐαγγέλιον* in the New Testament is the ministry of the gospel. In this acceptation I find the word used oftener than once by the apostle Paul. Thus, *God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit, in the gospel of his Son*, Rom. i. 9. *ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ*, that is, in the ministry of the gospel, or in dispensing the gospel of his Son. This is one of the passages in which the Syriac interpreter has retained the original word. In another place, 1 Cor. ix. 18. *What is my reward then? Verily that when I preach the gospel, I may make the gospel of Christ, τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, without charge*; that is, that the ministry of the gospel of Christ may not by me be rendered chargeable. This the context plainly shews; for this is the only expence he is here speaking of. I think, for perspicuity's sake, the word *ministry* should have been used in the translation, as the English name *gospel* hardly admits this meaning. Nor are these the only places wherein the word has this signification; see 2 Cor. viii. 18. and Phil. iv. 15.

§ 20. I observe also, in the epistles of this apostle, a fifth meaning,

meaning, or at least a particular application of the first general meaning, *good news*. It sometimes denotes, not the whole Christian dispensation, but some particular doctrine or promise, specially meriting that denomination. In this sense Paul uses the word, writing to the Galatians, ch. ii. 2. The particular doctrine to which he gives the pertinent appellation, *εὐαγγέλιον*, *good news*, is the free admission of the Gentiles into the church of Christ, without subjecting them to circumcision and the other ceremonies of the law. This, considering the Jewish prejudices at that time, accounts for the reserve which he used at Jerusalem, where, by his own representation, he imparted privately to the disciples of chief distinction, and consequently of most enlarged knowledge and sentiments, that doctrine which he publicly proclaimed in Gentile countries. I think it is this which the apostle sometimes, by way of distinction, denominates *his Gospel*. For though there was no discordancy in the doctrine taught by the different apostles, yet to him and Barnabas, the apostles of the uncircumcision, it was specially committed to announce every where among the heathen, God's gracious purpose of receiving them, uncircumcised as they were, into the church of Christ. Accordingly, as he proceeds in his argument, Gal. ii. 7. the gospel, or good news, *εὐαγγέλιον*, sent to the Gentiles, is expressly contrasted with that sent to the Jews.

This seems also to be the sense of the word in another passage, Rom. xvi. 25. where what he calls *το εὐαγγέλιον μου*, he describes as *μυστηριον κρυφτον αιωνιοις σκιασθημενον*, *kept secret for ages*, but now made known to all nations for the obedience of the faith. For, in this manner, he oftener than once speaks of the call of the Gentiles. In all such passages, it is better to retain the general term *good news* in the version. This appellation is, in some respect, evidently applicable to them all, whereas the term *gospel* is never thus understood in our language.

PART III.

Of the Phrase η καινη διαθηκη.

ANOTHER title by which the religious institution of Jesus Christ is sometimes denominated, is *η καινη διαθηκη*, which is almost always, in the writings of the apostles and evangelists, rendered by our translators *the New Testament*. Yet the word *διαθηκη* by itself is, except in a very few places, always there rendered not *testament*, but *covenant*. It is the Greek word whereby the Seventy have uniformly translated the Hebrew *ברית* *berith*, which

which our translators in the Old Testament have invariably rendered *covenant*. That the Hebrew term corresponds much better to the English word *covenant*, though not in every case perfectly equivalent, than to *testament*, there can be no question; at the same time it must be owned that the word διαθηκη, in classical use, is more frequently rendered *testament*. The proper Greek word for covenant is συνθηκη, which is not found in the New Testament, and occurs only thrice in the Septuagint. It is never there employed for rendering the Hebrew *berith*, though, in one place, it is substituted for a term nearly synonymous. That the scriptural sense of the word διαθηκη is more fitly expressed by our term *covenant*, will not be doubted by any body who considers the constant application of the Hebrew word so rendered in the Old Testament, and of the Greek word, in most places at least, where it is used in the New. What has led translators, ancient and modern, to render it *testament*, is, I imagine, the manner wherein the author of the epistle to the Hebrews argues, ch. ix. 16, 17. in allusion to the classical acceptation of the term. But however much it was necessary to give a different turn to the expression in that passage, in order to make the author's argument as intelligible to the English, as it is in the original to the Greek reader, this was not a sufficient reason for giving a version to the word in other places that neither suits the context, nor is conformable to the established use of the term, in the sacred writings.

§ 2. The term *new* is added to distinguish it from the *old covenant*, that is, the dispensation of Moses. I cannot help observing here by the way, that often the language of theological systems, so far from assisting us to understand the language of holy writ, tends rather to mislead us. The two covenants are always in Scripture the two dispensations, or religious institutions; that under Moses is the *old*, that under the Messiah is the *new*. I do not deny that in the latitude wherein the term is used in holy writ, the command under the sanction of death which God gave to Adam in paradise, may, like the ordinance of circumcision, with sufficient propriety be termed a *covenant*; but it is pertinent to observe that it is never so denominated in Scripture; and that, when mention is made in the Epistles of the two covenants, the *old* and the *new*, or the first and the second, (for there are two so called by way of eminence), there appears no reference to any thing that related to Adam. In all such places, Moses and Jesus are contrasted, the Jewish economy and the Christian, Mount Sinai in Arabia, whence the law was promulged, and Mount Sion in Jerusalem, where the gospel was first published.

§ 3. It is proper to observe further that, from signifying the two religious dispensations, they came soon to denote the books, wherein

wherein what related to these dispensations was contained; the sacred writings of the Jews being called ἡ παλαια διαθηκη, and the writings superadded by the apostles and evangelists, ἡ καινη διαθηκη. We have one example in Scripture of this use of the former appellation. The apostle says, 2 Cor. iii. 14. speaking of his countrymen, *Until this day remaineth the veil untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament, ἐπι τη ανωρωσει της παλαιας διαθηκης.* The word in this application is always rendered in our language *Testament*. We have in this followed the Vulgate, as most modern translators also have done. In the Geneva French, the word is rendered both ways in the title, that the one may serve for explaining the other, *Le nouveau Testament, c'est a dire La nouvelle alliance, &c.* in which they copied Beza, who says, *Testamentum novum, sive Fædus novum.* That the second rendering of the word is the better version is unquestionable; but the title appropriated by custom to a particular book, is on the same footing with a proper name, which is hardly considered as a subject of criticism. Thus we call Cesar's Diary, *Cesar's Commentaries*, from their Latin name, though very different in meaning from the English word.

PART IV.

Of the Name ὁ Χριστος.

THE only other term necessary to be examined here, is ὁ χριστος, the Messiah, or *the Christ*, in English rendered, according to the etymology of the word, *the anointed*; for so both the Hebrew מָשִׁיחַ, *Meschiach*, and the Greek χριστος signify; and from the sound of these are formed our names *Messiah* and *Christ*. What first gave rise to the term was the ceremony of anointing, by which the kings and the high priests of God's people, and sometimes the prophets, 1 Kings xix. 16. were consecrated and admitted to the exercise of their holy functions; for all these functions were accounted holy among the Israelites. As this consecration was considered as adding a sacredness to their persons, it served as a guard against violence from the respect had to religion. Its efficacy this way was remarkably exemplified in David. By this consideration principally, as he acknowledges, he was restrained from avenging himself on Saul his enemy, who sought his life, when he had it in his power to kill him. *The Lord forbid*, said he, 1 Sam. xxiv. 6. *that I should do this thing unto my master, the Lord's anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him, seeing he is the anointed of the Lord.* The word

here translated *anointed* is, as in other places, in Hebrew *Messiah*, and in the Greek of the Seventy, *Christ*. It was a term, therefore, in its original use, applicable to all the succession of kings and high priests, good and bad, of the people of Israel.

§ 2. But as the king and the high priest were the heads of the whole nation, the one in civil, the other in religious matters, the term *anointed*, that is, *Messiah* or *Christ*, might, not improbably, serve, by a figure, to denote the chief, head, or principal of any class or people. So thinks the learned Grotius. Thus the high-priest is sometimes distinguished from ordinary priests by the title *the anointed priest*, in the Septuagint $\delta \text{ ιερεὺς } \delta \text{ χριστός}$; though this, I own, is not a proof of the point, since he was literally so distinguished from the rest *. But that the word is sometimes applied, when, in the literal sense, no anointing had been used, cannot be questioned. In this way it is applied to Cyrus, the Persian monarch by the prophet Isaiah, ch. xlv. 1. *Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus*; yet Houbigant, differing from his usual manner, renders the words, *de uncto suo Cyrus*. But whether the import of this expression be, that Cyrus was a chief among kings, a most eminent sovereign, as Grotius seems to imagine, or that he was selected of God for the restoration of Judah, and the rebuilding of the temple of Jerusalem, the only temple dedicated to the true God, may be made a question. For my part, I am inclinable to think that it is rather this latter interpretation which conveys the prophet's idea, and the meaning intended by the Spirit of God. And to this interpretation the context entirely agrees. The word was also employed to denote those specially favoured of God, as were the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, concerning whom he is represented by the Psalmist as having said, *Touch not mine anointed*, Psal. cv. 15 1 Chron. xvi. 22. The word is in the plural number, $\tauῶν \text{ χριστῶν } \mu\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$, in the Vulgate *Christos meos*, which, in our idiom, is not distinguished from the singular. Now there is no ground from Scripture to believe that any of them was in the literal sense anointed.

§ 3. But the most eminent use and application of the word is when it is employed as the title of that sublime Personage typified and predicted from the beginning, who was to prove, in the most exalted sense, the Redeemer and Lord of God's people. He is spoken of by the prophets under several characters, and, amongst others, under this *of God's anointed*, the Messiah or the Christ. Those of the prophets, who seem more especially to have appropriated this title, formerly more common, to the Mediator of the new covenant, were, the royal prophet David, (Psal. ii. 2.) Isaiah, (ch. lxi. 1. &c.) and Daniel, (ch. ix. 25, 26.) The first represents

* The sons of Aaron were indeed all anointed, in their father's lifetime, by the express command of God; but it does not appear that this practice descended to other ordinary priests.

sents him as anointed of God king of God's heritage, the second as set apart and consecrated to be the messenger of good tidings to the inhabitants of the earth, the third as appointed to make expiation for the sins of the people.

§ 4. It deserves to be remarked, that in the English translation of the Old Testament, the word is always rendered *anointed*. to whomsoever applied, except in the two verses of Daniel quoted in the margin, where it is translated *Messiah*. In the New Testament, the corresponding Greek word is always rendered *Christ*, and commonly without the article. In this our interpreters have been so uniform, that they have even employed the word *Christ*, where the passage is a quotation and literal translation from the Old Testament, in which the Hebrew word, though perfectly equivalent, had been by themselves rendered *anointed*. Thus, Acts iv. 26, 27. *the rulers were gathered together against the Lord, and against his Christ, κατὰ τὴν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ*. The words are quoted from the second Psalm, where they had said, *against his anointed*. The change here is the more remarkable, as there is a plain reference to the meaning of the word in the very next sentence: *For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, is exhered, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together*.

§ 5. In the Vulgate, in all the places of the Old Testament above referred to, it is translated *Christus*. So it is also in Houbigant, except where it is applied to Cyrus, as mentioned § 2. Whereas, in regard to Cyrus, it is in the Vulgate, *Hæc dicit Dominus Christo meo Cyro*. The same appellation is also given to King Saul, *Dixitque David ad viros suos, Propitius sit mihi Dominus, ne faciam hanc rem domino meo, Christo Domini, ut mittam manum meam in eum, quia Christus Domini est*. In the Psalms, *Nolite tangere Christos meos, and adversus Dominum et adversus Christum ejus*. In Daniel also the word is in the same way rendered. Here indeed, and in the last mentioned passage from the Psalms, as no Christian can well doubt the reference to the Messiah, there is not so great an appearance of impropriety; yet, when applied to the high-priest, they have not said *christus*, but *unctus*, giving the import of the word as it was literally applicable to him. Otherwise the term *Christus* might have been used at least as properly of the high-priest, who was, in one respect, a figure of our Lord, as either of a heathen prince, or even of a bad king of Israel. All the other Latin translators, except *Leo de Juda*, if I remember right. use *unctus*, not only in speaking of the priest, but also in relation to Cyrus and Saul; and wherever they have not observed a direct reference to the Lord Jesus. *Leo*, in the passage above quoted from Samuel, uses both words, *messias* and *unctus*, in relation to Saul, where he probably introduces the latter word for explaining the former. *Ser-*

vet me Dominus, ne rem istam designem contra dominum meum messiam Domini, ut scilicet inferam ei manum; est enim unctus Domini. To Cyrus also he applies the word *messias*. In Daniel, Leo, Castalio and Houbigant, all use the word *messias*: Junius uses *christus* with the Vulgate, both there and in the second Psalm, in which last mentioned place Leo also uses *christus*. About other modern translations it is not necessary here to enquire. It is sufficient to observe that at, and for many years before, the time of our Lord's appearing, the term was understood to denote the great Deliverer and Prince whom God had promised, by his prophets, to send for the comfort and redemption of his people.

§ 6. Let us now consider a little the use of the term in the New Testament. If we were to judge by the common version, or even by most versions into modern tongues, we should consider the word as rather a proper name than an appellative, or name of office, and should think of it only as a surname given to our Lord. Our translators have contributed greatly to this mistake, by very seldom prefixing the article before *Christ*, though it is rarely wanting in the original. The word *christ* was at first as much an appellative as the word *baptist* was, and the one was as regularly accompanied with the article as the other. Yet our translators, who always say *the baptist*, have, one would think, studiously avoided saying *the christ*. This may appear to superficial readers an inconsiderable difference; but the addition of the article will be found, when attended to, of real consequence for conveying the meaning in English, with the same perspicuity and propriety with which it is conveyed in Greek. So much virtue there is in the article, which, in our idiom, is never prefixed to the name of a man, though it is invariably prefixed to a name of office, (unless where some pronoun, or other appropriating expression renders it unnecessary), that without it the sense is always darkened, and sometimes marred. Thus, in such expressions as these, *This Jesus whom I preach unto you is Christ*, Acts xvii. 3. *Paul testified to the Jews that Jesus was Christ*, ch. xviii. 5. *Shewing by the Scriptures that Jesus was Christ*, ver. 28. the unlearned reader forms no distinct apprehension, as the common application of the words leads him uniformly to consider Jesus and Christ, as no other than the name and the surname of the same person. It would have conveyed to such a reader precisely the same meaning to have said, *Paul testified to the Jews that Christ was Jesus*; and so of the rest. The article alone, therefore, in such cases, adds considerable light to the expression; yet no more than what the words of the historian manifestly convey to every reader who understands his language. It should be, therefore, *Paul testified to the Jews that Jesus was the christ*, or the

the messiah, &c. Many other examples might be brought to the same purpose; but these are sufficient.

§ 7. But it may be asked, Is the word *Christ* then never to be understood in the New Testament as a proper name, but always as having a direct reference to the office or dignity? I answer that, without question, this word, though originally an appellative, came at length, from the frequency of application to one individual, and only to one, to supply the place of a proper name. What would contribute to hasten this effect, was the commonness of the name *Jesus* among the Jews at that time, which rendered an addition necessary for distinguishing the person. The remark of Grotius is not without foundation, that, in process of time, the name *Jesus* was very much dropped, and *Christ*, which had never been used before as the proper name of any person, and was, for that very reason, a better distinction, was substituted for it; insomuch that, among the heathen, our Lord came to be more known by the latter than by the former. This use seems to have begun soon after his ascension. In his life-time, it does not appear that the word was ever used in this manner; nay, the contrary is evident from several passages of the Gospels. But the Evangelists wrote some years after the period above mentioned, and therefore, the more perfectly to notify the subject of their history, they adopted the practice common among Christians at that time, which was to employ the word as a surname for the sake of distinction. This was especially proper in the beginning of their narrative, for ascertaining the person whose history they were to write. Thus Matthew begins, *The lineage of Jesus Christ*, i. 1.; and a little after, ver. 18. *Now the birth of Jesus Christ happened thus*. Mark, in like manner, i. 1. *The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ*. In all the three places it is Ιησους Χριστος , *Jesus Christ*, not Ιησους τω Χριστω , *Jesus the Christ*, or the Messiah.

Matthew and Mark, as was just now observed, name him so, in introducing their Gospels; but it deserves to be remarked, that they do not afterwards, in their history, either name him so themselves, or mention this name as given him by any of his contemporaries: nay, the very profession of Peter, and the doubts raised by his enemies in regard to his being $\delta \chiριστος$, *the Messiah*, or *the Christ*, and his never being named familiarly, either by them or by others, during that period, Ιησους Χριστος , but simply Ιησους or $\delta \text{Ιησους}$, which occurs in the four Gospels upwards of five hundred times, put it beyond doubt, that the word was never applied to him as a proper name, whilst he remained on this earth. It was at that time always understood as the denomination of the dignity or office to which some believed him entitled, others disbelieved, and many doubted. The names used both by Matthew and by Mark, in the beginning of their Gospels, and

by John in the introductory part of his, i. 17. for Luke does not adopt this manner in his Gospel, shew only the usage which obtained at the time when they wrote, but not when their Lord was living upon the earth. In the last of the four Gospels, he is in one place, John xvii. 3. represented as calling himself Jesus Christ in an address to God; but this is so singular, that I cannot help suspecting an accidental omission of the article; and that the clause must have stood originally, *ὃν ἀπέστειλας Ἰησοῦν τοῦ χριστοῦ*, *Jesus the messiah whom thou hast sent*. But whatever be in this, we are warranted to conclude, from the uniform tenor of all the Gospels, that *χριστός*, in this passage, must be understood as the name of his office. Now, for the very same reason for which our translators have rendered *ὁ βαπτιστής*, uniformly *the baptist*, with the article, they ought to have rendered *ὁ χριστός*, *the christ*, or *the messiah*, with the article. By not doing it, they have thrown much obscurity on some passages, and weakened others.

§ 8. Though in the epistles it may be sometimes difficult, but is seldom of consequence, to determine whether *χριστός* be an appellative or a proper name, there is rarely in the Gospels, with which I am here more immediately concerned, any difficulty that can retard an attentive and judicious critic. Such will be sensible, that whatever was the case afterwards, the word Christ, during the period comprehended in the Gospel history, was employed solely to express the office or dignity wherewith he was invested, as the apostle of God, for the redemption of the world. Accordingly, when it is used in the Gospels, the stress of the sentence lies commonly on the signification of that word. Peter, in his solemn confession, says, John vi. 69. *We believe and are sure that thou art ὁ χριστός, the christ, the messiah, the Son of the living God*. Here the substance of his declared belief lies much in the import of this term. Our translators have considered this as so evident that, in the parallel passages in other Gospels, they have departed from their ordinary practice, and rendered it *the christ*, and in this passage, less properly, *that christ*. In other places where propriety equally required the article, they have not given it.

Of several which might be quoted, I shall mention only one example in the question put by Jesus to the Pharisees, Matt. xxii. 42. *Τι ὑμῖν δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ χριστοῦ*, which our translators render, *What think ye of Christ?* The word used in this manner, without any article definite or indefinite, or any other term to ascertain the meaning, must, in our idiom, be a proper name; and, as here proposed by Jesus, can be understood no otherwise by an unlearned reader than as intended for drawing forth their sentiments concerning himself. To such the question must appear identical with *What think ye of Jesus?* A name of office is never used in so indistinct a manner. For example, we may say indefinitely,
What

What think ye of a king? or definitely, *What think ye of the king?* but never, *What think ye of king?* unless we speak of one whose name is *King*. Yet an appellative may be used without an article when the name is subjoined, because this serves equally with the article to ascertain the meaning, as thus, *What think ye of king Solomon?* In the place above quoted, there was therefore the strongest reason for following more closely the original, as it was evidently our Lord's purpose to draw forth their sentiments, not concerning himself, the individual who put the question to them, and whom he knew they considered as an impostor, but, in general, concerning the quality of that Personage whom, under the title of Messiah, they themselves expected.

§ 9. One mark of distinction, therefore, whereby the title *Χριστος* may be discriminated from the name, is its being attended with the article. I do not mention this, however, as holding invariably, but very generally. When the word is in the vocative, by the idiom of the language, there can be no article; in that case, therefore, we must be directed solely by the sense. Thus, in *προφητευτον ἡμιν χριστι*, Matt. xxvi. 68. this term must mean *messiah*, as the intended ridicule is entirely founded on their ascribing that character to one in his wretched circumstances. Another exception is, when it is joined to some other title, as *Χριστος Κυριος*, Luke ii. 11. *Χριστος βασιλευς*, xxiii. 2.; and sometimes, but more rarely, when construed with a pronoun, as *εαν τις αυτον ἠμολογηση χριστον*, John ix. 22. where the sense renders the meaning indubitable. In a few places in regard to this, as well as to other terms, there is an ellipsis of the article, where the most common usage would require it. Of this *οτι χρισυ εστι*, Mark ix. 41. is an instance.

I know it may be objected to the article as a criterion, that in Greek it is not unusual to prefix it to the proper names of persons. Accordingly, in naming our Lord, *Ιησους* and *ο Ιησους* are used indifferently. For this reason, I do not lay much stress on this distinction, unless it be confirmed by the connection. In the Epistles, it is plain, that the term is used familiarly as a proper name, and consequently when alone, and not appearing from the context to be emphatical, may be properly rendered as a name, whether it have the article or not. But when it immediately follows *Ιησους*, the article not intervening, it can hardly be interpreted otherwise. Let it be observed that, in scriptural use, when a person has two names, the article, if used at all, is prefixed to the first name, and never inserted between them, unless when some other word, as *λεγομενος*, is added by way of explanation. Thus it is *Πορκιος Φησος*, *Σεργιος Παυλος*, *Ιουδας Ισκαριωτης*, *Ποπιος Πιλατος*, and *Σιμων Πετρος*. Indeed, where a person is distinguished by adding an epithet rather than a surname, denoting the place of his birth, or of his residence, the article is constantly

prefixed

prefixed to the adjective. Thus it is always Μαρια ἡ Μαγδαληνη, literally *Mary the Magdalene*, that is, of *Magdala*, a city on the lake of Gennefaret; and Ιησους ὁ Ναζαρεταιος, *Jesus the Nazarene*, or of *Nazareth*.

When the article, therefore, is inserted between the words Ιησους and Χριστος, there is reason to consider the latter as used emphatically, and pointing directly to his office. In many places in the Epistles, perhaps in a very few in the Gospels, it may be regarded as a matter of indifference, in which of the two ways the term is translated. Thus, in the first chapter of Matthew, ver. 16. Ιησους ὁ λεγομενος Χριστος, may be either *Jesus who is called Christ*, that being a surname which, when Matthew wrote, was frequently given him, or *Jesus who is called* (that is *accounted*) *Messiah*. I have, in my version, preferred the second interpretation; as, in the verse immediately following, we cannot understand otherwise, the words εως τε χριστου, with the article, and without the name Ιησου prefixed. If so, ὁ λεγομενος χριστος is mentioned to prepare us for this application of the title. Besides, the same phrase occurs again in this Gospel, xxvii. 17. 22. as used by Pilate at a time when it was never applied to our Lord but by his followers, and that solely as the denomination of his office. So much for the method whereby we may discover when this word is emphatical, and when it is merely a surname.

§ 10. It is proper now to enquire, in the last place, which of the three terms, *Messiah*, *Christ*, or *Anointed*, is the most proper to be applied in an English version. The word *Anointed* is indeed an English word, and is, besides, in respect of the idea it conveys, expressive of the etymological import of the Hebrew and Greek terms. But, notwithstanding these advantages, it is not so proper in this case for being used in a version. For first, the original term had early been employed, as we have seen, without any regard to the literal signification; and in the ordinary application of it, in our Lord's time, little or no attention seems to have been given to the circumstance of unction, which gave rise to the name. Though the word *Anointed*, therefore, expresses the primitive import of the Hebrew name, it does not convey the meaning in which it was then universally understood. It was considered solely as the well-known title of an extraordinary office, to which there was nothing similar amongst any other people. The original name, therefore, agreeably to what was concluded in a former discourse, (Diff. II. § 5.) ought to be retained. Secondly, it deserves some notice that the word, both in Hebrew and in Greek, is a substantive, and therefore, in point of form, well adapted for a name of office, being susceptible of the same variety, in number and mode of construction, with other substantives; the English word *Anointed* is a participle and indeclinable, and so far from being adapted for the name of an office,

office, that it is grammatically no more than the attributive of some name, either expressed or understood.

§ 11. As to the other two words, *Messiah* and *Christ*, it may be thought a matter of indifference which of them should be preferred. The following are the reasons which have determined me to give the preference to the former. First, our Lord's own ministry was only amongst his countrymen the Jews, to whom the title of *messiah* was familiar. With them, wheresoever dispersed, it is considered as the title of that dignity to this day, and is accordingly naturalized in every language that they speak. We never hear of the *Jewish christ*, it is always the *Jewish messiah*. When the English translators found it convenient, in translating Daniel, to adopt a term more appropriated than the general word *anointed*, they chose the Hebrew term *messiah*, in preference to the Greek; and it is surely proper, when the meaning of a word in the New Testament is manifestly the same, to conform, as much as possible, to the language of the Old. That the word *messiah* was constantly used in Palestine, in our Lord's time, is evident from the two passages in the Gospel of John, i. 42. iv. 25. where, after mentioning it as the title in current use both with Jews and with Samaritans, he adds the explanation in Greek. Secondly, *messiah* is, even in English use, much more familiar, as the name of the office, than the term *christ*, which is now universally understood as a proper name of our Saviour. The word *messiah*, on the contrary, is never employed, and consequently never understood, as a proper name. It is invariably a name of office; and even this circumstance, however slight it may appear, has a considerable influence on perspicuity.

§ 12. I shall only add here, before I conclude this subject, that the word *κρίστος* is frequently used by Paul as a trope, denoting sometimes the Christian spirit and temper, as when he says, *My little children, of whom I travail in birth again, until Christ be formed in you*, Gal. iv. 19.; sometimes the Christian doctrine, *But ye have not so learned Christ*, Eph. iv. 28.; and in one place at least, the Christian church, *For as the body is one, and hath many members; and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ*, 1 Cor. xii. 12. In these cases it is better to retain the name *Christ*, as used hitherto in the version.

§ 13. Some have thought that the expression *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, *the son of man*, which our Lord always uses when he speaks of himself in the third person, is also a title which was then understood to denote the messiah. But of this there does not appear sufficient evidence. The only passage of moment that is pleaded in support of it, is from the prophet Daniel, who says, that he saw in the night visions, *one like the son of man come, with the*

clouds of heaven, to the ancient of days, and that there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, Dan. vii. 13, 14. There can be no reasonable doubt, from the description given, that the messiah is meant. But this is not notified by any of the terms or phrases taken separately; it is the result of the whole. Nothing appears to be pointed out by this single circumstance, *one like the son of man, or like a son of man* (as it ought to have been rendered, neither term being in *statu emphatico*, which in Chaldee supplies the article), but that he would be a human, not an angelical, or any other kind of being: for, in the oriental idiom, *son of man* and *man* are terms equivalent.

The four monarchies which were to precede that of the messiah, the prophet had, in the foregoing part of the chapter, described under the figure of certain beasts, as emblems severally of the predominant character of each; the first under the figure of a lion, the second under that of a bear, the third of a leopard, and the fourth of a monster more terrible than any of these. This kingdom, which God himself was to erect, is contradistinguished to all the rest, by the figure of a man, in order to denote that whereas violence, in some shape or other, would be the principal means by which those merely secular kingdoms would be established, and terror the principal motive by which submission would be enforced, it would be quite otherwise in that spiritual kingdom to be erected by the ancient of days, wherein every thing would be suited to man's rational and moral nature; affection would be the prevailing motive to obedience, and persuasion the means of producing it; or, to use the Scripture expression, we should be drawn *with cords of a man, with bands of love*.

Had the prophet used *man* instead of *son of man*, could one have concluded, that the word *man* was intended as a distinguishing title of the messiah? It will hardly be pretended. Yet the argument would have been the same, for the terms are synonymous.

There are two phrases by which this may be expressed in Hebrew, בן אדם *ben adam*, and בן איש *ben ish*. When these two are contrasted to each other, the former denotes one of low degree, the latter one of superior rank. Thus *bene adam* and *bene ish*, are in the Psalms, xlix. 2. rightly rendered in the common version *low and high*. The first *bene adam* is, in the Septuagint, translated γῆγενῆς, in the Vulgate, *terrigenæ*, earth-born, or sons of earth, in allusion to the derivation of the word *adam*, man, from a word signifying ground or *earth*. The same *ben adam*, is the common appellation by which God addresses the prophet Ezekiel, which is rendered by the Seventy *ὁ υἱος ἀνθρώπου*, and frequently occurs in that book. *The son of man*, therefore, was an humble title, in which nothing was claimed, but what was enjoyed in common with all mankind. In the Syriac version of
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the New Testament it often occurs, where the term in the Greek is simply *ανθρωπος, man.*

That it was never understood by the people in our Lord's time, as a title of the messiah, or even a title of dignity, is manifest from several considerations. In the first place, though Jesus commonly takes it to himself, it is never given him by the Evangelists, in speaking of him. He is never addressed with this title by others, whether disciples or strangers. Several honourable appellations were given him, by those who applied for relief, as, *κυριε, διδασκαλε, rabbi*; sometimes he is addressed *son of David*, sometimes *son of God*, and on one occasion he is called *he who cometh in the name of the Lord*. The two last titles may reasonably be supposed to imply an acknowledgment of him as messiah. Now, if the title *son of man* had been thought, even in any degree, respectful from others, we should certainly have had some examples of it in his life-time. Further, our Lord was in the practice of denominating himself in this manner, at the very time that he prohibited his disciples from acquainting any man that he was the messiah. What purpose could this prohibition have answered, if the title he commonly assumed in the hearing of every body, was understood to be of the same import? It is urged further, that this phrase is used in the Apocalypse, i. 13. in describing the vision which the apostle John had of his Master. The answer is the same with that given to the argument founded on Daniel's vision. First, the phrase is not entirely the same with that by which Jesus distinguishes himself in the Gospel. Our Lord calls himself *ο υιος του ανθρωπου, the son of man*; John says, *ομοιον υιω ανθρωπου*, without any article, *one like a son of man*, that is, *in the human form*. It is indeed evident that he is speaking of Jesus Christ; but this is what we gather from the whole description and context, and not from this circumstance alone.

§ 14. But, whatever be in this, there are several titles which, in the writings of the apostles and evangelists, are peculiarly applied to our Lord, though they do not often occur. I have already mentioned *ο ερχομενος εν ονοματι κυριε*, and *ο υιος Δαβιδ*. Add to these *ο αγιος του Θεου, the saint, or the holy one of God*, *ο εκλεκτος του Θεου, the elect, or the chosen one of God*, both expressions borrowed from the prophets. Now, though these terms are in the plural number susceptible of an application to others, both angels and men, they are, in the New Testament, when in the singular number, and accompanied with the article, evidently appropriated to the messiah.

DISSERTATION THE SIXTH.

INQUIRY INTO THE DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORT OF SOME
WORDS COMMONLY THOUGHT SYNONYMOUS.

SEVERAL words in the New Testament considered by our translators as synonymous, and commonly rendered by the same English word, are not really synonymous, though their significations may have an affinity, and though sometimes they may be used indiscriminately. I shall exemplify this remark in a few instances of words which occur in the Gospels.

PART I.

Διαβολος, Δαιμων, and Δαιμονιοι.

THE first of this kind, on which I intend to make some observations, are *διαβολος*, *δαιμων*, and *δαιμονιοι*, all rendered in the common translation almost invariably *devil*. The word *διαβολος*, in its ordinary acceptation, signifies *calumniator, traducer, false accuser*, from the verb *διαβαλλειν*, to calumniate, &c. Though the word is sometimes, both in the Old Testament and in the New, applied to men and women of this character, it is, by way of eminence, employed to denote that apostate angel, who is exhibited to us, particularly in the New Testament, as the great enemy of God and man. In the two first chapters of Job, it is the word in the Septuagint by which the Hebrew *שָׂטָן* *Satan* or *adversary*, is translated. Indeed the Hebrew word in this application, as well as the Greek, has been naturalized in most modern languages. Thus we say indifferently *the devil* or *Satan*; only the latter has more the appearance of a proper name, as it is not attended with the article. There is this difference between the import of such terms, as occurring in their native tongues, and as modernized in translations. In the former they always retain somewhat of their primitive meaning, and, beside indicating a particular being,

or class of beings, they are of the nature of appellatives, and mark a special character or note of distinction in such beings. Whereas, when thus Latinized or Englished, they answer solely the first of these uses, as they come nearer the nature of proper names. This remark extends to all such words as *cherub, seraph, angel, apostle, evangelist, messiah*.

§ 2. Διαβολος, I observed, is sometimes applied to human beings. But nothing is easier than to distinguish this application from the more frequent application to the arch-apostate. One mark of distinction is that, in this last use of the term, it is never found in the plural. When the plural is used, the context always shews that it is human beings, and not fallen angels, that are spoken of. It occurs in the plural only thrice, and only in Paul's Epistles. Γυναικας, says he, 1 Tim. iii. 11. *ωσαντως οσμητας, μη διαβολας*. *Even so must their wives be grave, not slanderers*. In scriptural use the word may be either masculine or feminine. Again, speaking of the bad men who would appear in the last times, he says, 2 Tim. iii. 3. amongst other things, that they will be *ασοργοι, ασπονδοι, διαβολοι*, in the common translation, *without natural affection, truce-breakers, false accusers*. Once more, Tit. ii. 3. Πρεσβυτιδας ωσαντως εν κατασηματι ιεροπρεπεις, μη διαβολας. *The aged women likewise, that they be in behaviour as becometh holiness, not false accusers*. Another criterion, whereby the application of this word to the prince of darkness may be discovered, is its being attended with the article. The term almost invariably is *ο διαβολος*. I say *almost*, because there are a few exceptions.

§ 3. It may not be amiss, ere we proceed, to specify the exceptions, that we may discover whether there be any thing in the construction that supplies the place of the article, or at least makes that it may be more easily dispensed with. Paul, addressing himself to Elymas, the sorcerer, who endeavoured to turn away the proconsul Sergius Paulus from the faith, says, Acts xiii. 10. *O full of all subtilty, thou child of the devil, υιε διαβολα*. There can be no doubt that the apostle here means the evil spirit, agreeably to the idiom of Scripture, where a good man is called a child of God, and a bad man a child of the devil. *Ye are of your father the devil*, said our Lord to the Pharisees, John viii. 44. As to the example from the Acts, all I can say is, that in an address of this form; where a vocative is immediately followed by the genitive of the word construed with it, the connection is conceived to be so close as to render the omission of the article more natural than in other cases. This holds especially when, as in the present instance, the address must have been accompanied with some emotion and vehemence in the speaker. I know not whether *ο αντιδικας υμων διαβολος*, 1 Pet. v. 8. *your adversary the devil*, ought to be considered as an example. There being
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here two appellatives, the article prefixed to the first may be regarded as common, though I own it is more usual in such cases for the greater emphasis to repeat it. In the word *ὁ ἐστὶ διαβόλος καὶ σατανᾶς*, Rev. xx. 2. *who is the devil and satan*; as the sole view is to mention the names whereby the malignant spirit is distinguished, we can hardly call this instance an exception. Now these are all the examples I can find, in which the word, though used indefinitely or without the article, evidently denotes our spiritual and ancient enemy. The examples in which it occurs in this sense with the article, it were tedious to enumerate.

§ 4. There is only one place, beside those above mentioned, where the word is found without the article, and, as it is intended to express a human character, though a very bad one, ought not, I think, to have been rendered *devil*. The words are, *Jesus answered, Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?* *εἰς ὑμῶν ἐστὶ διαβόλος ἐστὶ*, John vi. 70. My reasons for not translating it *devil* in this place are; first, the word is strictly and originally an appellative, denoting a certain bad quality, and though commonly applied to one particular being, yet naturally applicable to any kind of being susceptible of moral character; secondly, as the term in its appropriation to the arch rebel, always denotes one individual, the term *a devil* is not agreeable to Scripture style, inasmuch, that I am inclined to think, that if our Lord's intention had been to use, by an antonomasia, the distinguishing name of the evil spirit, in order to express more strongly the sameness of character in both, he would have said *ὁ διαβόλος*, one of you is *the devil*, this being the only way whereby that evil spirit is discriminated. The words *αντιδικός* adversary, *πειραζών* tempter with the article, are also used by way of eminence, though not so frequently, to express the same malignant being; yet, when either of these occurs without the article, applied to a man as an adversary or a tempter, we do not suppose any allusion to the devil. The case would be different, if one were denominated *ὁ πειραζών*, *ὁ αντιδικός*, *the tempter*, *the adversary*.

There is not any epithet (for *διαβόλος* is no more than an epithet) by which the same spirit is oftener distinguished, than by that of *ὁ πονηρός*, *the evil one*. Now, when a man is called simply *πονηρός* without the article, no more is understood to be implied than that he is a bad man. But if the expression were *ὁ πονηρός*, unless used to distinguish a bad from a good man of the same name, we should consider it as equivalent to the devil, or *the evil one*. Even in metaphorical appellations, if a man were denominated *a dragon* or *a serpent*, we should go no farther for the import of the metaphor, than to the nature of the animal so called; but if he were termed *the dragon*, or *the old serpent*, this would immediately suggest to us, that it was the intention of the speaker to represent the character as the same with that of the seducer of
our

our first parents. The unlearned English reader will object, Where is the impropriety in speaking of *a devil*? Is any thing more common in the New Testament? How often is there mention of persons possessed with *a devil*? We hear too of numbers of them. Out of Mary Magdalene went seven; and out of the furious man who made the sepulchres his residence, a legion. The Greek student needs not be informed, that in none of those places is the term *δαιβλος*, but *δαιμων* or *δαιμονιον*. Nor can any thing be clearer from Scripture, than that, though the *demons* are innumerable, there is but one *devil* in the universe. Besides, if we must suppose that this word, when applied to human creatures, bears at the same time an allusion to the evil spirit, there is the same reason for rendering it devils in the three passages lately quoted from Paul; for, wherever the indefinite use is proper in the singular, there can be no impropriety in the use of the plural. Both equally suppose that there may be many of the sort. Now, it is plain that those passages would lose greatly by such an alteration. Instead of pointing, according to the manifest scope of the place, to a particular bad quality to be avoided, or a vice whereby certain dangerous persons would be distinguished, it could only serve as a vague expression of what is bad in general, and so would convey little or no instruction.

§ 5. The only plea I know, in favour of the common translation of the passage is, that, by the help of the trope *antonomasia*, (for devil in our language has much the force of a proper name), the expression has more strength and animation than a mere appellative could give it. But that the expression is more animated, is so far from being an argument in its favour, that it is, in my judgment, the contrary. It favours more of the human spirit than of the divine, more of the translator than of the author. We are inclinable to put that expression into an author's mouth, which we should, on such an occasion, have chosen ourselves. When affected with anger or resentment, we always desert the proper terms, for those tropes which will convey our sentiment with most asperity. This is not the manner of our Lord, especially in cases wherein he himself is the direct object of either injury or insult. Apposite thoughts, clothed in the plainest expressions are much more characteristic of his manner. When there appears severity in what he says, it will be found to arise from the truth and pertinency of the thought, and not from a curious selection of cutting and reproachful words. This would be but ill adapted to the patience, the meekness, and the humility of his character; not to mention that it would be little of a piece with the account given of the rest of his sufferings.

I know it may be objected, that the rebuke given to Peter, Matt. xvi. 23. *Get thee behind me, Satan*, is conceived in terms as harsh, though the provocation was far from being equal. The

answer

answer is much the same in regard to both. Satan, though conceived by us as a proper name, was an appellative in the language spoken by our Lord; for, from the Hebrew it passed into the Syriac, and signified no more than adversary or opponent. It is naturally just as applicable to human as to spiritual agents, and is, in the Old Testament, often so applied.

§ 6. I acknowledge that the word *διαβολος*, in the case under examination, is to be understood as used in the same latitude with the Hebrew *Satan*, which, though commonly interpreted by the Seventy *διεβολος*, is sometimes rendered *επιβουλος*, *insidiator*, and may be here fitly translated into English, either *spy* or *informér*. The Scribes and Pharisees, in consequence of their knowledge of the opposition between our Lord's doctrine and theirs, had conceived an envy of him, which settled into malice and hatred, insomuch that they needed no accuser. But though Judas did not properly accuse his Master to them as a criminal, the purpose which he engaged to the Scribes, the chief priests, and the elders, to execute, was to observe his motions, and inform them when and where he might be apprehended privately without tumult, and to conduct their servants to the place. The term used was therefore pertinent, but rather soft than severe. He calls him barely *spy* or *informér*, whom he might have called traitor and perfidious.

§ 7. It is now proper to enquire, secondly, into the use that has been made of the terms *δαιμων* and *δαιμονιον*. First, as to the word *δαιμων*, it occurs only five times in the New Testament, once in each of the three Gospels, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and twice in the Apocalypse. It is remarkable, that in the three Gospels it refers to the same possession, to wit, that of the furious man in the country of the Gadarenes, who haunted the sepulchres. There does not, however, seem to be any material difference in this application from that of the diminutive *δαιμονιον*, which is also used by Luke in relation to the same demoniac.

§ 8. *Δαιμονιον* occurs frequently in the Gospels, and always in reference to possessions real or supposed. But the word *διαβολος* is never so applied. The use of the term *δαιμονιον* is as constantly indefinite, as the term *διαβολος* is definite. Not but that it is sometimes attended with the article; but that is only when the ordinary rules of composition require that the article be used even of a term that is strictly indefinite. Thus, when a possession is first named, it is called simply *δαιμονιον*, a *demon*, or *πνευμα ακαθαρτον*, an *unclean spirit*, never *το δαιμονιον* or *το πνευμα ακαθαρτον*. But when, in the progress of the story, mention is again made of the same demon, he is styled *το δαιμονιον* the *demon*, namely that already spoken of. And in English, as well as Greek, this is the usage in regard to all indefinites. Further, the plural *δαιμονια* occurs frequently applied to the same order of beings with the singular,

guilar. But what sets the difference of signification in the clearest light is that, though both words, *διαβολος* and *δαιμονιον*, occur often in the Septuagint, they are invariably used for translating different Hebrew words. *διαβολος* is always in Hebrew either *צ'ר* *tsar*, *enemy*, or *ש'טן* *Satan*, *adversary*, words never translated *δαιμονιον*. This word, on the contrary, is made to express some Hebrew term, signifying idol, pagan deity, apparition, or what some render *satyr*. What the precise idea of the *demon*, to whom possessions were ascribed, then was, it would perhaps be impossible for us with any certainty to affirm; but as it is evident that the two words, *διαβολος* and *δαιμονιον*, are not once confounded, though the first occurs in the New Testament upwards of thirty times, and the second about sixty, they can, by no just rule of interpretation, be rendered by the same term. Possessions are never attributed to the being termed *ο διαβολος*. Nor are his authority and dominion ever ascribed to *δαιμονια*: nay, when the discriminating appellations of the devil are occasionally mentioned, *δαιμονιον* is never given as one. Thus he is called not only *ο διαβολος*, but *ο πομπης*, *ο πειραζων*, *ο αντιδικος*, *ο σατανας*, *ο δρακων ο μεγας*, *ο οφης ο παλαιος*, *ο αρχων τ'ε κοσμου τ'ετ'ε*, *ο αρχων της εξουσι'ας τ'ε α'ερος*, and *ο θεος τ'ε αιωνος τ'ετ'ε*, that is, *the devil*, *the evil one*, *the tempter*, *the adversary*, (this last word answers both to *ο αντιδικος*, and *ο σατανας*, which cannot be translated differently), *the great dragon*, *the old serpent*, *the prince of this world*, *the prince of the power of the air*, and *the god of this world*. But there is no such being as *το δαιμονιον*, the appellation *δαιμονιον* being common to multitudes, whilst the other is always represented as a singular being, the only one of his kind. Not that the Jewish notion of the devil had any resemblance to what the Persians first, and the Manicheans afterwards, called the evil principle, which they made in some sort co-ordinate with God, and the first source of all evil, as the other is of good. For *the devil*, in the Jewish system, was a creature as much as any other being in the universe, and as liable to be controlled by omnipotence, an attribute which they ascribed to God alone. But still the devil is spoken of as only one; and other beings, however bad, are never confounded with him.

§ 9. I know but two passages of the history that have the appearance of exceptions from this remark. One is, that wherein our Lord, when accused of casting out demons by the prince of demons, says in return, *How can Satan cast out Satan?* Mark iii. 23. There is no doubt that *ο Σατανας* and *ο Διαβολος* are the same. Here then, say the objectors, the former of these names is applied to *δαιμονια*, which seems to shew an intercommunity of names. Yet it must be observed, that this of Satan is introduced only in the way of illustration by similitude, as the divisions in kingdoms and families also are. The utmost that can be deduced from such an example is, that they are malignant beings

as well as he, engaged in the same bad cause, and perhaps of the number of those called his angels, and made to serve as his instruments. But this is no evidence that he and they are the same. The other passage is in Luke, chap. xiii. 11. where we have an account of the cure of a woman, who had been bowed down for eighteen years. She is said to have had a spirit of infirmity; and our Lord himself says that Satan had bound her, ver. 16. But let it be observed, first, that nothing is said that implies possession. She is not called *δαιμονιζομενη*, a *demoniac*. Our Saviour is not said to dispossess the demon, but to loose her from her infirmity; secondly, that it is a common idiom among the Jews, to put *spirit* before any quality ascribed to a person, whether it be good or bad, mental or corporeal. Thus the spirit of fear, the spirit of meekness, the spirit of slumber, the spirit of jealousy, are used to express habitual fear, &c.: thirdly, that the ascribing of her disease to Satan, does not imply possession. The former is frequent, even where there is no insinuation of the latter. All the diseased whom our Lord healed, are said to have been oppressed by the devil, *υπο του διαβολου*, Acts x. 38. All Job's afflictions are ascribed to Satan as the cause, Job i. ii. yet Job is no where represented as a demoniac.

§ 10. A late learned and ingenious author*, has written an elaborate dissertation to evince, that there was no real possession in the demoniacs mentioned in the gospel; but that the style there employed was adopted merely in conformity to popular prejudices, and used of a natural disease. His hypothesis is by no means necessary for supporting the distinction which I have been illustrating, and which is founded purely on Scriptural usage. Concerning his doctrine, I shall only say in passing that, if there had been no more to urge from sacred writ in favour of the common opinion, than the name *δαιμονιζομενος*, or even the phrases *δαιμονιον εχειν*, *εκβαλλειν*, &c. I should have thought his explanation at least not improbable. But when I find mention made of the number of demons in particular possessions, their actions so expressly distinguished from those of the man possessed, conversations held by the former in regard to the disposal of them after their expulsion, and accounts given how they were actually disposed of; when I find desires and passions ascribed peculiarly to them, and similitudes taken from the conduct which they usually observe; it is impossible for me to deny their existence, without admitting that the sacred historians were either deceived themselves in regard to them, or intended to deceive their readers. Nay, if they were faithful historians, this reflection, I am afraid, will strike still deeper. But this only by the way. To enter farther into the question here, would be foreign to my purpose.

* Dr Farmer.

pose. The reader of that performance, which is written very plausibly, will judge for himself.

§ 11. I observe further that, though we cannot discover, with certainty, from all that is said in the gospel concerning possession, whether the demons were conceived to be the ghosts of wicked men deceased, or lapsed angels, or (as was the opinion of some early Christian writers *) the mongrel breed of certain angels (whom they understood by *the sons of God* mentioned in Genesis, ch. vi. 2) and of *the daughters of men*; it is plain they were conceived to be malignant spirits. They are exhibited as the causes of the most direful calamities to the unhappy persons whom they possess, dumbness, deafness, madness, palsy, epilepsy, and the like. The descriptive titles given them, always denote some ill quality or other. Most frequently they are called *πνευματα ακαθαρτα*, *unclean spirits*, sometimes *πνευματα πονηρα*, *malign spirits*. They are represented as conscious that they are doomed to misery and torments, though their punishment be for a while suspended. Art thou come hither, *βασανισαι ημας*, *to torment us before the time?* Matt viii. 29.

§ 12. But, though this is the character of those demons who were dislodged by our Lord out of the bodies of men and women possessed by them, it does not follow that the word *demon* always conveys this bad sense, even in the New Testament. This having been a word much in use among the heathen, from whom the Hellenist Jews first borrowed it, it is reasonable to expect that, when it is used in speaking of Pagans, their customs, worship, and opinions, more especially when Pagans are represented as employing the term, the sense should be that which is conformable, or nearly so, to classical use. Now, in classical use, the word signified a divine being, though not in the highest order of their divinities, and therefore supposed not equivalent to *Θεος*, but superior to human, and consequently, by the maxims of their theology, a proper object of adoration. Though they commonly used the term in a good sense, they did not so always. They had evil demons as well as good. *Juxta usurpatam*, says Calcidias, *penes Græcos loquendi consuetudinem tam sancti sunt demones quam profesti est infidi*. But when no bad quality is ascribed to the demon or demons spoken of, and nothing affirmed that implies it, the acceptation of the term in Pagan writers is generally favourable. Who has not heard of the demon of Socrates?

§ 13. In this way the word is to be understood in the only passage of the Acts where it occurs, Acts xvii. 18. *Οι δε, Ξενων δαιμονιων δοκει καταγγελευς ειναι*. *Others said, he seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods*. So our translators render it. The reason of this verdict is added, *because he preached to them Jesus and the*

* Just. M. Apol. i.

the resurrection, τον Ιησυν και την Αναστασιν. They supposed the former to be a male, and the latter a female divinity; for it was customary with them to deify abstract qualities, making them either gods or goddesses, as suited the gender of the name. This, if I remember right, is the only passage in the New Testament, in which δαιμονια is not rendered devils, but *gods*. If our translators had adhered to their method of rendering this word in every other instance, and said, *He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange devils*, they would have grossly perverted the sense of the passage. Now, this may suggest a suspicion of the impropriety of this version of the word any where, but especially where it relates to the objects of worship among the Pagans, with whom the term, when unaccompanied with a bad epithet, or any thing in the context that fixed the application to evil spirits, was always employed in a good sense.

§ 14. There is a famous passage to this purpose in the writings of the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. x. 20, 21. on which I shall lay before the reader a few observations. Ἄ θυναι τα εθνη, δαιμονιοις θυναι, και ου Θεω· ου διλω δε ἡμας κοινωνους των δαιμονιων γινωσθαι. Ου δυνασθε ποτηριον Κυριου πινειν και ποτηριον δαιμονιων· ου δυνασθε τραπεζης Κυριου μετεχειν, και τραπεζης δαιμονιων. In the English Bible thus rendered, *The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God; and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: Ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table and the table of devils.* Passing the impropriety, so often observed above, of representing a name as common to many, which Scripture has invariably appropriated to one, the sentiment itself expressed by our translators, that the Gentiles sacrifice to devils, is not just, whether we consider the thing abstractly, or in relation to the intention of the worshippers.

Considered abstractly, the pagan worship and sacrifices were not offered to God, whom they knew not, and to whose character and attributes there was nothing in the popular creed (I speak not of philosophers) that bore the least affinity. But as little were they offered to that being, whom Christians and Jews call the devil or Satan, with whose character and history they were equally unacquainted. Nor is it enough to say, that the characters of their deities were often so bad, that they partook more of the diabolical nature than of the divine. That is indeed true, and therefore evil spirits are not understood as excluded from the import of the term δαιμονια; but as little, on the other hand, ought that term to be confined to such. The proper notion is, beings, in respect of power, (whatever be their other qualities) superior to human, but inferior to that which we Christians comprehend under the term *divine*. For this reason even the higher orders of the heathen divinities, those whom they styled *Dii majorum*

forum gentium, are included in the Apostle's declaration. For, though they more rarely applied to such the terms *δαίμων* and *δαίμονιον*, the power ascribed to them by their votaries, was infinitely short of omnipotence, as indeed all their other attributes were short of the divine perfections. Paul acknowledged no God but one, of whom the gentiles were ignorant, and to whom, therefore, they could not offer sacrifice. All beings of a subordinate nature, however much they might be accounted superior to us, he classes under the same general name. 'But can Jupiter himself be included in this description, Jupiter to whom all mighty power and supreme dominion are attributed, and who is styled by the poets, *The father of gods and men, the greatest and best of beings?*' The attributes sometimes given to Jupiter, must be considered as words merely complimentary and adulatory; they being utterly inconsistent with the accounts which the same persons give of his origin and history. They are like the titles with which earthly potentates are saluted by their flatterers, when styled fathers of their country, absolute lords of earth and ocean. De la Motte's reply to Madam Dacier*, is here very apposite: "What! Could Homer seriously believe Jupiter to be the creator of gods and men? Could he think him the father of his own father Saturn, whom he drove out of heaven, or of Juno his sister, and his wife; of Neptune and Pluto his brothers, or of the nymphs, who had the charge of him in his childhood; or of the giants who made war upon him, and would have dethroned him, if they had been then arrived at the age of manhood? How well his actions justify the Latin epithets, *optimus, maximus*, so often given him, all the world knows." Jupiter has, therefore, no right to be held an exception, but is, with strict propriety, comprehended in the name *δαίμονια* attributed, by the Apostle, to all the heathen gods. But *δαίμονιον*, as we have seen, is one thing, and *ὁ διαβολος* is another. Now, if a supposed resemblance, in disposition, between the heathen gods and the devil, were a sufficient foundation for what is affirmed in the common version; any vicious person of whom mention is made in history, such as Cain, Ham, Jezebel, in whom one might fancy a likeness in character or actions to some divinities of the heathen, might, with equal propriety as the devil, be called the objects of their adoration.

§ 15. There are two passages in the Old Testament, one in the Pentateuch, Deut. xxxii. 17. the other in the Psalms, xcvi. 5. to which, particularly the first, the Apostle had doubtless an allusion. In both, the term used by the Septuagint is *δαίμονια*: the Hebrew term is not the same in both places, but in neither is it a word which is ever translated *διαβολος* by the Seventy. In the Psalm referred to, the term in the original, is
that

* De la Critique; seconde partie. Des Dieux.

that which is commonly rendered *idols*. Now, in regard to idols, the Apostle had said in the same epistle, 1 Cor. viii. 4. that *an idol is nothing in the world*; in other words, is the representation of no real existence in the universe, though it may be the representation of an imaginary being. It is as much as to say, Jupiter, and Juno, and Saturn, and all the rest of the heathen gods, as delineated by the poets and mythologists, are nonentities, the mere creatures of imagination. Now, if an idol represent no real being, it does not represent the devil, whose existence is, on the Christian hypothesis, beyond a question. But I am aware of the objection that, if idols represent no real beings, they either do not represent demons, or demons are not real beings. I answer, it is true, that no individual demons, actually existing, are properly represented by their idols; nevertheless, these may, with strict justice, be said to represent the genus or kind, that is, beings intermediate between God and man, less than the former, greater than the latter. For to all who come under this description, real or imaginary, good or bad, the name *demons* is promiscuously given. The reality of such intermediate orders of beings, revelation every where supposes, and rational theism does not contradict. Now, it is to *the kind* expressed in the definition now given, that the pagan deities are represented as corresponding, and not individually to *particular demons* actually existing. To say, therefore, that the Gentiles sacrifice to *demons*, is no more than to say, that they sacrifice to beings which, whether real, or imaginary, we perceive, from their own accounts of them, to be below the supreme. "What are men?" says a dialogist in Lucian*, The answer is, "Mortal gods. What are gods? Immortal men." In fact, immortality was almost the only distinction between them.

§ 16. This leads directly to the examination of the justness of the sentiment, that *the gentiles sacrifice to devils*, in the second view of it that was suggested, or considered in relation to the ideas and intentions of the worshippers themselves, to which alone, in my apprehension, the apostle here alludes. First then, we may justly say, that their sacrifices were not offered to God; for, however much they might use the name of God, the intention is to be judged, not by the name, but by the meaning affixed to it. Now, such a being as the eternal, unoriginated, immutable, Creator and Ruler of the world, they had not in all their system, and therefore did not adore. For this reason, they are not unjustly termed, by the same Apostle, *αθεοι, atheists*, Eph. ii. 2. without God, that is, without the knowledge, and, consequently, the belief and worship, of him who alone is God. But their sacrifices and devotions were presented to beings, to whom they

* Vitarum auctio. Τι δαι οι ανθρωποι; θεοι θνητοι. τι δαι οι θεοι; ανθρωποι αθανατοι.

they themselves ascribed a character infinitely inferior to what we know to belong to the true God, of whom they were ignorant.

A late philosopher, who will not be suspected of partiality to the sentiments of an Apostle, or of the weakness of a bias in favour of Christianity, has, nevertheless, in this instance, adopted the ideas of the sacred author, and has not hesitated to pronounce the pagans * *a kind of superstitious atheists, who acknowledged no being that corresponds to our idea of a deity.* Besides, a great part of the heathen worship was confessedly paid to the ghosts of departed heroes, of conquerors, and potentates, and of the inventors of arts, whom popular superstition, after disguising their history with fables and absurdities, had blindly deified. Now, to all such beings, they themselves, as well as the Jews, assigned the name *δαίμονια*. Further, it deserves our notice, that the Apostle is not writing here to Hebrews, but to Greeks; and that he himself, being a native of a Grecian city, knew perfectly the sense that was affixed by them to the word *δαίμονια*. If, therefore, he had intended to suggest, that they were all malignant beings to whom their devotions were addressed, he would never have used the general term, which he knew they commonly understood in a more favourable sense. In that case, he would have said *κακοδαίμονσι θύσι*, or something equivalent.

§ 17. However much, therefore, the gentiles might have disputed the truth of the first part of the Apostle's assertion, that they did not offer sacrifice to God, because they were not sensible of their own ignorance on this article, the latter part of the assertion they would have readily admitted, that they sacrificed to demons, such as the spirits of heroes and heroines deceased, and other beings conceived superior to mere mortals. This charge they themselves would not have pretended to be either injurious or untrue. The very passage formerly quoted from the Acts, where they call Jesus and the resurrection *strange demons*, *ζενα δαιμονια*, shews, that there were *known demons*, *γνωριμα δαιμονια*, to whose service they were accustomed. We cannot worship whom we do not mean to worship. There is an inconsistency in the ideas. They could, therefore, no more be said to have worshipped the devil, as we Christians understand the term, than they could be said to have worshipped the cannibals of New Zealand, because they had no more conception of the one than of the other. However much it may be in the spirit of theological controvertists, to use amplifications irreconcilable with truth and justice, in order to render an adversary odious; this manner is not in the spirit of the sacred penmen. Some appearances of the polemic temper there are in most versions of the New Testament, which will be found to spring entirely from translators. The popular

* Natural History of Religion. Sect. IV.

popular doctrine has indeed been adopted by Milton, and greatly embellished in his incomparable poem. But it is not from the fictions of poets that we must draw the principles of religion.

§ 18. I must likewise own that when, in the passage to the Corinthians under examination, we render *δαίμονα* *demons*, we still express the sentiment more harshly than it is in the original, because the word was often then used in a good sense, or at least, not as we Christians use it at present, invariably in a bad sense. One way, however, of restoring it to its proper import, is to preserve sacredly the distinction, which holy writ so plainly authorises, and never to confound terms as synonymous, which are there never confounded.

§ 19. The above observations may serve also to illustrate a noted passage in the Apocalypse, Rev. ix. 20.: *The rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues, yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, δαίμονα, and idols of gold and silver, and brass, and stone, and of wood, which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk.* It is equally manifest here, as in the former example, that the word rendered *devils*, ought to have been *demons*; nor is it less manifest, that every being who is not the one true God, however much conceived to be superior to us, is, whether good or bad, hero or heroine, demigod or demigoddes, angel or departed spirit, saint or sinner, real or imaginary, in the class comprized under the name *demons*. And the worship of them is as much *demonolatry* (if ye will admit the word) as the worship of Jupiter, Mars and Minerva. This may serve to shew, of how much consequence it is to attend, with accuracy, to the differences to be found in the application of words. It is only thereby that we can learn their exact import, and be qualified to judge both of the subject, and of the completion of scriptural prophecies. As to the worship of the devil *του διαβολου*, nothing can be clearer than that, in Scripture, no pagans are charged with it; and as to the worship *των δαιμονιων*, beings subordinate to the supreme, it may be considered how far we can with justice say, that the pagans are peculiarly chargeable. It will deserve to be remarked, by the way, that the only difference between demonolatry and idolatry appears to be, that the first regards the object of worship, the second the mode. The former is a violation of the first commandment, the latter of the second. The connection, however, is so intimate between them, that they have rarely, if ever, been found separate.

§ 20. There are only two other passages wherein the word *δαίμονα* occurs in the New Testament, in both which there is some difficulty. One is, where Paul warns Timothy, 1 Ep. iv. 1. of those who would make a defection from the faith, *giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils, διδασκαλιαις δαιμονιων*, doctrines

trines of demons. It is hard to say whether, by this phrase, we are to understand doctrines suggested by demons, or doctrines concerning demons. The form of expression will support either meaning. If the first, the word *demons* is taken in a bad sense, for ghosts, or other spirits of a malignant character, the common acceptance of the word in the Gospels, where an agency on human beings is ascribed to them. The connection of the words, *doctrines of demons*, with *seducing spirits*, immediately preceding, gives some plausibility to this interpretation. If the second, there is reason to think, that it is used more extensively, for all those beings, inferior to God, who are made objects of adoration. In this case, the words foretel either a total apostasy from the faith of the Gospel, to heathen demonology, commonly called mythology, or a defection from the purity of its doctrine, by admitting an unnatural mixture of heathenish absurdities. That this is his meaning, is rendered not improbable, by its being connected with other corruptions of the Christian doctrine, also introduced some ages after the times of the Apostles, and implied in the words, *forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, &c.* But in regard to this question, I do not pretend to decide.

§ 21. The other passage is in the Epistle of James, ch. ii. 19. The whole verse in the common version runs thus: *Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe and tremble: τα δαιμονια*, the demons. That the Apostle here means the spirits of wicked men deceased, which (in Jewish use, as we learn from Josephus) were commonly styled demons, there is no reason to question. The only points of which their belief is asserted, are the being and the unity of the Godhead. The epithet *δαιμονιαδης* is accordingly used in a bad sense in this Epistle, ch. iii. 15. where that wisdom which produceth envy and contention, is styled earthly, sensual, *devilish*, *δαιμονιαδης*, demonian.

§ 22. The only other words in the New Testament, connected with *δαιμονι* are *δαισιδαμων* and *δαισιδαμονια*. Each occurs only once. The former is rendered, by our translators, *superstitious*, the latter, *superstition*. Neither of them is found in the Septuagint, or the Apocrypha, or in any part of the New Testament, except the Acts of the Apostles. We may readily believe, that the Jews, in speaking of their own religion, would avoid the use of terms bearing so manifest an allusion to a species of worship which it condemns. The only place where the term *δαισιδαμων* occurs, is Paul's speech in the Areopagus at Athens. It is applied by him to the Athenians, who were pagans. *Ανδρες Αθηναιοι*, says he, *κατα παντα ως δαισιδαμονιστους υμας θεωρω*, Acts xvii. 22.; in the common version, *Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious.* The English expression is, in my

opinion, much harsher than the Greek. As the word no where else occurs in the sacred writings, our only rule for ascertaining its import is the classical application. Besides, the Apostle, being a native of a Grecian city, well knew in what sense his hearers would understand the term. If then he spoke to be understood, we must suppose that he employed his words according to their current value in the place. Now, it is plain that, in the classical use, *δεισιδαιμων* has not a bad meaning, unless there be something in the context that leads us to an unfavourable interpretation. *Αι δε δεισιδαιμων η;* *He was always a religious man,* says Xenophon of Agesilaus, when he is plainly commending him. Favorinus explains the word by *ὁ ευσθενης pious;* and gives *εὐλαβεια* as the common import of *δεισιδαιμονια*, which he resolves into *Φεβος Θεου η δαιμονων, the fear of God, or of demons.*

Now, it has been shown, that among pagans, in the common acceptation of *δαιμων*, the meaning was favourable. It is acknowledged that *δεισιδαιμων* was also susceptible of a bad meaning, answering to our word *superstitious*. Further, I readily admit that the Apostle would not probably have used that term in speaking of either Jews or Christians, because he did not consider the *δαιμονες* as objects of their veneration. At the same time, he knew, that in addressing the Athenians, he employed a term which could not be offensive to them. Indeed, his manner of introducing his subject, shews a desire of softening the disapprobation which his words imply, and from which he took occasion to expound the principles of a more sublime theology. The Athenians gloried in the character of being more religious *δεισιδαιμονιστεροι*, than any other Grecian state. Paul's concession of this point in their favour, would rather gratify than offend them, and would serve to alleviate the censure of carrying their religion to excess. Every thing, in the turn of his expression, shews that it was his intention to tell them, in the mildest terms, what he found censurable in their devotion, and thence to take occasion of preaching to them the only true God. Accordingly, he employed a word which he knew no pagan could take amiss; and to denote the excess with which he thought them chargeable, he chose to use the comparative degree, which was the gentlest manner of doing it. Nay, he even abates the import of the comparative, by the particle *ως*. Beza has properly rendered the expression, *quasi religiosiores*. The version, *too superstitious*, not only deviates from the intention of the speaker, but includes a gross impropriety, as it implies that it is right to be superstitious to a certain degree, and that the error lies in exceeding that degree; whereas, in the universal acceptation of the English term, all superstition is excess, and therefore faulty.

As to the noun *δεισιδαιμονια*, in the only place of Scripture where it occurs, it is mentioned as used by a heathen, in relation

to the Jewish religion. Festus, the president, when he acquainted king Agrippa concerning Paul, at that time his prisoner, says that he found the accusation brought against him by his countrymen, not to be such as he had expected, but to consist in ζητηματα τινα περι της ιδιης δεισιδαιμονιας, in the English translation, *certain questions of their own superstition*, Acts xxv. 19. It was not unlike a Roman magistrate to call the Jewish religion *superstition*. That the gentiles were accustomed to speak of it contemptuously, is notorious. But it should be considered, that Festus was then addressing his discourse to king Agrippa, whom he knew to be a Jew, who had come to Cesarea to congratulate him, and to whom it appears, from the whole of the story, that Festus meant to shew the utmost civility. It cannot then be imagined, that he would intentionally affront a visitant of his rank, the very purpose of whose visit had been to do him honour on his promotion. That the ordinary import of the term was favourable, cannot be questioned. Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the religious service performed by the high priest, at which the kings of Egypt were obliged to be present, adds, Ταυτα δ'επρατειν, αμμι μιν εις δεισιδαιμονιας και θεοφιλη βιον τον βασιλευα προτροπουμενος⁴. "These things he did to excite the king to a devout and pious life." The word, therefore, ought to have been rendered *religion*, according to its primitive and most usual acceptation among the Greeks.

Bishop Pierce is, for aught I know, singular in thinking that της ιδιης δεισιδαιμονιας ought to be translated *of a private superstition*, meaning the Christian doctrine taught by Paul. But of this version the words are evidently not susceptible; the only authority alleged is Peter, who says, (2 ep. i. 20.) πασα προφητικη γραφης ιδιης επιλυσιως ου γινεται, in the common translation, *No prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation*. Admitting that this is a just expression of the sense of that passage, the cases are not parallel. *ιδιος* has there no article. If the import of *ιδιος* in the other place were *private*, the meaning of the phrase must not be *a* but *the* private superstition, or the private religion. Had we any evidence that this designation had been given to Christianity in the times of the apostles, there might be some plausibility in the conjecture. But there is no trace of such a designation; and indeed it would have been exceedingly improper as applied to a doctrine, which was preached publicly every where, and of whose ministers, both Jews and Pagans, complained that they turned the world upside down. There are few words in the New Testament more common than *ιδιος*, but there is not a single instance wherein it is accompanied with the article, that can be rendered otherwise than *his own*, *her own*, or *their own*.

§ 23. So much for the distinction uniformly observed in Scripture between the words *διαβολος* and *δαιμονιον*; to which I shall only

only add, that in the ancient Syriac version, these names are always duly distinguished. The words employed in translating one of them are never used in rendering the other; and in all the Latin translations I have seen, ancient and modern, Popish and Protestant, this distinction is carefully observed. It is observed also in Diodati's Italian version, and most of the late French versions. But in Luther's German translation, the Geneva French, and the common English, the words are confounded in the manner above observed. Some of the later English translations have corrected this error, and some have implicitly followed the common version.

PART II.

Ἅδης and γέεννα.

THE next example I shall produce of words in which, though commonly translated by the same English term, there is a real difference of signification, shall be *Ἅδης* and *γέεννα*, in the common version rendered *hell*. That *γέεννα* is employed in the New Testament to denote the place of future punishment, prepared for the devil and his angels, is indisputable. In the Old Testament, we do not find this place in the same manner mentioned. Accordingly the word *γέεννα* does not occur in the Septuagint. It is not a Greek word, and consequently not to be found in the Grecian classics. It is originally a compound of the two Hebrew words *גֵּי הַיְּבִנּוֹם* *ge hinnom*, the valley of Hinnom, a place near Jerusalem, of which we hear first in the Book of Joshua, xv. 8. It was there that the cruel sacrifices of children were made by fire to Moloch, the Ammonitish idol, 2 Chron. xxxiii. 6. The place was also called *Tophet*, 2 Kings xxiii. 10. and that, as is supposed, from the noise of drums, *Toph* signifying a drum, a noise raised on purpose to drown the cries of the helpless infants. As this place was, in process of time, considered as an emblem of hell, or the place of torment reserved for the punishment of the wicked in a future state, the name *Tophet* came gradually to be used in this sense, and at length to be confined to it. This is the sense, if I mistake not, in which *gebenna*, a synonymous term, is always to be understood in the New Testament, where it occurs just twelve times. In ten of these there can be no doubt; in the other two, the expression is figurative; but it scarcely will admit a question, that the figure is taken from that state of misery which awaits the impenitent. Thus the Pharisees are said to make the proselyte, whom they compass sea and land to gain, twofold

twofold more a child of hell, υἱος γεέννης, than themselves, Matt. xxiii. 15. an expression both similar in form, and equivalent in signification, to υἱος διαβολου, *son of the devil*, and υἱος της απολειας, *son of perdition*. In the other passage an unruly tongue is said to be *set on fire of hell*, James iii. 6. φλογιζομενη ὑπο της γεέννης. These two cannot be considered as exceptions, it being the manifest intention of the writers in both to draw an illustration of the subject from that state of perfect wretchedness.

§ 2. As to the word ἀδης, which occurs in eleven places of the New Testament, and is rendered *hell* in all, except one, where it is translated *grave*, it is quite common in classical authors, and frequently used by the Seventy in the translation of the Old Testament. In my judgment it ought never in Scripture to be rendered *hell*, at least in the sense wherein that word is now universally understood by Christians. In the Old Testament, the corresponding word is שאול *sheol*, which signifies the state of the dead in general, without regard to the goodness or badness of the persons, their happiness or misery. In translating that word, the Seventy have almost invariably used ἀδης. This word is also used sometimes in rendering the nearly synonymous words or phrases בור *bor*, and אבני בור *abne bor*, *the pit*, and *stones of the pit*, זלמות *tsal moth*, *the shades of death*, דומה *dumeh*, *silence*. The state is always represented under those figures which suggest something dreadful, dark and silent, about which the most prying eye, and listening ear, can acquire no information. The term ἀδης, *hades*, is well adapted to express this idea. It was written anciently, as we learn from the poets (for what is called the poetic, is nothing but the ancient dialect), αἰδης, *ab a privativo et uideo* *video*, and signifies obscure, hidden, invisible. To this the word *hell* in its primitive signification perfectly corresponded. For, at first, it denoted only what was secret or concealed. This word is found with little variation of form, and precisely in the same meaning, in all the Teutonic dialects*.

But though our word *hell*, in its original signification, was more adapted to express the sense of ἀδης than of γεέννα, it is not so now. When we speak as Christians, we always express by it, the place of the punishment of the wicked after the general judgment, as opposed to heaven, the place of the reward of the righteous. It is true, that in translating heathen poets, we retain the old sense of the word *hell*, which answers to the Latin *orcus*, or rather *infernus*, as when we speak of the descent of Eneas, or of Orpheus, into *hell*. Now the word *infernus*, in Latin, comprehends the receptacle of all the dead, and contains both *elysium*, the place of the blessed, and *tartarus* the abode of the miserable. The term *inferi*, comprehends all the inhabitants good and bad, happy

* See Junius' Gothic Glossary, subjoined to the Codex Argenteus, on the word *bulyan*,

happy and wretched. The Latin words *infernus* and *inferni* bear evident traces of the notion that the repository of the souls of the departed is under ground. This appears also to have been the opinion of both Greeks and Hebrews, and indeed of all antiquity. How far the ancient practice of burying the body may have contributed to produce this idea concerning the mansion of the ghosts of the deceased, I shall not take upon me to say; but it is very plain, that neither in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, nor in the New, does the word *ᾗδης* convey the meaning which the present English word *hell*, in the Christian usage, always conveys to our minds.

§ 3. It were endless to illustrate this remark by an enumeration and examination of all the passages in both Testaments wherein the word is found. The attempt would be unnecessary, as it is hardly now pretended by any critic, that this is the acceptance of the term in the Old Testament. Who, for example, would render the words of the venerable patriarch Jacob, Gen. xxxvii. 35. when he was deceived by his sons into the opinion that his favourite child Joseph had been devoured by a wild beast, *I will go down to hell to my son mourning?* or the words which he used, ch. xlii. 38. when they expostulated with him about sending his youngest son Benjamin into Egypt along with them, *Ye will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell?* Yet in both places the word, in the original, is *sheol*, and in the version of the Seventy, *hades*. I shall only add, that in the famous passage from the Psalms, xvi. 10. quoted in the Acts of the Apostles, Acts ii. 27. of which I shall have occasion to take notice afterwards, though the word is the same both in Hebrew and in Greek, as in the two former quotations, and though it is in both places rendered *hell* in the common version, it would be absurd to understand it as denoting the place of the damned, whether the expression be interpreted literally of David the type, or of Jesus Christ the antitype, agreeably to its principal and ultimate object.

§ 4. But it appears at present to be the prevailing opinion among critics, that the term, at least in the Old Testament, means no more than *קבר* *keber*, *grave* or *sepulchre*. Of the truth of this opinion, after the most attentive, and, I think, impartial examination, I am far from being convinced. At the same time I am not insensible of the weight which is given to that interpretation by some great names in the learned world, particularly that of Father Simon, a man deeply versed in oriental literature, who has expressly said *, that *sheol* signifies, in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, *sepulchre*, and who has strenuously and repeatedly defended this sentiment against Le Clerc, and others, who had attacked

* Hist. Crit. du N. T. ch. 12.

acked it *. And since he seems even to challenge his opponents to produce examples from the Old Testament, wherein the word *sheol* has the signification which they ascribe to it; I shall here briefly, with all the deference due to names so respectable as those which appear on the opposite side, lay before the reader the result of my inquiries upon the question.

§ 5. I freely acknowledge that, by translating *sheol* *the grave*, the purport of the sentence is often expressed with sufficient clearness. The example last quoted from Genesis is an evidence. *Ye will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave*, undoubtedly gives the meaning of the sentence in the original, notwithstanding that the English word *grave* does not give the meaning of the Hebrew word *sheol*. This may at first appear a paradox, but will not be found so when examined. Suppose one, in relating the circumstances of a friend's death, should say, "This unlucky accident brought him to his shroud," another should say, "It brought him to his coffin," a third, "It brought him to his grave." The same sentiment is expressed by them all, and these plain words, "This accident proved the cause of his death," are equivalent to what was said by every one of them. But is it just to infer thence that the English words, *shroud*, *coffin*, *grave*, and *death*, are synonymous terms? It will not be pretended. Yet I have not heard any argument stronger than this, for accounting the Hebrew words *sheol* and *keber* synonymous. The cases are entirely parallel. Used as tropes, they often no doubt are so. Who can question, that when there is any thing figurative in the expression, the sense may be conveyed without the figure, or by another figure? And if so, the figures or tropes, however different, may doubtless, in such application, be called synonymous to one another, and to the proper term.

Now, if this holds of the tropes of the same language, it holds also of those of different languages. You may adopt a trope in translating, which does not literally answer to that of the original, and which, nevertheless, conveys the sense of the original more justly than the literal version would have done. But in this case, though the whole sentence in the version corresponds to the whole sentence in the original, there is not the like correspondence in the words taken severally. Sometimes the reverse happens, to wit, that every word of a sentence in the original, has a word exactly corresponding in the version; and yet the whole sentence in the one does not correspond to the whole sentence in the other. The different geniuses of different languages, render it impossible to obtain always a correspondence in both respects. When it can be had only in one, the sentiment is always to be preferred to the words. For this reason, I do not
know

* Reponse a la Defense des Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande, ch. xvi.

know how our translators could have rendered *sheol* in that passage better than they have done. Taken by itself, we have no word in our language that answers to it. The Latin is, in this instance, luckier; as it supplies a word perfectly equivalent to that of the sacred penman, at the same time that it justly expresses the sense of the whole. Such is the translation of the verse in the Vulgate, *Deducetis canos meos cum dolore ad inferos*. Now, though our word *the grave*, may answer sufficiently in some cases for expressing, not the import of the Hebrew word *sheol*, but the purport of the sentence, it gives, in other cases, but a feeble, and sometimes an improper, version of the original. But this will be more evident afterwards.

§ 6. First, in regard to the situation of *hades*, it seems always to have been conceived by both Jews and Pagans, as in the lower parts of the earth, near its centre, as we should term it, or its foundation (according to the notions of the Hebrews, who knew nothing of its spherical figure), and answering in depth to the visible heavens in height, both which are, on this account, oftener than once, contrasted in sacred writ. In general, to express any thing inconceivably deep, this word is adopted, which shews sufficiently that unfathomable depth was always a concomitant of the idea conveyed by *sheol*. Thus God is represented by Moses as saying, Deut. xxxii. 22. *A fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn to the lowest hell*, as it is rendered in the common version. The word is *sheol* or *hades*; and Simon himself admits*, that it is here an hyperbole, which signifies that the fire should reach the bottom of the earth, and consume the whole earth. I acknowledge that it is in this passage used hyperbolically. But will any person pretend that it could have answered the purpose of giving the most terrible view of divine judgments, if the literal meaning of the word had implied no more than a grave? This concession of Simon's, is in effect giving up the cause. According to the explanation I have given of the proper sense of the word, it was perfectly adapted to such an use, and made a very striking hyperbole; but if his account of the literal and ordinary import of the term be just, the expression, so far from being hyperbolic, would have been the reverse.

In further evidence of this doctrine, the inhabitants of *ἀδης* are, from their subterranean abode, denominated in the New Testament, Phil. ii. 10. *καταχθονιοι*, a word of the same import with the phrase *ὑποκατω της γης*, *under the earth*, in the Apocalypse, ch. v. 13. and which, with the *επουρανιοι* and *επιγιοι*, *celestial* and *terrestrial* beings, include the whole rational creation. Of the coincidence of the Hebrew and the Pagan notions in regard to the situation of the place of departed spirits, if it were necessary to add any thing to what was observed above, from the im-

port

* Reponse a la Defense, &c. ch. xvi.

port of the names *infernus* and *inferi*, these beautiful lines of Virgil might suffice :

Non fecus, ac si qua penitus vi terra dehiscens
 Infernas referet sedes, et regna recludat
 Pallida, diis invisâ, superque immane barathrum
 Cernatur trepidentque inimisso lumine manes *.

§ 7. Several proofs might be brought from the prophets, and even from the Gospels, of the opposition in which heaven for height, and hades for depth, were conceived to stand to each other. I shall produce but a few from the Old Testament, which convey the most precise notion of their sentiments on this subject. The first is from the Book of Job, ch. xi. 7, 8, 9. where we have an illustration of the unsearchableness of the divine perfections in these memorable words, as found in the common version, *Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell, βεθυλα δὲ τῶν ἐν ἄδου, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.* Now of the opinion that the word in the Old Testament always denotes *grave* or *sepulchre*, nothing can be a fuller confutation than this passage. Among such immense distances as the height of heaven, the extent of the earth and the ocean, which were not only in those days unknown to men, but conceived to be unknowable; to introduce, as one of the unmeasurables, a sepulchre whose depth could scarcely exceed ten or twelve cubits, and which, being the work of men, was perfectly known, would have been absurd indeed, not to say ridiculous. What man in his senses could have said, ‘Ye can no more comprehend the Deity, than ye can discover the height of the firmament, or measure the depth of a grave.’

A passage very similar we have in the Psalms, cxxxix. 8. where heaven and ἄδης are in the same way contrasted. *If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, ἐὰν καταβῶ εἰς τὸν ἄδου, behold thou art there.* The only other place I shall mention is in the prophet Amos, ch. ix. 2, 3. where God is represented as saying, *Though they dig into hell, ἐν ἄδου, thence shall my hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down, and though they hide themselves on the top of Carmel, I will search and take them out thence; and though they be hid from my sight in the bottom of the sea, thence will I command the serpent, and he shall bite them.* Here for illustration we have a double contrast. To the top of Carmel, a very high mountain, is contrasted very properly the bottom of the sea; but to heaven, which is incomparably higher than the highest mountain, no suitable contrast is found, except *sheol* or *hades*,

which was evidently conceived to be the lowest thing in the world. The *επιγειοι* were supposed to possess the middle parts, the *επουρανιοι* and *καταχθονιοι* occupied the extremes, the former in height, the latter in depth. A late writer, of profound erudition, of whose sentiments on this subject I shall have occasion soon to take notice, has quoted the above passage of Amos, to prove that *into sheol men penetrate by digging*: he might, with equal reason, have quoted it to prove that *into heaven men penetrate by climbing*, or that men, in order to hide themselves, have recourse to the bottom of the sea.

§ 8. Again, let it be observed, that *keber*, the Hebrew word for *grave* or *sepulchre*, is never rendered in the ancient translation *αδης*, but *ταφος*, *μημα*, or some equivalent term. *Sheol*, on the contrary, is never rendered *ταφος* or *μημα*, but always *αδης*; nor is it ever construed with *θαπτω*, or any verb which signifies to bury, a thing almost inevitable in words so frequently occurring, if it had ever properly signified a grave. This itself might suffice to shew that the ideas which the Jews had of these were never confounded. I observe further, that *αδης*, as well as the corresponding Hebrew word, is always singular in meaning, as well as in form. The word for grave is often plural. The former never admits the possessive pronouns, being the receptacle of all the dead, and therefore incapable of an appropriation to individuals, the latter often. Where the disposal of the body or corpse is spoken of, *ταφος*, or some equivalent term, is the name of its repository. When mention is made of the spirit after death, its abode is *αδης*. When notice is taken of one's making or visiting the grave of any person, touching it, mourning at it, or erecting a pillar or monument upon it, and the like, it is always *keber* that is employed. Add to all this that, in *hades*, all the dead are represented as present, without exception. The case is quite different with the graves or sepulchres. Thus, Isaiah represents, very beautifully and poetically, a great and sudden desolation that would be brought upon the earth, saying, Isa. v. 14. *Hades, which is in the common version, Hell hath enlarged herself, and opened her mouth without measure. Hades alone is conceived to contain them all, though the graves, in which their bodies were deposited, might be innumerable. Again, in the song of triumph on the fall of the king of Babylon, ch. xiv. 9. Hell (the original word is the same as in the preceding passage) from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming: it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth: it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations. Thus in hades, all the monarchs and nobles, not of one family or race, but of the whole earth, are assembled. Yet their sepulchres are as distant from one another as the nations they governed. Those mighty dead are raised, not from their couches, which would have*

have been the natural expression, had the prophet's idea been a sepulchral vault, how magnificent soever, but *from their thrones*, as suited the notion of all antiquity, concerning not the bodies, but the shades or ghosts of the departed, to which was always assigned something similar in rank and occupation to what they had possessed upon the earth. Nay, as is well observed by Castalio *, those are represented as in hades, whose carcases were denied the honours of sepulture.

§ 9. To the preceding examples, I shall add but one other from the Old Testament. It is taken from that beautiful passage in Job, ch. xxviii. 17. wherein God himself is the speaker, and whereof the great purpose is, to expose human ignorance, and check human presumption. *Have the gates of death been opened unto thee? or hast thou seen the doors of the shadow of death?* For this last designation the term is in Hebrew *tsalmoth*, and in the translation of the Seventy, ἀδης: for, as was hinted before, *tsalmoth*, in its ordinary acceptation, is synonymous with *sheol*, though sometimes used metaphorically, for a very dark place, or a state of great ignorance. It is almost too obvious to need being remarked, that this challenge to Job could have no relation to a sepulchre, the door, or entry to which, is always known to the living. The case was very different with regard to the habitation of departed spirits. At the same time I entirely agree with the learned and ingenious bishop Lowth †, that the custom of depositing under ground the bodies of the deceased, and the form of their sepulchres, have, probably, first suggested some of the gloomy notions entertained on this subject. But popular opinions have a growth and progress, and come often, especially in questions at once so interesting and so inscrutable, to differ widely from what they were originally. May we not then, upon the whole, fairly conclude, that we have all the evidence which the nature of the thing will admit, and more than in most philological inquiries is thought sufficient, that the word *grave* or *sepulchre* never conveys the full import of the Hebrew *sheol*, or the Greek *hades*, though, in some instances, it may have all the precision necessary for giving the import of the sentiment?

§ 10. Even in some instances, where the language is so figurative, as to allow great latitude to a translator, the original term is but weakly rendered *grave*. Thus it is said, *Love is strong as death, jealousy is cruel as the grave*, Cant. viii. 6. The *grave*, when personified, or used metaphorically, is more commonly, if I mistake not, exhibited as a gentle power, which brings relief from cruelty, oppression, and trouble of every kind: whereas *hades*, which regards more the state of departed souls, than the mansions

* Defensio adv. Bezam. Adversarii Errores.

† De sacra Poesi Hebræorum, Præl. vii.

mansions of their bodies, exhibits, when personified, a severe and inflexible jailor, who is not to be gained by the most pathetic entreaties, or by any arts merely human. The clause would be appositely rendered in Latin, *inexorabilis sicut orcus*; for it is this inflexibility of character, that is chiefly indicated by the original word rendered *cruel*. In this notion of that state, as indeed in some other sentiments on this subject, and even in the terms applied to it, there is a pretty close coincidence with those of the ancient pagans. When the Latin poet mentions the fatal consequence of the venial trespass of Orpheus (as it appeared to him) in turning about to take one look of his beloved Eurydice, before leaving the infernal regions, he says, *Ignoscenda quidem*; but immediately correcting himself, adds, *scirent se ignoscere manes*.

§ 11. I shall now proceed to examine some passages in the New Testament, wherein the word occurs, that we may discover whether we ought to affix the same idea to it as to the corresponding term in the Old.—The first I shall produce is one, which, being originally in the Old Testament, is quoted and commented on in the New, and is consequently one of the fittest for assisting us in the discovery. Peter, in supporting the mission of his Master, in a speech made to the inhabitants of Judea and Jerusalem, on the famous day of Pentecost, alleges, amongst other things, the prediction of the royal Psalmist, part of which runs thus in the common version, Act. ii. 27. *Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy One to see corruption*. The passage is cited from the Psalms, xvi. 10. in the very words of the Seventy, which are (as far as concerns the present question) entirely conformable to the original Hebrew. As this prophecy might be understood by some to relate only to the Psalmist himself, the Apostle shews how inapplicable it is to him, when literally explained. It plainly pointed to a resurrection, and such a resurrection as would very soon follow death, that the soul should not be left in hades, should not remain in the mansion of departed spirits, but should reanimate its body, before the latter had suffered corruption. *Bretbren*, says he, Acts ii. 29. *let me speak freely to you of the Patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his sepulchre is with us to this day*. He has had no resurrection. It was never pretended that he had. His body, like other bodies, has undergone corruption; and this gives sufficient reason to believe that his soul has shared the fate of other souls, and that the prophecy was never meant of him, unless in a secondary sense. *But*, continues he, ver. 30, 31. *being a prophet, he spake of the resurrection of Christ, or the Messiah*: and, to shew how exactly both what related to the soul, and what related to the body, had their completion in the Messiah, adds, that *his soul was not left in hades, neither did his*
flesh

flesh see corruption. It has been argued, that this is an example of the figure *ἰν δὶα δυναν*, where the same sentiment is expressed a second time by a different phrase. In some sense this may be admitted; for, no doubt, either of the expressions would have served for predicting the event. But it is enough for my purpose, that the writer, in using two, one regarding the soul, the other regarding the body, would undoubtedly adapt his language to the received opinions concerning each. And if so, *hades* was as truly, in their account, the soul's destiny after death, as corruption was the body's.

§ 12. I am surpris'd, that a man of Dr Taylor's critical abilities, as well as Oriental literature, should produce the passage quoted by the Apostle, as an example to prove that *sheol, the pit, death,* and *corruption,* are synonymous. The expression, as we read it in the Psalm, is (to say the least) no evidence of this; but if we admit Peter to have been a just interpreter of the Psalmist's meaning, which Simon seems very unwilling to admit, it contains a strong evidence of the contrary; for, in his comment, he clearly distinguishes the destiny of the *soul*, which is to be consigned to *sheol* or *hades*, from that of the *body* or *flesh*, which is to be consigned to *corruption*. Nor is there, in this, the slightest appearance of an unusual or mystical application of the words. The other examples brought by that author, in his very valuable Hebrew Concordance, are equally exceptionable.

He proceeds on the supposition, that no account can be given, why certain phrases are often found coupl'd together, but by saying that they are synonymous: whereas, in the present case, it is much more naturally accounted for, by saying, that the events to which they relate, are commonly concomitant. We ought never to recur to tautology for the solution of a difficulty, unless when the ordinary application of the words admits no other resource. This is far from being the case in the instances referred to. Of the like kind are the arguments founded on such figurative expressions, as digging into *hades*; Korah's descending alive into it; Jonah's being there, when in the belly of the great fish; the foundations of the mountains, or the roots of the trees, reaching to it; which are all evident hyperboles, and to which we find expressions entirely similar in ancient authors, both Greek and Latin. Thus, Virgil, describing the storm in which Æneas was involved at sea, says,

Tollimur in cælum, curvato gurgite, et iidem
Subducta ad manes imos descendimus unda.

Again, speaking of an oak,

Ipsa hæret scopulis; et quantum vertice ad auras
Æthereas, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.

Yet,

Yet, these figures, as far as I have heard, have never created any doubt among critics, concerning the ordinary acceptation of the words *tartarus* and *inimanes*. No pretence has been made that the one ever meant, when used not tropically, but properly, the bottom of the sea, and the other a few yards under ground. Indeed, if a man were to employ the same mode of reasoning, in regard to the Latin terms that relate to this subject, which has been employed, in regard to the Hebrew; we should conclude, that *sepulchrum* and *infernus* are synonymous, *anima* and *corpus*, *manes* and *cinis*, upon evidence incomparably stronger than that we have for inferring, that *sheol* and *keber* are so. Of the first two the Latin poet says, *Animamque sepulchro condimus*. If *anima* be here used for *the soul*, agreeably to its ordinary and proper acceptation, he assigns it the same habitation as is given to the body after death, to wit, the *sepulchre*: and if it be used for *the body*, the words *corpus* and *anima* are strangely confounded, even by the best writers. As we have *anima* here for *corpus*, we have, in other places, *corpus* for *anima*. For, speaking of Charon's ferrying the souls of the deceased over Styx, he says,

Et ferruginea subvectat corpora cymba.

Now, what Virgil here calls *corpora*, and a few lines after, more explicitly, *defunctaque corpora vita*, he had a very little before expressed by a phrase of the contrary import, *tenues sine corpore vitas*, the one being *the body without the life*, the other *the life without the body*. That *cinis* and *manes* are in like manner confounded, we have an example from the same author:

Id cinerem, aut manes credis curare sepultos?

Here, if *sepultos* mean *buried*, *cinis* and *manes* are synonymous: if *manes* mean *ghosts*, then *sepultos* is equivalent to *deductos ad infernum*. Yet it would not be easy to say to what trope the author has, in these instances, had recourse, if it be not the catachresis. Nor is this promiscuous application of the words peculiar to the poets. Livy, the historian, uses the word *manes* in prose with equal latitude: *Sepulchra diruta, nudati manes*.

To these instances of confusion in the meanings of the words mentioned, nothing parallel has been alleged from the Hebrew Scriptures, except only that *שׁוֹל* sometimes, like *anima* in the example above quoted, means *a dead body*. Yet nobody considers the examples aforesaid as invalidating those distinctions in Latin, which an usage incomparably more extensive has established in the language. With much less reason then can a few expressions, confessedly hyperbolic and figurative, be pleaded for subverting the uniform acceptation of the Hebrew words in question, in their proper and natural application. Taylor's remark, that *keber* grave, is one particular cavity, &c. and that *sheol* is a collective

lective name for all the graves, &c. tends more to perplex the subject than to explain it. He would hardly be thought to apprehend distinctly the import of the Latin words, who should define them by telling us, that *sepulchrum* is one particular cavity digged for the interment of a dead person, and that *infernus* is a collective name for all the *sepulchra*, &c. The definition would be both obscure and unjust; yet, from what has been shown, more might be produced to justify it, than can be advanced in vindication of the other.

§ 13. Besides, we have another clear proof from the New Testament, that *hades* denotes the intermediate state of souls between death and the general resurrection. In the Apocalypse, ch. xx. 14. we learn that *death and hades*, by our translators rendered *hell* as usual, *shall*, immediately after the general judgment, *be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death.* In other words, the death which consists in the separation of the soul from the body, and the state of souls intervening between death and judgment, shall be no more. To the wicked these shall be succeeded by a more terrible death, the damnation of gehenna, *hell* properly so called. Indeed, in this sacred Book, the commencement, as well as the destruction, of this intermediate state, are so clearly marked, as to render it almost impossible to mistake them. In a preceding chapter, vi. 8. we learn that *hades* follows close at the heels of death; and, from the other passage quoted, that both are involved in one common ruin at the universal judgment. Whereas, if we interpret *adns hell*, in the Christian sense of the word, the whole passage is rendered nonsense. *Hell* is represented as being cast into *hell*: for so the lake of fire, which is in this place also denominated the second death, is universally interpreted.

§ 14. The Apostle Paul, without naming *hades*, conveys to us the same idea of the state of souls departed, Rom. x. 6. 7. *The righteousness which is of faith, speaketh on this wise, Say not in thine heart, who shall ascend into heaven? (that is to bring Christ down from above;) or, who shall descend into the deep? us τῆν ἀβύσσον into the abyfs, (that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead)—that is, faith doth not require, for our satisfaction, things impracticable, either to scale the heavens, or to explore the profound recesses of departed spirits. The word here used shows this. It is ἀβύσσος, that is, a pit or gulph, if not bottomless, at least of an indeterminable depth. The very antithesis of descending into the deep, and ascending into heaven, also shows it. There would be a most absurd disparity in the different members of this illustration, if no more were to be understood by the abyfs than the grave, since nothing is more practicable for the living than a descent thither. The women, who went to visit our Lord's sepulchre, did actually descend into it, Mark*

xvi. 5. Luke xxiv 3. Besides, to call the grave the abyfs, is entirely unexampled. Let it be also observed, that it is not faid *to bring Chrift up from the grave*, but *from the dead*; for which end to bring back the foul is in the firft place neceffary. I do not fay that the Greek word *αβυσος*, or the correpondent Hebrew word *תהום* *thehom*, is confined to the fignification here given it. I know that it often means the ocean, becaufe conceived to be of an unfathomable depth, and may indeed be applied to any thing of which the fame quality can be affirmed.

§ 15. So much for the literal fenfe of the word *hades*, which, as has been obferved, implies properly neither *hell* nor the *grave*, but the place or ftate of departed fouls. I know that it has been faid, and fpecioufly fupported, that in the Mofaical economy, there was no exprefs revelation of the exiftence of fouls after death. Admitting this to be in fome fenfe true, the Ifraelites were not without fuch intimations of a future ftate, as types, and figures, and emblematical predictions, could give them: yet certain it is, that life and immortality were, in an eminent manner, brought to light only by the Gofpel. But, from whatever fource they derived their opinions, that they had opinions on this fubject, though dark and confufed, is manifelt, as from many other circumftances, fo particularly from the practice of witchcraft and necromancy, which prevailed among them, and the power they afcribed to forcerers, juftly or unjuftly it matters not, of evoking the ghofts of the deceased.

The whole ftory of the witch of Endor, 1 Sam. xxviii. 7, &c. is an irrefragable evidence of this. For, however much people may differ in their manner of explaining the phenomena which it prefents to us, judicious and impartial men, whofe minds are not preoccupied with a fyftem, can hardly differ as to the evidence it affords, that the exiftence of fpirits in a feparate ftate, was an article of the popular belief, and that it was thought poffible, by certain fecret arts, to maintain an intercourfe with them. Our queftion here is, not what was exprefsly revealed to that people on this fubject, but what appear to have been the notions commonly entertained concerning it? or what was it which the learned bifhop of London ftyles*, the *infernum poeticum* of the Hebrews? Indeed, the artifices employed by their wizards and necromancers alluded to by Ifaiah, of returning answers in a feigned voice, which appeared to thofe prefent, as proceeding from under the ground, Ifa. xxix. 4. is a demonftration of the prevalence of the fentiments I have been illustrating, in regard both to the exiftence, and to the abode of fouls departed. For that thefe were the oracles intended to be confulted, is manifelt from the Prophet's upbraiding them with it, as an abfurdity, that the living fhould recur for counfel, not to their God, but to the dead.

It

* Notes on chap. xiii. and xiv. of Ifaiah.

It is well expressed in Houbigant's translation, *Itane pro vivis mortui interrogantur*, Isa. viii. 19. But what can be clearer to this purpose than the law itself, whereby such practices are prohibited? *There shall not be found among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer*, Deut. xviii. 10, 11. This last character is not expressed in the original as in the English translation, by a single word, but by a periphrasis, *דורש אל המתים* *doresh el hamatim*, which, rendered literally, is *one who consulteth the dead*. It is accordingly translated by the Seventy *επειρωτων της νεκρας*, and by Houbigant, *Qui mortuos interroget*.

§ 16. I shall add a few things in regard to the metaphorical use of the term. I have observed that *heaven* and *hades* are commonly set in opposition to each other; the one is conceived to be the highest object, the other the lowest. From what is literally or locally so, the transition is very natural (inasmuch that we find traces of it in all languages) to what is figuratively so; that is, what expresses a glorious and happy state on the one hand, or a humble and miserable state on the other. In this way it is used by our Lord, Matth. xi. 23. *And thou Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shalt be brought down to hades, εως αδου*. As the city of Capernaum was never literally raised to *heaven*, we have no reason to believe that it was to be literally brought down to *hades*. But as, by the former expression, we are given to understand, that it was become a flourishing and splendid city, or, as some think, that it had obtained great spiritual advantages; so, by the latter, that it should be brought to the lowest degree of abasement and wretchedness.

§ 17. Another passage, in which the application of the word is figurative, we have in that celebrated promise made to Peter, Matth. xvi. 18. *Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell, πυλαι αδου*, the gates of hades, *shall not prevail against it*. It is by death, and by it only, that the spirit enters into *hades*. The gate of *hades* is therefore a very natural periphrasis for death; inasmuch that, without any positive evidence, we should naturally conclude this to be the meaning of the phrase. But we have sufficient evidence, both sacred and profane, that this is the meaning. The phrase occurs in the Septuagint in the thanksgiving of Hezekiah, after his miraculous recovery from the mortal disease he had been seized with, Isa. xxxviii. 10. I said, *I shall go to the gates of the grave, ε πυλαι αδου*. It follows, *I am deprived of the residue of my years*. Nothing can be plainer than that *πυλαι αδου* here means *death*, in other words, I shall die and be deprived of the residue of my years. But though the phrase be the same (for *πυλαι αδου*

is a literal version of the Hebrew) with that used by our Lord, our translators have not liked to make Hezekiah, who was a good man, speak as if he thought himself going to hell, and have therefore rendered it *the grave*.

Another example we have in the Wisdom of Solomon, which, though not canonical Scripture, is, in a question of criticism, a good authority, xvi. 13. *Thou hast power of life and death, thou leadeſt to the gates of hades*, εις πυλας ἀδου, and *bringeſt up again*. This paſſage is as little ſuſceptible of doubt as the former. The claſſical uſe of this phraſe is the ſame with that of the inſpired writers. Homer, Iliad B, makes Achilles ſay, as rendered by our Engliſh poet :

Who can think one thing, and another tell,
My ſoul deteſts him as the gates of hell ;

εικος αἰῶμας πυλῆσι·

that is, I hate him as death, or I hate him mortally. To ſay then that the gates of *hades* ſhall not prevail againſt the church, is, in other words, to ſay, It ſhall never die, it ſhall never be extinct. Le Clerc, though meaning the ſame thing (as appears by his note), has expreſſed it inaccurately : “ Les portes de la mort ne la ſurmonteront point ; ” *The gates of death ſhall not ſurmount it*. We ſee at once how appoſitely *death* is called *the gate of hades*. But what ſhould we call the gates of death ? Not death itſelf, ſurely. They muſt be *difeaſes* ; for by theſe we are brought to death. But in this ſenſe we cannot apply the promiſe. For many direful diſeaſes has the church been afflicted with, if the introduction of the groſſeſt errors, the moſt ſuperſtitious practices and ſenſeleſs diſputes, are to be accounted ſuch ; but they have not hitherto proved mortal, and, we have reaſon to believe, never ſhall.

§ 18. In the exclamation adopted by the Apoſtle, 1 Cor. xv. 55. *O death, where is thy ſting ? O grave, ἀδῆ, where is thy victory ?* we cannot ſay ſo properly, that the words *death* and *hades* are uſed figuratively, as the words *ſting* and *victory*, with which they are accompanied. In regard to the ſenſe, there can be no doubt. It is manifeſtly the Apoſtle’s view to ſignify that, whatever might have been formerly an object of terror in either *death* or *hades*, is removed by Jeſus Chriſt, inſomuch that in theſe very things the true diſciples find matter of joy and exultation.

§ 19. But is there not one paſſage, it may be ſaid, in which the word ἀδῆς muſt be underſtood as ſynonymous with γέννα, and conſequently muſt denote the place of final puniſhment prepared for the wicked, or *hell* in the Chriſtian acceptation of the term ? Ye have it in the ſtory of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi. 23. *In hell, εν τω ἀδῆ, he liſt up his eyes, being in torments, and ſeeth Abraham afar off and Lazarus in his boſom*. This is the only

only passage in holy writ which seems to give countenance to the opinion that *adēs* sometimes means the same thing as *γέηνᾱ*. Here it is represented as a place of punishment. The rich man is said to be tormented there in the midst of flames. These things will deserve to be examined narrowly. It is plain, that in the Old Testament, the most profound silence is observed in regard to the state of the deceased, their joys or sorrows, happiness or misery. It is represented to us rather by negative qualities than by positive, by its silence, its darkness, its being inaccessible, unless by preternatural means, to the living, and their ignorance about it. Thus much in general seems always to have been presumed concerning it, that it is not a state of activity adapted for exertion, or indeed for the accomplishment of any important purpose, good or bad. In most respects, however, there was a resemblance in their notions on this subject, to those of the most ancient heathens.

But the opinions neither of Hebrews nor of heathens, remained invariably the same. And from the time of the captivity, more especially from the time of the subjection of the Jews, first to the Macedonian empire, and afterwards to the Roman; as they had a closer intercourse with pagans, they insensibly imbibed many of their sentiments, particularly on those subjects whereon their law was silent, and wherein, by consequence, they considered themselves as at greater freedom. On this subject of a future state, we find a considerable difference in the popular opinions of the Jews in our Saviour's time, from those which prevailed in the days of the ancient prophets. As both Greeks and Romans had adopted the notion, that the ghosts of the departed were susceptible both of enjoyment and of suffering, they were led to suppose a sort of retribution in that state, for their merit or demerit in the present. The Jews did not indeed adopt the pagan fables on this subject, nor did they express themselves entirely in the same manner; but the general train of thinking in both came pretty much to coincide. The Greek *hadēs* they found well adapted to express the Hebrew *sheol*. This they came to conceive as including different sorts of habitations for ghosts of different characters. And though they did not receive the terms *Elysium* or *Elysian fields*, as suitable appellations for the regions peopled by good spirits, they took instead of them, as better adapted to their own theology, *the garden of Eden*, or *Paradise*, a name originally Persian, by which the word answering to *garden*, especially when applied to Eden, had commonly been rendered by the Seventy. To denote the same state, they sometimes used the phrase *Abraham's bosom*, a metaphor borrowed from the manner in which they reclined at meals. But, on the other hand, to express the unhappy situation of the wicked in that intermediate state, they do not seem to have declined the

the use of the word *tartarus*. The Apostle Peter, 2 Ep. ii. 4. says of evil angels that *God cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment*. So it stands in the common version, though neither *γεεννα* nor *αιδης* are in the original, where the expression is *οσιςαις ζοφου ταρταρωσας παρεδωκεν εις χρισιν τστηρημεσους*. The word is not *γεεννα*; for that comes after judgment; but *ταρταρος*, which is, as it were, the prison of hades, wherein criminals are kept till the general judgment. And as, in the ordinary use of the Greek word, it was comprehended under *hades*, as a part; it ought, unless we had some positive reason to the contrary, by the ordinary rules of interpretation, to be understood so here. There is then no inconsistency in maintaining that the rich man, though in torments, was not in *gebenna*, but in that part of *hades* called *tartarus*, where we have seen already that spirits reserved for judgment are detained in darkness.

That there is, in a lower degree, a reward of the righteous, and a punishment of the wicked, in the state intervening between death and the resurrection, is no more repugnant to the divine perfections, than that there should be (as, in the course of providence, there often are) manifest recompences of eminent virtues, and of enormous crimes, in this present world. Add to this, that Josephus, in the account he gives of the opinions of the Pharisees, or those Jews who believed a future state, mentions expressly the rewards of the virtuous, and the punishments of the vicious, in *hades*, or under the earth, which is, as was observed before, another expression for the same thing*. From his representation we should conclude, that, in his time, a resurrection and future judgment, as understood by the Christians, were not universally the doctrine, even of the Pharisees; but
that

* *Αθανατον τε ισχυνταις ψυχαις πισις αυτοις ιναι, και υπο χθονος δικαιοσως τε και τιμας οις αρετης η κακιας επιτηδουσις εν τω βιω γιγονε, και ταις μεν ειργμοι αιδιον προσιθεσθαι, ταις δε ρασηνη του αναβιουν. Antiq. lib. xviii. c. 2. Ψυχην δε πασαν μεν αφθαρτον μεταβαινει δε εις ετερον σωμα, την των αγαθων μονη. την δε των φαυλων, αιδιω τιμορια κολαζεσθαι. Bell. Lib. ii. c. 12. Ετερον σωμα is an expression by no means parallel, as Dr Jennings seems to have thought (Jewish Antiquities, B. i. c. 10.) to that used of our Lord's transfiguration (Luke ix. 29.) το ειδος του προσωπου αυτου ετερον. Ειδος is no more than the appearance. Now, to say that the body into which the soul passes is another body; and to say that it has another appearance, are two expressions which no person who reflects, will confound as equivalent. That there are some things, however, which would lead one to infer that the opinions of the Pharisees on this article were more conformable to the Christian doctrine, than is implied in the words of Josephus, is not to be dissembled. But the difficulty resulting hence is more easily removed by admitting, what is nowise improbable, that there was not then among them an exact uniformity of opinion, than by recurring on either side to a mode of criticism which the language will not bear.*

that the prevalent and distinguishing opinion was, that the soul survived the body, that vicious souls would suffer an everlasting imprisonment in *hades*, and that the souls of the virtuous would both be happy there, and, in process of time, obtain the privilege of transmigrating into other bodies. The immortality of human souls, and the transmigration of the good, seem to have been all that they comprehended in the phrase *αναστασις των νεκρων*. Indeed, the words strictly denote no more than renewal of life.

Their sentiments on this topic naturally recal to our remembrance some of those exhibited by Virgil, in the sixth book of the *Æneid*. That this Pythagorean dogma was become pretty general among the Jews, appears even from some passages in the Gospels. The question put by the disciples, John ix. 2. *Who sinned; this man or his parents, that he was born blind?* and some popular opinions concerning Jesus, whom they knew to have been born and brought up among themselves, that he was Elijah, or Jeremiah, or one of the ancient prophets, Matt. xvi. 14. manifestly presuppose the doctrine of the transmigration. It is also in allusion to this, that the Jewish author of the book of Wisdom, has, as it is rendered in the common translation, thus expressed himself: *I was a witty child, and had a good spirit; yea rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled:* *αγαθος ανηλων εις σωμα αμικτων*, Wisd. viii. 19, 20. Yet we have reason, from the New Testament, to think that these tenets were not, at that time, universal among the Pharisees, but that some entertained juster notions of a resurrection, and that afterwards, the opinions of the Talmudists, on this article, had a much greater conformity to the doctrine of the Gospel, than the opinions of some of their predecessors in and before our Saviour's time.

§ 20. According to this explication, the rich man and Lazarus were both in *hades*, though in very different situations, the latter in the mansions of the happy, and the former in those of the wretched. Let us see how the circumstances mentioned, and the expressions used in the parable will suit this hypothesis. First, though they are said to be at a great distance from each other, they are still within sight and hearing. This would have been too gross a violation of probability, if the one were considered as inhabiting the highest heavens, and the other as placed in the infernal regions. Again, the expressions used, are such as entirely suit this explanation, and no other; for, first, the distance from each other is mentioned, but no hint that the one was higher in situation than the other; secondly, the terms whereby motion from the one to the other is expressed, are such as are never employed in expressing motion to or from heaven, but always when the places are on a level, or nearly so. Thus Lazarus, when dead, is said, Luke xvi. 22. *απενεχθησαι*, *to be carried away*, not *ανενεχθησαι*, *to be carried up*, by angels into Abraham's bosom; whereas,

whereas, it is the latter of these, or one similarly compounded, that is always used, where an assumption into heaven is spoken of. Thus, the same writer, in speaking of our Lord's ascension, says, ch. xxiv. 51. *ἀνιψήετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*, and Mark, ch. xvi. 19. in relation to the same event, says, *ἀνιληφθῆ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*, *he was taken up into heaven*. These words are also used, wherever one is said to be conveyed from a lower to a higher situation. But, what is still more decisive in this way, where mention is made of passing from Abraham to the rich man, and inversely, the verbs employed are, *διαβαίνω* and *διαπίρρω*, words which always denote motion on the same ground or level; as, passing a river or lake, passing through the Red Sea, or passing from Asia into Macedonia. But, when heaven is spoken of as the termination to which, or from which, the passage is made, the word is invariably, either in the first case *ἀναβαίνω*, and in the second *ἐκταβαίνω*, or some word similarly formed, and of the same import. Thus, both the circumstances of the story, and the expressions employed in it, confirm the explanation I have given. For if the sacred penmen wrote to be understood, they must have employed their words and phrases in conformity to the current usage of those for whom they wrote.

§ 21. When our Saviour, therefore, said to the penitent thief upon the cross, Luke xxiii. 43. *To day shalt thou be with me in paradise*; he said nothing that contradicts what is affirmed of his descent into *hades*, in the Psalms, in the Acts, or in the Apostles creed. *Paradise* is another name for what is, in the parable, called Abraham's bosom. But it may be urged on the other side, that Paul has given some reason to conclude that *paradise* and heaven, or the seat of the glorious hierarchy, are the same. *It is not*, says he, 2 Cor. xii. 1, 2, 3, 4. *expedient for me doubtless to glory: I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago (whether in the body I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth), such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth), how that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.* The Jews make mention of three heavens. The first is properly the atmosphere where the birds fly, and the clouds are suspended. The second is above the first, and is what we call the visible firmament, wherein the sun, moon, and stars appear. The third, to us invisible, is conceived to be above the second, and therefore sometimes styled the heaven of heavens. This they considered as the place of the throne of God, and the habitation of the holy angels. Now it is evident, that if, in the second and fourth verses, he speak of one vision or revelation only, *paradise* and heaven are the same; not so, if in these he speak

ſpeak of two different revelations. My opinion is, that they are two, and I ſhall aſſign my reaſons. Firſt, he ſpeaks of them as more than one, and that not only in introducing them, *I will come to viſions and revelations*, for ſometimes, it muſt be owned, the plural is uſed in expreſſing a ſubject indefinitely, but afterwards, in referring to what he had related he ſays, ver. 7. *leſt I ſhould be exalted above meaſure, through the abundance of the revelations*, τῶν ἀποκαλυψῶν. Secondly, they are related precisely as two diſtinct events, and coupled together by the connexive particle. Thirdly, there is a repetition of his doubts, ver. 2, 3. in regard to the reality of his tranſlation, which, if the whole relate to a ſingle event, was not only ſuperfluous, but improper. This repetition, however, was neceſſary, if what is related in the third and fourth verſes, be a different fact from what is told in the ſecond, and if he was equally uncertain whether it paſſed in viſion or in reality. Fourthly, if all the three verſes regard only one revelation, there is a tautology in the manner of relating it unexampled in the apoſtle's writings. I might urge, as a fifth reaſon, the opinion of all Chriſtian antiquity, Origen alone excepted. And this, in a queſtion of philology, is not without its weight.

I ſhall only add, that though, in both verſes, the words in the Engliſh Bible are *caught up*, there is nothing in the original anſwering to the particle *up*. The apoſtle has very properly employed here the word ἀρπαζω, expreſſive more of the ſuddenneſs of the event, and of his own paſſivenenſs, than of the direction of the motion *. The only other place in which παραδειſος occurs is in the Apocalypſe, Rev. ii. 7. *To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the miſt, του παραδειſου, of the paradise of God*. Here our Lord, no doubt, ſpeaks of heaven, but, as he plainly alludes to the ſtate of matters in the garden of Eden, where our firſt parents were placed, and where the tree of life grew, it can only be underſtood as a figurative expreſſion of the promiſe of eternal life, forfeited by Adam, but recovered by our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.

§ 22. To conclude this long diſcuſſion, I ſhall obſerve that, though

* The learned reader may peruſe the following paſſage from Epiphanius on this ſubject, in oppoſition to Origen. Ουδε ὁ ἀποſολος υποτιθεται τον παραδειſον ειναι εν τριτω ουρανω, τοις λεπτων ἀεροſται λογων επιſταμενοις· οίδα γαρ ἀρπαγεντα ἕωσ τριτου λεγων ουρανου. και οίδα τον τοιſτον ανθρωπον, ειτε εν ſωματι, ειτε χωρις ſωματος, ὁ θεοſ οιδεν, ὅτε ἤρπαγη ειſ τον παραδειſον. δυο ἀποκαλυψιſ μεγαλαſ ἔωρακεναι μηνυει, διſ ἀναληφθειſ εναργωſ, ἀπαξ μεν ἕωσ τριτω βρανω, ἀπαξ δε ειſ τον παραδειſον. το γαρ οίδα ἀρπαγεντα τον τοιſτον ἕωσ τριτω βρανω, ιδιωſ ἀποκαλυψιν αυτω κατα τον τριτον ἀναληφθεντι πεφηνειαι ſυνιſηſι. το δε, και οίδα παλιν επιφερομενον τον τοιſτον ανθρωπον, ειτε εν ſωματι, ειτε εκτοſ του ſωματοſ, ειſ τον παραδειſον, ἕτεραν αυδιſ αυτω πεφανερωθῆμι κατωſ τον παραδειſον ἀποκαλυψιν ἔεικνυει. Epiph. Lib. ii. Hæc. 44.

though we may discover hence, pretty exactly, the general sentiments entertained on these subjects at the time, and the style used concerning them, we are not to imagine that the expressions are to be rigorously interpreted, in order to come at the true doctrine upon those articles, but solely in order to discover the popular opinions of the age. In regard to these, the opinions of the age, there ought to be a close attention to the letter of what is spoken; but, in regard to the other, the doctrine of holy writ, our attention ought to be mostly to the spirit. Thus it appears to me the plain doctrine of Scripture, that there are such states as I have mentioned, and that the use and nature of them is such as has been said. But in respect of their situation, expressions implying that *hades* is under the earth, and that the seat of the blessed is above the stars, ought to be regarded merely as attempts to accommodate what is spoken to vulgar apprehension and language. Of the like kind is the practice, so frequent in holy writ, of ascribing human passions, nay, and human organs and members, to the Deity. The same may be said of what we hear of plants and trees in paradise, of eating and drinking, or of fire and brimstone in either *hades* or *gebenna*. We have no more reason to understand these literally, than we have to believe that the soul, when separated from the body, can feel torment in its tongue, or that a little cold water can relieve it.

§ 23. I am not ignorant, that the doctrine of an intermediate state between death and the resurrection, has been of late strenuously combated by some learned and ingenious men; amongst whom we must reckon that excellent divine, and firm friend to freedom of inquiry, Dr Law, the present bishop of Carlisle*. I honour his disposition, and have the greatest respect for his talents; but at the same time that I acknowledge he has, with much ability, supported the side he has espoused, I have never felt myself, on this head, convinced, though sometimes perplexed, by his reasoning. It is foreign to my purpose to enter into a minute discussion of controverted points in theology; and therefore I shall only, in passing, make a few remarks on this controversy, as it is closely connected with my subject.

First, I remark that the arguments on which the deniers of that state chiefly build, arise, in my opinion, from a misapprehension of the import of some Scriptural expressions. Καθευδεν, κοιμουν, *to sleep*, are words often applied to the *dead*, but this application is no more than a metaphorical euphemism derived from the resemblance which a dead body bears to the body of a person asleep. Traces of this idiom may be found in all languages, whatever be the popular belief about the state of the dead. They often occur in the Old Testament; yet it has been shown, that

* Dr Law was living when these Dissertations were in the hands of the Printer.

that the common doctrine of the Orientals favoured the separate existence of the souls of the deceased. But if it did not, and if, as some suppose, the ancient Jews were, on all articles relating to another life, no better than Sadducees; this shews the more strongly, that such metaphors, so frequent in their writings, could be derived solely from bodily likeness, and having no reference to a resurrection, could be employed solely for the sake of avoiding a disagreeable or ominous word. I own, at the same time, that Christians have been the more ready to adopt such expressions, as their doctrine of the resurrection of the body presented to their minds an additional analogy between the bodies of the deceased and the bodies of those asleep, that of being one day awaked. But I see no reason to imagine that, in this use, they carried their thoughts further than to the corporeal and visible resemblance now mentioned. Another mistake about the import of Scriptural terms, is in the sense which has been given to the word *αναστασις*. They confine it by a use derived merely from modern European tongues, to that renovation which we call the reunion of the soul and the body, and which is to take place at the last day. I have shewn, in another place, (Notes on Matt. xxii. 23. and 32.) that this is not always the sense of the term in the New Testament.

I remark, secondly, that many expressions of Scripture, in the natural and obvious sense, imply that an intermediate and separate state of the soul is actually to succeed death. Such are the words of our Lord to the penitent thief upon the cross, Luke xxiii. 43. Stephen's dying petition, Acts vii. 59. the comparisons which the apostle Paul makes in different places, (2 Cor. v. 6. &c. Philip. i. 21.) between the enjoyment which true Christians can attain by their continuance in this world, and that which they enter on at their departure out of it, and several other passages. Let the words referred to be read by any judicious person, either in the original, or in the common translation, which is sufficiently exact for this purpose; and let him, setting aside all theory or system, say candidly whether they would not be understood, by the gross of mankind, as presupposing that the soul may, and will, exist separately from the body, and be susceptible of happiness or misery in that state. If any thing could add to the native evidence of the expressions, it would be the unnatural meanings that are put upon them, in order to disguise that evidence. What shall we say of the metaphysical distinction introduced, for this purpose, between absolute and relative time? The apostle Paul, they are sensible, speaks of the saints as admitted to enjoyment in the presence of God, immediately after death. Now, to palliate the direct contradiction there is in this to their doctrine, that the vital principle, which is all they mean by the soul, remains extinguished between death and the resurrection, they

remind us of the difference there is between absolute or real, and relative or apparent, time. They admit that, if the apostle be understood as speaking of real time, what is said flatly contradicts their system; but, say they, his words must be interpreted as spoken only of apparent time. He talks indeed of entering on a state of enjoyment, immediately after death, though there may be many thousands of years between the one and the other; for he means only, that when that state shall commence, however distant in reality the time may be, the person entering on it will not be sensible of that distance, and consequently there will be to him an apparent coincidence with the moment of his death. But does the apostle any where give a hint that this is his meaning? or is it what any man would naturally discover from his words? That it is exceedingly remote from the common use of language, I believe hardly any of those who favour this scheme, will be partial enough to deny. Did the sacred penmen then mean to put a cheat upon the world, and, by the help of an equivocal expression, to flatter men with the hope of entering, the instant they expire, on a state of felicity, when, in fact, they knew that it would be many ages before it would take place? But, were the hypothesis about the extinction of the mind between death and the resurrection well founded, the apparent coincidence they speak of, is not so clear as they seem to think it. For my part, I cannot regard it as an axiom, and I never heard of any who attempted to demonstrate it. To me it appears merely a corollary from Mr Locke's doctrine, which derives our conceptions of time from the succession of our ideas, which, whether true or false, is a doctrine to be found only among certain philosophers, and which, we may reasonably believe, never came into the heads of those to whom the gospel in the apostolic age was announced.

I remark, thirdly, that even the curious equivocations (or, perhaps more properly, mental reservation), that has been devised for them, will not, in every case, save the credit of apostolical veracity. The words of Paul to the Corinthians are, *Knowing, that whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord: again, We are willing rather to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord.* Could such expressions have been used by him, if he had held it impossible to be with the Lord, or indeed any where, without the body; and that, whatever the change was which was made by death, he could not be in the presence of the Lord, till he returned to the body? Absence from the body, and presence with the Lord, were never, therefore, more unfortunately combined, than in this illustration. Things are combined here as coincident, which, on the hypothesis of those gentlemen, are incompatible. If recourse be had to the original, the expressions in Greek are, if possible, still stronger. They are, *οι ενδημευτες εν τω σωματι, those who dwell in the body, who are ενδη*
μευτες

μαρτυροῦντες ἀπο τῆς Κυρίας, at a distance from the Lord; as, on the contrary, they are οἱ ἐκδημιῶντες ἐκ τῆς σαρκός, those who have travelled out of the body, who are οἱ ἐνδημιῶντες πρὸς τὸν Κύριον, those who reside, or are present with the Lord. In the passage to the Philippians also, the commencement of his presence with the Lord is represented as coincident, not with his return to the body, but with his leaving it, with the dissolution, not with the restoration, of the union.

The fourth, and only other remark I shall make, on this subject, is, that from the tenor of the New Testament, the sacred writers appear to proceed on the supposition, that the soul and the body are naturally distinct and separable, and that the soul is susceptible of pain or pleasure in a state of separation. It were endless to enumerate all the places which evince this. The story of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi. 22, 23.; the last words of our Lord upon the cross, Luke xxiii. 46. and of Stephen when dying; Paul's doubts whether he was in the body or out of the body, when he was translated to the third heaven, and paradise, 2 Cor. xii. 2, 3, 4.; our Lord's words to Thomas, to satisfy him that he was not a spirit, Luke xxiv. 39.; and, to conclude, the express mention of the denial of spirits, as one of the errors of the Sadducees, Acts xxiii. 8.: *For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit, μηδε αγγελου μηδε πνευμα.* All these are irrefragable evidences of the general opinion on this subject of both Jews and Christians. By *spirit*, as distinguished from *angel*, is evidently meant the departed spirit of a human being; for, that man is here, before his natural death, possessed of a vital and intelligent principle, which is commonly called his soul or spirit, it was never pretended that they denied. It has been said, that this manner of expressing themselves has been adopted by the apostles and evangelists, merely in conformity to vulgar notions. To me it appears a conformity, which (if the sacred writers entertained the sentiments of our antagonists on this article) is hardly reconcilable to the known simplicity and integrity of their character. It favours much more of the pious frauds, which became common afterwards, to which I own myself unwilling to ascribe so ancient and so respectable an origin. See Part I. of this Dissertation, § 10.

§ 24. I shall subjoin a few words on the manner wherein the distinction has been preserved between *hades* and *gehenna* by the translators of the New Testament; for, as I observed before, *gehenna*, as a name for the place of future punishment, does not occur in the Old. All the Latin translations I have seen, observe the distinction. All without exception adopt the word *gehenna*, though they do not all uniformly translate *hades*. Both the Geneva French, and Diodati, have followed the same method. Luther, on the contrary, in his German version, has uniformly con-

founded

founded them, rendering both by the word *bolle*. The English translators have taken the same method, and rendered both the Greek names by the word *bell*, except in one single place, 1 Cor. xv. 55. where *ᾠδης* is translated *grave*. Most foreign versions observe the difference. So do some of the late English translators, but not all. The common method of distinguishing, hitherto observed, has been to retain the word *gebenna*, and translate *hades* either *bell* or *grave*, as appeared most to suit the context. I have chosen, in this version, to reverse that method, to render *γεεννα* always *bell*, and to retain the word *hades*. My reasons are, first, though English ears are not entirely familiarized to either term, they are much more so to the latter than to the former, in consequence of the greater use made of the latter in theological writings. Secondly, the import of the English word *bell*, when we speak as Christians, answers exactly to *γεεννα*, not to *ᾠδης*; whereas, to this last word we have no term in the language corresponding. Accordingly, though, in my judgment, it is not one of those terms which admit different meanings, there has been very little uniformity preserved by translators in rendering it.

P A R T III.

Μετανοση and Μεταμελομαι.

I SHALL now offer a few remarks on two words that are uniformly rendered by the same English word in the common version, between which there appears, notwithstanding, to be a real difference in signification. The words are *μετανοση* and *μεταμελομαι*, *I repent*. It has been observed by some, and, I think, with reason, that the former denotes properly a change to the better; the latter, barely a change, whether it be to the better or to the worse; that the former marks a change of mind that is durable and productive of consequences; the latter expresses only a present uneasy feeling of regret or sorrow for what is done, without regard either to duration or to effects; in fine, that the first may properly be translated into English *to reform*; the second, *to repent*, in the familiar acceptance of the word.

§ 2. The learned Grotius (whose judgment in critical questions is highly respectable) is not convinced that this distinction is well-founded. And I acknowledge that he advances some plausible things in support of his opinion. But as I have not found them satisfactory, I shall assign my reasons for thinking differently. Let it, in the first place be observed, that the import of *μεταμελομαι*, in the explanation given, being more extensive

or generical than that of μετανοῶ, it may, in many cases, be used, without impropriety, for μετανοῶ; though the latter, being more limited and special in its acceptation, cannot so properly be employed for the former. The genus includes the species, not the species the genus.

§ 3. Admitting, therefore, that, in the expression in the parable quoted by Grotius in support of his opinion, ὕστερον δὲ μεταμεληθεὶς ἀπηλθε, *afterwards he repented and went*, Matt. xxi. 29. the word μετανοήσας would have been apposite, because the change spoken of is to the better, and had an effect on his conduct; still the word μεταμελομαι is not improper, no more than the English word *repented*, though the change, as far as it went, was a real reformation. Every one who reforms, repents; but every one who repents does not reform. I use the words entirely according to the popular idiom, and not according to the definitions of theologians; nay, I say further, that in this instance the Greek word μεταμελομαι is more proper than μετανοῶ, and the English *repent* than *reform*. The reason is, because the latter expression in each language is not so well adapted to a single action, as to a habit of acting, whereas the former may be equally applied to either. Now it is only one action that is mentioned in the parable.

§ 4. In regard to the other passage quoted by Grotius, to shew that μετανοια also is used where, according to the doctrine above explained, it ought to be μεταμελεια, I think he has not been more fortunate than in the former. The passage is, where it is said of Esau, Heb. xii. 17. *Ye know that afterward, when he would have inherited the blessing, he was rejected. For he found no place of repentance, μετανοίας τοποι οὐχ ἔνευε, though he sought it carefully with tears.* Grotius, in his comment on the place, acknowledges that the word μετανοια is not used here literally, but by a metonymy of the effect for the cause. ‘He found no scope for effecting a change in what had been done, a revocation of the blessing given to Jacob, with a new grant of it to himself, or at least of such a blessing as might, in a great measure, supersede or cancel the former.’ This change was what he found no possibility of effecting, however earnestly and movingly he sought it. It is plain, that neither μετανοια, nor μεταμελεια, in their ordinary acceptation, expresses this change. For that it was not any repentance or reformation on himself, which he found no place for, is manifest both from the passage itself, and from the story to which it refers. From the construction of the words we learn, that what Esau did not find, was what he sought carefully with tears. Now, what he sought carefully with tears, was, as is evident from the history, Gen. xxvii. 30. &c. such a change in his father as I have mentioned. This was what he urged to affectingly, and this was what he, notwithstanding, found it impossible

possible to obtain. Now, I acknowledge that it is only by a trope that this can be called either μετανοια or μεταμελεια. That it was not literally the regret or grief implied in μεταμελεια that he sought, is as clear as day, since the manner in which he applied to his father, shewed him to be already possessed of the most pungent grief for what had happened. Nay, it appears from the history, that the good old Patriarch, when he discovered the deceit that had been practised on him, was very strongly affected also; for it is said, ver. 33. that Isaac *trembled very exceedingly*. Now, as μετανοια implies a change of conduct, as well as sorrow for what is past, it comes nearer the scope of the sacred writer than μεταμελεια. If, therefore, there is some deviation from strict propriety in the word μετανοια here used, it is unquestionable that to substitute in its place μεταμελεια, and represent Esau as seeking, in the bitterness of grief, that he, or even his father, might be grieved, would include, not barely an impropriety, or deviation from the literal import, but an evident absurdity.

§ 5. Passing these examples, which are all that have been produced on that side, are the words in general so promiscuously used by sacred writers (for it is only about words which seldom occur in Scripture, that we need recur to the usage of profane authors), as that we cannot, with certainty, or at least with probability, mark the difference? Though I do not believe this to be the case, yet as I do not think the matter so clear as in the supposed synonymas already discussed, I shall impartially and briefly state what appears to me of weight on both sides.

§ 6. First, in regard to the usage of the Seventy, it cannot be denied that they employ the two words indiscriminately; and, if the present enquiry were about the use observed in their version, we could not, with justice, say, that they intended to mark any distinction between them. They are, besides, used indifferently in translating the same Hebrew words, so that there is every appearance that with them they were synonymous. But though the use of the Seventy adds considerable strength to any argument drawn from the use of the New Testament writers, when the usages of both are the same, or even doubtful; yet, when they differ, the former, however clear, cannot, in a question which solely concerns the use that prevails in the New Testament, invalidate the evidence of the latter. We know, that in a much shorter period than that which intervened between the translation of the Old Testament, and the composition of the New, some words may become obsolete, and others may considerably alter in signification. It is comparatively but a short time (being less than two centuries) that has intervened between the making of our own version and the present hour; and yet, in regard to the language of that version, both have already happened,

pened, as shall be shewn afterwards *. Several of its words are antiquated, and others bear a different meaning now from what they did then.

§ 7. Let us therefore recur to the use of the New Testament. And here I observe, first, that where this change of mind is inculcated as a duty, or the necessity of it mentioned as a doctrine of Christianity, the terms are invariably *μετάνοια* and *μετανοια*. Thus John the Baptist and our Lord, both began their preaching with this injunction, *μετανοείτε*, Math. iii. 2. iv. 17. The disciples that were sent out to warn and prepare men for the manifestation of the Messiah, are said to have gone and preached *ἵνα μετανοήσωσι*, Mark vi. 12. The call which the Apostles gave to all hearers was, *μετανοήσατε, και επιστρέψατε, και βαπτισθήτω ἕκαστος ὑμῶν*, Acts ii. 38. iii. 19. *to reform their lives, return to God, and be baptized.* Peter's command to Simon Magus, on discovering the corruption of his heart, is, *μετανοήσον ἀπο τῆς κακίας ταύτης*, ch. viii. 22. When it is mentioned as an order from God, *παρηγγίλλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ πανταχῶς μετάνοιαν*, ch. xvii. 30. The duty to which Paul every where exhorted was, *μετάνοιαν και επιστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν*, ch. xxvi. 20. The charge to reformation given to the Asiatic churches in the Apocalypse, is always expressed by the word *μετανοήσον*, and their failure in this particular by *οὐ μετενόησε*, Rev. ii. and iii. passim. The necessity of this change for preventing final ruin, is thus repeatedly expressed by our Lord, *Εὰν μὴ μετανόητε, πάντες ἀπολεισθήσε*, Luke xiii. 3, 5. And, in regard to the noun, wherever mention is made of this change as a duty, it is *μετάνοια*, not *μεταμελεια*. It was *εἰς μετάνοιαν* that our Lord came to call sinners, Math. ix. 13.; the baptism which John preached was *βαπτισμα μετάνοιας*, Mark i. 4. The fruits of a good life, which he enjoined them to produce, were *ἀξίαι μετάνοιας*, Math. iii. 8. What the Apostles preached to all nations, in their Master's name as inseparably connected, were *μετάνοιαν και ἀφίσει ἁμαρτιῶν*, Luke xxiv. 47. Again, it is given as the sum of their teaching, *τὴν εἰς τὸν Θεὸν μετάνοιαν, και πίστιν εἰς τὸν Κυρίον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν*, Acts xx. 21. The same word is employed when the offer of such terms is exhibited as the result of divine grace, Acts xi. 18. Now, in a question of criticism, it is hardly possible to find stronger evidence of the distinction than that which has now been produced.

§ 8. There is a great difference between the mention of any thing as a duty, especially of that consequence, that the promises or threats of religion depend on the performance or neglect of it; and the bare recording of an event as fact. In the former, the words ought to be as special as possible, that there may be no mistake in the application of the promise, no pretence for saying that more is exacted than was expressed in the condition. But, in relating facts, it is often a matter of indifference, whether the terms

* Diff. XI. Part II. § 5. &c.

terms be general or special. Provided nothing false be added, it is not expected that every thing true should be included. This is the less necessary when, in the sequel of a story, circumstances are mentioned, which supply any defect arising from the generality of the terms. Under this description may be included both the passage formerly considered, ὕστερον μεταμεληθεὶς ἀπέλθε; and that other connected with it, in the reproach pronounced against the Pharisees, for their impenitence and incredulity under the Baptist's ministry, & μετεμεληθητε ὕστερον, τὰ πισύσαι αὐτῶν, Matth. xxi. 32. The last clause in each perfectly ascertains the import of the sentence, and supplies every defect.

§ 9. Let it further be observed, that when such a sorrow is alluded to, as either was not productive of reformation, or, in the nature of the thing, does not imply it, the words μετανοια and μετανοω are never used. Thus the repentance of Judas, which drove him to despair, is expressed by μεταμεληθεὶς, Matth. xxvii. 3. When Paul, writing to the Corinthians, mentions the sorrow his former letter had given them, he says, that considering the good effects of that sorrow, he does not repent that he had written it, though he had formerly repented. Here no more can be understood by his own repentance spoken of, but that uneasiness which a good man feels, not from the consciousness of having done wrong, but from a tenderness for others, and a fear, lest that which, prompted by duty, he had said, should have too strong an effect upon them. This might have been the case, without any fault in him, as the consequence of a reproof depends much on the temper with which it is received. His words are Εἰ ἐλυπηθῆκα ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ οὐ μεταμελομαι εἰ καὶ μετεμελομένη, 2 Cor. vii. 8. As it would have made nonsense of the passage to have rendered the verb in English, *reformed* instead of *repented*, the verb μετανοω instead of μεταμελομαι, would have been improper in Greek.

There is one passage in which this Apostle has in effect employed both words, and in such a manner, as clearly shows the difference. Ἡ κατὰ Θεοῦ λύπη μετανοίαν εἰς σωτηρίαν ἀμεταμελητόν καταργεῖται, ver. 10. : in the common version, *Godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of*. There is a paronomasia here, or play upon the word *repent*, which is not in the original. As both words μετανοω and μεταμελομαι are uniformly translated by the same English word, this figure of speech could hardly have been avoided in the common version. Now, had the two words been also synonymous in Greek (as that trope, when it comes in the way, is often adopted by the sacred writers), it had been more natural to say μετανοίαν ἀμετανοητόν. Whereas the change of the word plainly shows, that in the Apostle's judgment, there would have been something incongruous in that expression. In the first word μετανοίαν, is expressed the effect of godly sorrow, which is reformation, a duty required by our religion

religion as necessary to salvation. In the other *αμεταμελητον*, there is no allusion to a further reformation, but to a further change, it being only meant to say, that the reformation effected is such as shall never be regretted, never repented of. As into the import of this word there enters no consideration of goodness or badness, but barely of change, from whatever motive or cause; the word *αμεταμελητος* comes to signify *steady, immutable, irrevocable*. This is evidently the meaning of it in that expression, *Αμεταμελητα τα χαρισματα και η κλησις τς Θεου*, Rom. xi. 29. which our translators render, *the gifts and calling of God are without repentance*; more appositely and perspicuously, are *irrevocable*. For this reason the word *μεταμελομαι* is used when the sentence relates to the constancy or immutability of God. Thus *Ωμοσε Κυριος και ου μεταμεληθησεται*, Heb. vii. 21.: *The Lord hath sworn and will not repent*, that is, *alter his purpose*.

The word *μετανοητον*, on the contrary, including somewhat of the sense of its primitive, expresses not, as the other, *unchanged* or *unchangeable*, but *unreformed, unreformable, impenitent*. The Apostle says, addressing himself to the obstinate infidel, *κατα την σκληροτητα σου και αμετανοητον καρδιαν*, Rom. ii. 5: *After thy hardness and impenitent, or irreclaimable heart*. The word *αμετανοητος*, in the New Testament style, ought analogically to express a wretched state, as it signifies the want of that *μετανοια*, which the Gospel every where represents as the indispensable duty of the lapsed, and therefore as essential to their becoming Christians; but the term *αμεταμελητος* is noway fitted to this end, as it expresses only the absence of that *μεταμελεια*, which is nowhere represented as a virtue, or required as a duty, and which may be good, bad, or indifferent, according to its object. Thus I have shown, that on every pertinent occasion, the distinction is sacredly observed by the penmen of the New Testament, and that the very few instances in which it may appear otherwise at first glance, are found to be no exceptions when attentively examined.

§ 10. Having now ascertained the distinction, it may be asked, How the words ought to be discriminated in a translation? In my opinion, *μετανοεω*, in most cases, particularly where it is expressed as a command, or mentioned as a duty, should be rendered by the English verb *reform*, *μετανοια*, by *reformation*; and that *μεταμελομαι* ought to be translated *repent*. *Μεταμελεια* is defined by Phavorinus *δυσαρεστησις επι πεπραγμειοις*, *dissatisfaction with one's self, for what one has done*, which exactly hits the meaning of the word *repentance*; whereas *μετανοια* is defined *γνησια απο πταισματος επι το εναντιον αγαθον επισροφη*, and *η προς το κρειττον επισροφη* *a genuine correction of faults, and a change from worse to better*. We cannot more exactly define the word *reformation*. It may be said that, in using the terms *repent* and *repentance*, as our translators have done, for both the original terms, there is no

risk of any dangerous error; because, in the theological definitions of repentance, given by almost all parties, such a reformation of the disposition is included, as will infallibly produce a reformation of conduct. This, however, does not satisfy. Our Lord and his Apostles accommodated themselves in their style to the people whom they addressed, by employing words according to the received and vulgar idiom, and not according to the technical use of any learned doctors. It was not to such that his doctrine was revealed, but to those who, in respect of acquired knowledge, were babes, Matth. xi. 25. The learned use is known comparatively but to a few: and it is certain that with us, according to the common acceptation of the words, a man may be said just as properly to repent of a good, as of a bad, action. A covetous man will repent of the alms which a sudden fit of pity may have induced him to bestow. Besides, it is but too evident, that a man may often justly be said to repent, who never reforms. In neither of these ways do I find the word μετανοῶ ever used.

I have another objection to the word *repent*. It unavoidably appears to lay the principal stress on the sorrow or remorse which it implies for former misconduct. Now this appears a secondary matter at the most, and not to be the idea suggested by the Greek verb. The primary object is a real change of conduct. The Apostle expressly distinguishes it from sorrow, in a passage lately quoted, representing it as what the sorrow, if of a godly sort, terminates in, or produces. Ἡ κατὰ Θεοῦ λύπη μετανοίαν κατεργάζεται, rendered in the common version, *Godly sorrow worketh repentance*. Now, if he did not mean to say that the thing was caused by itself, or that repentance worketh repentance (and who will charge him with this absurdity?) ἡ κατὰ Θεοῦ λύπη is one thing, and μετανοία is another. But it is certain that our word *repentance* implies no more in common use, even in its best sense, than ἡ κατὰ Θεοῦ λύπη, and often not so much. It is consequently not a just interpretation of the Greek word μετανοία, which is not ἡ κατὰ Θεοῦ λύπη, but its certain consequence. Grief or remorse, compared with this, is but an accidental circumstance. Who had more grief than Judas, whom it drove to despondency and self-destruction? To him, the Evangelist applies very properly the term μεταμελήθεις, which we as properly translate *repented*. He was in the highest degree dissatisfied with himself. But, to show that a great deal more is necessary in the Christian, neither our Lord himself, as we have seen, nor his forerunner John, nor his Apostles and ministers who followed, ever expressed themselves in this manner, when recommending to their hearers the great duties of Christianity. They never called out to the people, μεταμελεῖτε, but always μετανοεῖτε. If they were so attentive to this distinction, in order to prevent men, in so important an article, from placing their duty in a barren remorse, however violent;

lent; we ought not surely to express this capital precept of our religion, by a term that is just as well adapted to the case of Judas, as to that of Peter. For the Greek word μεταμελομαι, though carefully avoided by the inspired writers, in expressing our duty, is fully equivalent to the English word *repent*.

§ II. I shall now, ere I conclude this subject, consider briefly in what manner some of the principal translators have rendered the words in question into other languages. I shall begin with the Syriac, being the most respectable, on the score of antiquity, of all we are acquainted with. In this venerable version, which has served as a model to interpreters in the East, in like manner as the Vulgate has served to those in the West, the distinction is uniformly preserved. μετανοειν is rendered תשובה *thubh*, to reform, to return to God, to amend one's life; μετανοια תשובתא *thebutha*, reformation; μεταμελομαι is rendered תשובתא *thua*, to repent, to be sorry for what one has done. Nor are these Syriac words ever confounded as synonymous, except in the Apocalypse, which, though now added in the printed editions, is no part of that ancient translation, but was made many centuries after.

The second place in point of antiquity is, no doubt, due to the Vulgate, where, I acknowledge, there is no distinction made. The usual term for μετανοια is *pœnitentia*, for μετανοια and μεταμελομαι indiscriminately, *pœnitentiam ago*, *pœnitentiam habeo*, *pœniteo* or *me pœnitet*. These can hardly be said to express more than the English words *repentance* and *repent*. Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον is not improperly rendered *pœnitentiam stabilem*, agreeably to an acceptance of the term above taken notice of.

Beza, one of the most noted, and by Protestants most imitated, of all the Latin translators since the reformation, has carefully observed the distinction, wherever it was of consequence; for, as I remarked, there are a few cases in which either term might have been used in the original, and concerning which, a translator must be directed by the idiom of the tongue in which he writes. The same distinction had been made before, though not with perfect uniformity, by the translators of Zürich. Beza's word for μετανοια is *resipisco*, and for μεταμελομαι, *resipiscentia*. To this last term he was led both by analogy, and (if not by classical authority) by the authority of early ecclesiastical writers, which, in the translation of holy writ, is authority sufficient. These words have this advantage of *pœnitere* and *pœnitentia*, that they always denote a change of some continuance, and a change to the better. For μεταμελομαι his word is *pœnitere*. Thus μεταμεληθεις, spoken of Judas, is *pœnitens*: Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον, *resipiscentiam cujus nunquam pœniteat*, in which the force of both words is very well expressed. So is also αμετανοητον καρδιαν, *quod resipiscere nescit*. Erasmus one of the earliest translators on the Romish side, uses both *resipisco* and *pœnitentiam ago*, but with

with no discrimination. They are not only both employed in rendering the same word μετανοῶ, but even when the scope is the same. Thus μετανοεῖτε in the imperative, is at one time *respicite*, at another *pœnitentiam agite*: so that his only view seems to have been to diversify his style.

Castalio, one of the most eminent Latin Protestant translators, has been sensible of the distinction, and careful to preserve it in his version. But, as his great aim was to give a classical air to the books of Scripture, in order to engage readers of taste who affected an elegant and copious diction; he has disfigured, with his adventitious ornaments, the native simplicity which so remarkably distinguishes the sacred penmen, and is, in fact, one of their greatest ornaments. We can more easily bear rusticity than affectation, especially on the most serious and important subjects. Amongst other arts, by which Castalio has endeavoured to recommend his work, one is a studied variety in the phrases, that the ear may not be tired by too frequent recurrence to the same sounds. The words under consideration afford a strong example. The verb μετανοῶ is translated by him I know not how many different ways. It is *se corrigere, vitam corrigere, redire ad frugem, redire ad sanitatem, reverti ad sanitatem*; when the vices which we are required to amend are mentioned, the phrase is, *desiscere a sua pravitate, desistere a turpitudine, desistere a suis operibus, impudicitia sua recedere, sua homicidia, &c. omittere*. Μετανοῶ partakes of the like variety. It is *emendata vita, vitæ emendatio, correctæ vita, vitæ correctio, morum correctio, correcti mores, corrigenda vita, sanitas, pœnitentia*; and in the oblique cases, *frugem and bonam frugem*. For μεταμελομαι, I only find the two words *pœnitere and mutare sententiam*. Μετανοῶν ἀμεταμελητον is not badly rendered *vitæ correctionem nunquam pœnitendam, ἀμεταμελητα χαρισματα munera irrevocabilia, and ἀμετανοητος καρδια. deploratus animus*.

Diodati, the Italian translator, in every case of moment, renders the verb μετανοῶ *ravedersi*, which in the Vocabolario della Crusca is explained *respicere, ad mentis sanitatem redire*; but for the noun μετανοῶ, he always uses *penitenza*, and for μεταμελομαι, very properly *pentirsi*. The Geneva French, translates μετανοῶ, *s'amender*, μεταμελομαι, *se repentir*, and μετανοῶ *repentance*. In both these versions they use, in rendering μετανοῶν ἀμεταμελητον, the same paronomasia which is in the common English version. Diodati has *penitenza della quale huom non si pente*. The Geneva French has *repentance dont on ne se repent*. The other passages also above quoted from the original, they translate in nearly the same manner. Luther, in his German translation, has generally distinguished the two verbs, rendering μετανοῶ *buße thun*, and μεταμελομαι *reuen or gereuen*.

P A R T I V.

Ἄγιος and ὁσιος,

I SHALL give, as another example of words, supposed to be synonymous, the terms ἄγιος and ὁσιος. The former is, if I mistake not, uniformly rendered in the New Testament, *holy*, or, when used substantively in the plural, *saints*. The latter, except in one instance, is always rendered by the same term, not only in the English Bible, but in most modern translations. Yet that these two Greek words are altogether equivalent, there is, in my opinion, good reason to doubt. Both belong to the second class of words, which I explained in a former Dissertation*. They relate to manners, and are therefore not so easily defined. Nor are such words in one language ever found exactly to tally with those of another. There are, however, certain means, by which the true signification may, in most cases, be, very nearly, if not entirely, reached. I shall, therefore, first mention my reasons for thinking that the two words ἄγιος and ὁσιος in the New Testament are not synonymous, and then endeavour to ascertain the precise meaning of each.

§ 2. That there is a real difference in signification between the two Greek words, notwithstanding their affinity, my first reason for thinking is, because in the Septuagint, which is the foundation of the Hellenistic idiom, one of them is that by which one Hebrew word, and the other that by which another, not at all synonymous, is commonly translated. Ἄγιος is the word used for קדוש *kadosh*, *sanctus*, *holy*, ὁσιος for חסיד *chasid*, *benignus*, *gracious*.

§ 3. My second reason is, because these words have been understood by the ancient Greek translators to be so distinct in signification, that not in one single instance is the Hebrew word *kadosh* rendered by the Greek ὁσιος, or *chasid* by ἄγιος. What gives additional weight to this reason, is the consideration, that both words frequently occur; and that the Greek translators, though they have not been uniform in rendering either, but have adopted different words, on different occasions, for translating each; have, nevertheless, not in a single instance, adopted any of those terms, for rendering one of these Hebrew words, which they had adopted for rendering the other. Few words occur oftener than *kadosh*. But, though it is, beyond comparison, ofteneft translated ἄγιος, it is not so always. In one place it is rendered καθαρὸς, *mundus*, *clean*; the verb *kadosh*, the *stymon* is rendered δοξάζειν, *glorificare*, *to glorify*, ἀναβιβάζειν *ascendere facere*, *to cause to ascend*;

* Diff. II. § 4.

cond, καθαρίζειν *purgare*, to cleanse, ἀγνίζειν *purificare*, to purify, as well as ἀγιαζέειν and καθαραγιαζέειν *sanctificare*, to hallow, to sanctify; but not once by ὁσιος, or any of its conjugates. On the other hand, *chafid* is rendered ελεειμάν and πωλυελεος *misericors*, *merciful*, ευλαβης *pius*, *devout*, and by some other words, but not once by ἅγιος, or by any of its conjugates, or by any of the terms employed in rendering *kadosh*; a certain sign, that to the old Greek translators, several other words appeared to have more coincidence with either, than these had with each other.

§ 4. The third reason, which inclines me to think that the two words are not synonymous, is, because I find, on examining and comparing, that there is a considerable difference in the application of them, not only in the Old Testament, but in the New. In regard to the word ἅγιος, it is applied not only to persons, but to things inanimate, as the sacred utensils and vestments; to times, as their jubilees and sabbaths, their solemn festivals and fasts; and to places, as the land of Judea, the city of Jerusalem, the mountain whereon stood the temple, the temple with its courts; but more especially the house which the courts enclosed, the outer part whereof was called, by way of eminence, ἡ ἅγια, *scilicet* ἁγία, *the holy place*, and the inner ἡ ἅγια ἅγιος, *the holy of holies*, or *the most holy place*. Now I find nothing like this in the use made of the word ὁσιος, which, as far as I can discover, is applied only to persons, or beings susceptible of character. The τὰ ὁσια Δαβιδ, Isa. lv. 3. Acts xiii. 34. cannot be accounted an exception. The word used by the Prophet is חֶסֶד *chesed*, *benignitas*, not חַסִּד *chafid*, *benignus*, and is not improperly rendered in our version *mercies*. Nor is the ὁσιος χειρας of the Apostle, 1 Tim. ii. 8. an exception, this being manifestly not a literal, but a tropical use of the epithet, wherein that is applied to the instrument, which, in strictness, is applicable only to the agent; as when we say a *slandering tongue* and *guilty hands*, we are always understood as applying the qualities of *slander* and *guilt*, to the person of whose tongue and hands we are speaking.

§ 5. I observe, further, that even when ἅγιος is applied to persons, it has not always a relation to the moral character, but often to something, which, in regard to the person, is merely circumstantial and external. It is, in this respect, that the children of Israel are called a *holy nation*, being consecrated by their circumcision, notwithstanding that they were a rebellious and stiff-necked people, and rather worse, instead of better, than other nations; as their great legislator Moses often declares to them. In this sense the tribe of Levi was *holier* than any other tribe, purely because selected for the sacred service; the priesthood had more *holiness* than the other Levites, and the high-priest was the *holiest* of all. There was the same gradation in these, as in the courts and house of the temple. It is in this sense I understand the

the word ἀγίος, as applied to Aaron; *They envied Moses, also, in the camp, and Aaron the saint of the Lord*, Pſal. cvi. 16.; τὸν ἀγίον Κυρίου. Aaron's personal character does not ſeem to have entitled him to this diſtinction above Moſes, and the whole nation. Nor does the title ſeem to have been peculiarly applicable to him, in any other ſenſe than that now mentioned, namely, that he was the only one of the people who carried on his forehead the ſignature of his conſecration, *holineſs to the Lord*, ἁγιασμα Κυρίου.

§ 6. On the other hand, it does not appear, from any clear paſſage, either in the Old Teſtament or in the New, that the Hebrew word *chafid*, or the Greek *hoſtos*, are ſuſceptible of this interpretation. I ſay, any clear paſſage; for I acknowledge there is one, the only one I can find in either, wherein the application of this term, as commonly underſtood, is ſimilar to that of the other lately quoted from the Pſalms. It is in Moſes' benediction of the tribes, immediately before his death: *Of Levi he ſaid, Let thy Thummim and thy Urim be with thy holy one, whom thou didſt prove at Maſſah, and with whom thou didſt ſtrive at the waters of Meribah*, Deut. xxxiii. 8. Not to mention, that in the Samaritan copy of the Pentateuch (which in ſome things is more correct than the Hebrew), there is a different reading of the word here rendered ἅγιος; the whole paſſage is exceedingly obſcure; inſomuch that it is impoſſible to ſay with certainty who is here called *chafidecha*, which our translators have rendered *thy holy one*. The words which follow ſerve rather to increaſe the darkneſs, than to remove it.

Houbigant, in his valuable edition of the Old Teſtament, with a new Latin tranſlation, and notes, will not admit that it can refer to Aaron or his ſucceſſors in the pontificate; and, in my judgment, ſupports his opinion with unanſwerable reaſons. One is, that the term *chafid*, *hoſtos*, is never applied to Aaron, nor to the prieſthood in general, nor to any prieſt as ſuch. Another is that, though we often hear of the people's proving God at Maſſah, and contending with him at the waters of Meribah, we nowhere hear that they proved or tempted Aaron, and ſtrove with him there. Indeed, if they had been ſaid to have tempted Moſes, the expreſſion, though unuſual, had been leſs improper, becauſe the immediate recourſe of the people, in their ſtrait, was to Moſes. They chid with him, we are told, and were almoſt ready to ſtone him, Exod. xvii. 1. &c. Numb. xx. 3 &c. Houbigant's opinion is, that by *thy holy one*, is here meant Jeſus Chriſt, who is diſtinguiſhed by this appellation in the Book of Pſalms. *Thou wilt not ſuffer thy holy one*, חַפִּידֶיךָ *chafidecha*, τὸν ἅγιον σου, *to ſee corruption*, Pſal. xvi. 10. And to ſay that they ſtrove with, tempted or proved Chriſt in the wilderneſs, is conformable to the language of Scripture. *Neither let us tempt*
Chriſt

Christ, says Paul, 1 Cor. x. 9. *as some of them also tempted, referring to what happened in the desert, and were destroyed of serpents.* Houbigant's version (the words being understood as addressed to Levi, according to the original) is *Levi autem dixit, Thummim tuum, tuumque Urim viri sancti tui est, quem tu tentationis in loco tentasti, cui convitium fecisti, apud aquas contradictionis.* It must be owned, that he has added some plausibility to his gloss upon the passage, by the turn he has given to the following verses. But it is sufficient for my purpose to say, in regard to the negative part of his remark, that he is certainly right in maintaining that the expression does not refer to Aaron and his successors. But as to the positive part, that it refers to our Lord Jesus Christ, will perhaps be thought more questionable. His being styled *thy holy one*, *τον ὅσιον σου*, in words addressed to God, is not authority enough for understanding him to be meant by *τω ὄσιω σου*, *to thy holy one*, in words addressed to Levi.

§ 7. But to return: another difference in the application of the words *ἅγιος* and *ὅσιος*, is that the latter is sometimes found coupled with other epithets expressive of different good qualities, and applied to character or moral conduct, each exhibiting, as it were, a feature distinct from those exhibited by the rest. The word *ἅγιος* is not commonly accompanied with other epithets; when it is, they are of such a general nature, as rather to affect the whole character than separate parts of it. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says of our Lord, Heb. vii. 26. that he was *ὅσιος, ἀκακος, ἀμιαντος*, in the common translation, *holy, harmless, undefiled.* But the English word *holy*, being general in its signification, adds nothing to the import of the other epithets, especially of *ἀμιαντος*, and consequently does not hit the exact meaning of the word *ὅσιος*, which here probably denotes *pious*; the two other epithets, being employed to express compendiously the regards due to others, and to himself. Paul has given us another example in his character of a bishop, who, he says, Tit. i. 8. ought to be *φιλοξενος, φιλαγαθον, σωφρονα, δικαιον, ὄσιον, εγκρατη.* To render the word *ὄσιος* in this verse *holy*, is chargeable with the same fault as in the former instance. The same thing holds also of the adverb *ὄσιως*. Now the word *ἅγιος* is not included in this manner, in an enumeration of good qualities. It is commonly found single, or joined with other epithets equally general. The expression used by the apostle, Rom. vii. 12. *ὁ μὲν νομος ἅγιος, καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ ἅγια, καὶ δικαία, καὶ ἀγαθὴ*: *The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good*—is no exception; for we have no enumeration here of the virtues of an individual, but of the general good qualities that may be ascribed to God's law. And though the terms are equally general, they are not synonymous; they present us with the different aspects of the same object. To say that the law of God is *holy*,

is to represent it as awful to creatures such as we; to say it is *just*, is to remind us that it is obligatory; and to say it is *good*, is to tell us, in other words, that it is adapted to promote universal happiness, and therefore *lovely*.

§ 8. Having assigned my reasons for thinking that the two words *ἅγιος* and *ἀγιος* in the New Testament are not synonymous, I shall now, as I proposed, endeavour to ascertain the precise meaning of each. I believe it will appear, on examination, that the affinity between the two Greek words, in their ordinary and classical acceptance, is greater than between the Hebrew words, in lieu of which they have been so generally substituted by the Seventy. This, which may have originated from some peculiarity in the idiom of Alexandria, has, I suppose, led the translators of both Testaments to regard them often as equivalent, and to translate them by the same word. The authors of the Vulgate, in particular, have almost always employed *sanctus* in expounding both. This has misled most modern interpreters in the West. As to our own translators, the example has, doubtless, had some influence. Nevertheless they have in this not so implicitly followed the Vulgate in their version of the Old Testament, as in that of the New. Let it be premised, that the significations of words in any nation do not remain invariably the same. In a course of years, much fewer than two thousand, which are reckoned to have elapsed from the commencement to the finishing of the sacred canon, very considerable changes happen in the meanings of words in the same language, and among the same people. Now, to trace the gradations and nicer shades of meaning, which distinguish different periods, is one of the most difficult, but most important, tasks of criticism.

§ 9. In regard to the word *kadosh*, *bagios*, I acknowledge that it does not seem to me to have had originally any relation to character or morals. Its primitive signification appears to have been *clean*; first, in the literal sense, as denoting free from all filth, dirt, or nastiness; secondly, as expressing what, according to the religious ritual, was accounted *clean*. The first is natural, the second ceremonial, cleanness. Some traces of the first of these meanings we have in the Old Testament, but nothing is more common there than the second, particularly in the Pentateuch. Again, as things are made clean to prepare them for being used, (and the more important the use, the more carefully they are cleaned), the term has been adopted to denote, thirdly, *prepared*, *fitted*, *destined for* a particular purpose, of what kind soever the purpose be; fourthly, and more especially *consecrated*, or devoted to a religious use; fifthly, as things, so prepared and devoted, are treated with peculiar care and attention, *to hallow*, or *sanctify*, comes to signify to honour, to reverence, to stand in awe of, and *holy* to imply worthy of this treatment, that is, honourable,

venerable, awful ; sixthly, and lastly, as outward and corporeal cleanness has, in all ages and languages, been considered as an apt metaphor for moral purity, it denotes guiltless, *irreproachable*, which is at present, among Christians, the most common acceptation of the word.

§ 10. I shall give an example or two of each of the six uses aforesaid, not confining myself to the adjective *kadosh*, but including its conjugates of the same root. First, that it denotes *clean* in the vulgar acceptation, is manifest from the precept given to Israel in the desert, to be careful to keep the camp free from all ordure *. The reason assigned is in these words: *For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, therefore shall thy camp be holy*, וְהָיָה קָדוֹשׁ וְכִי יֵשֶׁת אֲרָגָה, *that he see no unclean thing in thee, and turn away from thee.*

Another remarkable example of this meaning we have in the history of king Hezekiah, who is said to have given orders to the Levites, 2 Chron. xxix. 5. &c. to sanctify the house of the Lord ; the import of which order is explained by the words immediately following, and *carry forth the filthiness out of the holy place.* The sacred service had, in the reign of the impious Ahaz, been for a long time totally neglected ; the lamps were gone out, and the fire extinguished on the altars, both of burnt-offerings and of incense ; nay, and the temple itself had at length been absolutely deserted and shut up. The king, intending to restore the religious worship of Jehovah to its former splendour, saw that the first thing necessary was to make clean the house, with all its furniture, that they might be fit for the service. Frequent mention is made of this cleansing in the chapter above referred to, where it is sometimes called *cleansing*, ver. 15, 16. 18. sometimes *sanctifying*, ver. 5. 17. 19. the Hebrew verbs, טָהַר *tabar*, and קָדַשׁ *kadosh*, being manifestly, through the whole chapter, used indiscriminately. Both words are, accordingly, in this passage, rendered by the Seventy indifferently ἀγνίσκειν and καθαρῶς, not ἀγνίσκειν ; in the Vulgate, *mandare*, *expiare*, and once *sanctificare*. In both the above examples, the word *holy* is evidently the opposite of *dirty*, *nasty*, *filthy*, in the current acceptation of the terms. This, as being the simplest and most obvious, is probably the primitive sense. Things sensible first had names in every language. The names were afterwards extended to things conceivable and intellectual. This is according to the natural progress of knowledge.

§ 11. From this first signification, the transition is easy to that which, in the eye of the ceremonial law, is clean. One great purpose of that law, though neither the only nor the chief purpose, is to draw respect to the religious service, by guarding against every thing that might favour of indecency or uncleanness.

* See the whole passage, Deut. xxiii. 12, 13, 14.

ness. The climate, as well as the nature of their service, rendered this more necessary than we are apt to imagine. Any thing which could serve as a security against infectious disorders in their public assemblies, whereof, as they lived in a hot climate, they were in much greater danger than we are, was a matter of the highest importance. Now, when once a fence is established by statute, it is necessary, in order to support its authority, that the letter of the statute should be the rule in all cases. Hence it will happen, that there may be a defilment in the eye of the law, where there is no natural foulness at all. This I call *ceremonial uncleanness*, to express the reverse of which, the term *holy* is frequently employed. Thus, by avoiding to eat what was accounted unclean food, they sanctified themselves, Lev. xi. 42. &c. xx. 25, 26. ; they were likewise kept holy by avoiding the touch of dead bodies, to avoid which was particularly required of the priests, except in certain cases, they being obliged, by their ministry, to be holier than others, Lev. xxi. 1,—6. Moses is said, Exod. xix. 10. 14. 22. to sanctify the people, by making them wash their clothes, and go through the legal ceremonies of purification. Nor is it possible to doubt that, when men were ordered to sanctify themselves directly for a particular occasion, they were enjoined the immediate performance of something which could be visibly and quickly executed, and not the acquisition of a character, which is certainly not the work of an hour or of a day. Thus the priests were to sanctify themselves, before they approached the Lord on Sinai; and thus the people were commanded by Joshua to sanctify themselves in the evening, that they might be prepared for seeing the wonders which God was to perform among them next day, Josh. iii. 5. In the same sense also Joshua is said to sanctify the people, Josh. vii. 13. In this sense we are also to understand what we are told of those who sanctified themselves for the observance of that great passover which Hezekiah caused to be celebrated. What is termed *sanctifying* in one verse, is *cleansing* in another, 2 Chron. xxx. 17, 18. To prevent being tedious, I do not repeat the whole passages, but refer to them in the margin; the reader may consult them at his leisure.

Even in the New Testament, where the word is not so frequently used in the ceremonial sense, *holy* and *unclean*, ἅγιος and ἀκαθάρτος, are contrasted as natural opposites, 1 Cor. vii. 14. In one place in the Old Testament, Numb. v. 17. the Seventy have rendered the word *kadosh* καθάρος, as entirely equivalent, calling that pure or *clean* water, which, in Hebrew, is *holy water*; and oftener than once in the Targums or Chaldee paraphrases, the Hebrew *kadosh* is rendered, by their common term, for *clean*. Thus, in that passage of the prophet, Isa. lxxv. 5. “Stand by thy-
“ self;

“self; come not near me, for I am *holier* than thou,” the last clause is in Chaldee, “I am *cleaner* than thou.”

§ 12. In regard to the third sense, separated or *prepared* for a special purpose, there are several examples. The appointing of places for cities of refuge, is, both in the original and in the Septuagint, Josh. xx. 7. called sanctifying them. To make ready for war, is, in several places, to *sanctify* war, Jer. vi. 4. Mic. iii. 5. In such places, however, the Seventy have not imitated the Hebrew penmen, probably thinking it too great a stretch for the Greek language to employ *ἀγιαζω* in this manner. In one place, men are said to be *sanctified* for destruction, Jer. xii. 3. that is, devoted or prepared for it. To devote to a bad, even to an idolatrous use, is called to sanctify. Thus, both in Hebrew and in Greek, Micah’s mother is said, Judges xvii. 3. to *sanctify* the silver which she had devoted for making an idol, for her and her family to worship. From this application, probably, has sprung such anomalous productions as *קדשׁבב* *kedeshbab*, a prostitute, and *קדשׁבם* *kedeshbim*, Sodomites. Nor is this so strange as it may at first appear. Similar examples may be found in most tongues. The Latin *sacer*, which commonly signifies *sacred*, *holy*, *venerable*, sometimes denotes the contrary, and is equivalent to *scelestus*. *Auri sacra fames*, the execrable thirst of gold.

§ 13. The fourth meaning mentioned, was devoted to a religious or pious use. Thus Jeremiah was *sanctified*, Jer. i. 5. from the womb, in being ordained a prophet unto the nations; the priests and the Levites were sanctified or consecrated for their respective sacred offices. It were losing time to produce examples of an use, so frequently to be met with in Scripture, and almost in every page of the Books of Moses. In this sense (for it admits degrees) the Jewish nation was called *holy*, they being consecrated to God by circumcision, the seal of his covenant; in this sense also, all who profess Christianity are denominated *saints*, having been dedicated to God in their baptism.

§ 14. Of the fifth meaning, according to which, to *hallow* or *sanctify* denotes to respect, to honour, to venerate; and *holy* denotes respectable, honourable, venerable; we have many examples. Thus, to *hallow* God, is opposed to profaning his name, Lev. xxii. 32. that is, to treating him with irreverence and disrespect. It is opposed also to the display of a want of confidence in his power and in his promise, Num. xx. 12. It is in this meaning the word is used, when we are required to sanctify the Sabbath, that is, to treat it with respect; and are commanded to pray that God’s name may be hallowed, that is, honoured, revered. It is in this meaning chiefly that the word seems, in a lower degree applied to angels, and, in the highest, to the Lord of heaven and earth.

There

There are some things which incline me to conclude, that this is more properly the import of the word, at least in the application to God, than, as is commonly supposed, moral excellence in general. Doubtless, both the moral, and what are called the natural, attributes of God, may be considered as, in some respect, included, being the foundations of that profound reverence with which he ought ever to be mentioned, and more especially addressed, by mortals. But it is worthy of our notice, that when the term *holy* is applied to God, and accompanied with other attributives, they are such as infuse fear rather than love, and suggest ideas of vengeance rather than of grace. When Joshua found it necessary to alarm the fears of an inconsiderate nation, he told them, *Ye cannot serve the Lord, for he is a holy God, he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your transgressions and sins*, Josh. xxiv. 19. Again, this epithet *holy* is more frequently than any other applied to God's name. Now, if we consider what other epithets are thus applied in Scripture, we shall find that they are not those which express any natural or moral qualities abstractly considered; they are not the names of essential attributes, but such only as suggest the sentiments of awe and reverence with which he ought to be regarded by every reasonable creature. No mention is made of God's wise name, powerful name, or true name, good name, or merciful name, faithful name, or righteous name; yet all these qualities, wisdom, power, truth, goodness, mercy, faithfulness and righteousness, are, in numberless instances, ascribed to God, as the eternal and immutable perfections of his nature: but there is mention of his fearful name, his glorious name, his great name, his reverend name, and his excellent name, sometimes even of his dreadful name, but ofteneft of his holy name; for all these terms are comparative, and bear an immediate reference to the sentiments of the humble worshipper. Nay, as the epithet *holy* is often found in conjunction with some of the others above mentioned, which admit this application, they serve to explain it. Thus the Psalmist, xcix. 3. *Let them praise thy great and terrible name; for it is holy*. Again, cxi. 9. *Holy and reverend is his name*.

What was the display which Jehovah made to the Philistines, when his ark was in their possession, a display which extorted from them the acknowledgment that the God of Israel is a holy God, before whom they could not stand? It was solely of sovereignty and uncontrollable power in the destruction of their idol god Dagon, and great numbers of the people. This filled them with such terror at the bare sight of the ark, the symbol of God's presence, as was too much for them to bear. And indeed both the Greek *ἅγιος*, and the Latin *sanctus*, admit the same meaning, and are often equivalent to *augustus*, *venerandus*. The former term *augustus*, Castalio has frequently, and not improperly, adopted

adopted in his version, when the Hebrew word *kadosh* is applied to God. The change of the epithet *sanctus* is not necessary; but if perspicuity might be thought in a particular case to require it, I should prefer the latter term *venerandus*, as more expressive of religious awe. Further, when the term *holy* is ascribed by angels to God, we find it accompanied with such words or gestures as are expressive of the profoundest awe and veneration.

The description, action, and exclamation of the seraphim in Isaiah, ch. vi. 1. &c. lead our thoughts more to the ideas of majesty and transcendent glory, than to those of a moral nature. *I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lofty, and his train filled the temple: above it stood the seraphim: each one had six wings: with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried to another, and said, Holy, holy, holy is Jehovah the God of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory. And the pillars of the porch were shaken by the voice of him that cried; and the house was filled with smoke.* Every thing in this description is awful and majestic. That he is the Lord of hosts who dwelleth on high, in whose august presence even the seraphim must veil their faces, and that the whole earth is full of his glory, are introduced as the ground of ascribing to him thrice, in the most solemn manner, the epithet *holy*.

There is a passage pretty similar to this in the Apocalypse, Rev. iv. 8. &c. *The four beasts (or, as the word ought to be rendered, living creatures) had each of them six wings about him, and they were full of eyes within; and they rest not day and night, saying, Holy holy holy, Lord God Almighty, who was, and is, and is to come. And when those creatures give glory, and honour, and thanks, to him that sitteth on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever; the four and twenty elders fall down before him that sitteth on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are, and they were created.* Here every circumstance points to the majesty, power, and dominion, not to the moral perfections of God; the action and doxology of the elders make the best comment on the exclamation of the four living creatures, *Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, &c.*

It is universally admitted, that to hallow or sanctify the name of God, is to venerate, to *honour* it. According to analogy, therefore, to affirm that the name of God is holy, is to affirm that it is *honourable*, that it is *venerable*. Nay, in the same sense, we are said to sanctify God himself; that is, to make him the object of our veneration and awe. In this way, to sanctify God,

God, is nearly the same as to fear him, differing chiefly in degree, and may be opposed to an undue fear of man. Thus it is employed by the prophet, Isa. viii. 12, 13. *Say not, A confederacy to all them to whom this people shall say, a confederacy, neither fear ye their fear, nor be afraid. Sanctify the Lord of hosts himself, and let him be your fear, and let him be your dread.* But nothing can give a more apposite example of this use than the words of Moses to Aaron, Lev. x. 1. &c. on occasion of the terrible fate of Aaron's two sons, Nadab and Abihu. *This is that the Lord spake, I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me; and before all the people I will be glorified.* Their transgression was, that they offered before the Lord strange fire, or what was not the peculiar fire of the altar, lighted originally from heaven, but ordinary fire kindled from their own hearths, an action which, in the eye of that dispensation, must be deemed the grossest indignity. Spencer * has well expressed the sense of the passage in these words: "Deum sanctum esse, id est, a qua-
"vis persona vel eminentia, incomparabili naturæ suæ excellentia,
"separatum, ideoque postulare, ut sanctificetur, id est, auguste,
"decore, et ritu naturæ suæ separatæ, imaginem quandam fe-
"rente, colatur."

§ 15. The sixth and last sense mentioned, was *moral purity* and innocence, a sense which, by a very natural turn of thinking, arises out of the two first meanings assigned, namely, clean in the common import of the word, and clean in the eye of the ceremonial law. This meaning might, in respect of its connection with these, have been ranked in the third place. But, because I consider this as originally a metaphorical use of the word, and requiring a greater degree of refinement than the other meanings, I have reserved it for the last. This acceptation is accordingly much more frequent in the New Testament than in the Old. In the latter, it oftener occurs in the prophetic and devotional writings, than in the Pentateuch, and the other historical books, where we never find *holy* mentioned in the description of a good character. This, in my judgment, merits a more particular attention than seems to have been given it. In what is affirmed expressly in commendation of Noah, Abraham, or any of the patriarchs, of Moses, Joshua, Job, David, Hezekiah, or any of the good kings of Israel or Judah, or any of the prophets or ancient worthies, except where there is an allusion to a sacred office, the term *kadosh*, holy, is not once employed. Now there is hardly another general term, as *just, good, perfect, upright*, whereof, in such cases, we do not find examples. Yet there is no epithet which occurs oftener on other occasions than that whereof I am speaking. But, in the time of the Evangelists, this moral application of the corresponding word *bagios*, was be-
come

* Lib. I. cap. vii.

come more familiar; though the other meanings were not obsolete, as they are almost all at present. Herod is said to have known that John the Baptist *was a just man and a holy*, Mark vi. 20. There is nothing like this in the Old Testament. When David pleads that he is holy, Psa. lxxxvi. 2. it is not the word *hadosb* that he uses. The many injunctions to holiness given in the law, as has been already hinted, have at least a much greater reference to ceremonial purity, than to moral. The only immorality against which they sometimes seem immediately pointed, is *idolatry*, it being always considered in the law as the greatest degree of defilement in both senses, ceremonial and moral.

But as every vicious action is a transgression of the law, holiness came gradually to be opposed to vice of every kind. The consideration of this, as a stain on the character, as what sullies the mind, and renders it similarly disagreeable to a virtuous man, as dirt renders the body to a cleanly man, has been common in most nations. Metaphors drawn hence are to be found perhaps in every language. As the ideas of a people become more spiritual and refined, and, which is a natural consequence, as ceremonies sink in their estimation, and virtue rises, the secondary and metaphorical use of such terms grows more habitual, and often in the end supplants the primitive and the proper. This has happened to the term *holiness*, as now commonly understood by Christians, or rather to the original terms so rendered. It had, in a good measure happened, but not entirely, in the language of the Jews, in the days of our Lord and his apostles. The exhortations to holiness in the New Testament, are evidently to be understood of moral purity, and of that only. On other occasions, the words *holy*, and *saints*, *ἀγιοι*, even in the New Testament, ought to be explained in conformity to the fourth meaning above assigned, devoted or consecrated to the service of God.

§ 16. Having illustrated these different senses, I shall consider an objection that may be offered against the interpretation here given of the word *holy*, when applied to God, as denoting *awful, venerable*. Is not, it may be said, the imitation of God, in holiness, enjoined as a duty? And does not this imply, that the thing itself must be the same in nature, how different soever in degree, when ascribed to God, and when enjoined on us? As I did not entirely exclude this sense, to wit, *moral purity*, from the term, when applied to the Deity, I readily admit that, in this injunction in the New Testament, there may be a particular reference to it. But it is not necessary that, in such sentences, there be so perfect a coincidence of signification, as seems in the objection to be contended for. The words are, *Be ye holy, for (not as) I am holy*. In the passage where this precept first occurs, it is manifest, from the context, that the scope of the charge given to the people, is to avoid ceremonial impurities; those particularly

ticularly that may be contracted by eating unclean meats, and above all, by eating insects and reptiles, which are called an abomination. Now, certainly in this inferior acceptation, the term is utterly inapplicable to God. But what entirely removes the difficulty, is, that the people are said, by a participation in such unclean food, to make themselves abominable. To this the precept *Sanctify yourselves, and be ye holy*, stands in direct opposition. There is here, therefore, a coincidence of the second and fifth meanings of the word *holy*, which are connected, in their application to men, as the means and the end, and therefore ought both to be understood as comprehended; though the latter alone is applicable to God. Now, as the opposite of abominable is, *estimable, venerable*, the import of the precept, *Sanctify yourselves*, manifestly is, ‘Be careful, by a strict attention to the statutes ye have received concerning purity, especially in what regards your food, to avoid the pollution of your body; maintain thus a proper respect for your persons, that your religious services may be esteemed by men, and accepted of God; for remember that the God whom ye serve, as being pure and perfect, is entitled to the highest esteem and veneration. Whatever, therefore, may be called *slovenly*, or what his law has pronounced impure in his servants, is an indignity offered by them to their master, which he will certainly resent.’

But as an artful gloss or paraphrase will sometimes mislead, I shall subjoin the plain words of Scripture, Lev. xi. 42. &c. which come in the conclusion of a long chapter, wherein the laws relating to cleanness in animal food, in beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles, are laid down. *Whatsoever goeth upon the belly, and whatsoever goeth upon all four, or whatsoever hath more feet among all creeping things, that creep upon the earth; them ye shall not eat, for they are an abomination. Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth, neither shall ye make yourselves unclean with them, that ye should be defiled thereby. For I am the Lord your God; ye shall therefore sanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy; for I am holy: neither shall ye defile yourselves with any manner of creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. For I am the Lord that bringeth you up out of the land of Egypt, to be your God; ye shall therefore be holy, for I am holy.* It is plain, that any other interpretation of the word *holy* than that now given, would render the whole passage incoherent.

§ 17. Now, to come to the word חַסִּיד *chasid*, ὁσιος, this is a term which properly and originally expresses a mental quality, and that only in the same manner as צַדִּיק *tsaddik*, δικαιος *just*, אֱמוּנָה *amon*, πιστος *faithful*, and several others. Nor is there any material variation of meaning that the word seems to have under-

gone at different periods. The most common acceptation is *gracious, merciful, beneficent, benign*. When there appears to be a particular reference to the way wherein the person stands affected to God and religion, it means *pious, devout*. In conformity to this sense, our translators have, in several places in the Old Testament, rendered it *godly*. The phrase *οἱ ὅσιοι τῆς Θεοῦ* is, therefore, not improperly rendered *the saints of God*, that is, his pious servants. It most probably, as was hinted before, means *pious* in what was said of our Lord, that he was *ὅσιος, ἀκακος, ἀμιαντος*, as it seems to have been the intention of the sacred writer to comprehend, in few words, his whole moral character respecting God, the rest of mankind, and himself. In the enumeration which Paul gives to Titus, ch. i. 8. of the virtues whereof a bishop ought to be possessed, it is surely improper to explain any of them by a general term equally adapted to them all; since nothing can be plainer than that his intention is to denote, by every epithet, some quality not expressed before. His words are *φιλεξίτην, φιλαγαθόν, σωφρονα, δικαίον, ἴσιον, εγκρατη*. To render *ἴσιος* *holy* (though that were in other places a proper version) would be here in effect the same as to omit it altogether. If the sense had been *pious*, it had probably been either the first or the last in the catalogue. As it stands, I think, it ought to be rendered *beneficent*.

There are certain words which, on some occasions, are used with greater, and on others, with less, latitude. Thus the word *δικαίος* sometimes comprehends the whole of our duty to God, our neighbour, and ourselves; sometimes it includes only the virtue of justice. When *οἱ δίκαιοι* is opposed to *οἱ πονηροί*, the former is the case, and it is better to render it *the righteous*, and *δικαιοσύνη* *righteousness*; but when *δικαίος* or *δικαιοσύνη* occur in a list with other virtues, it is better to render them *just* or *justice*. Sometimes the word is employed in a sense which has been called forensic, as being derived from judicial proceedings. *He that justifieth the wicked, says Solomon, Prov. xvii. 15. and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord.* The word *wicked*, means here no more than *guilty*, and the word *just*, guiltless of the crime charged. In like manner *ἁγιότης*, in one or two instances, may be found in the New Testament, in an extent of signification greater than usual. In such cases it may be rendered *sanctity*, a word rather more expressive of what concerns manners than *holiness* is.

§ 18. But, as a further evidence that the Hebrew word *כבוד* *cbafid*, is not synonymous with *קדוש* *kadosh*, and consequently neither *ὅσιος* with *ἅγιος*, it must be observed, that the abstract *כבוד* *chafed*, is not once rendered by the Seventy *ἁγιότης*, or, by our interpreters, *holiness*, though the concrete is almost always rendered *ὅσιος* in Greek, and often *holy* in English. This substantive,

stantive, on the contrary, is translated in the Septuagint, ελεος, ελεημοσυνη, οικτειρημα, ελπις, χαρις, or some such term; once, indeed, and but once, οσια. In English it is translated *kindness, favour, grace, mercy, loving-kindness, pity*, but never *holiness*. The analogy of language (unless use were clear against it, which is not the case here) would lead us to think, that there must be a nearer relation in meaning than this, between the substantive and the adjective formed from it. Yet *worthy* does not more evidently spring from *worth*, than *חַסִּיד* *chafid*, springs from *חֲסִיד* *chafed*. Of the term last mentioned it may be proper just to observe, that there is also an anomalous use (like that remarked in *kadosh*) which assigns it a meaning, the reverse of its usual signification, answering to *ανομια, ονειδος, flagitium, probrum*. But it is only in two or three places that the word occurs in this acceptation.

§ 19. I shall conclude with observing, that *chafid* or *hosios* are sometimes applied to God; in which case there can be little doubt of its implying *merciful, bountiful, gracious, liberal, or benign*. The only case wherein it has an affinity in meaning to the English words *saint* or *holy*, is when it expresses pious affections towards God. As these cannot be attributed to God himself, the term, when used of him, ought to be understood, according to its most frequent acceptation. The Psalmist's words, which, in the common version, are, Psal. clxv. 17. *The Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy, chafid, in all his works*, would have been more truly, as well as intelligibly and emphatically rendered, *The Lord is just in all his ways, and bountiful in all his works*. There is not equal reason for translating in the same manner the Greek *hosios*, when applied to God in the New Testament. Though *hosios*, in the Septuagint, commonly occupies the place of *chafid*, it does not always. It is sometimes employed in translating the Hebrew words *תָּמ* *tham, perfect*, and *יָשָׁר* *jasher, upright*. Once it is used for this last term when applied to God, Deut. xxxii. 4. These words, therefore, *ὅτι μόνος ὁσῖος*, Rev. xv. 4. in an address to God, ought to be translated, *for thou alone art perfect* rather than *bountiful* or *gracious*. The addition of *μονος* to the other epithet, is a sufficient ground for this preference. The context also favours it. But, in the more common acceptation of the term *ὁσῖος hosios*, there is this difference between it and *ἅγιος hagios*, as applied to God, that the latter appellation represents the Deity as awful, or rather terrible; the former as amiable. The latter checks all advances on our part. We are ready to cry with the men of Bethshemesh, 1 Sam. vi. 20. *Who is able to stand before this holy God?* The former emboldens us to approach. Thus they are so far from being synonymous in this application, that they may rather be contrasted with each other. As to their import, when applied to men, the word *ἅγιος*, in the best sense, still retains so much of its origin, as to appear rather

rather a negative character, denoting a mind without stain; whereas the term *ἅγιος* is properly positive, and implies, in its utmost extent, both piety and benevolence.

§ 20. In regard to the manner of translating *kadosb* in the Old Testament, and *hagios* in the New; when all circumstances are considered, I think it safest to retain very generally the common version *holy*. The same remark holds nearly also of the conjugates. It is very true that the sense of the original in many places does not entirely suit the meaning which we affix to that word. But it is certain, on the other hand, that we have no one word that answers so well in all cases. To change the term with each variation in meaning, would be attended with great inconveniency; and, in many cases, oblige the translator to express himself either unintelligibly, and to appearance, inconsequentially, or too much in the manner of a paraphrast. On the other hand, as the English term *holy* is somewhat indefinite in respect of meaning, and in a manner appropriated to religious subjects, nothing can serve better to ascertain and illustrate the scriptural use than such uniformity; and the scriptural use of a word hardly current in common discourse, cannot fail to fix the general acceptation. But this would not hold of any words in familiar use on ordinary subjects. With regard to such, any deviation from the received meaning would, to common readers, prove the occasion of perplexity at least, if not of error. But *chastid* in the Old Testament, and *hosios* in the New (except when used substantively, where it may be rendered *saint*), ought, when it respects the disposition towards God, to be translated *pious*; when it respects the disposition towards men, *gracious, kind, humane*.

P A R T V.

κηρυσσειν, ευαγγελιζειν, καταγγελλειν, and διδασκειν.

THE only other specimen I shall here give of words supposed to be synonymous, or nearly so, shall be *κηρυσσειν, ευαγγελιζειν, καταγγελλειν*, and *διδασκειν*, all nearly related, the former three being almost always rendered in English *to preach*, and the last *to teach*. My intention is, not only to point out exactly the differences of meaning in these words, but to evince that the words whereby the two former are rendered in some, perhaps most modern languages, do not entirely reach the meaning of the original terms; and, in some measure, by consequence, mislead most readers. It happens in a tract of ages, through the gradual alterations which take place in respect of laws, manners, rites, and customs, that words

words come, as it were, along with these, by imperceptible degrees, to vary considerably from their primitive signification. Perhaps it is oftener than we are aware, to be ascribed to this cause, that the terms employed by translators, are found so feebly to express the meaning of the original.

§ 2. The first of the words above mentioned, κηρυσσειν, rendered to *preach*, is derived from κηρυξ, rendered *preacher*, whence also κηρυγμα, rendered a *preaching*. The primitive κηρυξ signifies properly both *herald* and *common crier*, and answers exactly to the Latin word *caduceator* in the first of these senses, and to *præco* in the second. The verb κηρυσσειν is accordingly to *cry*, *publish*, or *proclaim* authoritatively, or by commission from another, and the noun κηρυγμα is *the thing published* or *proclaimed*. The word κηρυξ occurs only twice in the Septuagint, and once in the apocryphal book Ecclesiasticus, and evidently means in them all *crier*. The other sense of the word, namely, *herald*, or messenger of important intelligence between princes and states, is nearly related, as the same persons had often the charge of carrying such embassies, and of proclaiming war or peace: but it is not quite the same. In the New Testament the word seems to partake of both senses, but more evidently of that of *crier*. And to this sense the derivatives κηρυσσω and κηρυγμα, more properly accord than to the other: for, to discharge the office of herald is, in Greek, κερυκειν, and the office itself κερυκεισις. But these words, though frequent in classical writers, are not found in Scripture. The word κηρυξ occurs but thrice in the New Testament, once in each of the Epistles to Timothy, 1 Tim. ii. 7. 2 Tim. i. 11. wherein Paul calls himself κηρυξ και αποστολος; and once it is used by the Apostle Peter, who, speaking of Noah, calls him κηρυξ δικαιουσης, 2 Pet. ii. 5. The word κηρυγμα occurs but in three places in the Septuagint, and imports in them all *proclamation*, or *thing proclaimed*. In one of those places it relates to that made by the prophet Jonah, through the streets of Nineveh, called, as in the Gospel, *preaching*, Jonah iii. 2. and in another, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22. is, in the common version, rendered *proclamation*. In the New Testament it occurs eight times, and is always rendered *preaching*. In two of those places it relates to Jonah's proclamation in Nineveh. The verb κηρυσσω occurs in the New Testament about five and twenty times, always in nearly the same sense: *I proclaim, prædico, palam annuncio*. In at least twelve of these cases it relates solely to proclamations made by human authority, and denotes in them all *to warn*, or, by crying out, to advertise people openly of any thing done or to be done, or danger to be avoided. This may be called the primitive sense of the word, and in this sense it will be found to be ofteneft employed in the New Testament.

§ 3. Now, if it be asked, whether this suits the import of the English

English word, *to preach*, by which it is almost always rendered in the common version of this part of the canon, I answer, that, in my judgment, it does not entirely suit it. *To preach*, is defined, by Johnson, in his Dictionary, “to pronounce a public discourse upon sacred subjects.” This expresses, with sufficient exactness, the idea we commonly affix to the term. For, we may admit, that the attendant circumstances of church, pulpit, text, worship, are but appendages. But the definition, given by the English lexicographer, cannot be called an interpretation of the term *κηρυσσω*, as used in Scripture. For, so far is it from being necessary that the *κηρυγμα* should be a discourse, that it may be only a single sentence, and a very short sentence too. Nay, to such brief notifications we shall find the term most frequently applied. Besides, the word *κηρυσσω*, and *κηρυγμα*, were adopted, with equal propriety, whether the subject were sacred or civil. Again, though the verb *κηρυσσω* always implied public notice of some event, either accomplished, or about to be accomplished, often accompanied with a warning, to do or forbear something; it never denoted either a comment on, or explanation of any doctrine, critical observations on, or illustrations of any subject, or a chain of reasoning, in proof of a particular sentiment. And, if so, to pronounce publicly such a discourse, as, with us, is denominated sermon, homily, lecture, or preaching, would, by no means, come within the meaning of the word *κηρυσσω*, in its first and most common acceptation. It is, therefore, not so nearly synonymous with *διδασκω*, *to teach*, as is now commonly imagined.

§ 4. But, that we may be more fully satisfied of this, it will be necessary to examine more closely the application of the word in the Gospels, and in the Acts. The first time it occurs, is in the account that is given of our Lord’s harbinger, Matth. iii. 1, 2. *In those days came John the Baptist, κηρυσσων εν τη ερημω της Ιουδαιας, και λεγων, making proclamation in the wilderness of Judea, and saying.* Now, what was it that he cried, or proclaimed in the wilderness? It immediately follows, *Μετανοειτε ηγγικε γαρ η βασιλεια των υραων Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth.* This is, literally, his *κηρυγμα*, proclamation, or preaching, stripped of the allegorical language in which it is clothed by the prophet, Isa. xl. 3. as quoted in the next verse, to this effect: *For this is he to whom Isaiab alludeth in these words, The cry of a crier in the desert, “Prepare a way for the Lord, make his road straight.”* Hence we may learn, what the Evangelists call *βαπτισμα μετανοιας*, which John preached for the remission of sins. He proclaimed to all within hearing, that if they would obtain the pardon of former offences, they must now enter on a new life; for that the reign of the Messiah was just about to commence; and, as a pledge of their intended reformation, and an engagement to it,

he called on all to come and be baptized by him, confessing their sins.

Another public intimation, which John made to the people, and to which the word κηρυσσω is also applied, we have in Mark i. 7, 8. : *He proclaimed, saying, "After me cometh one mightier than I, whose shoe latchet I am not worthy to stoop down and untie. I indeed baptize you in water, but he will baptize you in the Holy Spirit."* Such short calls, warnings, notices, or advertisements, given with a loud voice to the multitude, from whomsoever, and on what subject soever, come under the notion of κηρυγματα, as used in Scripture. To the particular moral instructions which John gave the people severally, according to their different professions, the word κηρυσσω is not applied, but παρακαλω, *to admonish, to exhort*, Luke iii. 18. Πολλα μιν εν και ετερα παρακαλων ευηγγελιζετο τον λαον. Which is very improperly translated, *And many other things in his exhortation preached he unto the people.* Πολλα is manifestly construed with παρακαλων, not with ευηγγελιζετο, whose only regimen is τον λαον. The meaning is, therefore : *Accompanied with many other exhortations, he published the good news to the people.*

§ 5. Let us next consider in what manner the term κηρυσσω is applied to our Saviour. The first time we find it used of him, Mat. iv. 17. the very same proclamation or preaching is ascribed to him, which had been ascribed to John the Baptist. *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth.* With giving this public notice he also began his ministry. Again, we are told, Mat. iv. 23. that *he went over all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and κηρυσσαν το ευαγγελιον της βασιλειας, proclaiming the good news of the reign.* There can be no doubt that the same proclamation is here meant, which is quoted above from the same chapter. Nor is this the only place wherein this expression is used of our Lord, Mat. ix. 35. Mark i. 14. Again, it is applied to Jesus Christ by the Prophet Isaiah, ch. lxi. 1. &c. as quoted in the Gospel, Luke iv. 18, 19. as to which I shall only observe, at present (having made some remarks on the passage in a former Dissertation), that the word κηρυσσω, which twice occurs in it, is used solely in relation to those things which were wont to be notified by proclamation. In the last clause, *to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord,* there is a manifest allusion to the jubilee, which was always proclaimed by sound of trumpet, and accompanied with a proclamation of liberty to all the bondmen and bondwomen among them. It was by proclamation also, that Cyrus gave freedom to the captives of Judah, to return to their native land. I need only add, that the word κηρυσσω is sometimes applied to our Lord indefinitely, where we are not told what he proclaimed or preached. In such cases, the rules of interpretation invariably require, that the expressions which are indefinite and defective, be explained

by those which are definite and full ; and that, by consequence, they be understood to signify, that he gave public warning of the Messiah's approaching reign.

§ 6. Lastly, as to the application of the term to the apostles, its first appearance is in the instructions which their Lord gave them, along with their first mission to the cities and villages of Israel. *As ye go*, says he, Matt. x. 7. κηρυσσετε λεγοντες, *proclaim, saying*, κηρυξι η βασιλεια των υραων, *the reign of heaven approacheth*. Here we have the very words of their preaching, or proclamation, expressly given them. To the same purpose, another evangelist tells us, Luke ix. 2. Απειλθεν αυτης κηρυσσει την βασιλειαν του Θεου, which is literally, *He commissioned them to proclaim the reign of God*. The same is doubtless to be understood by Mark, who acquaints us, ch. vi. 12. Εξελθοντες εκηρυσσοι να μετανοησωσι ; which is saying, in effect, that wherever they went they made the same proclamation, which had been made by their Master, and his precursor, before them : *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth*. Now, it deserves our notice, that we no where find such an order as διδασκατε λεγοντες, *teach saying*, where the express words of their teaching are prescribed. It was necessary that this should differ in manner, according to the occasion, and be suited to the capacities and circumstances of the persons to be taught, and therefore, that it should be left to the discretion of the teacher. No variation was necessary, or even proper, in the other, which was no more than the public notification of a fact, with a warning to prepare themselves.

In the charge which our Lord gave to his apostles after his resurrection, he says, Mark xvi. 15. *Go throughout all the world, κηρυσσατε το ευαγγελιον, proclaim the good news to the whole creation*. And as the call to reformation was enforced by the promise of remission in the name of Christ, these also are said, Luke xxiv. 47. κηρυχθησιν εις παντα τα εθνη, *to have been proclaimed to all nations*. Indemnity for past sins is the foundation of the call to reform, with which the proclamation of the reign of God was always accompanied. It is proper to remark, that the form κηρυξι η βασιλεια των υραων, used first by the Baptist, then by our Lord himself, and lastly, by his disciples in his lifetime, is never repeated after his resurrection. And we have reason to believe, from the material alteration in circumstances which then took place, that they have then said, not as formerly, κηρυξι, but ηλθε η βασιλεια των υραων. *The reign of heaven, that is, of the Messiah, is come*.

§ 7. Further, I must take notice, that though announcing publicly the reign of the Messiah, comes always under the denomination, κηρυσσειν, no moral instructions, or doctrinal explanations, given either by our Lord, or by his apostles, are ever, either in the Gospels or in the Acts, so denominated. Thus, that most instructive discourse of our Lord, the longest that is recorded in
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the Gospel, commonly named his sermon on the mount, is called teaching by the evangelist, both in introducing it, and after the conclusion, Matt. v. 2. vii. 28, 29. *Opening his mouth, ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοῖς, he taught them, saying: and, when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished, ἐπὶ τῇ διδασκῇ αὐτοῦ, at his doctrine, his manner of teaching.* It is added, *ὡς γὰρ διδασκῶν αὐτοῖς; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes.* He is said to have been employed in teaching, (Matt. xiii. 54. Mark vi. 2. Luke iv. 15. 22.) when the wisdom, which shone forth in his discourses, excited the astonishment of all who heard him. In like manner, the instructions he gave by parables, are called teaching the people, not preaching to them, Mark iv. 1, 2. and those given in private to his apostles, are in the same way styled, (Mark viii. 31.) teaching, never preaching. And if teaching and preaching be found sometimes coupled together, the reason appears to be, because their teaching, in the beginning of this new dispensation, must have been frequently introduced by announcing the Messiah, which alone was preaching. The explanations, admonitions, arguments and motives, that followed, came under the denomination of teaching. Nor does any thing else spoken by our Lord and his disciples, in his lifetime, appear to have been called preaching, but this single sentence, *Μετανοεῖτε ἡγγικε γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.* In the Acts of the apostles, the difference of meaning in the two words is carefully observed. The former is always a general and open declaration of the Messiah's reign, called emphatically the good news, or gospel; or, which amounts to the same, the announcing of the great foundation of our hope, the Messiah's resurrection; the latter comprehends every kind of instruction, public or private, that is necessary for illustrating the nature and laws of this kingdom, for confuting gainfayers, persuading the hearers, for confirming and comforting believers. The proper subject of each is fitly expressed in the conclusion of this book, Acts xxviii. 31. where, speaking of Paul, then confined at Rome in a hired house, the author tells us that he received all who came to him, *κηρυσσῶν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ; καὶ διδασκῶν τὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.* Announcing to them the reign of God, and instructing them in every thing that related to the Lord Jesus Christ.

§ 8. Let it also be observed that, in all the quotations in the Gospels from the ancient prophets, neither the word *κηρυσσῶν*, nor any of its conjugates, is applied to any of them beside Jonah. What is quoted from the rest, is said to have been spoken, or foretold, or prophesied, but never *preached*. Jonah's prophecy to the Ninevites, on the contrary, is but twice quoted; and it is in both places called *κηρυγμῶν*, rendered *preaching*, properly *cry* or *proclamation*. The same name it has, in the book itself, in the Septuagint, and with great propriety, according to the explana-

tion above given of the word, for it was a real proclamation which God required him to make through the streets of Nineveh. Thus he is charged, Jonah iii. 2. *Go to Nineveh, that great city, and preach to it the preaching that I bid thee.* The very words are prescribed. It may be observed here, by the way, that both in the Hebrew and in the Greek, it is the same word which is here rendered *preach*, and in verse fifth, *proclaim*, when used in reference to a fast appointed by the king of Nineveh, for averting the divine anger, and notified to the people by *proclamation*. In obedience to the command of God, Jonah began to enter into the city, a day's journey, and to cry as he had been bidden. Now, what was the *preaching* which God put into his mouth? It was neither more nor less than this, *Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown.* This warning the prophet, at proper distances, repeated as he advanced.

In one passage of the Apocalypse, Rev. v. 2. the word occurs so manifestly in the same sense, that it is one of the two places (for there are no more) in the New Testament, wherein our translators have rendered it *proclaim*. *I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice, Who is worthy to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof?* That is, whosoever is worthy to open the book and to loose its seals, may come and do it. This is the whole of the angel's κηρυγμα, preaching or proclamation. In the Acts and Epistles, we find the verb κηρυσσω followed by τῶν Χριστῶν, τῶν Ἰησοῦν, or something equivalent. This is entirely proper. To proclaim the advent of the Messiah, and that Jesus is the person, was the first step of their important charge, and necessarily preceded their teaching and explaining his doctrine, or inculcating his precepts.

§ 9. So much for the primitive and most common meaning of the word κηρυσσω in the New Testament. But, as few words in any language remain perfectly univocal, I own there are some instances in which the term is employed in this part of Scripture with greater latitude. The first and most natural extension of the word is when it is used by hyperbole for publishing any how, divulging, making a thing to be universally talked of. The first instance of this is where we are told of the leper that was cured by our Lord, and charged not to divulge the manner of his cure. *But he went out, says the historian, Mark i. 45. and began to publish it much, κηρυσσειν πολλα.* So our translators very properly render the word. In some other places we find it in the same sense, and in the same way rendered, Matt. x. 27. Luke xii. 3. All the instances are similar, in that they relate to miraculous cures performed by our Lord, which some of those who received, notwithstanding the prohibition given them, were every where assiduous to divulge. Not that they did literally proclaim them, by crying aloud in the public places, but that they made
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the matter as well known, as though this method had been taken. Such hyperbolical idioms are to be found in all languages. How common is it to say of profligates, that they proclaim their infamy to all the world, because their lives make it as notorious as it could be made by proclamation? It is in the same sense of publishing, and by the same figure, that proclaiming from the house-tops (*ibid.*) is opposed to whispering in the ear. Nor is it certain, that the words *κηρυσσω* and *κηρυγμα* have any other meaning than those above specified in the Gospels and Acts.

§ 10. The only remaining sense of the words which I find in the New Testament, and which answers to the import of the English words *preach* and *preaching*, seems to be peculiar to the writings of Paul. *Thou*, says he, Rom. ii. 21. *who teachest another, teachest thou not thyself? Thou that preachest, ὁ κηρυσσων, a man should not steal, dost thou steal?* The two clauses illustrate each other, and shew that *κηρυσσω* in the latter, has nearly the same import with *διδασκω* in the former. For though we may speak properly of proclaiming laws, and *thou shalt not steal* is doubtless of the number, it is only of laws newly enacted, or at least not before promulgated, that we use that expression. The law here spoken of was sufficiently known and acknowledged every where; but though there was no occasion for proclaiming it, it might be very necessary to inculcate and explain it. Now this is properly expressed by the word *preach*. There are some other places in his Epistles, wherein it cannot be doubted, that the word is used in this large acceptation for teaching publicly. Thus we ought to understand his admonition to Timothy, 2 Tim. iv. 2. *κηρυσσον τον λογον, preach the word.* *Κηρυγμα* is also used by him with the same latitude for all public teaching, as when he says, 1 Cor. i. 21. *It pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, δια της μωριας τε κηρυγματος, to save them that believe.* Again, 1 Cor. ii. 4. *My speech and my preaching, το κηρυγμα μου, was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in the demonstration of the spirit and of power;* there can be no question but the term is used for teaching in general, since *κηρυγμα*, in the confined sense it bears in the Gospels, could hardly admit variety or choice in the expression, nor consequently ought of the enticing words of man's wisdom. There is, besides, one place where the apostle Peter uses the word *κηρυσσω*, 1 Pet. iii. 19. in speaking of our Lord's preaching to the spirits in prison; but the passage is so obscure, that no argument can safely be founded on it.

§ 11. Nothing, however, can be clearer to the attentive and critical reader of the original, than that the aforesaid words are not used with the same latitude in the historical books. In the Acts, in particular, several discourses are recorded, those especially of Peter and Paul, but to none of them are the terms *κηρυσσω* and *κηρυγμα*, ever applied. I think it the more necessary to make
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this remark, because the English word *preach* is in the common version frequently applied to them. Now this tends to confound the distinction so well preserved in the history, and to render all our ideas on this head extremely indeterminate. Some will perhaps be surpris'd to be inform'd, that there are in the Acts alone no fewer than six Greek words, not synonymous neither, which are, some of them oftener, some of them seldomer, translated by the verb *preach*. The words are κηρυσσω, ευαγγελίζομαι, καταγγελλω, λαλειω, διαλεγομαι, and παρησιαζομαι, which last is rendered to *preach boldly*. I admit that it is impossible, in translating out of one language into another, to find a distinction of words in one exactly correspondent to what obtains in the other, and so to preserve uniformity in rendering every different word by a different word, and the same word by the same word. This is what neither propriety nor perspicuity will admit. The rule however to translate uniformly, when it can be done, in a consistency both with propriety and perspicuity, is a good rule, and one of the simplest and surest methods I know, of making us enter into the conceptions of the sacred writers, and adopt their very turn of thinking.

§ 12. I shall here take notice only of two passages in the common translation, which, to a reader unacquainted with the original, may appear to contradict my remark in regard to the distinction so carefully observed by the historian. *When the Jews,* says he, Acts xiii. 42. *were gone out of the synagogue, the Gentiles besought that these words might be preached to them,* λαληθηναι αυτοις τα ερηματα ταυτα, *the next Sabbath*; literally and simply, *that these words might be spoken to them*. The words here meant, are those contained in the twenty-six preceding verses. Our translators, I suppose, have been the more inclinable to call it preaching, because spoken in a synagogue by permission of the rulers. In another place, Acts xx. 7. *when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them,* διαλεγτο αυτοις. Soon after, ver. 9. *as Paul was long preaching,* διαλεγμενος επι πλειον. Διαλεγομαι is properly *differo, disputo*. It occurs frequently in the Acts, but, except in this passage, is always rendered to *reason, or to dispute*. I own that neither of these words suits the context here, as it appears that all present were disciples. The word however implies not only to *dispute*, but to *discourse* on any subject. But what I take the freedom to censure in our translators, is not their rendering διαλεγομαι in this place *preach*, which, considered by itself, might be justified; but it is their confounding it with so many words not synonymous, particularly with κηρυσσω, whose meaning in this book, as well as in the Gospels, is totally different.

§ 13. Now, in regard to the manner wherein this word has been translated, with which I shall finish what relates peculiarly

to it, we may observe that *prædicare*, used in the Vulgate, and in all the Latin versions, corresponds entirely to the Greek word in its primitive meaning, and signifies to give public notice by proclamation. In this sense it had been used by the Latin classics, long before the translation of the Bible into their tongue. But *prædicare*, having been employed uniformly in rendering *κηρυσσειν*, not only in the history, but in the Epistles, has derived from the latter use a signification different, and much more limited than it has in profane authors. Now, this additional, or acquired signification, is that which has principally obtained amongst ecclesiastics; and hence has arisen the sole meaning in modern languages ascribed to the word, whereby they commonly render the Greek *κηρυσσω*. The Latin word is manifestly that from which the Italian *predicare*, the French *precher*, and the English *to preach*, are derived. Yet these three words correspond to the Latin only in the last mentioned and ecclesiastical sense, not in the primitive and classical, which is also the scriptural sense in the Gospels and Acts. Thus the learned Academicians della Crusca, in their Vocabulary, interpret the Italian *predicare*, not by the Latin *prædicare*, its etymon, but by *concionari, concionem habere*; terms certainly much nearer than the other to the import of the word used in the other two languages mentioned, though by no means adapted to express the sense of *κηρυσσειν* in the historical books. This is another evidence of what was observed in a former Dissertation *, that a mistake, occasioned by supposing the word in the original, exactly correspondent to the term in the common version, by which it is usually rendered, is often confirmed, instead of being corrected by recurring to translations into other modern tongues, inasmuch as from the same, or similar causes, the like deviation from the original import, has been produced in these languages, as in our own.

§ 14. I should now examine critically the import of the word *ευαγγελιζω*, often rendered in the same way with *κηρυσσω*. But what might have been offered on this subject, I have in a great measure anticipated, in the explanation I gave of the name *ευαγγελιον*. It was impossible to consider the noun and the verb separately, without either repeating the same observations and criticisms on each, or, by dividing things so closely connected, injuring the illustration of both. I shall therefore here, after referring the reader to that Dissertation †, which is pretty full, point out, in the briefest manner, the chief distinctions in meaning that may be remarked between this word and *κηρυσσω*, already explained.

The former always refers to a message or news in itself good and agreeable, the latter does not require this quality in the subject. What would come under the denomination of *κακαγγελιζω*,
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* Diss. III. § 6.

† Diss. V. Part II.

bad news, may be the subject of κηρυγμα, *proclamation*, as well as good news. We say, with equal propriety, κηρυσσειν πολειμοι as κηρυσσειν ειρηην, to proclaim war, as to proclaim peace. Nay, Jonah's cry through the streets of Nineveh, *Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrowen*, is denominated κηρυγμα both in the Old Testament and in the New. But this is no where, nor indeed could be, styled ευαγγελιον, *glad tidings*.

A second difference is, the word κηρυσσω implies that the notification is made openly to many, whereas the word ευαγγελιζομαι may not improperly be used, in whatever way the thing be notified, publicly or privately, aloud or in a whisper, to one or to many. Thus, in regard to the important and agreeable message delivered by Gabriel to Zacharias the father of John the Baptist, when the latter was alone in the sanctuary offering incense; the archangel says, Luke i. 19. *I am sent, ευαγγελισασθαι σοι ταυτα, to show thee these glad tidings*. And it is said of Philip, when in the chariot with only the Ethiopian eunuch, Acts viii. 35. ευαγγελισατο αυτω τον Ιησυν. *He preached to him Jesus*. The term *preached*, by which our translators have rendered the word, does not in this place reach the meaning of the Greek word, nor does it answer to the ordinary acceptation of the English. It does not reach the meaning of the Greek, as the quality of the subject, its being good news, is not suggested. Nor is the English word proper here; for this teaching was neither public, nor have we reason to believe it was a continued discourse. It is much more probable, that it was in the familiar way of dialogue, in which he had begun, that Philip continued to instruct this stranger in the doctrine of Christ.

Another distinction seems to arise from the original import of the words, though I will not say that it is uniformly observed. It is, that the word ευαγγελιζω relates to the first information that is given to a person or people, that is, when the subject may be properly called *news*. Thus, in the Acts, it is frequently used for expressing the first publication of the Gospel in a city or village, or amongst a particular people. In regard to the word κηρυσσω, there is no impropriety in speaking of the same thing as repeatedly proclaimed among the same people. Thus the approach of the reign of God was, in fact, proclaimed to the Jews in our Saviour's lifetime, first by the Baptist, then by our Lord himself, afterwards by the Apostles, and lastly by the seventy disciples. I shall only add, that the word ευαγγελιζομαι is sometimes, though not often, used more indefinitely for teaching or preaching in general, Acts xiv. 15. Gal. i. 23. In one place, Rev. x. 7. it is rendered by our translators *declared*. But in the Gospels it always preserves the primitive signification. When, therefore, we find it there coupled with the verb διδασκω, we are not to understand the terms as synonymous, but as intended to acquaint

acquaint us that the teaching mentioned was accompanied, or perhaps introduced, with an intimation of the approaching reign of the Messiah.

The most obvious things are sometimes the most apt to be overlooked by ingenious men. We should otherwise think it unaccountable that men, eminent for their attainments in sacred literature, should be so far misled by the ordinary meaning of a phrase in the translation, as entirely to forget the proper import of the original expression. I am led to this reflection by observing, in a late publication, the following remark * on Luke xx. 1 “ Διδασκοντας αυτους—και ευαγγελιζομενους. Why this specification of “ *preaching the gospel*? Did he not always *preach the gospel* “ when *he taught the people*? Hence I conclude, that και ευαγγελι- “ ζομενους should be thrown out as a marginal reading, founded per- “ haps on Mat. iv. 23. or ix. 35.” Doubtless, according to the import of the English phrase, he always preached the Gospel when he taught, inasmuch as his teaching consisted either in explaining the doctrine, or enforcing the precepts of the Christian religion, which is all that we mean by *preaching the gospel*. But his teaching was not always (as is manifest from his whole history) attended with the intimation above mentioned, which, in that history, is the only thing implied in ευαγγελιζομενους, though it was sometimes attended with it. A close version of the words removes every difficulty. *One day, as he was teaching the people in the temple, and publishing the good tidings.* In my judgment, this last circumstance was the more worthy of being specified here by the Evangelist, as it has probably been that which then incensed the chief priests, and prompted them to demand of him in so peremptory a manner to show his warrant for what he did. To say that the reign of the Messiah was about to commence, would be accounted by them very presumptuous, and might be construed into an insinuation, that he himself was the Messiah, a position which we find them soon after pronouncing blasphemy: and in any case they would consider the declaration (which was well known not to originate from them) as an attempt to undermine their authority with the people.

Hence I also will take the liberty to conclude, that the common way of rendering the Greek verb, by the aid of consecrated words, not only into English, but into Latin, and most modern languages, has produced an association in the minds of men strong enough to mislead critical, as well as ordinary readers: else men of letters, like Dr Owen and Mr Bowyer, had never fancied that there is here either a tautology, or so much as a redundancy of words. I further conclude, that if we were to proceed in the way proposed by the former of these critics, and to expunge whatever in Scripture we dislike, or imagine might be spared,

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* Bowyer's Conjectures.

it is impossible to say what would be left at last of the divine oracles. The remarker, if he would act consistently, ought also to throw out as a marginal reading κηρυσσων το ευαγγελιον, which is coupled with διδασκων in the two places of Matthew referred to. We may not be able to discover the meaning or the use of a particular expression; for who can discover every thing? but let us not be vain enough to think, that what we do not discover, no other person ever will*.

§ 15. The only other word in the New Testament that can be said to be nearly synonymous with either of the preceding, is καταγγελλω *annuncio*, I announce, publish, or promulgate. It is an intermediate term between κηρυσσω and ευαγγελιζομαι. In regard to the manner, it implies more of public notice than is necessarily implied in ευαγγελιζομαι, but less than is denoted by κηρυσσω. In regard to the subject, though commonly used in a good sense, it does not express quite so much as ευαγγελιζομαι, but it expresses more than κηρυσσω, which generally refers to some one remarkable fact or event, that may be told in a sentence or two. Accordingly both these words, καταγγελλω and ευαγγελιζομαι come nearer to a coincidence in signification with διδασκω than κηρυσσω does.

§ 16. The word ευαγγελιστης, rendered *evangelist*, occurs only thrice in the New Testament. First in the Acts, xxi. 8. where Philip, one of the seven deacons, is called an Evangelist; secondly, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, ch. iv. 11. where *evangelists* are mentioned after apostles and prophets, as one of the offices which our Lord, after his ascension, had appointed for the conversion of infidels, and the establishment of order in his church; and, lastly, in the injunction which Paul gives Timothy to do the work of an evangelist, 2 Tim. iv. 5. This word has also obtained another signification, which, though not canonical, is very ancient. As ευαγγελιον sometimes denotes any of the four narratives of our Lord's life and sufferings, which make a part of the canon, so evangelist means the composer. Hence Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, are called Evangelists.

§ 17. As to the word διδασκειν, it may suffice to observe, that it can hardly be wrong translated into Latin by the verb *docere*, or into English by the verb *to teach*; and that it was mentioned in the title, not on account of any difficulty occasioned by it, but solely for the sake of suggesting my purpose to show that, far from being coincident, it has not even so great an affinity in signification to the other words there mentioned, as is commonly supposed. But, as the supposed coincidence or affinity always arises from mistaking the exact import of the other words, and not from any error in regard to this, a particular explanation of this term is not necessary.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION THE SEVENTH.

INQUIRY INTO THE IMPORT OF CERTAIN TITLES OF HONOUR
OCCURRING IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I INTEND, in this Dissertation, to offer a few remarks on those titles of honour which most frequently occur in the New Testament, that we may judge more accurately of their import, by attending, not only to their peculiarities in signification, but also to the difference in the ancient Jewish manner of applying them, from that which obtains among the modern Europeans, in the use of words thought to be equivalent.

P A R T I.

Kugios.

NOTHING can be more evident, than that, originally, titles were every where the names, either of offices, or of relations, natural or conventional, inasmuch that it could not be said of any of them, as may be said, with justice, of several of our titles at present, those especially called titles of quality, that they mark neither office nor relation, property nor jurisdiction, but merely certain degrees of hereditary honour, and rights of precedency. Relation implies opposite relation in the object. Now, when those persons for whose behoof a particular office was exercised, and who were consequently in the opposite relation, were very numerous, as a whole nation, province, or kingdom, the language commonly had no correlate to the title expressing the office; that is, it had not a term appropriated to denote the people who stood in the opposite relation. But when there was only a small number, there was a special term for denoting the relative connection in which these also stood. Thus the terms, *king, judge, prophet, pontiff*, hardly admitted any correlative term, but the general one of *people*. But this does not hold invariably. With us the correlate to *king* is *subject*. In like manner, offices which are ex-

exercised, not statedly, to certain individuals, but variously and occasionally, sometimes to one, sometimes to another, do not often require titles correlative. Of this kind are the names of most handicrafts, and several other professions. Yet, with us, the *physician* has his *patients*, the *lawyer* his *clients*, and the *tradesman* his *customers*. In most other cases of relation, whether arising from nature or from convention, we find title tallying with title exactly. Thus, *father* has *son*, *husband* has *wife*, *uncle* has *nephew*, *teacher* has *disciple* or *scholar*, *master* has *servant*.

§ 2. I admit, however, that in the most simple times, and the most ancient usages with which we are acquainted, things did not remain so entirely on the original footing, as that none should be called *father*, but by his *son* or his *daughter*; none should be saluted *master* but by his *servant*, or styled *teacher* but by his *scholar*. There is a progression in every thing relating to language, as, indeed, in all human sciences and arts. Necessity, first, and ornament afterwards, lead to the extension of words beyond their primitive signification. All languages are scanty in the beginning, not having been fabricated beforehand, to suit the occasions which might arise. Now, when a person, in speaking, is sensible of the want of a proper sign for expressing his thought, he, much more naturally, recurs to a word which is the known name of something that has an affinity to what he means, than to a sound which, being entirely new to the hearers, cannot, by any law of association in our ideas, suggest his meaning to them. Whereas, by availing himself of the name of something related, by resemblance, or otherwise, to the sentiment he wants to convey, he touches some principle in the minds of those whom he addresses, which (if they be persons of any sagacity) will quickly lead them to the discovery of his meaning. Thus, for expressing the reverence which I feel for a respectable character, in one who is also my senior, I shall naturally be led to style him *father*, though I be not literally his *son*; to express my submission to a man of greater merit and dignity, I shall call him *master*, though I be not his *servant*; and, to express my respect for one of more extensive knowledge and erudition, I shall denominate him *teacher*, though I be not his *disciple*. Indeed, these consequences arise so directly from those essential principles of the imagination, uniformly to be found in human nature, that deviations, in some degree similar, from the earliest meanings of words, are to be found in all tongues, ancient and modern. This is the first step from pure simplicity.

§ 3. Yet, that the differences in laws, sentiments, and manners, which obtain in different nations, will occasion in this, as well as in other things, considerable variety, is not to be denied. In Asia, a common sign of respect to superiors was prostration. In Europe, that ceremony was held in abhorrence. What I have remarked

remarked above, suits entirely the progress of civilization in the Asiatic regions. The high-spirited republicans of Greece and Rome, appear, on the contrary, long to have considered the title *kyrios*, or *dominus*, given to a man, as proper only in the mouth of a slave. Octavius, the emperor, when master of the world, and absolute in Rome, seems not to have thought it prudent to accept it. But, in despotic countries long accustomed to kingly government, it was otherwise.

§ 4. That such honorary applications of words were quite common among the Jews, is evident to every body, who has read the Bible with attention. In such applications, however, it must be noted, that the titles are not considered as strictly due from those who give them. They are considered rather as voluntary expressions of respect, in him who gives the title, being a sort of tribute, either to politeness, or to the personal merit of him on whom it is bestowed. But to affix titles to places and offices, to be given by all who shall address those possessed of such places and offices, whether they that give them stand in the relation correspondent to the title or not, or whether they possess the respect or esteem implied or not, is comparatively a modern refinement in the civil intercourse of mankind, at least in the degree to which it is carried in Europe. This is the second remove from the earliest and simplest state of society.

§ 5. There remains a third, still more remarkable, to which I find nothing similar in ancient times. We have gotten a number of honorary titles, such as, *duke*, *marquis*, *carl*, *viscount*, *baron*, *baronet*, &c. which it would be very difficult, or rather impossible, to define; as they express, at present, neither office, nor relation, but which, nevertheless, descend from father to son, are regarded as part of a man's inheritance, and, without any consideration of merit, or station, or wealth, secure to him certain titular honours and ceremonial respect, and which are of a more unalienable nature than any other property (if they may be called property), real or personal, that he possesses. I am sensible, that those modern titles were all originally names of offices, as well as the ancient. Thus, *duke* was equivalent to commander; *marquis*, or margrave (for they differed in different countries), to guardian of the marches; *count*, landgrave, alderman, or *earl*, to sheriff; whence the shire is still denominated county; *viscount*, to deputy-sheriff. *Vicecomes*, accordingly, is the Latin word, in law-writs, for the officiating sheriff*. When the principal, in any kind of office, becomes too rich, and too lazy, for the service, the burden naturally devolves upon the substitute; and the power of the constituent, through disuse, comes at last to be antiquated. But, so much was the title once connected with the office, that when the king intended to create a new *earl*, he had no other expedient,

* Blackstone's Commentary, Introd. Sect. 4. and B. I. ch. 12. § 3, 4.

expedient, than to erect a certain territory into a *county*, *earldom*, or *sheriffdom* (for these words were then synonymous), and to bestow the jurisdiction of it on the person honoured with the title. The *baron*, though his name was anciently common to all the nobility, was judge or lord of a smaller and subordinate jurisdiction, called a *barony* *. In process of time, through the vicissitudes that necessarily happen in the manners of the people, and in their methods of government, the offices came gradually to be superseded, or at least to subsist no longer, on the same footing of hereditary possession. But, when these had given place to other political arrangements, the titles, as a badge of ancestry and of the right to certain privileges which accompanied the name, were, as we may naturally suppose, still suffered to remain. It hardly now answers the first end, as a badge of ancestry, in those countries where there are often new creations: but it answers the second, and besides, ennobles their posterity. In consequence of these differences, the titles are regarded as due to him who succeeds to them, alike from all men, and that without any consideration of either personal or official dignity, or even of territorial possessions. Thus, one who is entitled to be called my lord, is, in this manner, addressed not only by his inferiors, but by his equals, nay, even his superiors. The king himself, in addressing his nobles, says, my lords.

§ 6. It was totally different among the Hebrews, I might have said, among the ancients in general. The Greek word *κυριος* *kyrios*, answering to the Hebrew *אֲדוֹן* *adon*, to the Latin *dominus*, and to the words *lord* or *master* in English, was not originally given, unless by a servant to his master, by a subject to his sovereign, or in brief, by one bound to obey, to the person entitled to command. Soon however it became common to give it to a superior, though the person who gave it had no dependence upon him; and if sometimes it was, through complaisance, bestowed on an equal, still the man who gave the title was considered as modestly putting himself on the footing of an inferior and servant, in as much as the title was invariably understood to express, not only superior rank, but even authority, in the person on whom it was conferred. We have examples in Scripture which put it beyond a doubt, that for any man to address another by the title, my lord, and to acknowledge himself that person's servant, were but different ways of expressing the same thing, *κυριος* and *δουλος* being correlative terms. The courteous form of addressing with them, when they meant to be respectful, (for it was not used on all occasions), was not that of most modern Europeans, who, in using the second personal pronoun, employ the plural for the singular; nor that of the Germans, who change both person and number, making the third plural serve for the second singular, but

* See Spelman's Glossary on the different names.

but it was what more rarely could occasion ambiguity than either of these; the substitution of the third person for the first, the number being retained, whether singular or plural. This mode as occurring in Scripture, gives an additional illustration of the import of the term *xygios* with them. "Let *thy servant*, I pray thee," said Judah, Gen. xlv. 18. to his brother Joseph, when governor of Egypt, "speak a word in my lord's ears." "Nay, my lord," said the Shunamite to the prophet Elisha, "do not deceive *thine handmaid*," 2 Kings iv. 16. Some other instances are marked in the margin*.

Assisted by these remarks, we may perceive the force of that observation of the apostle Peter, 1 Pet. iii. 5, 6. in regard to the conjugal respect and obedience yielded by Sarah to her husband Abraham. *Being in subjection*, says he, speaking of the wives, *to their own husbands, even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord*; that is, acknowledging, by this her usual compellation, her inferiority, and obligation to obedience; for the intimacy of their relation hinders us from ascribing it to a ceremonious civility. Some have cavilled at this argument brought by the apostle. The rank and quality of Abraham, say they, who, by the accounts we have of him, was a powerful prince, entitled him to be addressed in this manner by every body. Others, in the opposite extreme, have inferred that every dutiful wife ought to give the same testimony of respect and submission to her husband, which this pious matron did to the patriarch. Both ways of reasoning are weak, and proceed from the same ignorance of the different import of words resulting from the difference of manners and customs. The title *lord* with us, as applied to men, is either hereditary in certain families, or annexed by royal authority, or immemorial usage, to certain offices and stations. Wherever it is considered as due, nobody, of what rank soever, withholds it; and wherever it is not due, one would not only expose one's self to ridicule by giving it, but, instead of paying a compliment to the person addressed, would put him out of countenance. It cannot therefore with us, serve as a token of subjection in the person who gives it. Such is the consequence of the different footing whereon things now stand, that the titles which, in those times of simplicity, were merely relative and ambulatory, are now absolute and stationary. Whereas the man who, in those ages, was well entitled to the compellation of *lord* in one company, had no title to it at all in another. It happens with us frequently, (to wit, as often as two or more who, by law or custom, have a right to that mark of respect, converse together), that the title of *lord* is reciprocally given and taken by the same persons. But of this I do not recollect a single instance in Scripture. Such a thing to the ancients must, doubtless, have appear-

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* Gen. xxxii. 4, 5. xxxiii. 5. 8. xlii. 10. 1 Kings xviii. 7. 9.

ed ridiculous, as an acknowledgment of superiority in the person on whom it was conferred, was always understood to be conveyed by it. For, though it was sometimes, as I observed, politely given to an equal, he was thereby treated as superior; and, as each could not be superior, to retort the title on him who gave it, must have been considered by them as an indelicate rejection of the civility offered. To their sentiments it seems to have been more conformable, that the honour should be repaid with some other marks of respect or affection by the person who received it. The fact, if I remember right, is certain; this manner of accounting for it, I acknowledge to be no more than conjecture; but it is a conjecture which some passages in ancient history, particularly the conversation of Abraham with Ephron and the sons of Heth, Gen. xxiii. 3. &c. and Jacob's interview with his elder brother Esau, ch. xxxiii. 1,—15. after an absence of more than fourteen years, render not improbable.

§ 7. The title of *master* (for the Hebrew *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, signify no more) was perhaps universally the first which, by a kind of catachresis, was bestowed on a superior, or a person considered as such, by one who was not his servant or dependent. But still, as it implied the acknowledgment of superiority, it varied with the company. There were few so low who were not entitled to this honourable compellation from some persons; there were none (the king alone excepted) so high as to be entitled to it from every person. Joab, who was captain general of the army, is properly styled by Uriah, 2 Sam. xi. 11. who was only an inferior officer, *my lord* Joab, but had the king himself, or any of the princes, given him that title, it could have been understood no otherwise than in derision. It would have been as if the sovereign should call any of his ministers his master. The title *father*, though held in general superior to *lord*, yet as the respect expressed by it, implied superiority, not in station, but in years, experience and knowledge, was sometimes given to the prophets of the true God, even by kings. Thus the prophet Elisha is in this manner addressed by the king of Israel, 2 Kings vi. 21. but no prophet is ever denominated lord or master by one vested with the supreme authority. By others the prophets were often so denominated. Thus Obadiah, who was steward of the king's household, calls the prophet Elijah, *my lord* Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 7. 13. The same title we find also given to Elisha, 2 Kings ii. 19. iv. 16. 28. Whereas to the king himself, the common address, from men of all ranks, was, *my lord*, *O king*, or, as the expression strictly implied, *O king*, *my master*; but by the king, the title *my lord*, or *my master*, was given to none but God. The reason is obvious. A monarch, who was not tributary, acknowledged, in point of station, no earthly superior. And though in any rank inferior to the highest, good breeding might require

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it to be conferred on an equal, the royal dignity appears generally to have been considered as of too delicate a nature to admit the use of such compliments without derogation. Cræsus king of Lydia, is represented by Herodotus*, as giving the title *δισποτης*, which is of the same import, to Cyrus, king of Persia; but it was after his kingdom was conquered by Cyrus, and when he himself was his captive, and consequently, according to the usages of those times, his slave. Before that event, he would have disdained to salute any man with this compellation. Ahab king of Israel, styled Benhadad king of Syria, *my lord*; but it was when, through fear, he consented to surrender himself, and all that he had, into his hands, 1 Kings xx. 4.

I am not, however, certain that the politeness of the Orientals, which, in the judgment of the Greeks, favoured of servility, did not sometimes carry them thus far; for, though no such title is found in the conversation between Solomon and the queen of Sheba, 1 Kings x. or between Jehoshaphat king of Judah, and Ahab king of Israel, 1 Kings xxii. 2 Chron. xviii. as related either in the First Book of Kings, or in the Second Book of Chronicles; or in the correspondence between Hiram king of Tyre and Solomon, as related in the First Book of Kings, ch. ix. 10. &c. yet, in the account we have of this correspondence in the Second Book of Chronicles, ch. ii. 14, 15. which is by the bye of much later date, Hiram is represented as giving this title to both David and Solomon. Whether this ought to be considered as merely a strain of eastern complaisance, or as an acknowledgment of subordination, a state to which many of the neighbouring princes had been reduced by those monarchs, I will not take upon me to say. But it may hold as a general truth, that when this title is found given to a man in any ancient author, particularly in Scripture, before we can judge from it of the quality of the person accosted, we must know something of the quality of the person that accosts. It is not so with us, or in any Christian European country at present. When we find one addressed with the title of *bigbness*, or *grace*, or *lord/bishop*, we discover his rank, without needing to know any thing of the addresser, save only that he is not ignorant of the current forms of civility.

When we find that Mary Magdalene addresses, with the title of lord (*κυριε* is her word, John xx. 15.) one whom she took to be no higher than a gardener, we are apt to accuse her in our hearts, either of flattery or of gross ignorance, to accost a man in so low a station with so high a title. But the ignorance is entirely our own, when we would vainly make our ideas, modes and usages, a standard for other ages and nations. Mary and a gardener might, in the world's account, have been on a level in
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* Lib. I.

point of rank. If so, as he was a stranger to her, modestly and the laws of courtesy led her to yield to him the superiority, by giving him this respectful title. Abraham's servant was addressed in the same way by Rebekah, before she knew him, Gen. xxiv. 18. Paul and Silas, who cannot be supposed superior in figure and appearance to ordinary mechanics, were, after having been publicly stripped, beaten, imprisoned, and put in the stocks, accosted with the title *κυριος lords*, Acts xvi. 30. though the common translation has it *sirs*. But it was given by a jailor, and, it may be added, after a miraculous interposition of heaven in their favour. To satisfy us, however, that this last circumstance was not necessary to entitle mean people to be addressed in this manner by those whose condition was equally mean or meaner, we may observe that the same title *κυριος* is given to Philip, John xii. 21. one of the apostles from Bethsaida of Galilee, who was probably not above the rank of a fisherman. The persons who gave it were Greeks, doubtless of the lowest sort, who had come to Jerusalem to worship. With us, the title *lord*, given to one who by law or custom has no right to it, is a sort of injury to the whole order to whom the constitution of their country has given an exclusive privilege to be so denominated. With them it could affect no third person whatever, as it implied merely that the person spoken to was, by the speaker, acknowledged his superior.

It may appear to some an objection against this account of the relative import of the words *adon* and *kyrios*, that in the English Bible, we find the title *lord*, in one place of the sacred history, used as we should use the word *nobleman* or *grandee*, for denoting a person of a certain determinate rank. Thus we are informed of a *lord*, on whose hand king Jehoram leaned, who is mentioned thrice under this description in the same chapter, 2 Kings vii. 2. 17. 19. I acknowledge, that if the Hebrew word there were *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, it would suffice to overturn what has been here advanced in regard to the difference between the ancient use of such titles and the modern. But it is not *adon* and *kyrios*. In neither language is it a title of honour, but a mere name of office. In Hebrew it is *שליש* *shalish*, in Greek *τριστατης*, *tristates*, a word which occurs often in other places, and is never translated *lord*, but always *captain*, as it ought to have been rendered here. The Vulgate interprets it not *dominus quidam*, but very properly *unus de ducibus*. Again, in the common version, we find mention of the *king and his lords*, Ezra viii. 25. precisely in the manner wherein an English historian would speak of his sovereign and the peers of the realm. But neither here is the Hebrew word *adon*, nor the Greek *kyrios*. It is *שריו* *sharaiio*, in the former, and *ἡ αρχαις αὐτου* in the latter. In the Vulgate, it is rendered *principes ejus*, and ought to have been

been in English, *his chief men*, or *his principal officers*. Whereas *אֲדוֹנָיו* *adoniaio* in Hebrew, *οἱ κυριοι αυτου* in Greek, and *domini ejus* in Latin, would have meant *his masters*, or those whom he served, a sense quite foreign from the purpose. But though our word *lords*, used as in the above quotations, is not unsuitable to the English style, it would have been better in such instances to conform to the Hebrew idiom, for a reason which will appear from the next paragraph. Herod is said, by our translators, to have made a supper to his *lords*, Mark vi. 21. The word is *μυσηταιων grandees*. I shall only add, that the term *lords* is also used in the English translation, where the corresponding words, both in Hebrew and in Greek, are names of offices equivalent to rulers, magistrates, governors of provinces. And therefore nothing can be concluded from the application of this title in the version.

§ 8. Now, with the aid of the above observations, on the relative value of honorary titles among the ancients, we may discover the full force of our Saviour's argument, in regard to the dignity of the Messiah. The modern use, in this particular, is so different from the ancient, that, without knowing this circumstance, and reflecting upon it, a proper apprehension of the reasoning is unattainable. I shall give the whole passage as rendered in this version, Matt. xxii. 41. &c. *While so many Pharisees were present, Jesus asked them, saying, What think ye of the Messiah? Whose son should he be? They answered, David's. He replied, How then doth David, speaking by inspiration, call him his Lord? The Lord, saith he, said to my Lord. Sit at my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footstool. If the Messiah were David's son, would David call him his Lord? To this none of them could answer. They were confounded. Yet from our very different usages, whereby such titles, if due at all, are due alike from superiors as from inferiors and equals; we cannot easily, at first, feel the strength of this argument. I have observed already, that an independent monarch, such as David, acknowledged no lord or master but God. Far less would he bestow this title on a son or descendent. It was customary, because respectful, and in the natural order of subordination, for a son so to address his father. Accordingly, in the parable of the man who had two sons, the elder son is thus represented as answering his father, *Εγω κυριε*, Matt. xxi. 30. It is the same word which is commonly rendered *lord*, but in this place *sir*. The same title was also given by Rachel to her father Laban, when he came into her tent, in quest of his images, Gen. xxxi. 35. and even by Jacob, after his return from Padan Aram, to his elder brother Esau, Gen. xxxii. 4, 5. In no instance however will it be found given by a father to his son. This, according to their notions of paternal dignity and authority, which were incomparably higher*

than ours, would have been preposterous. The Pharisees, and other hearers, were so sensible of this, that, however much they shewed themselves, on most occasions, disposed to cavil, our Saviour's observation struck them dumb. *None of them could answer.*

§ 9. Though the general belief of the Jews at that time was, that the Messiah would be a much greater man than David, a mighty conqueror, and even a universal monarch, the sovereign of the kings of the earth, who was to subdue all nations, and render them tributary to the chosen people; yet they still supposed him to be a mere man, possessed of no higher nature than that which he derived from his earthly progenitors. Though their rabbies at that time agreed that the words quoted were spoken of the Messiah, and spoken by David, the difficulty suggested by our Lord seems never to have occurred to them; and now, that it was mentioned, they appeared by their silence, to admit that, on the received hypothesis, it was incapable of a solution. It was plainly our Saviour's intention to insinuate, that there was in this character, as delineated by the prophets, and suggested by the royal Psalmist, something superior to human which they were not aware of. And, though he does not, in express words, give the solution, he leaves no person who reflects, at a loss to infer it. I have been the more particular in this illustration, in order to shew of how much importance it is, for attaining a critical acquaintance with the import of words in the sacred languages, to become acquainted with the customs, sentiments, and manners of the people.

§ 10. The name *κύριος*, in the New Testament, is most frequently translated in the common version *lord*, sometimes *sir*, sometimes *master*, and once *owner*. It corresponds pretty nearly, except when it is employed in translating the name *Jehovah*, to the Latin *dominus*, and to the Italian *signore*. But there is not any one word, either in French or in English, that will so generally answer. It may occasionally be applied to a man in any station except the very lowest, because to men of every other station there are inferiors. It is always proper as applied to God, to whom every creature is inferior. In the former of these applications, namely to man, it frequently corresponds, but not invariably, to the French *monsieur*, and to the English *sir*, or *master*. In the application to God, it answers always to the French *seigneur* and to the English *lord*. There is a necessity, in these two languages, of changing the term, in compliance with the idiom of the tongue. *Domine* in Latin, and *signor* in Italian, in like manner as *kyrie* in Greek, and *adoni* in Hebrew, are equally suitable, in addressing God or man. But every body must be sensible, that this cannot be affirmed of the compellation of *monsieur* in French, or *sir* in English.

§ 11. There

§ 11. There is something so peculiar in the English use of these familiar titles, that it may be proper to take particular notice of it, before I proceed to the application of them in translating. In regard to the term *sir*, the most common of all, let it be observed, first, that, in its ordinary acceptation, it is never used, except in the vocative answering to *kyrie* and *domine*; secondly, that it is never joined to the name of a person, neither to the Christian name, nor to the surname. When the proper name is used, *master*, not *sir*, must be prefixed. I say this of the word *sir*, in its ordinary acceptation; for when it serves as the distinguishing title of knighthood, it is used in all the cases, and is always prefixed to the Christian name. But for this application there is no occasion in translating. The third thing I shall observe, on the ordinary acceptation of the word, is, that it never admits the article, either definite or indefinite. This, indeed, is a consequence of its use being confined to the vocative. Lastly, it has not a proper plural. The word *sirs*, originally the plural, and equally respectful with the singular, is now rarely used. When it is used, it is with some difference in meaning. The compellation *sir*, almost always shews respect; but *sirs* shews a degree of familiarity hardly consistent with respect. It is most commonly employed in speaking to a crowd, or to inferiors. We usually supply the plural of *sir*, in our addresses to others, by the word *gentlemen*. But this bears so strong a signature of the distinctions which obtain in modern Europe, that it could not be used with propriety in the translation of an ancient author.

Now, as to the title of *lord*, I have several peculiarities to observe. In the first place, when in the vocative, without either the possessive pronoun *my* prefixed, or any name or title annexed, the application is, invariably, according to the best use at present, to God or Christ. When it is addressed to men (now it is only to noblemen, and to persons in certain eminent stations that use permits us to give it), it is always either preceded by the pronoun *my*, or followed by the title, or both. Thus, to say, *Lord*, or, *O Lord help me!* is nowhere proper, but in an address to God: whereas, *Help me, my Lord*, is proper only when spoken to a man. The distinction now taken notice of, is, if I mistake not, sacredly observed in the common version of the Old Testament. There are two cases, indeed, in which *my Lord*, in the vocative is applied to God; but the intention, in both, is sufficiently marked. In one case, whereof there occur a few examples, it is preceded by the interjection *O!* which adds solemnity to the invocation: *O! my Lord*, Exod. iv. 10. 13. The other is, when it is coupled with *my God*, as in this, Psal. xxxv. 23. *Awake to my judgment, my God, and my Lord*. Another thing to be remarked is, that when the term *lord* has the definite article prefixed, with no name, title, or description subjoined, it is to

be understood as spoken of God, or of Christ. When the word is applied to men, whether the article be, or be not used, the name or title should be annexed. If the frequent recurrence of the title render it proper to omit it, we must say *my lord*, not *the lord*, acted thus; or we may say, *his lordship*, this last form being never used of a celestial power.

§ 12. So much for the words *sir* and *lord*, as used by us at present. In regard to the term *master*, there can be no question that it comes nearer the primitive signification of *κυριος*, than either of the former. *Κυριος* and *δουλος* are correlates in Greek, just as *master* and *servant* are in English. Indeed, *lord* and *servant* are thus used in the common version of the Gospels, but not so properly. *Vassal*, not *servant*, is, in English, correlative to *lord**. At least, it was so anciently; for both were feudal terms, the latter denoting the proprietor of the land, the former the tenant, or him who held it under the proprietor. But, with the gradual abolition of feudal customs, the name *vassal* has gone almost into disuse; whereas the import of the term *lord* has been greatly altered, in some respects extended, and in some respects limited. But such variations are incident to every language. A remnant of this usage, however, we have still in Scotland, in the meaning assigned to the word *laird*, which is no other than the old Scots pronunciation of *lord*. In that dialect, it invariably denotes *landlord*, or, as Johnson well explains it, *lord of the manor*. But to return: the reason why our translators have chosen sometimes to contrast *servant* and *lord*, rather than *servant* and *master*, is because they had preoccupied the word *master*, employing it to answer to *διδασκαλος*.¹ This made it necessary to recur to some other term, to answer to *κυριος*, for which none fitter could be found than *lord*. I have thought it preferable to render *διδασκαλος*, more literally, *teacher*, and say, Mat. x. 24. *The disciple is not above his teacher, nor the servant above his master*. That the motive of our translators was precisely what I have mentioned, is evident from this, that in the numerous passages in the Epistles, where the observance of the relative duties of masters and servants is inculcated, the word *κυριος*, as well as *διοικητης*, is always rendered *master*, and not *lord*. But there is an ambiguity, which arises from rendering *διδασκαλος* *master*, when the context does not point out what kind of master is meant. In the words of James, ch. iii. 1. *Μη πολλοι διδασκαλοι γινωσθε*, as expressed in the common translation, *Be not many masters*, hardly any of the unlearned suppose him to be speaking of *teachers*.

§ 13. Now, let us consider the ordinary method which our translators have followed, in the history of Jesus Christ. One who reads the Bible with reflection (which not one of a thousand docs),

* Blackstone's Com. B. II. ch. 4.

does), is astonished to find, that on the very first appearance of Jesus Christ, as a teacher, though attended with no exterior marks of splendour and majesty; though not acknowledged by the great and learned of the age; though meanly habited, in a garb not superior to that of an ordinary artificer, in which capacity we have ground to believe he assisted his supposed father in his earlier days, Mark vi. 3.; he is addressed by almost every body in the peculiar manner in which the Almighty is addressed in prayer. Thus the leper, Mat. viii. 2. *Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.* Thus the centurion, ver. 6. *Lord, my servant lieth at home.* The Canaanitish woman crieth after him, ch. xv. 22. *Have mercy on me, O Lord.* He is likewise mentioned sometimes under the simple appellation of *The Lord*, John xx. 2. without any addition, a form of expression which, in the Old Testament, our translators, as above observed, had invariably appropriated to God. What is the meaning of this? Is it that, from his first showing himself in public, all men believed him to be the Messiah; and not only so, but to be possessed of a divine nature, and entitled to be accosted as God? Far from it. The utmost that can with truth be affirmed of the multitude, is, that they believed him to be a prophet. And even those who, in process of time, came to think him the Messiah, never formed a conception of any character, as belonging to that title, superior to that of an earthly sovereign, or of any nature superior to the human. Nay, that the Apostles themselves, before his resurrection, had no higher notion, it were easy to prove. What then is the reason of this strange peculiarity? Does the original give any handle for it? None in the least. For, though the title that is given to him, is the same that is given to God, it is so far from being peculiarly so, as is the case with the English term so circumstanced, that it is the common compellation of civility given not only to every stranger, but to almost every man of a decent appearance, by those whose station does not place them in an evident superiority.

It is the title with which Mary Magdalene accosted one whom she supposed to be a gardener, John xx. 15. It is the title given by some Greek proselytes to the Apostle Philip, John xii. 21. probably a fisherman of Galilee. It is the title with which Paul the tentmaker, and Silas his companion, were saluted by the jailor at Thyatira, Acts xvi. 30. Lastly, it is the title with which Pontius Pilate, the Roman procurator, a pagan and idolater, is addressed by the chief priests and Pharisees, Matth. xxvii. 63. And though the Jewish rulers would not refuse what was merely respectful to the Roman procurator, who as such was their superior, we may be sure they would not have given him a title that could be understood to imply any thing sacred or divine. Our translators have been so sensible of this, that even in the application

plication to the chief magistrate within the country, they have thought fit to render it only *sir*. Further, it is the title which those gave to Jesus, who, at the time they gave it, knew nothing about him. In this manner, the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well addressed him, John iv. 11. when she knew no more of him than that he was a Jew, which would not recommend him to her regard. Thus also he was addressed by the impotent man who lay near the pool of Bethesda, John v. 7. who, as we learn from the sequel of the story, did not then know the person who conversed with him, and who soon proved his benefactor. In these places indeed, and some others which might be mentioned, our translators have rendered the word *κύριε*, not *lord*, but *sir*. Why they have not uniformly done so, when the term is given by contemporaries to Jesus residing on the earth, it would be impossible to assign a good reason. The only reason I can imagine, is the uniform practice that obtains very properly amongst his followers since his ascension, now when all power in heaven and on earth is committed to him, Matth. xxviii. 18. now when he is made head over all things unto his church, Eph. i. 22. and hath received a name that is above every name, Phil. ii. 9. &c. that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow of things in heaven, and things on the earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is LORD, to the glory of God the Father: in one word, now when men are more especially obliged to honour the Son even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

Is there any fitness in thus exhibiting the honours of deity, as appropriated to him in the very time of his humiliation, when for our sakes, he was pleased to veil his glory, Phil. ii. 6. when he made himself of no reputation, divested himself, as the expression strictly implies, and took upon him the form of a servant? Or is there any consistency in representing men as using this style, whose sentiments, on examination, will not support it? The highest to which the faith of any of the people, not his disciples, at that time rose, was to think that he was John the Baptist risen from the dead, Jeremiah, or one of the prophets, Matth. xvi. 13. &c. But where do we find any of the Prophets addressed with that peculiarity of idiom, which commonly distinguishes the Deity? There is, therefore, in this manner of translating, a very great impropriety, first, as it produces an inconsistency between the style of the persons introduced, and what from the history itself we discover of their sentiments; secondly, as it thereby, to a mere English reader, throws a degree of incredibility on the whole narrative.

§ 14. If they had uniformly translated the word *κύριε* *lord*, to whomsoever applied, they would have done better; because every reader of common sense must have perceived that the word

was employed, not according to the English idiom, but according to the usage of a tongue very different. Still, however, by comparing the various places where it occurs, it would have been practicable to reduce the term to its proper value. Not that I approve this servile manner of translating, any more than that in the opposite extreme called liberal. To translate the words, but not the idiom, is doing but half, and much the easier half, of the work of a translator, and never fails to render obscure and enigmatical in the translation, what is perspicuous and simple in the original. But our interpreters have, in this particular, followed neither the Hebrew idiom nor the English, but adopted a peculiarity in regard to Jesus Christ, which represents most of his contemporaries, as entertaining the same opinions concerning him, which are now entertained among Christians. Now, nothing can be more manifest than that, in those days, the ideas of his Apostles themselves were far inferior to what we entertain.

To do justice, therefore, to our idiom, to preserve at once consistency, perspicuity, and propriety, it is necessary that the word *κυριος*, in an address to heaven, be rendered *Lord*, or *O Lord*; when the Supreme Being is not addressed, but spoken of, *the Lord*; in addressing a king, or eminent magistrate, *my lord*; and in other ordinary cases, *sir*. Sometimes from a servant to his master, or from one in immediate subordination, to a person on whom he depends, it may be more emphatical to say *master*. Let it, however, be observed, that in translating the Scripture, *κυριος* prefixed to a proper name, cannot be rendered either *sir* or *master*, immediately followed by the name, on account of the particular idea which that mode of expression conveys to us. Let it be also observed, that what I have said of *kyrios*, as applied to Jesus Christ, regards purely its application in the Gospels. It is plain, that after Christ's ascension into heaven, and exaltation to the right hand of the Father, he is viewed in a very different light. Addresses to him are conveyed only by prayer, and ought to be clothed in its language. When we speak of him, it ought to be, not as of *a lord*, one possessed of great power and eminence, but as of *The Lord* of the creation, the heir of all things, to whom all authority in heaven and upon earth, and all judgment, are committed by the Father. That expression of Thomas, therefore, *ὁ Κυριος μου καὶ ὁ Θεος μου*, John xx. 28. cannot be otherwise rendered than it has been rendered by our translators, *My Lord and my God*. It is manifest, from the exclamation, that Thomas viewed his Master now since his resurrection, though not yet ascended, in a light in which he had never viewed him before. For these reasons, I think that in general no alteration would be proper in the way of rendering the word *κυριος* as applied to Jesus, either in the Acts or in the Epistles. The case is different in the Gospels.

§ 15. It is proper to take notice, before I conclude this article, that the word *κύριος* is in the Septuagint also employed in translating the Hebrew word *יהוה* *Jehovah*, the incommunicable name of God. Though this is a proper name, and not an appellative, the Seventy, probably from the superstitious opinion which had arisen among the Jews (for it was evidently not from the beginning), that it was dangerous to pronounce that word, and consequently to adopt it into another language, have thought fit to render it always *κύριος*, an appellative which, as we have seen, is of very extensive application. Nay, in reading the Hebrew Scriptures, in the synagogue service, their doctors to this day always read *adon*, or *adoni*, *Lord*, or *my Lord*, where they find *Jehovah*. The writers of the New Testament, who wrote in Greek, have so far conformed to the usage of their countrymen, that they have never introduced this name in their writings. In quoting from the Old Testament, they have adopted the method of the Seventy, whose words they frequently use. The generality of Christian translators have in this imitated their practice. Our own, in particular, have only in four places of the Old Testament used the name *Jehovah*. In all other places, which are almost innumerable, they render it *the Lord*. But, for distinction's sake, when this word corresponds to *Jehovah*, it is printed in capitals.

I once thought, that in translating the New Testament, the word *Jehovah* might properly be replaced, wherever, in a quotation from the Old, that name was used in the Hebrew. On more mature reflection I now think differently. It seemed good to infinite wisdom, in the old dispensation, when a peculiar nation was chosen, and contradistinguished to all others, so far to condescend to the weakness of his creatures, as to distinguish himself as their God, by an appropriated name, which might discriminate him with them from the gods of the nations; the general names *God* and *Lord* being applied to them all. But, in the Gospel dispensation, wherein all such distinctions were to be abolished, it was proper that there should remain nothing which might appear to represent God as a national or local deity. A proper name is not necessary where there are no more than one of a kind. We are not sensible of the want of a proper name for the sun, the moon, or the earth. It is not suitable in the interpreter of the New Testament, to show a greater nicety of distinction than the sacred penmen have warrant'd. It belongs rather to the annotator, than to the translator, to mark such differences. In translating the Old Testament, the distinction, in my judgment, ought to be sacredly preserved, for the very same reason that no distinction ought to be made in the New. The translator ought faithfully to represent his original, as far as the language

guage which he writes is capable of doing it. So much for the import of the word *κρησιος*, and the different senses that it bears, according to the application.

P A R T II.

Διδασκαλος, Rabbi.

I PURPOSE NOW to make a few observations on the word *διδασκαλος*, and some other titles of respect current in Judea in the days of our Saviour. After the Babylonish captivity, when Jerusalem and the temple were rebuilt, and the people restored to their ancient possessions, care was taken, under the conduct of Ezra, and those who succeeded him in the administration of affairs, to prevent their relapsing into idolatry, which had brought such accumulated calamities on their country. It was justly considered as one of the best expedients for answering this end, as we learn partly from Scripture, and partly from Jewish writers, to promote amongst all ranks the knowledge of God and of his law, and to excite the whole people throughout the land to join regularly in the public worship of the only true God. For their accommodation, synagogues came, in process of time, to be erected in every city and village where a sufficient number of people could be found to make a congregation. Every synagogue had its stated governors and president, that the public service might be decently conducted, and that the people might be instructed in the sacred writings, both the law and the prophets. The synagogues were fitted for answering among them the like purposes with parish-churches amongst us Christians. But this was not all. That the synagogues might be provided with knowing pastors and wise rulers, it was necessary that there should also be public seminaries or schools, wherein those who were destined to teach others, were to be taught themselves. And so great was their veneration for these schools or colleges, that they accounted them more sacred than even synagogues, and next, in this respect, to the temple. They maintained that a synagogue might lawfully be converted into a school, but not a school into a synagogue. The former was ascending, the latter descending. Both were devoted to the service of God; but the synagogue, say they, is for the spiritual nourishment of the sheep, the school for that of the shepherds.

§ 2. Now their schools were properly what we should call divinity colleges; for in them they were instructed in the sacred language, the ancient Hebrew, not then the language of the

country, in the law and the traditions, the writings of the Prophets, the holy ceremonies, the statutes, customs, and procedure of their judicatories; in a word, in whatever concerned the civil constitution and religion of their country. I make this distinction, of civil and religious, more in conformity to modern and Christian notions, than in reference to ancient and Jewish. In that polity, these were so interwoven, or rather blended, as to be inseparable. Their law was their religion, and their religion was their law; insomuch that with them there was a perfect coincidence in the professions of lawyer and divine. But as to their mode of education, that they had some kind of schools long before the time above mentioned, even from the beginning of their establishment, under Joshua, in the land of Canaan, or, at least, from the time of Samuel, can hardly be made a question. A certain progress in letters had been made very early by this people, and regularly transmitted from one generation to another. But this seems evidently to have been without such fixed seminaries as were erected and endowed afterwards; else it is impossible there should be so little notice of them in so long a tract of time, of which, as far as religion is concerned, we have a history pretty particular. All that appears before the captivity, on this subject, is, that numbers of young men were wont, for the sake of instruction, to attend the most eminent Prophets, and were therefore called the sons, that is, the disciples, of the Prophets, and that, in this manner, were constituted a sort of ambulatory schools, for communicating the knowledge of letters, and of the law. In these were probably taught the elements of the Hebrew music and versification. We are informed also, 2 Chron. xvii. 7, 8, 9. that Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, sent Priests, Levites, and others, to teach in all the cities of Judah. But this appears to have been merely a temporary measure, adopted by that pious monarch for the instruction of the people in his own time, and not an establishment, which secured a succession and continuance. Now, this is quite different from the erection that obtained afterwards in their cities, of a sort of permanent academies, for the education of the youth destined for the upper stations in society.

§ 3. Further, to give the greater lustre to those seminaries, they were commonly men of note, in respect of their station and quality, as well as distinguished for their learning, who were appointed to preside and teach in them. These were mostly Priests and Levites; but not entirely: for eminent persons, from other tribes, were also admitted to share in this honour. No sooner did erudition become an object of national attention in Judea; no sooner were endowments made for advancing and promoting it, than the emulation of literary men was excited to attain the honours peculiar to the profession, by having the direction, or a principal part in the teaching, in some noted school. Even a certificate,

certificate, from the persons qualified, of being equal to the charge, was not a little prized. Though, at first sight, it may appear but a small circumstance, it will be admitted, by the judicious to be a considerable evidence that, in our Saviour's time, learning was in general and high esteem among the Jews, to find that those titles which related to the business of teaching, were, with so much solicitude courted, and with so much ostentation displayed, by persons of distinction. Of this kind, the honorary titles, *father, rabbi, doctor, or teacher, guide, or conductor, the name scribe*, often indeed a name of office, *lawyer, doctor of law*, may justly be accounted. I do not, however, mean to affirm, that all these titles are of different import. Some of them, as will soon appear, are justly held synonymous.

§ 4. Some of these had come into use but a little before our Saviour's time. This was the case, in particular, of that most celebrated title *rabbi*, or as for some time it seems to have been distinguished into *rab*, and *rabban*, with some difference of signification. In the Old Testament, we find the term **רב** *rab*, in composition with some other word, employed as a name of office and dignity, but not till the people became acquainted with the Chaldeans, concerning whom only it is used. The word, both in Hebrew and in Chaldee, signifies sometimes *great*, sometimes *many*, and, when used substantively, denotes one who is at the head of any business, of whatever kind it be. Thus **רב החבל** *rab hachbel*, Jonah i. 6. is, in the Septuagint, **πρωτος**, **מבחים** *rab tebachim*, Jer. xxxix. 11. **αρχιμαγειρος**, *chief cook*. The word will bear this version, but it does not suit the context in the passage where it is found, and **רב סריסים** *rab serisim*, Dan. i. 3. **αρχιμαγειρος**, the first rendered in the English version, *ship-master*, the second, *captain of the guard*, and the third, *master of the eunuchs*. It is used in the plural also for *chief men*, in general, superintendants, or those at the head of affairs. Thus, **רבי המלך** *rabbe hammelech*, Jer. xxxix. 13. are the chief men employed by the king over the different departments of the state. It is rendered *the princes of the king* in the common translation. The original term suits entirely the import of the Latin word *princeps*, but not of the English word *prince*, at least in its most common acceptation: for it is not the king's sons, or any order of nobles, who are so denominated. The word among the Chaldeans, appears evidently to have been equivalent to the term **שר** *shar* among the Hebrews. Accordingly, he who is styled by Daniel, in the passage above quoted, **רב סריסים**, is four times, in the same chapter, called **שר הסריסים** *shar baserisim*, Dan. i. 7, 8, 9. 18. And this use of the name *rab* seems to have continued long in Syria, as well as in Chaldea. Thus, in the Syriac New Testament, it is found, in the same manner, united with the common appellation of any sort of officer, in order to denote

denote the principal person in that office. Thus, *rab-cobana*, Mat. xxvi. 51. is the high-priest, *rab-machfa* is chief of the publicans, Luke xix. 2. and *rab-ragbotba* 1 Pet. v. 4. is chief shepherd. *Rab*, construed in this manner, is equivalent to the Greek *αρχι*, as used in composition. The preceding titles are accordingly thus expressed in Greek, *αρχιερευς*, *αρχιτελωνης*, and *αρχιποιμηη*.

Again, the word *rab* is sometimes found in that version, combined, not with the title of any sort of officer, but with a term denoting the office or charge itself; in which case it always means the person who is principally entrusted with the business. Thus, *rab-betb*, Matth. xx. 8 is the steward, *επιτροπος*, he who is over the household; and *rab canosbetba*, Mark v. 35. is the ruler of the synagogue, *αρχισυναγωγος*. It is not unlikely, though I do not find any example of it in Scripture, that the term has at first been similarly compounded with some word signifying a school, or, perhaps, with the name of the art or science taught, in order to denote the overseer of such a seminary, or the teacher of such an art. This hypothesis is at least favoured by analogy. As use, however, is variable, it appears, from what has actually happened, extremely probable, that when all other applications of the term have been dropped, it has still remained as an honourable compellation of the learned. And when the term *rab* came to be peculiarly applied to such, the word wherewith it was, at first, for distinction's sake, compounded, would be superseded as unnecessary.

It is, at least, certain, that the Jewish doctors, who resided at Babylon, about the time of our Saviour, were called simply *rab*. But, in the Old Testament, there is no trace of such a title as *rab*, *rabbi*, or *rabban*, given to a man of letters; nor is any of the old prophets, or Scribes, or indeed any other person, distinguished by this mark of respect prefixed to his name. Though the introduction of titles is always occasioned by the erection of useful and important offices, it is commonly in the decline of merit that pompous titles are most affected. At first, no doubt, vain glory has led many to assume them, to whom they did not belong, in right of office, and an interested adulation has induced others to give them. Some of them, however, came soon, among the Jews, to be converted into a kind of academical distinctions, which, to give them more weight, are said to have been conferred solemnly in their schools or colleges, accompanied with certain religious ceremonies. From this practice, I may observe by the way, sprang literary degrees in Christian universities, to which there is nothing similar in all Pagan antiquity, either Greek or Roman, but to which the Jewish custom above mentioned bears an evident and close analogy.

§ 5. Those who belonged to the school were divided into three classes or orders. The lowest was that of the disciples, or learners

ers; the second, that of the fellows, or companions, those who, having made considerable progress in learning, were occasionally employed by the masters, in teaching the younger students. The highest was that of the preceptors or teachers, to whom they appropriated the respectful title of *doctor*, or *rabbi*, which differs from *rab* only by the addition of the affix pronoun of the first person. All belonging to the school were accounted honourable in a certain degree. Even the lowest, the name *disciple*, was considered as redounding to the honour of those youths, who were selected from the multitude, had the advantage of a learned education, and by their diligence and progress, gave hopes that they would one day fill with credit the most important stations. The title *companion*, *fellow*, or *associate*, was considered as very honourable to the young graduate who obtained it, being a public testimony of the proficiency he had made in his studies. And the title *rabbi* was their highest academical honour. That it was only the youth, in what are called the genteeler stations, who had the advantage of a learned education, is manifest from the contempt which our Lord's parentage drew on him, as a teacher, from his fellow-citizens. *Whence*, say they, Matt. xiii. 54, 55. *hath this man this wisdom? Is not this the carpenter's son?* They conclude that he must be illiterate, from the mean condition of his parents. It was not the children of such then, we may reasonably infer, who were trained in those seminaries.

In the Gospels, *διδασκαλος* is given as the Greek translation of the Syriac *rabbi*, John i. 38. Yet this word does not, as the Greek, literally signify *teacher*; but, having been conferred, at first, as a mark of respect on actual teachers, and afterwards on other learned men, *διδασκαλος* was justly accounted as apposite a version as the Greek language afforded. It is certain, the term *rabbi* began soon to be used with great latitude. But though it came gradually to be bestowed on those who were not actual teachers, it always retained, ever since it had been appropriated to the learned, a relation to learning; and, being understood as an addition due only to literary merit, it still denoted that though the person who enjoyed it, might not be actually employed in teaching, he was well qualified for the office. *Rabban* is not the name of a degree superior to *rabbi*, though it seems intended for heightening the signification. It may be understood to denote eminent or learned *rabbi*, and appears to have been but very seldom used. The title *rabboni*, which we find twice given to our Lord, is *rabban*, with the addition of the affix of the first person, and accommodated to the pronunciation of Judea. One of those who addressed him with this compellation, was blind Bartimeus, when he applied for the recovery of his sight, Mark x. 51. The
other

other was Mary Magdalene, when she first saw Jesus after his resurrection, John xx. 16.

That the use of the term *rabban* has not extended far beyond Palestine, may be presumed from the following circumstance. Though the word *rabbi* is very common in the Syriac translation, the Greek *διδασκαλις* being generally so rendered; yet in the only place where that translator introduces the word *rabboni*, which is that quoted from John, he prefixes *in Hebrew*, that is, in the dialect of Palestine, which was then so called, adding the explanation given by the evangelist, *that is, teacher*; which plainly shews that the word *rabboni* was not Syriac. This is the more remarkable, as in the other passage, where the historian interprets in the same manner the word *rabbi*, adding, John i. 38. *ὁ λεγεται ἐρμηνευμενον διδασκαλις*, that interpreter omits this explanatory clause as intended only for the Grecian reader, and of no use to those who understood Syriac. In the passage in Mark, where *rabboni* occurs, as the evangelist had added no explanation, his interpreter has not thought it necessary to change their own word *rabbi*. This is an evidence that he also considered the difference in signification between the two words as inconsiderable. Another strong presumption of the same point is, that the apostle John explains both by the same Greek word.

It may be observed here by the way, that they likewise used to raise the import of a title by doubling it. Thus our Lord, speaking of the Pharisees, says, They love to be called of men *rabbi, rabbi*, Matt. xxiii. 7. In this manner he was himself addressed by Judas at the time when that disciple chose to assume the appearance of more than ordinary regard, Mark xiv. 45. The title *κυριε* seems to have been used in the same manner. Not every one who saith unto me, *Lord, Lord, κυριε, κυριε*, Matt. vii. 21. This is very agreeable to the genius of the Oriental tongues, which often, by the repetition of an adjective, expresses the superlative degree.

§ 6. I took notice once before that, in the common version of the Gospels, *διδασκαλος* is generally rendered *master*. I cannot say that the word is mistranslated when so rendered, since it is the most common title with us, wherewith scholars address their teacher. But it is rather too indefinite, as this term does not distinguish the relation meant from almost any other relation, wherein superior and inferior are brought together. The word *master* serves equally for rendering *κυριος, δεσποτης, επιστατης, κωδηγης*, as for *διδασκαλος*. And therefore in many cases, especially where the context requires a contra-distinction to any of those terms, the word *master* is not proper. It is indeed evident to me, that in the ordinary Hellenistic use, it corresponds nearly to the English word *doctor*. Both are honorary titles, expressive of the qualifications of the person to whom they are given. Both are
literary

literary titles that relate to no other sort of merit but learning; and both are solemnly conferred with certain ceremonies, which we call *graduation*, by those who are accounted the proper judges. Our translators have, in one place, very properly rendered it *doctor*. Joseph and Mary, we are told, Luke ii. 46. found Jesus in the temple sitting *in the midst of the doctors*, εν μισω των διδασκαλων. To have said, in the midst of the masters, would have been a very vague expression of the sense. Nor have we reason to believe that it would have been proper here to translate the word *teachers*, as it did not imply that they were such by profession. In composition, our interpreters have commonly rendered it *doctors*, Luke v. 17. *There were Pharisees and νομοδιδασκαλοι, doctors of the law sitting by*. Again, Acts v. 34. *There stood up one of the council, a Pharisee, named Gamaliel, νομοδιδασκαλος, a doctor of law*. Besides, we are accustomed to hear the words *Jewish rabbies* and *Jewish doctors* used synonymously. In Justin Martyr's dialogue with Trypho, the Jew, the rabbies are always called διδασκαλοι.

§ 7. But it may be objected that this does not account for the application of the title to our Lord. As he did not derive his doctrine from any of those learned seminaries frequented by such of the youth as were reckoned the flower of the nation, the name *doctor* could not, with propriety, be applied to him. In answer to this, let it be observed, first, that as in Judea at that time they spoke not Greek, but a dialect of Chaldee, not differing considerably from what is called Syriac, it is evident that the actual compellation, whereby our Saviour was addressed, was *rabbi*. For this we have the express testimony of the apostle John, in a passage lately quoted, who, though writing in a different tongue, thought proper to mention the title usually given him in the language of the country, adding, merely for the sake of those readers who knew nothing of the Oriental languages, that it is equivalent to the Greek διδασκαλος. Now, as the Chaldaic word does not literally signify *teacher*, which the Greek word does, their equivalence must arise solely from the ordinary application of them as titles of respect to men of learning; and in this view the English word *doctor* is adapted equally to the translation of both.

Secondly, though the title *rabbi* could regularly be conferred only by those who had the superintendency of their schools, we have ground to believe that with them, as with us, the people would be ready to give the compellation through courtesy, and on the presumption that it had been conferred, wherever they saw or supposed distinguished abilities in learning; and this is most probably the reason why we find it given also to John the Baptist, John iii. 26.

Thirdly, in the Jewish state, a divine commission was concei-
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ved to confer all sorts of dignities and honours, in an eminent manner, and so superseded ordinary rules and human destinations. On this account they considered a prophet, though not of the sacerdotal family, as an extraordinary priest, and entitled to offer sacrifice, in consideration of the evidences he gave of his mission. Thus the prophets Samuel, 1 Sam. vii. 9. and Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 31. &c. neither of whom was a priest, offered sacrifice with acceptance and upon altars too not warranted by the law. It is evident that some of those who gave the title of *rabbi* to our Saviour, were willing, either sincerely or pretendedly, thus to account for their doing so. *Rabbi*, said Nicodemus, a Pharisee, and a member of the Sanhedrim, John iii. 1. &c. *we know that thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him.* Here he, as it were, assigns the reason why he saluted him *rabbi*, although he knew that he had not been educated in human literature, and had not received from men any literary honours. The same title was given him also by others of that sect insidiously, when, though they pretended friendship, their aim was to entangle him in his talk, that they might have a pretext for delivering him up to the Roman governor. In other cases, they shew sufficiently how little they were disposed to admit his right to any degree of respect arising from knowledge. They said, John vii. 15. *How knoweth this man letters, having never learned?* A charge, the truth of which our Lord very readily admitted by replying, *My doctrine is not mine, but his who sent me.*

§ 8. Now, from the foregoing observations, it appears that the name *διδασκαλος*, as being nearly equivalent in import to the appellation *rabbi*, for which it has been substituted by the Evangelist, may be fitly expressed, either by the English term *doctor*, or by the Syriac *rabbi*, which is now so much naturalized amongst us, that its meaning, as a Jewish title of literary honour, can hardly be mistaken. In the addresses made to our Lord in his lifetime, the Syriac term is surely preferable; the English word, though very apposite in respect of its origin, and ordinary acceptance, has considerably sunk in its value, in consequence of the slight manner wherein we are accustomed to hear it applied. But we all know that *rabbi* among the Jews of that age was a title in the highest degree respectful, and on that account interdicted by their Master, even to the apostles themselves. It is also the word by which *διδασκαλος* is commonly rendered in the Syriac version of the New Testament, justly held the most respectable of all the translations extant, as being both the oldest, and written in a language not materially different from that spoken by our Lord and his apostles. The difference appears not to be greater (if so great) than that which we observe between the Attic and the Ionic dialects in Greek. But when *διδασκαλος*, is construed

frued with other words, which either limit or appropriate it, we commonly judge it better to render it *teacher*, according to the simple and primitive signification of the word. In such cases it is probable, that the writer alludes merely to what is usually implied in the Greek term. So much for the import of *rabbi* or *διδασκαλος* in the New Testament.

§ 9. Now, when we compare the titles *kyrios* and *didascalos* together, in respect of the Jewish use and application of them, we find several remarkable differences between them. From our modes of thinking, we should be apt to conclude, that the former of these appellations would be much the more honourable of the two. Yet this is far from holding generally, though in particular cases, it no doubt does. In regard to the term *kyrios*, I observed formerly, that, as it originally signified *master*, as opposed to *servant*, it retained in that nation, in our Saviour's time, so much of its primitive meaning, as to be always understood to imply an acknowledged inferiority in the person who gave it, to him to whom it was given. Civility might lead a man to give it to his equal. But to give it to one who either in the order of nature, or by human conventions, was considered as inferior and subordinate, would have looked more like an insult than like a compliment. Hence it must be regarded as a term purely relative, which derived its value solely from the dignity of the person who seriously bestowed it. To be entitled to this compellation from a monarch neither tributary nor dependent, denoted him who received it to be superior to human. But no useful citizen was so low as not to be entitled to this mark of respect from a common beggar. And, as its value in every instance depended solely on the dignity of the giver, it might be either the most honourable title that could be conferred, or the most insignificant. The use of the title *rabbi*, *didascalos*, or doctor, was, in this respect, totally different. As it was understood to express not relation, but certain permanent qualifications in the person who received it, they did not consider it as a matter of courtesy, but as a matter of right. It was not relative but absolute. The same person did not (as was the case of *kyrios*) consider himself as obliged to give it to one, and entitled to receive it from another. Whoever had this literary degree conferred on him, was entitled to receive the honourable compellation equally from all persons, superiors, inferiors, and equals. And we need not doubt that this vain-glorious race would brand with the ignominious character of rusticity all who withheld it.

§ 10. Hence we may discover the reason why our Lord, when warning his disciples (Matt. xxiii. 7. &c.) against imitating the ostentation and presumption of the Scribes and Pharisees in affecting to be denominated *rabbi*, father, guide, or conductor, does not once mention *kyrios*, though, of all titles of respect the most

common. It is manifest that his view was not to prohibit them from giving or receiving the common marks of civility, but to check them from arrogating what might seem to imply a superiority in wisdom and understanding over others, and a title to dictate to their fellows, a species of arrogance which appeared but too plainly in the Scribes and learned men of those days. As to the title *kyrios*, he knew well that from their worldly situation and circumstances, which in this matter were the only rule, they could expect it from none but those in the lowest ranks, who would as readily give it to an artisan or a peasant, and that therefore there could be no danger of vanity from this quarter. But the case was different with titles expressive not of fleeting relations, but of those important qualifications which denote a fitness for being the lights and conductors of the human race. The title *father*, in the spiritual or metaphoric sense, the most respectful of all, he prohibits his disciples from either assuming or giving, chusing that it should be appropriated to God, and at the same time claims the title of guide and spiritual instructor to himself.

§ II. Nor let it be imagined that the title *διδασκαλοι*, bestowed on the first ministers of the religion of Christ, stands in opposition to the admonitions here given. The word, it must be owned, is equivocal, but is every where easily distinguished by the connection; for when it is applied to such as are literally employed in teaching, it must not be understood as a complimentary title answering to the Chaldaic word *rabbi*, but as a name of office corresponding to the Hebrew word מלמד *melammed*, *teacher*, *preceptor*. Besides, when applied even to the apostles, it is to be understood in a subordinate sense. They are in like manner called *shepherds*, but still in subordination to him who is the *chief Shepherd*, as well as the *chief Teacher* in his church. Christ is called the only foundation; *for other foundation, says Paul, 1 Cor. iii. 11. can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ.* Yet the same apostle does not hesitate to represent the church, Eph. ii. 20. as *built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets.* Nor does he consider his styling himself the father of those in whose conversion he had been instrumental, as either incompatible with, or derogatory from, the honour of him who alone is our Father, and who is in heaven. When his meaning is so evident, no mistake can arise from the word. *It is the Spirit that quickeneth*, said our Lord, John vi. 63. *the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.* Now the spirit of the precept is transgressed, when his ministers claim an undue superiority over their Lord's heritage, arrogating to themselves a dominion over the faith of his disciples; and when, in consequence of an undue attachment to worldly honours, or to the power that is understood to accom-

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pany these, men become solicitous of being distinguished from their equals, either by external marks of homage, or by an implicit deference and submission in point of judgment. With this character Diotrephes, (3 John 9.) seems to have been charged, whom the apostle John denominates *φιλοπρωτων*, one who loves pre-eminence, a character which, not many ages after, became too general in the church.

§ 12. It was not, therefore, so much the titles, as that sort of authority which was understood, among the Jews, to be conveyed under them, that was our Saviour's object in those admonitions. Indeed, a fondness for title, a solicitude about precedency, or an affectation of being distinguished by such outward marks of reverence, are evidently condemned by him as a kind of earthly ambition unbecoming the meekness and humility of his disciples, and that unremitted deference to the divine authority, which they ought ever to maintain. The practice of the apostles, and indeed the whole tenor of the New Testament, supply us with this commentary on the words. Whereas the customary marks of mere civil respect, so far from being condemned in Scripture, are always used by the inspired penmen themselves, when there is a proper occasion of giving them.

§ 13. So much for the import of the principal titles of honour which occur in the New Testament, and the difference, in respect of application, between them and those commonly supposed to correspond to them, amongst us.

DISSERTATION THE EIGHTH.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANNER OF RENDERING SOME WORDS,
TO WHICH THERE ARE NOT ANY THAT PERFECTLY CORRESPOND
IN MODERN LANGUAGES.

IT was observed in a former Dissertation *, that there are words in the language of every people, which are not capable of being translated into that of any other people who have not a perfect conformity with them in those customs or sentiments which have given rise to those words. The terms comprehended under this remark may be distributed into three classes. The first is of weights, measures, and coins; the second of rites, sects, and festivals; the third of drefs, judicatories, and offices.

PART I.

Weights, Measures, and Coins.

AS to the first class, it is evident that there is nothing wherein nations, especially such as are distant from one another in time and place, more frequently differ than in the measures and coins, which law or custom has established among them. Under coins I shall here include weights; because it was chiefly by weight that money was anciently distinguished. As commonly every people has names only for their own, it is often necessary, in the translation of ancient and foreign books, to adopt their peculiar names, and by mentioning in the margin the equivalent in our own money, measures, and weights, to supply the reader with the proper information. This method has accordingly been often, though not always, taken by the translators of holy writ. Into the common version of the Old Testament, several oriental, and other foreign names have been admitted, which are explained in the margin. Hence we have *shekel, ephab, bath, homer, cor,* and
some

* Diss. II. P. I. § 5.

some others. This, however, (for what reason I know not), has not been attempted in the New Testament. Instead of it, one or other of these two methods has been taken; either some name of our own, supposed to be equivalent, or at least not strictly confined, by use, to a precise meaning, is adopted, such as *pound, penny, farthing, bushel, firkin*; or (which is the only other method ever used by our translators) some general expression is employed; as, *a piece of money, a piece of silver, tribute money, a measure*, and the like. These are three ways, every one of which has some advantages, and some disadvantages, and is, in some cases, the most eligible method, but not in others.

One Monsieur le Cene, a French writer, who, in the end of the last century, wrote what he called, A Project for a new Translation of the Bible into French, has recommended a fourth method, which is, to give in the version the exact value expressed in the money, or measures of the country into whose language the version is made. The anonymous author of an Essay, in English, for a new translation, has adopted this idea; or rather, without naming Le Cene, has turned into English, and transferred to our use, all those remarks of the Frenchman, which he accounted applicable to the English version. This fourth method, though much approved by some, on account of its supposed perspicuity, is, in my judgment, the worst of them all, nor do I know a single instance wherein I could say that it ought to be adopted*.

§ 2. But, before I enter on the discussion of these methods, it is proper here to premise, that as to measures, the enquiry may well be confined to those called measures of capacity. The smaller length measures have originally, in every country, been borrowed from some of the proportions which take place in the human body. Hence *inch, handbreadth, span, foot, cubit*. The larger measures, *pace, furlong, mile*, are but multiples of the less. Now, as there is not an exact uniformity of measure in the parts of individuals, it would naturally follow, that different nations would establish, for themselves, standard-measures, not much different from those of others, nor yet entirely the same. And this is what, in such measures, has actually happened. When any of them, therefore, is mentioned, we know the measure nearly, but

* Till I read it lately in Dr Geddes' Prospectus, I did not know that Le Cene had published a version of the Scriptures. The attentive reader will perceive that the criticisms which follow in relation to him, do not refer to that translation, which I never saw, but solely to his plan. If his version be conformable to his own rules, it is certainly a curiosity of its kind. But that cannot be; otherwise the learned Doctor, though not profuse in its praise, would not, on some points, have spoken so favourably as he has done. Could he have said, for instance, that he is very seldom biased by party prejudices? If Le Cene was faultless on this article, much may be said to exculpate Beza. Their parties were different, but their error was the same. See Diss. X. P. v. § 13.

but cannot know it accurately, till we are informed of what nation it is the inch, span, foot, cubit, &c. The names have, by use, acquired a latitude and currency in these different applications. As to superficial measure, we know it is reckoned no otherwise than by the square of the long measure. Whereas, the cubical form, not answering so well in practice to the mensuration of solids, the standards for them have generally been fixed without any regard to measures of length or surface. It is with these alone therefore that we are here concerned.

§ 3. Now, the best way of determining our choice properly, among the different methods of translating above mentioned, is by attending to the scope of the passages wherein the mention of money and measures is introduced. First, then, it sometimes happens that accuracy, in regard to the value of these, is of importance to the sense. Secondly, it sometimes happens, that the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, is of no consequence to the import of the passage. Thirdly, it happens also, sometimes, that though the real value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, does not affect the sense of the passage, the comparative value of the different articles mentioned, is of some moment for the better understanding of what is said. Let us consider what methods suit best the several cases now mentioned.

§ 4. First, I observed, that accuracy, in regard to the value of the measures or coins mentioned, is sometimes of importance to the sense. When this is the case, and when we have no word exactly corresponding in import to the original term, that term ought to be retained in the version, and explained in the margin, according to the first method taken notice of. An instance, where the knowledge both of the capacity of the measure and of the value of the coin, are essential to the sense, we have, in that public cry, *Χοιζὸν οὐτὸς ἀναγείναι*, Rev. vi. 6. which our translators render, *a measure of wheat for a penny*. It is evidently the intention of the writer to inform us of the rate of this necessary article, as a characteristic of the time whereof he is speaking. But our version not only gives no information on this head, but has not even the appearance of giving any, which the word *chanix* would have had, even to those who did not understand it. But to say *a measure*, without saying what measure, is to say just nothing at all. The word *penny*, here, is also exceptionable, being used indefinitely, insomuch that the amount of the declaration is, *a certain quantity of wheat for a certain quantity of money*. This suggests no idea of either dearth or plenty; and can be characteristic of no time, as it holds equally of every time. In this case, the original term, notwithstanding its harshness, ought to be retained in the text, and explained in the margin. Again, it was, doubtless, the intention of the sacred penman, to acquaint us at how low a price our Saviour was sold by his treacherous disciple,

ciple, when he informs us, Mat. xxvi. 15. that the chief priests agreed to give Judas *τριακοῦτα ἀργύρια*. In like manner, when the Evangelist mentioned, John xii. 5. the indignant observation of Judas, that the ointment, wherewith our Lord's feet were anointed, might have been sold for more than *τριακοσίων δηνυρίων*, it was, doubtless, his view to acquaint us with the value of the gift. Once more, when Philip remarked to our Lord, who had proposed to feed the multitude in the desert, John vi. 7. *διακοσίων δηνυρίων ἄρτοι*, *two hundred pennyworth of bread*, as it runs in the common version, *is not sufficient for them, that every one of them may take a little*, it was the design of the historian to supply us with a kind of criterion for computing the number of the people present. But this could be no criterion, unless we knew the value of the *δηνυρίων*.

§ 5. 'But,' say those modern correctors, 'in the examples above mentioned, when the knowledge of the value of the coin, and the capacity of the measure, is of importance to the sense, no method can be equal, in point of perspicuity, to that recommended by us, whereby both are reduced to an equivalent in the monies and measures of the country. Thus, the first passage quoted would be rendered, *A measure of wheat capable of supporting a man for one day*,' for thus Le Cene proposes to translate *χουίξ*, 'for seven pence halfpenny. The second, *The chief priests covenanted with Judas for three pounds fifteen shillings sterling*. The third, *Why was not this ointment sold for nine pounds seven shillings and six pence?* And the fourth, *Six pounds five shillings would not purchase bread sufficient.*'

The exceptions against this method are many. In the first place, it is a mere comment, and no translation. Considered as a comment, it may be good; but that must be egregiously wrong as a version, which represents an author as speaking of what he knew nothing about, nay, of what had no existence in his time. And such, surely, is the case with our sterling money, which an interpretation of this sort would represent as the current coin of Judea in the time of our Saviour. Nothing ought to be introduced by the translator, from which the English reader may fairly deduce a false conclusion, in regard to the manners and customs of the time. Besides, as the comparative value of their money and measures with ours is not founded on the clearest evidence, is it proper to give a questionable point the sanction, as it were, of inspiration? Add to all this, that no method can be devised, which would more effectually than this destroy the native simplicity and energy of the expression. What is expressed in round numbers, in the original, is, with an absurd minuteness, reduced to fractions in the version. Nothing can be more natural than the expression, *Two hundred denarii would not purchase bread enough to afford every one of them a little*. This is spoken

ken like one who makes a shrewd guess from what he sees. Whereas, nothing can be more unnatural than, in such a case, to descend to fractional parts, and say, *Six pounds five shillings would not purchase*. This is what nobody would have said, that had not previously made the computation. Just so, the round sum of three hundred denarii might very naturally be conjectured by one present, to be about the value of the ointment. But, for one to go so nearly to work as to say, *Nine pounds seven shillings and six pence might have been gotten for this liquor*, would directly suggest to the hearers, that he had weighed it, and computed its value at so much a pound. There is this additional absurdity in the last example, that it is said, *πρῶτον, more than*: consequently, it is mentioned, not as the exact account, but as a plausible conjecture, rather under than above the price. But does any body, in conjectures of this kind, acknowledged to be conjectures, descend to fractional parts?

§ 6. Now, if this method would succeed so ill in the first of the three cases mentioned, it will be found to answer still worse in the other two, where little depends on the knowledge of the value. In the second, I may say, nothing depends on it. Now, there are several passages, wherein coins and measures are mentioned, in which the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, is of no conceivable consequence to the import of the passage. In this case, either the second or the third method, above specified, is preferable to the introduction of a foreign term, not used in other places of the version, and noway necessary to the sense. But let it be observed of the second method, that I am never for using such names of coins and measures as are peculiarly modern or European, and not applied to the money and measures of ancient and Oriental countries: for such terms always suggest the notion of a coincidence with us, in things wherein there was actually no coincidence.

We read in the common version, Matth. v. 15. *Neither do men light a candle and put it under a bushel, ὑπο τοῦ μωδίου, but on a candlestick*. Every person must be sensible, that the size of the measure is of no consequence here to the sense: the intention being solely to signify, that a light is brought, not to be covered up, but to be placed where it may be of use in lighting the household. The general term *corn-measure*, perfectly answers the author's purpose in this place; and as nowhere, but in the expression of this very sentiment, does the word *μωδιος* occur in the Gospels, there is no reason for adopting it. The term *bushel* serves well enough for conveying the import of the sentiment; but as it indirectly suggests an untruth, namely, the ancient use of that measure in Judea, it is evidently improper. For an example in money, our Lord says, when the Pharisees interrogated him about the lawfulness of paying the tribute imposed by their conquerors,

conquerors, Luke xx. 24. *Επιδειξατε μοι δυναριον*, rendered in the common version, *show me a penny*, the sequel evinces that it was of no importance what the value of the money was; the argument is affected solely by the figure and inscription on it. And, if in no other place of the Gospels the value of that coin had affected the sense more than it does here, it might have been rendered by the general phrase *piece of money*. Now let us see how *Le Cene's* method does with those two examples. In the first he would say, *Neither do men light a candle to put it under a measure which contains about a pint less than a peck*. Or, according to the manner which he sometimes adopts, *containing such a precise number of eggs* (I do not recollect how many); would not this particularity in fixing the capacity of the measure, but too manifestly convey the insinuation that there would be nothing strange or improper in men's putting a lighted candle under any other measure larger or smaller than that whereof the capacity is, as a matter of principal moment, so nicely ascertained? A strange way this of rendering Scripture perspicuous!

Nor does it answer better in coins than in measures. When our Lord said, *Επιδειξατε μοι δυναριον*, the very words imply that it was a single piece he wanted to see; and what follows supplies us with the reason. But how does this suit *Le Cene's* mode of reduction? *Show me seven pence halfpenny*. Have we any such piece? The very demand must, to an English reader, appear capricious, and the money asked could not be presented otherwise than in different pieces, if not in different kinds. It is added, *Whose image and superscription hath it?* Is this a question which any man would put, *Whose image and superscription hath seven pence halfpenny?* 'But there may have been formerly seven pence halfpenny pieces, though we have none now.' Be it so. Still, as it is unsuitable to have the head and inscription of a Roman emperor on what must, from the denomination, be understood to be British coin, they ought, for the sake of consistency, and for making the transformation of the money complete, to render the reply to the aforesaid question, *George's* instead of *Cesar's*. If this be not translating into English, it is perhaps superior; it is what some moderns call, *Englishing*, *making English*, or *doing into English*; for all these expressions are used. Poems done in this manner are sometimes more humbly termed *imitations*.

§ 7. I observed a third case that occurs in the Gospels with respect to money and measure, which is when the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure mentioned, does not, but the comparative value of the articles specified, does, affect the sense. Of this kind some of our Lord's parables furnish us with excellent examples. Such is the parable of the pounds, Luke xix. 13, &c. I shall here give as much of it as is necessary for

my present purpose, first in the vulgar translation, then in *Le Gene's* manner. 13. *He called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds, and said unto them, Occupy till I come.* 16. *The first came, saying, Lord, thy pound hath gained ten pounds, and he said unto him, Well, thou good servant: because thou hast been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities. And the second came, saying, Lord, thy pound hath gained five pounds. And he said likewise to him, Be thou also over five cities.* Nothing can be more manifest than that it is of no consequence to the meaning and design of this brief narration, what the value of the pound was, great or little. Let it suffice that it here represents the whole of what we receive from our Creator to be laid out in his service. In the accounts returned by the servants, we see the different improvements which different men make of the gifts of heaven; and in the recompences bestowed, we have their proportional rewards. But these depend entirely on the numbers mentioned, and are the same, whatever be the value of the money. I shall now, in reducing them to our standard, follow the rates assigned on the margin of the English Bible. Ducats, so often mentioned by *Le Gene*, are no better known to the generality of our people than talents or minæ are. Whether the rate of conversion I have adopted be just or not, is of no consequence. I shall therefore take it for granted that it is just. The different opinions of the comparative value of their money and ours, nowise affect the argument. The objections are against the reduction from the one species to the other, not against the rule of reducing.

The foregoing verses so rendered will run thus: *He called his ten servants, and delivered them thirty-one pounds five shillings sterling, and said, Occupy till I come. The first came, saying, Lord, thy three pounds two shillings and sixpence, have gained thirty-one pounds five shillings; and he said to him, Well, thou good servant, because thou hast been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities. And the second came, saying, Lord, thy three pounds two shillings and sixpence, have gained fifteen pounds twelve shillings and sixpence. And he said likewise to him, Be thou also over five cities.* In regard to the parable of the talents, Matt. xxv. 14. it is needless, after the specimen now given, to be particular. I shall therefore give only part of one verse thus expressed in the common version. *To one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one; which, in Le Gene's manner, would be, To one he gave nine hundred thirty-seven pounds ten shillings sterling. To another three hundred seventy-five pounds. And to another one hundred eighty-seven pounds ten shillings.* In both examples, what is of real importance, the comparative degrees of improvement and proportional rewards, which in the original, and in the common version, are discover-

ed at a glance, are, if not lost, so much obscured by the complicated terms employed in the version, that it requires an arithmetical operation to discover them. In the example of the king who called his servants to account, Matt. xviii. 23. this manner is, if possible, still more awkward, by reason of the largeness of the sums. One of them is represented as owing to the king one million eight hundred seventy-five thousand pounds, and his fellow-servant as indebted to him three pounds two shillings and sixpence. There is some importance in the comparative value of the denarius and the talent, as it appears evidently one purpose of our Lord in this parable, to show how insignificant the greatest claims we can make on our fellow-creatures are, compared with those which divine justice can make on us. And though this be strongly marked when the two sums are reduced to one denomination, this advantage does not counterbalance the badness of the expression so grossly unnatural, unscriptural, and, in every sense, improper. In conveying religious and moral instruction, to embarrass a reader or hearer with fractions and complex numbers, is in a spirit and manner completely the reverse of our Lord's.

§ 8. I will not further try the patience of my readers with what has been proposed in the same taste, with respect to the measures, both liquid and dry, mentioned in Scripture, in the exhibition of their respective capacities by the number of eggs they could contain. I am afraid I have descended into too many particulars already, and shall therefore only add in general that, in this way, the beautiful and perspicuous simplicity of holy writ, is exchanged for a frivolous minuteness, which descends to the lowest denomination of parts, more in the style of a penurious money-broker, than in that of a judicious moralist, not to say, a divine teacher. Perspicuity is therefore injured, not promoted by it, and to those important lessons, an appearance, or rather a disguise, is given, which seems calculated to ruin their effect. That author has never reflected on what I think sufficiently obvious, that when a piece of money is named, the name is understood to denote something more than the weight of the silver or the gold. In the earliest ages, when it was only by weight that the money of the same metal was distinguished, if the weight was the same, or nearly so, the names used in different languages served equally well. It was therefore both natural and proper in the Seventy to render the Hebrew ככב *cheber*, in Greek *ταλαντον*, and שקל *shekel*, *διδραχμα*. For the Alexandrian *διδραχμα*, which was double the Attic referred to in the New Testament, was half an ounce. But though such terms might, with propriety, be used promiscuously, when the different denominations of money expressed solely their different weights, as was the case in the earlier ages of the Jewish commonwealth, it is not so now. The name signifies a coin of a particular form and size, stamp
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and inscription. The Hebrew *shekel*, the Greek *stater*, and the British *half crown*, being each about half an ounce of silver, are nearly equivalent. But the names are not synonymous. If one had promised to show you a *stater*, or a *shekel*, would you think he had discharged his promise by producing *half-a crown*?

§ 9. Words therefore which are by use exclusively appropriated to the coins and measures of modern nations, can never be used with propriety in the translation of an ancient author. I have mentioned three ways which a translator may take, and pointed out the different circumstances by which the preference among those methods may, in any instance, be determined. When the sense of the passage does, in any degree, depend on the value of the coin, or the capacity of the measure, the original term ought to be retained, and if needful, explained in a note. This is the way constantly used in the translation of books where mention is made of foreign coins or measures. What is more common than to find mention made in such works of Dutch *guilders*, French *livres*, or Portuguese *moidores*? I acknowledge, at the same time, the inconveniency of loading a version of Scripture with strange and uncouth names. But still this is preferable to expressions which, how smooth soever they be, do, in any respect, misrepresent the author, and mislead the reader. Our ears are accustomed to the foreign names which are found in the common version of the Old Testament, such as *shekel*, *bath*, *ephah*: though where the same coins and measures are evidently spoken of in the New, our translators have not liked to introduce them, and have sometimes, less properly, employed modern names which do not correspond in meaning.

§ 10. We have, besides, in the New Testament, the names of some Greek and Roman coins and measures not mentioned in the Old. Now, where the words are the same, or in common use coincident with those used by the Seventy in translating the Hebrew names above mentioned, I have thought it better to retain the Hebrew words, to which our ears are familiarized by the translation of the Old, than to adopt new terms for expressing the same things. We ought not surely to make an apparent difference by means of the language, where we have reason to believe that the things meant were the same. When the word, therefore, in the New Testament, is the name of either measure or coin peculiar to Greeks or Romans, it ought to be retained; but when it is merely the term by which a Hebrew word occurring in the Old Testament, has sometimes been rendered by the Seventy; the Hebrew name, to which the common version of the Old Testament has accustomed us, ought to be preferred. For this reason I have, in such cases, employed them in the version of the Gospels. *Αργυριον* I have rendered *shekel*, when used for money. This was the standard coin of the Jews; and when the

the Hebrew word for *silver* occurs in a plural signification, as must be the case when joined with a numeral adjective, it is evidently this that is meant. It is commonly in the Septuagint rendered *αργυρια*, and in one place in the common translation, *silverlings*, Isa. vii. 23. In Hebrew כֶּסֶף *cheseb* and שֶׁקֶל *shek l*, are often used indiscriminately, and both are sometimes rendered by the same Greek word. Though talent is not a word of Hebrew extraction, the Greek *ταλαντον* is so constantly employed by the Seventy in rendering the Hebrew כֶּסֶף *checher*, and is so perfectly familiar to us, as the name of an ancient coin of the highest value, that there can be no doubt of the propriety of retaining it. As to the word *pound*, in Greek *μνα*, and in Hebrew מָנֶה *maneh*, as the sense of the only passage wherein it occurs in the Gospel, could hardly, in any degree, be said to depend on the value of the coin mentioned, I have also thought proper to retain the name which had been employed by the English translators. Though *pound* is the name of a particular denomination of our own money, we all know that it admits also an indefinite application to that of other nations. This is so well understood, that where there is any risk of mistaking, we distinguish our own by the addition of *sterling*. The Greek word and the English are also analogous in this respect, that they are names both of money and of weight. Both also admit some latitude, in the application to the monies and weights of different countries, whose standards do not entirely coincide.

In regard to some other words, though *penny* is often used indefinitely, the common meaning differs so much from that of *δηνάριον* in Scripture, and the plural *pence* is so rarely used with that latitude, that I thought it better to retain the Latin word. I have reserved the word *penny* as a more proper translation of *ασσαριον*, between which and a *penny sterling*, the difference in value is inconsiderable. This naturally determined me to render *κοδραντης*, *farthing*; for *κοδραντης*, (that is, *quadrans*) is originally a Latin word as well as *δηνάριον*. They correspond in etymology as well as in value. By this I have avoided a double impropriety into which our translators have fallen. First, by rendering *δηνάριον*, a *penny*, and *ασσαριον*, a *farthing*, they make us consider the latter as a fourth part of the former, whereas it was but one-tenth. Again, by rendering *ασσαριον* and *κοδραντης* by the same word, they represent those names as synonymous which belong to coins of very different value. In translating *λεπτον*, I have retained the word *mite*, which is become proverbial for the lowest denomination of money.

§ 11. As to measures, wherever the knowledge of the capacity was of no use for throwing light on the passage, I have judged it always sufficient to employ some general term, as *measure*, *barrel*, &c. Of this kind is the parable of the unjust steward.

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The degree of his villany is sufficiently discovered by the numbers. But where it is the express view of the writer to communicate some notion of the size and capacity, as in the account given of the water pots at the marriage in Cana, or wherever such knowledge is of importance to the sense, those general words ought not to be used. Such are the reasons for the manner which I have adopted in this work, in regard to money and measures. There is no rule that can be followed, which is not attended with some inconveniencies. Whether the plan here laid down be attended with the fewest, the judicious and candid reader will judge.

P A R T II.

Rites, Festivals, and Sects.

THE second class of words to which it is not always possible to find in another language, equivalent terms, is the names of rites, festivals, and sects, religious, political, or philosophical. Of all words the names of sects come the nearest to the condition of proper names, and are almost always considered as not admitting a translation into the language of those who are unacquainted with the sect. This holds equally of modern, as of ancient sects. There are no words in other languages answering to the English terms *whig* and *tory*, or to the names of the Italian and German parties called *guelpb* and *ghibein*. It is exactly the same with philosophical sects, as *magian*, *stoic*, *peripatetic*, *epicurean*; and with the religious sects among the Jews, *pharisee*, *sadducee*, *essene*, *karaites*. Yet even this rule is not without exception. When the sect has been denominated from some common epithet or appellative thought to be particularly applicable to the party, the translation of the epithet or appellative, serves in other languages as a name to the sect. Thus those who are called by the Greeks *τεσσαρησκαδικατιται*, from their celebrating Easter on the fourteenth day of the month, were, by the Romans, called *quartadecimani*, which is a translation of the word into Latin. In like manner our *quakers* are called in French *trembleurs*. Yet in this their authors are not uniform, they sometimes adopt the English word. In regard to the sects mentioned in the New Testament, I do not know that there has been any difference among translators. The ancient names seem to be adopted by all.

§ 2. As to rites and festivals, which, being nearly related, may be considered together, the case is somewhat different. The original

ginal word, when expressive of the principal action in the rite, or in the celebration of the festival, is sometimes translated and sometimes retained. In these it is proper to follow the usage of the language, even although the distinctions made may originally have been capricious. In several modern languages we have, in what regards Jewish and Christian rites, generally followed the usage of the Old Latin version, though the authors of that version have not been entirely uniform in their method. Some words they have transferred from the original into their language, others they have translated. But it would not always be easy to find their reason for making this difference. Thus the word *περιτομη* they have translated *circumcisio*, which exactly corresponds in etymology; but the word *βαπτισμα* they have retained, changing only the letters from Greek to Roman. Yet the latter was just as susceptible of a literal version into Latin as the former. *Immersio*, *tinctio*, answers as exactly in the one case, as *circumcisio* in the other. And if it be said of those words, that they do not rest on classical authority, the same is true also of this. Etymology, and the usage of ecclesiastic authors, are all that can be pleaded.

Now, the use with respect to the names adopted in the Vulgate, has commonly been imitated, or rather implicitly followed, through the western parts of Europe. We have deserted the Greek names where the Latins have deserted them, and have adopted them where the Latins have adopted them. Hence we say *circumcision*, and not *peritomy*; and we do not say *immersion*, but *baptism*. Yet when the language furnishes us with materials for a version so exact and analogical, such a version conveys the sense more perspicuously than a foreign name. For this reason, I should think the word *immersion* (which, though of Latin origin, is an English noun, regularly formed from the verb *to immerse*), a better English name than *baptism*, were we now at liberty to make a choice. But we are not. The latter term has been introduced, and has obtained the universal suffrage; and though to us not so expressive of the action; yet, as it conveys nothing false, or unsuitable to the primitive idea, it has acquired a right by prescription, and is consequently entitled to the preference.

§ 3. I said that in the names of rites or sacred ceremonies, we have commonly followed the Vulgate. In some instances, however, we have not. The great Jewish ceremony, in commemoration of their deliverance from Egypt, is called in the New Testament *πασχα*, the sacred penmen having adopted the term that had been used by the Seventy, which is not a Greek word, but the Hebrew, or rather the Chaldaic, name in Greek letters. The Vulgate has retained *pascha*, transferring it into the Latin character. The words in Greek and Latin have no meaning but

as the name of this rite. In English the word has not been transferred, but translated *passover*, answering in our language to the import of the original Hebrew. Σκηνοπηγία, *scenopegia*, in the Gospel of John, ch. vii. 2. is retained by the Vulgate, and with us translated *the feast of tabernacles*. It would have been still nearer the original Hebrew, and more conformable to the Jewish practice, to have called it *the feast of booths*. But the other appellation has obtained the preference. The Latins have retained the Greek name *azyma*, which we render, properly enough, *unleavened bread*. But the words *jubilee*, *sabbath*, *purim*, and some others, run through most languages.

§ 4. There is a conveniency in translating, rather than transplanting, the original term, if the word chosen be apposite, as it more clearly conveys the import, than an exotic word, that has no original meaning or etymology in the language. This appears never in a stronger light than when the reason of the name happens to be assigned by the sacred author. I shall give, for instance, that Hebrew appellation, which I but just now observed, that both the Seventy and the Vulgate have retained in their versions, and which the English interpreters have translated. The word is, *pascha*, *passover*. In the explanation which the people are commanded to give of this service to their children, when they shall enquire concerning it, the reason of the name is assigned, Exod. xii. 27. *Ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's PASSOVER, who PASSED OVER the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians.* Now, this reason appears as clearly in the English version, which is literal, as in the original Hebrew; but it is lost in the version of the Seventy, who render it thus: Εξαιτε. Θυσια το ΠΑΣΧΑ τωτο Κυριω, ως ΕΣΚΕΠΑΣΕ τας οικιας των υιων Ισραηλ εν Αιγυπτω, ηνικα επαταζε τας Αιγυπτιους. Here, as the words *πασχα* and *εσκεπασε* have no affinity, it is impossible to discover the reason of the name. The authors of the Vulgate, who form the word *phase*, in the Old Testament, more closely after the Hebrew (though they call it *pascha* in the New), have thought proper, in turning that passage, to drop the name they had adopted, and translate the word *transitus*, that the allusion might not be lost. "Dicetis, victima TRANSITUS DOMINI est, quando TRANSIVIT super domos filiorum Israel in Ægypto, percutiens Ægyptios."

This manner is sometimes necessary, for giving a just notion of the sense. But it is still better when the usual name, in the language of the version, as happens in the English, preserves the analogy, and renders the change unnecessary. In proper names, it is generally impossible to preserve the allusion in a version. In such cases, the natural resource is the margin. The occasion is not so frequent in appellatives, but it occurs sometimes. It is said by Adam of the woman, Gen. ii. 23. soon after her formation,

tion, *She shall be called WOMAN, because she was formed out of MAN.* Here the affinity of the names, woman and man, is preserved without doing violence to the language. But in some versions, the affinity disappears altogether, and, in others, is effected by assigning a name which, if it may be used at all, cannot, with propriety, be given to the sex in general. It is lost in the Septuagint. *Αυτη κληθεται ΓΥΝΗ, οτι εκ τς ΑΝΔΡΟΣ αυτης εληφθη αυτη.* Not the shadow of a reason appears in what is here assigned as the reason. The sounds *γυνη* and *ανδρος* have no affinity. The same may be said of *mulier* and *vir* in Castalic's Latin. *Hæc vocabitur MULIER, quia sumpta de VIRO est.* Other Latin interpreters have, for the sake of that resemblance in the words, chosen to sacrifice a little of their latinity. The Vulgate, and Leo de Juda, have, *Hæc vocabitur VIRAGO, quia sumpta de VIRO est.* Junius, Le Clerc and Houbigant, use the word *vira*, upon the authority of Festus. Neither of the words is good in this application; but not worse than *ανδεις εξ ανδεις*, used by Symmachus for the same purpose. Much in the same taste are Luther's *männin*, the *bonasse* of the Geneva French, and the *buoma* of Diodati's Italian.

PART III.

Dress, Judicatories, and Offices.

I SHALL NOW proceed to the third general class of words, not capable of being translated, with exactness, into the language of a people whose customs are not in a great measure conformable to the customs of those amongst whom such words have arisen. This class comprehends names relating to dress, peculiar modes, judicatories, and offices. In regard to *garments*, it is well known that the usages of the ancients, particularly the Orientals, differed considerably from those of modern Europeans. And though I am by no means of opinion, that it is necessary, in a translation, to convey an idea of the exact form of their dress, when nothing in the piece translated appears to depend on that circumstance, I am ever for avoiding that which would positively convey a false notion in this or any other respect. Often, from that which may be thought a trivial deviation from truth, there will result inconveniences, of which one at first is not aware, but which, nevertheless, may produce in the mind of the attentive reader, unacquainted with the original, objections that affect the

credibility of the narration. A general name, therefore, like *clothes*, *raiment*, is sufficient, when nothing depends on the form, in like manner as *a piece of money*, *a corn measure*, will answer, when no light for understanding the scope of the place, can be derived from the value of the one or the capacity of the other. Where some distinction, however, seems to have been intended in the passage, there is a necessity for using names more definitive. It is not often necessary, for naming the parts of dress, to retain the terms of a dead language. The English translators have never done it, as far as I remember, except in naming that part of the sacerdotal vestments, called *the ephod*, for which it would be impossible to find an apposite term in any European tongue. *Phylacteries*, too, will perhaps be accounted an exception.

§ 2. But, though it is rarely necessary to adopt the ancient or foreign names of garments, it may not be always proper to employ those terms for expressing them, which are appropriated to particular pieces of the modern European habit. The word *coat* answers well enough as a name for the under garment, in Greek *χιτων*. *Cloak*, by which our translators in the New Testament commonly render *ιματιον*, the name for the upper garment, I do not so much approve. My reasons are these: First, *cloak* is not the term that they have used in the Old Testament for that vestment; though we have no reason to believe that there was any change in the Jewish fashions in this particular. It is well known that the modes, respecting dress, are not, nor ever were, in Asia, as at present they are in Europe, variable and fluctuating. The Orientals are as remarkable for constancy in this particular, as we are for the contrary. Now, though the Hebrew words, answering to *ιματιον*, are frequent in the Old Testament, and the Greek word itself in the translation of the Seventy, the word *cloak* has never been admitted by our translators into the version of the Old Testament, except once in Isaiah, ch. lix. 17. where it is used only as a simile. Wherever they have thought proper to distinguish the upper garment from that worn close to the body, they have named it the *mantle*. See the places marked in the margin*. But these are not all the places in which the original word might have been so rendered. Sometimes, indeed, it means garments in general, and in the plural especially signifies *clothes*. Now, though the difference of a name employed in the version of the Old Testament may be thought too slight a circumstance for founding an argument upon, in regard to the manner of translating the New; I cannot help thinking that, even if the words *mantle* and *cloak* were equally proper, we ought not, by an unnecessary change, without any reason, to give ground to
imagine,

* Judges iv. 18. 1 Sam. xxviii. 14. 1 Kings xix. 13. 19. 2 Kings ii. 8. 13. 14. Ezra ix. 3. 5. Job i. 20. Job ii. 12. Psalm cix. 29.

imagine, that there had been, in this article, any alteration in the Jewish customs.

Secondly, I am the more averse to introduce, in the New Testament, a change of the name that had been used in the Old, as it is evident that, in Judea, they placed some share of religion in retaining their ancient garb. They did not think themselves at liberty to depart from the customs of their ancestors in this point. As their law had regulated some particulars in relation to their habit, they looked upon the form as intended for distinguishing them from the heathen, and consequently as sacred, Numb. xv. 38, 39. Deut. xxii. 12.; the knots of strings which they were appointed to put upon the four corners or wings, as they called them, did not suit any other form of outer garment, than that to which they had been always accustomed.

Thirdly, the word *mantle* comes nearer a just representation of the loose vesture worn by the Hebrews, than *cloak*, or any other term, which refers us to something particular in the make. Whereas their *ἱματίον* was an oblong piece of cloth, square at the corners, in shape resembling more the *plaid* of a Scotch Highlander, than either the Greek *pallium* or the Roman *toga*. This mantle, it would appear, on ordinary occasions, they threw loosely about them: and, when employed in any sort of work in which it might encumber them, laid aside altogether. To this, doubtless, our Lord refers in that expression, Mark xiii. 16. *Let not him who shall be in the field, return home to fetch his mantle.* When setting out on a journey, or entering on any business, compatible with the use of this garment, they tucked it up with a girdle, that it might not incommode them. Hence, the similitude of having their *loins girt*, to express alertness, and habitual preparation for the discharge of duty. I know not why those who have been so inclinable, in some other articles, to give a modern cast to the manners of those ancients, have not modernized them in this also, and transformed *girding their loins*, a very antique phrase, into *buttoning their waistcoats*. This freedom would not be so great, as the reduction of their money and measures above considered. It would not even be greater than giving them *candles* for *lamps*, and making them sit at their meals, instead of reclining on couches. In regard to this last mode, I propose to consider it immediately.

§ 3. Of all their customs, they were not so tenacious, as of what regarded the form of their clothes. In things which were not conceived to be connected with religion, and about which neither the law, nor tradition, had made any regulation, they did not hesitate to conform themselves to the manners of those under whose power they had fallen. A remarkable instance of this appears, in their adopting the mode of the Greeks and Romans, in lying on couches at their meals. In the Old Testament times,

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the practice of sitting, on such occasions, appears to have been universal. It is justly remarked by Philo*, that Joseph “made his brethren sit down according to their ages; for men were not then accustomed to lie on beds at entertainments.” The words in the Septuagint, Gen. xliii. 33. are, *εκαθισαν εναντιον αυτου*; in the English translation, *They sat before him*; both literally from the Hebrew. In like manner, Gen. xxxvii. 25. *εκαθισαν δε φαγειν αρτον*, *they sat down to eat bread*; and, Exod. xxxii. 6. *εκαθισεν ο λαος φαγειν και πινειν*, *the people sat down to eat and drink*. But it were endless to enumerate all the examples. Suffice it to observe, that this is as uniformly employed to express the posture at table in the Old Testament, as *ανακλινω*, or some synonymous term, is employed for the same purpose in the New. The Hebrew word is equally unequivocal with the Greek. It is always *ישב* *jashab*, *to sit*, never *שכב* *shachab*, or any other word that imports lying down.

Some, indeed, have contended, that this manner of eating was practised among the Jews before the captivity; and in support of this opinion, have produced the passage in Samuel, 1 Sam. xxviii. 23. where Saul is spoken of as eating on the bed. But the passage, when examined, makes clearly against the opinion for which it has been quoted. The historian’s expression is, *sat upon the bed*. Nor is this, as in the New Testament, the style merely of modern translators, it is that of the original, as well as of all the ancient translations. The Septuagint says *εκαθισε*, the Vulgate *sedit*. Houbigant is the only translator I know, who (misled, I suppose, by the ordinary style of Latin authors), has said *decubuit*. The Hebrew word is *ישב* *jashab*, which never signifies *to lie*. Now, whether a man on a bed take his repast sitting after the European manner, with his feet on the floor, or after the Turkish, with his legs across under him, his posture differs totally from that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who lay at their length.

The words of the Prophet Amos, ch. vi. 4. have also been thought to favour the same opinion: *Wo to them that lie upon beds of ivory, and stretch themselves upon their couches, and eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the stall, that chant to the sound of the viol, &c.* Here the Prophet upbraids the people with their sloth and luxury, specifying a few instances in their manner of living. But nothing is said that implies any other connection among these instances, than that of their being the effects of the same cause, *voluptuousness*. We have no more reason to connect their eating the lambs and the calves with their lying stretched on beds of ivory, than we have to connect with this

* Εξης δε προσεζεντος κατα τας ηλικιας καθισθαι, μηπω των ανθρωπων ενταις συμποτικαις συνθροισι κατακλισει χρωμενων. Lib. de Josepho.

this posture, their chanting to the sound of the viol, and anointing themselves with ointments.

But in the Apocryphal writings, which are posterior in composition to those of the Old Testament, and probably posterior to the Macedonian conquests, though prior to the books of the New, we have the first indications of this change of posture. It is said of Judith, ch. xii. 15. in the common version, that *her maid laid soft skins on the ground for her over against Holofernes, that she might sit and eat upon them*, *ως το εθιμν κατακλινομενη επ' αυτων*, literally, that *she might eat lying upon them*. Again, in Tobit, ch. ii. 1. *ανεπεσα τς φαλιν*, not *I sat*, but *I lay down to eat*. Other examples might be given which render it probable that this fashion was first introduced into Judea by the Greeks, before the Jews became acquainted with the Romans. A sure evidence this, that the Jews were not so obstinately tenacious of every national custom, as some have represented them. It is very remarkable that, in our Saviour's time, the change was universal in Judea, that the very common people always conformed to it. The multitudes which our Lord twice fed in the desert, are by all the Evangelists represented as *lying*, not *sitting*, upon the ground. It is strange that our translators have here, by misinterpreting one word, as invariably exhibited them practising a custom which they had abandoned, as they had formerly, by the unwarranted and unnecessary change of a name, given ground to think that there was an alteration in their customs, when there was none.

§ 4. I know it is commonly pleaded in excuse for such deviations from the original, as that whereof I am now speaking, that the posture is a circumstance noway material to the right understanding of the passages wherein it is occasionally mentioned; that besides, to us moderas, there appears in the expressions *lying down to meat*, and *laying themselves at table*, from their repugnancy to our customs, an awkwardness which, so far from contributing to fix our minds on the principal scope of the author, would divert our attention from it. In answer to the first of these objections, I admit that it is sometimes, not always, as will soon be shown, of no consequence to the import of the passage, whether a mere circumstance, which is but occasionally mentioned, and on which the instruction conveyed in the story does not depend, be rightly apprehended or not. The two miracles of the loaves and fishes are to all valuable purposes the same, whether the people partook of their repast sitting or lying. The like may be said of the greater part of such narratives. For this reason I do not except against a general expression, as, *placed themselves at table*, where a literal version would be attended with the inconvenience of appearing unnatural: but I could never approve, for the sake of elegance or simplicity, a version which, in effect,

misrepresents

misrepresents the original; or, in other words, from which one may fairly deduce inferences that are not conformable to fact. In regard to the other exception, I cannot help observing, that it is only because the expression *lying at meat* is unusual, that it appears awkward. If the first translators of the Bible into English had thought fit, in this instance, to keep close to the original, the phrases would not now have sounded awkwardly. But it must be owned that no translators enjoy at present equal advantages with those who had, in a manner, the forming of our language in regard to things sacred. Their versions, by being widely dispersed, would soon give a currency to the terms used in them, which there was then no contrary use to counterbalance. And this is the reason why many things which might have been better rendered then, cannot now so well be altered.

§ 5. But to show that even such errors in translating, however trivial they may appear, are sometimes highly injurious to the sense, and render a plain story not only incredible but absurd, I must entreat the reader's attention to the following passage, as it runs in the common version, Luke vii. 36, 37, 38. : *One of the Pharisees desired Jesus that he would eat with him; and he went into the Pharisee's house, and sat down to meat. And behold a woman in the city, which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, and stood at his feet behind him weeping, and began to wash his feet with tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed his feet, and anointed them with the ointment.* Now a reader of any judgment will need to reflect but a moment to discover, that what is here told is impossible. If Jesus and others were in our manner sitting together at meat, the woman could not be behind them, when doing what is here recorded. She must in that case, on the contrary, have been under the table. The chairs, on which the guests were seated, would have effectually precluded access from behind. It is said also that she stood, while she bathed his feet with tears, wiped them with the hairs of her head, anointed and kissed them. Another manifest absurdity. On the supposition of their sitting, she must have been at least kneeling, if not lying on the floor. These inconsistencies instantly disappear, when the Evangelist is allowed to speak for himself, who, instead of saying that *Jesus sat down*, says expressly that he *lay down*, *ανεκλιθη*. And to prevent, if possible, a circumstance being mistaken or overlooked, on which the practicability of the thing depended, he repeats it by a synonymous term in the very next verse. "When she knew that *Jesus lay at table*," *ανακειται*. The knowledge of their manner at meals makes every thing in this story level to an ordinary capacity.

§ 6. At their feasts, matters were commonly ordered thus:
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Three couches were set in the form of the Greek Letter Π , the table was placed in the middle, the lower end whereof was left open, to give access to the servants, for setting and removing the dishes, and serving the guests. The other three sides were inclosed by the couches, whence it got the name of triclinium. The middle couch, which lay along the upper end of the table, and was therefore accounted the most honourable place, and that which the Pharisees are said particularly to have affected, was distinguished by the name $\piρωτοκλισια$, Matt. xxiii. 6. The person entrusted with the direction of the entertainment was called $αρχικλινης$, John ii. 8. The guests lay with their feet backwards, obliquely, across the couches, which were covered, for their better accommodation, with such sort of cloth, or tapestry, as suited the quality of the entertainer. As it was necessary, for the conveniency of eating, that the couches should be somewhat higher than the table, the guests have probably been raised by them three feet, and upwards, from the floor. When these particulars are taken into consideration, every circumstance of the story becomes perfectly consistent and intelligible. This also removes the difficulty there is, in the account given by John, ch. xiii. 23. 25. of the paschal supper, where Jesus being set, as our translators render it, at table, one of his disciples is said, in one verse, to have been leaning on his bosom, and in another, to have been lying on his breast. Though these attitudes are hardly compatible with our mode of sitting at meals, they were naturally consequent upon theirs. As they lay forwards, in a direction somewhat oblique, feeding themselves with their right hand, and leaning on their left arm; they no sooner intermitted, and reclined a little, than the head of each came close to the breast of him who was next on the left. Now, a circumstance (however frivolous in itself) cannot be deemed of no consequence, which serves to throw light on the sacred pages, and solve difficulties, otherwise inextricable. This case, though not properly requiring the use of any ancient or foreign name, I could not help considering minutely in this place, on account of its affinity with the other topics of which I had been treating.

§ 7. I shall add a few things, on the manner adopted by other translators in rendering what relates to this usage. With regard to the Latin versions, it may naturally be supposed, that the Vulgate would be literal, and consequently, in this particular, just. There was no temptation to depart from the letter. It suited their customs at that period, as well as the idiom of their language. And though it did not suit the customs of the times of modern Latin interpreters, they could have no motive, in this article, to desert the manner of the ancient translator, expressed in a phraseology which both Latin and Greek classics had rendered familiar. As to the translations into modern tongues, Luther appears

appears to have been the first who, in his translation into German, has, in this particular, forced the Evangelists into a conformity with modern fashions. The French translator, Olivetan, has avoided the false translation of *sitting* for *lying*, and also the apparent awkwardness of a literal version. In the passage from Luke, above quoted, he says, *Il se mit a table*; and speaking of the woman, *Laquelle ayant connu qu'il etoit a table*. In the miraculous increase of the loaves and the fishes in the desert, Matt. xv. 35. he thus expresses himself: *Il commanda aux troupees de s'arranger par terre*. Diodati has, in the first of these passages, adopted the same method with the French translator, saying *si mise a tavola*; and *ch'egli era a tavola*; in the other, he has fallen into the error of our common version, and said, *Jesu comando alle turbe, che si mettesero a sedere in terra*. Most other French versions have taken the same method of eluding the difficulty. But all the late English versions I have seen, follow implicitly the common translation.

§ 8. To come now to offices and judicatories: it must be acknowledged that, in these, it is not always easy to say, as was remarked in a preceding Dissertation*, whether the resemblances to, or differences from, offices and judicatories of our own, ought to induce us to retain the original term, or to translate it. But whatever be in this, or however the first translators ought to have been determined in their choice between these methods, the matter is not equally open to us in this late age as it was to them. The election made by our predecessors, in this department, has established an use which, except in some particular cases, it would be dangerous in their successors to violate; and which therefore, unless where perspicuity or energy requires an alteration, ought to be followed. For example, who could deny that the Greek terms, *αγγελος, αποστολος, διαβολος*, might not have been as well rendered *messenger, missionary, slanderer*, as the words *ιερευς, υπαρχεις, αντιδικος*, are rendered, *priest, minister, adversary*. In regard to the import of the words, there does not appear to me to be a closer correspondence in the last mentioned, than in the first. Besides, as the first are themselves no other than Greek translations of the Hebrew words *שטן, מלאך, שולח*, *satan, sbaluch, malach*, which the Seventy have not judged necessary to retain in another language, and in this judgment have been followed by the writers of the New Testament; they have given the example of translating, rather than transferring, these appellatives into other languages; the last name, *satan*, being the only one which is ever retained by them, and that very seldom.

But the true source of the distinction that has been made in this respect by European translators, is not any particular propriety in the different cases, but the example of the old Latin translator.

* Diff. II. § 5.

translator. The words which he retained with such an alteration in the orthography, as adapted them to the genius of the tongue, we also retain, and the words which he translated, we translate. Because he said, *angelus, apostolus, diabolus*, which are not properly Latin words, we say, *angel, apostle, devil*, not originally English. Had he, on the contrary, used the terms *nuncius, legatus, calumniator*, we had probably substituted for them, *messenger, missionary, slanderer*, or some terms equivalent. For in those cases wherein the Latin interpreter has not scrupled to translate the Greek by Latin words, neither have we scrupled to render them by English words. I am, however, far from affirming that the interpreters of the Latin church, either in the old Italic, or in the present Vulgate, have acted from caprice in their choice; though I do not always discover reasons of such weight for the distinctions they have made, as should lead us implicitly to follow them.

There is only one example in titles of this sort, wherein the moderns have taken the freedom to judge differently. The Greek *παράκλητος*, in John's Gospel, is always retained by the author of the Vulgate, who uses *paracletus*, but has not been followed by later translators. Erasmus has sometimes adopted his word, and sometimes said *consolator*, and is followed in both, by the translator of Zurich. Castalio says *confirmator*, and Beza *advocatus*. Most modern versions into Italian, French, and English, have, in this instance, followed Erasmus in the import they have given the word in preference even to Beza. And of these our common version is one, using the word *comforter*. Nay, some French translators from the Vulgate have deserted that version, rendering the word either *consolateur* or *avocat*. In general, I would pay that deference to the example of the ancient interpreters as to prefer their manner, wherever there is not, from perspicuity, energy, or the general scope of the discourse, positive reason to the contrary. Such reason, I think, we have in regard to the title last mentioned*. As to the term *διαβολος*, I have already considered the cases in which it is not proper to render it *devil*†. The name *αποσολος* is so much appropriated in the New Testament, to a particular class of extraordinary ministers, that there are very few cases, and none that I remember in the Gospels, where either perspicuity or energy would require a change of the term.

§ 9. It is otherwise with the name *αγγελος*, in regard to which there are several occurrences, where the import of the sentiment is, if not lost, very much obscured, because the word in the version has not the same extent of signification with that in the original. It was observed before ‡, that there is this difference be-

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tween

* See the note on John xiv. 16. † Diff. VI. Part. I. § 2, 3, 4.

‡ Diff. VI. Part. I. § 1.

tween the import of such terms as they occur in their native tongues, whether Hebrew or Greek, and as modernized in versions, that in the former they always retain somewhat of their primitive signification, and beside indicating a particular being or class of beings, they are of the nature of appellatives, and mark a special character, function, or note of distinction in such beings; whereas, when latinized or englished, but not translated into Latin or English, they answer solely the first of those uses, and approach the nature of proper names. Now, where there happens to be a manifest allusion in the original, to the primitive and ordinary acceptation of the word in that language, that allusion must be lost in a translation, where the word is properly not translated, and where there is nothing in the sound that can suggest the allusion. It is particularly unfortunate if it be in an argument, as the whole will be necessarily involved in darkness.

§ 10. I shall illustrate the preceding observations by some remarks on the following passage, Heb. i. 4, &c. 4. *Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they:* 5. *For unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son this day have I begotten thee? And again I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son.* 6. *And again when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him.* 7. *And of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.* 8. *But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever.* I cannot help thinking with Grotius, that there is here a comparison of the dignity of the different personages mentioned, from the consideration of what is imported in their respective titles. This is at best but obscurely suggested in the common version. For though the word *son* is expressive of a natural and near relation, the word *angel* in our language is the name of a certain order of beings, and beside that expresses nothing at all. It is not, like the original appellation, both in Hebrew and in Greek, a name of office. Further, the seventh verse, as it stands with us, *Who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire*, is unintelligible; and if some mystical sense may be put upon it, this is at best but a matter of conjecture, and appears quite unconnected with the argument. It is well known that the word *πνευματα* rendered *spirits*, signifies also *winds*. That this is the meaning of it here, is evident from the passage, Psal. civ. 4. whence the quotation is taken. For the Hebrew *רוּחַ ruach*, is of the same extent. And though it be in that place, for the sake of uniformity, rendered the same way as here, nothing can be more manifest, than that the Psalmist is celebrating the wonders of the material creation, all the parts of which execute, in their different ways, the commands of the Creator. Our translators

flators not only render the same Hebrew word *wind* in the third verse, and *spirits* in the fourth, but in this last evidently start aside from the subject. Nothing, on the contrary, can be better connected than the whole passage in the true, which is also the most obvious, interpretation, and may be thus expressed: *Who covereth himself with light as with a mantle, who stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain; who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters; who maketh the clouds his chariot; who walketh on the wings of the wind; who maketh winds his messengers, and flaming fire his ministers**; who hath laid the foundations of the earth, that it should never be removed. There is an internal probability of the justness of this version, arising from the perspicuous and close connection of the parts, and an improbability in the common version, arising from their obscurity and want of connection; ver. 4. *Who maketh his angels spirits, his ministers a flaming fire*, being a digression from the scope of the context, the material world, to the world of spirits.

Now, let us try in the passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews referred to, how the same translation of the words *πνευμα* and *αγγελος* by *wind* and *messenger*, through the whole, will suit the Apostle's reasoning. Speaking of our Lord, he says, *Being as far superior to the heavenly messengers, as the title he hath inherited is more excellent than theirs: For to which of those messengers did God ever say, "Thou art my son, I have to-day begotten thee:"* And again, *"I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son:"* Again, when he introduceth the first-born into the world, he saith, *"Let all God's messengers worship him."* Whereas, concerning messengers, he saith, *"Who maketh winds his messengers, and flaming fire his ministers:"* But to the Son, *"Thy throne, O God, endureth for ever."* To me it is plain, first, that the aim of his reasoning is to show the superior excellency of the Messiah, from the superiority of his title of *Son*, given him in a sense peculiar to him (and which, from analogy to the constitutions of the universe, should imply of the same nature with the Father) to that of *messenger*, which does not differ essentially from servant. Now the English word *angel* does not express this. It is a name for those celestial beings, but without suggesting their function. Secondly, that, in proof of the inferiority of the title *messenger*, the writer urges, that it is sometimes given even to things inanimate, such as storms and lightning.

Every reader of reflection admits, that there runs, through the whole

* Dr Lowth (*De sacra Poesi Hebræorum*, Præf. viii.), though he retains the word *angelus*, understands the passage just as I do, making winds the subject, and angels a metaphorical attribute. "Faciens ut venti sint angeli sui, ut ignis ardens sit sibi ministrorum loco." He adds: "Describuntur elementa in exequendis Dei mandatis. prompta et expedita quasi angeli, aut ministri tabernaculo deservientes."

whole passage, a contrast of the things spoken concerning the Messiah, to the things spoken concerning angels, in order to show the supereminence of the former above the latter. The seventh verse, as now rendered, perfectly suits this idea, and completes one side of the contrast. But does it answer this purpose in the common version? Not in the least: for, will any one say, that it derogates from the highest dignity to be called a *spirit*, when it is considered that God himself is so denominated? And as the term *flaming fire*, when applied to intelligent beings, must be metaphorical, the consideration that, by such metaphors, the energy and omniscience of the Deity are sometimes represented, will, in our estimation, serve rather to enhance than to depress the character. The case is totally different, when *flaming fire*, or lightning, in the literal sense, is made the subject of the proposition, and *God's messengers* the predicate.

§ 11. I know that it has been objected to this interpretation, that רוּחַ *ruach*, though used in the singular for *wind*, does not occur in this sense, in the plural, except when joined with the numeral adjective *four*. But from this, though it were true, we can conclude nothing. That the word is found in this meaning, in the plural, is a sufficient ground for interpreting it so, when the connection requires it. Farther, though it were conclusive, it is not true. In Jeremiah, ch. xlix. 36. we find, in the same passage, both אַרְבַּע רוּחוֹת *arbaug ruchotb, four winds*, and כָּל הַרוּחוֹת *col baruchotb, all the winds*, where it was never doubted, that both expressions were used of *the winds*. As to the intimation which some have thrown out concerning this explanation, as unfavourable to the doctrine of Christ's divinity, it can be accounted for only from that jealousy, an invariable attendant on the polemic spirit, which still continues too much to infect and dishonour theological enquiries. This jealousy, however, appears so much misplaced here, that the above interpretation is manifestly more favourable to the common doctrine than the other. I say not this to recommend it to any party, knowing that, in these matters, we ought all to be determined by the impartial principles of sound criticism, and not by our own prepossessions.

§ 12. But, to return; a second case wherein it is better to employ the general word *messenger* is, when it is not clear from the context, whether the sacred penmen meant a celestial or a terrestrial being. In such cases, it is always best to render the term, so as that the version may admit the same latitude of interpretation with the original; and this can be effected only by using the general term. For this reason, in the following expressions, οἵτινες εἰλαβετε τοι νομοι εἰς διαταγας ἀγγελων, Acts vii. 53. and διὰ ἀγγελων ἐν χειρι μεσσητων, Gal. iii. 19. it would have been better to translate ἀγγελων *messengers*, as it is not certain whether such extraordinary

traordinary ministers as Moses and Joshua, and the succeeding prophets, be meant, or any of the heavenly host. The same may be said of that passage, *ὀφείλει ἡ γυνὴ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, δια τῶν ἀγγέλων*, 1 Cor. xi. 10. it being very doubtful whether the word, in this place, denotes *angels* or *men*.

§ 13. A third case, wherein (I do not say it must, but) it may properly be rendered *messengers*, is when, though it evidently refers to superior beings, it is joined with some word or epithet, which sufficiently marks the reference, as *ἀγγεῖλος Κυρίου*, a *messenger of the Lord*, *οἱ ἀγγελοὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν*, the *heavenly messengers*, *οἱ ἅγιοι ἀγγελοὶ*, the *holy messengers*; for, with the addition of the epithet, the English is just as explicit as the Greek. Not but that such epithets may in some sense be applied to men also; but it is customary with the sacred writers thus to distinguish the inhabitants of heaven. In this case, however, it must be admitted, that either way of translating is good. There is one advantage in sometimes adopting this manner, that it accustoms us to the word *messenger* in this application, and may consequently assist the unlearned in applying it in doubtful cases. In some cases, not doubtful, to add the word *heavenly* in the version, is no interpolation, for the single word *ἀγγεῖλος* often includes it. Thus, though the word *γλῶσσα* originally means no more than *tongue*, it is frequently employed to denote an unknown or foreign tongue.

§ 14. A fourth case wherein the general term is proper, is when the word is applied to a human being. This rule, however, admits some exceptions, soon to be taken notice of. Our translators have rightly rendered it *messenger*, in the instances which fall under this description, noted in the margin*, wherein they are not only human beings that are meant, but the message is from men.

§ 15. I said, that there are some exceptions from this rule. The first is, when not only the message is from God, but when it appears to be the view of the writer to shew the dignity of the mission, from the title given to the missionary, as being a title which he has in common with superior natures; in such cases, it is better to preserve in the version the term *angel*, without which the allusion is lost, and by consequence justice is not done to the argument. For this reason the word *angel* ought to be retained in the noted passage of the Gospels concerning John the Baptist, Matt. xi. 9, 10. *What went ye to see? a prophet? yea, I tell you, and something superior to a prophet; for this is he concerning whom it is written, Behold I send mine angel before thee, who shall prepare thy way.* There is manifestly couched here a comparison between the two titles *prophet* and *angel*, with a view to
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* Luke vii. 24. ix. 52. James ii. 25.

raise the latter. Now, to this end the common English word *messenger* is not adapted, as it does not convey to us the idea of greater dignity than that of a prophet, or even of so great. My argument here may be thought not quite consistent with what I urged in my first remark on this word. But the two cases are rather opposite than similar. The allusion was there to the ordinary signification of the term; the allusion is here not to the signification, but to the common application of it, to beings of a superior order. The intention was there comparatively to depress the character, the intention here is to exalt it.

§ 16. Another case in which the word *angel* ought to be retained, though used of man, is when there would arise either obscurity or ambiguity from the construction, if the word *messenger* should be employed. It cannot be doubted, that the angels of the seven churches mentioned in the Apocalypse, Rev. i. 20. ii. 1. 8. 12. 18. iii. 1. 7. 14. are human creatures; but the term *messenger* would render the expression ambiguous or rather improper. The messenger of societies (in like manner as of individuals), is one sent by them, not to them. In this, and some other instances, the Greek *αγγελος* is to be understood as corresponding in extent of signification to the Hebrew *מלאך malach*, which often denotes a *minister*, or servant employed in any charge of importance and dignity, though not a message. It would, therefore, be no deviation from what is included in the Hellenistic sense of the word, if through the whole of that passage it were rendered *president*.

§ 17. In what concerns civil offices, our translators have very properly retained some names to which we have none entirely equivalent. Of this number is the name *tetrarch*, which admits no explanation but by a periphrasis. *Centurion* and *publican* are of the same kind. The word *legion*, though not a name of office, being the name of a military division, to which we have not any exactly corresponding, may be ranked in the same class. The three words last specified are neither Hebrew, nor Greek, but Latin; and as they are the names of things familiar only to the Latins, they are best expressed by those names of Latin derivation employed by our translators. Two of them occur in the Latin form in the New Testament, *λεγεων* and *κεντυριων*, though for the latter word the Greek *εκατονταρχος* is oftener used.

It may be proper here to observe, in regard to such Latin appellatives, that from the connection which has subsisted between all European countries and the Romans, and from the general acquaintance which the Western nations have long had with the ancient Roman usages, history and literature; their names of offices, &c. are naturalized in most modern languages, particularly in English. This makes the adoption of the Latin name for an office,

office, or any other thing which the Jews had solely from the Romans, peculiarly pertinent. The remark now made holds, especially when the persons spoken of were either Romans, or the servants of Rome. If, therefore, after the Vulgate, we had rendered *χιλιάρχης* *tribune*, *ανθυπατος* *proconsul*, and perhaps *σκιρα*, *cohort*, the expression, without losing any thing in perspicuity to those of an inferior class, would have been to the learned reader more significant than *chief-captain*, *deputy*, *band*.

The word *ηγμεων* also, though sometimes a general term, denoting *governor* or *president*; yet, as applied to Pilate, is known to import no more than *procurator*. Properly there was but one *president* in Syria, of which Judea was a part. He who had the superintendency of this part was styled *imperatoris procurator*. For this we have the authority of Tacitus, the Roman annalist, and of Philo, the Alexandrian Jew. And though the author of the Vulgate has commonly used the term *praeses* for *ηγμεων*, yet, in translating Luke, ch. iii. 1. he has rendered *ηγμενοντος Ποντιου Πιλατου της Ιουδαίας*, *procurante Pontio Pilato Judæam*. To those who know a little of the language, or even of the history, of ancient Rome, the Latin names, in many cases, are much more definite in their signification, than the words by which they are commonly rendered, and being already familiar in our language, are not, even to the vulgar, more obscure than names originally English, relating to things wherewith they are little acquainted. For a similar reason, I have also retained the name *pretorium*, which, though a Latin word, has been adopted by the sacred writers, and to which neither common-hall nor judgment-hall entirely answers. That the evangelists, who wrote in Greek, a more copious language, found themselves compelled to borrow from the Latin, the name of what belonged to the office of a Roman magistrate, is to their translators a sufficient authority for adopting the same method.

§ 18. I shall conclude this dissertation with observing, that there are two judicatories mentioned in the New Testament, one Jewish, the other Grecian, the distinguishing names of which may not, without energy, be preserved in a translation. Though the noun *συνηδριον* is Greek, and susceptible of the general interpretation *council* or *senate*; yet, as it is commonly in the Gospels and Acts appropriated to that celebrated court of senators or *elders* accustomed to assemble at Jerusalem, and from the Greek name, called *sanbedrim*, which was at once their national senate and supreme judicatory; and as it appears not in those books to have been ever applied to any other particular assembly, though sometimes to such in general as were vested with the highest authority; I have thought it reasonable to retain the word *sanbedrim* in every case where there could be no doubt that this is the court spoken of. The name has been long naturalized in the language;

language ; and, as it is more confined in its application than any common term, it is so much the more definite and energetic. The other is the famous Athenian court called *the Areopagus*, and mentioned in the Acts, ch. xvii. 19. which, as it was in several respects peculiar in its constitution, ought to be distinguished in a version, as it is in the original, by its proper name. To render it Mars-hill from etymology, without regard to use, would entirely mislead the unlearned, who could never imagine that the historian spoke of bringing the apostle before a court, but would suppose that he only informed us that they brought him up to an eminence in the city, from which he discoursed to the people. This is in part effected by the common version ; for, though in verse 19. it is said, *They brought Paul to Areopagus*, it is added in verse 22. *Then Paul stood in the midst of Mars-hill, and said.* This leads one to think that these were two names for the same hill. *The Areopagus* with the article is the proper version in both places.

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DISSERTATION THE NINTH.

INQUIRY WHETHER CERTAIN NAMES WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED INTO MOST TRANSLATIONS OF SCRIPTURE IN THE WEST, COINCIDE IN MEANING WITH THE ORIGINAL TERMS FROM WHICH THEY ARE DERIVED, AND OF WHICH THEY ARE USED AS THE VERSION.

IT was observed, in a former dissertation *, as one cause of difficulty in the examination of the Scriptures, that before we begin to study them critically, we have been accustomed to read them in a translation, whence we have acquired a habit of considering several ancient and Oriental terms as equivalent to certain words, in modern use, in our own language, by which they have been commonly rendered. What makes the difficulty greater is, that when we become acquainted with other versions beside that into our mother-tongue, these, instead of correcting, serve but to confirm the prejudice. For, in these translations, we find the same original words rendered by words which we know to correspond exactly in those tongues, to the terms employed in the English translation. In order to set this observation in the strongest light, it will be necessary to trace the origin of some terms which have become technical amongst ecclesiastic writers, pointing out the changes in meaning which they have undergone. When alterations are produced gradually, they escape the notice of the generality of people, and sometimes even of the more discerning. For a term once universally understood to be equivalent to an original term, whose place it occupies in the translation, will naturally be supposed still equivalent, by those who do not attend to the variations in the meanings of words, which a tract of time often insensibly produces. Sometimes etymology contributes to favour the deception.

How few are there, even among the readers of the original, who entertain a suspicion that the words *mystery*, *blasphemy*, *schism*, *heresy*, do not convey to moderns precisely those ideas which the Greek words (being the same except in termination)

tion) *μυστηριον, βλασφημια, σχισμα, αιρεσις*, in the New Testament, conveyed to Christians in the times of the apostles? Yet, that there is not such a correspondence in meaning between them as is commonly supposed, I intend, in the present Dissertation, to put beyond a doubt. That there is a real difference, in regard to some of those words is, I think, generally allowed by men of letters; but as all are not agreed in regard to the precise difference between the one and the other, I shall here examine briefly the import of the original terms, in the order above mentioned, that we may be qualified to judge how far they are rightly rendered by the words supposed to correspond to them, and that we may not be misled, by the resemblance of sound, to determine concerning the sameness of signification.

PART I.

Of Mystery.

THE Greek word *μυστηριον* occurs frequently in the New Testament, and is uniformly rendered, in the English translation, *mystery*. We all know that by the most current use of the English word *mystery* (as well as of the Latin ecclesiastic word *mysterium*, and the corresponding terms in modern languages), is denoted some doctrine to human reason incomprehensible; in other words, such a doctrine as exhibits difficulties, and even apparent contradictions, which we cannot solve or explain. Another use of the word, which, though not so universal at present, is often to be met with in ecclesiastic writers of former ages, and in foreign writers of the present age, is to signify some religious ceremony or rite, especially those now denominated sacraments. In the communion office of the church of England, the elements, after consecration, are sometimes termed *holy mysteries*. But this use seems not now to be common among Protestants, less perhaps in this country than in any other. Johnson has not so much as mentioned it in his Dictionary. Indeed in the fourth, and some succeeding centuries, the word *μυστηριον* was so much in vogue with the Greek fathers, and *mysterium* or *sacramentum*, as it was often rendered, with the Latin, that it would be impossible to say in what meaning they used the words; nay, whether or not they affixed any meaning to them at all. In every thing that related to religion, there were found *mysteries* and *sacraments*, in doctrines and precepts, in ordinances and petitions; they could

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even discover numbers of them in the Lord's Prayer. Nay, so late as father Posslevini, this unmeaning application of these terms has prevailed in some places. That Jesuit is cited with approbation by Walton in the prolegomena to his Polyglot, for saying, "Tot esse in Hebraica Scriptura sacramenta, quot literæ; tot mysteria, quot puncta; tot arcana, quot apices," a sentence, I acknowledge, as unintelligible to me, as Father Simon owns it was to him. But passing this indefinite use, of which we know not what to make, the two significations I have mentioned, are sufficiently known to theologians, and continue, though not equally, still in use with modern writers.

§ 2. When we come to examine the Scriptures critically, and make them serve for their own interpreters, which is the surest way of attaining the true knowledge of them, we shall find, if I mistake not, that both these senses are unsupported by the usage of the inspired penmen. After the most careful examination of all the passages in the New Testament, in which the Greek word occurs, and after consulting the use made of the term, by the ancient Greek interpreters of the Old, and borrowing aid from the practice of the Hellenist Jews, in the writings called Apocrypha, I can only find two senses nearly related to each other, which can strictly be called scriptural. The first, and what I may call the leading sense of the word, is *arcantum*, a secret, any thing not disclosed, not published to the world, though perhaps communicated to a select number.

§ 3. Now, let it be observed, that this is totally different from the current sense of the English word *mystery*, something incomprehensible. In the former acceptation, a thing was no longer a mystery than whilst it remained unrevealed; in the latter, a thing is equally a mystery after the revelation as before. To the former we apply properly the epithet *unknown*, to the latter we may, in a great measure, apply the term *unknowable*. Thus, that God would call the Gentiles, and receive them into his church, was as intelligible, or, if ye like the term better, comprehensible, as that he once had called the descendents of the patriarchs, or as any plain proposition or historical fact. Yet, whilst undiscovered, or at least veiled under figures and types, it remained in the scriptural idiom, a *mystery*, having been hidden from ages and generations. But, after it had pleased God to reveal this his gracious purpose to the apostles by his Spirit, it was a mystery no longer.

The Greek words, *αποκαλυψις* and *μυστηριον*, stand in the same relation to each other that the English words *discovery* and *secret* do. *Μυστηριον αποκαλυφθεν*, is a *secret discovered*, and consequently a secret no longer. The discovery is the extinction of the secret as such. These words, accordingly, or words equivalent, as *μυστηριον γνωρισθεν*, *φανερωθεν*, are often brought together by the apostles,

ties, to shew that what were once the secret purposes and counsels of God, had been imparted to them, to be by them promulgated to all the world. Thus they invited the grateful attention of all to what was so distinguished a favour on the part of Heaven, and must be of such unspeakable importance to the apostate race of Adam. The terms, communication, revelation, manifestation, plainly shew the import of the term *μυστηριον*, to which they are applied. As this, indeed, seems to be a point now universally acknowledged by the learned, I shall only refer the judicious reader, for further proof of it from the New Testament, to the passages quoted in the margin *; in all which, he will plainly perceive, that the apostle treats of something which had been concealed for ages (and for that reason called *μυστηριον*), but was then openly revealed; and not of any thing, in its own nature, dark and inconceivable.

§ 4. If, in addition to the evidence arising from so many direct and clear passages in the writings of Paul, it should be thought necessary to recur to the usage of the Seventy, we find that, in the Prophet Daniel, ch. ii. 18, 19. 27, 28, 29. 30. 47. iv. 9. the word *μυστηριον* occurs not fewer than nine times, answering always to the Chaldaic *מִסְתָּרָא* *mista'ra*, *res arcana*, and used in relation to Nebuchadnezzar's dream, which was become a secret, even to the dreamer himself, as he had forgot it. The word there is uniformly rendered in the common version *secret*; and it deserves to be remarked that, in those verse, it is found connected with the verbs *γινωρίζω*, *φασίζω*, and *αποκαλυπτω*; in a way exactly similar to the usage of the New Testament above observed. It occurs in no other place of that version, but one in Isaiah, of very doubtful import. In the apocryphal writings (which, in matters of criticism on the Hellenistic idiom, are of good authority), the word *μυστηριον* frequently occurs in the same sense, and is used in reference to human secrets, as well as to divine. Nay, the word is not, even in the New Testament, confined to divine secrets. It expresses sometimes those of a different, and even contrary, nature. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the antichristian spirit, says, *The mystery of iniquity doth already work*, 2 Thess. ii. 7. The spirit of antichrist hath begun to operate; but the operation is latent and unperceived. The Gospel of Christ is a blessing, the spirit of antichrist a curse. Both are equally denominated *mystery*, or secret, whilst they remain concealed.

§ 5. I shall be much misunderstood, if any one infer, from what has been now advanced, that I mean to signify, that there is nothing in the doctrines of religion which is not, on all sides, perfectly comprehensible to us, or nothing from which difficulties may be raised, that we are not able to give a satisfactory solution of.

* Rom. xvi. 25, 26. 1 Cor. ii. 7, 8, 9, 10. Eph. i. 9. iii. 3. 5. 6. 9. vi. 19. Col. i. 26, 27.

of. On the contrary, I am fully convinced, that in all sciences, particularly natural theology, as well as in revelation, there are many truths of this kind, whose evidence such objections are not regarded by a judicious person, as of force sufficient to invalidate. For example, the divine omniscience is a tenet of natural religion. This manifestly implies God's foreknowledge of all future events. Yet, to reconcile the divine prescience with the freedom, and even the contingency, and consequently, with the good or ill desert of human actions, is what I have never yet seen achieved by any, and indeed despair of seeing. That there are such difficulties also in the doctrines of revelation, it would, in my opinion, be very absurd to deny. But the present inquiry does not affect that matter in the least. This inquiry is critical and concerns solely the scriptural acceptation of the word *μυστήριον*, which I have shown to relate merely to the secrecy for some time observed with regard to any doctrine, whether mysterious, in the modern acceptation of the word, or not.

§ 6. The foregoing observations will throw some light on what Paul says of the nature of the office with which he was vested: *Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God,* 1 Cor. iv. 1 *οικονομῶν μυστηρίων* Θεοῦ, dispensers to mankind of the gracious purposes of heaven, heretofore concealed, and therefore denominated secrets. Nor can any thing be more conformable than this interpretation, both to the instructions given to the Apostles, during our Lord's ministry, and to the commission they received from him. In regard to the former, he tells them, *To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven; no secret, relating to this subject is withheld from you; but to them it is not given,* Matt. xiii. 41. that is, not yet given. For these very Apostles, when commissioned to preach, were not only empowered, but commanded to disclose to all the world, (Matt. xxviii. 19. Mark xvi. 15.) the whole mystery of God, his secret counsels in regard to man's salvation. And that they might not imagine that the private informations, received from their Master, had never been intended for the public ear, he gave them this express injunction, *What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in light. And what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the house tops.* He assigns the reason, the divine decree; a topic to which he oftener than once recurs. *There is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, and hid that shall not be known,* Matt. x. 26, 27. Again: *There is nothing hid, which shall not be manifested; neither was any thing kept secret, but that it should come abroad,* Mark iv. 22. This may serve to explain to us the import of these phrases which occur in the Epistles, as expressing the whole Christian institution, *the mystery of the gospel, the mystery of the faith, the mystery of God, and the mystery of Christ;* mystery, in the singular number,

ber, not mysteries, in the plural, which would have been more conformable to the modern import of the word, as relating to the incomprehensibility of the different articles of doctrine. But the whole of the gospel, taken together, is denominated *the mystery*, the grand secret, in reference to the silence or concealment under which it was formerly kept; as, in like manner, it is styled the revelation of Jesus Christ, in reference to the publication afterwards enjoined.

§ 7. I signified, before, that there was another meaning which the term *μυστηριον* sometimes bears in the New Testament. But it is so nearly related to, if not coincident with, the former, that I am doubtful whether I can call it other than a particular application of the same meaning. However, if the thing be understood, it is not material which of the two ways we denominate it. The word is sometimes employed to denote the figurative sense, as distinguished from the literal, which is conveyed under any fable, parable, allegory, symbolical action, representation, dream, or vision. It is plain that, in this case, the term *μυστηριον* is used comparatively; for, however clear the meaning, intended to be conveyed in the apologue, or parable, may be to the intelligent, it is obscure, compared with the literal sense, which, to the unintelligent, proves a kind of veil. The one is, as it were, open to the senses; the other requires penetration and reflection. Perhaps there was some allusion to this import of the term, when our Lord said to his disciples, *To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but to them that are without all these things are done in parables*, Mark iv. 11. The Apostles were let into the secret, and got the spiritual sense of the similitude, whilst the multitude amused themselves with the letter, and searched no further.

In this sense *μυστηριον* is used in these words: *The mystery of the seven stars which thou sawest in my right hand, and the seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars are the angels of the seven churches, and the seven candlesticks are the seven churches*, Rev. i. 20. Again, in the same book: *I will tell thee the mystery of the woman, and of the beast that carrieth her, &c.* Rev. xvii. 7. There is only one other passage, to which this meaning of the word is adapted, and on which I shall have occasion to remark afterwards*. *This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church*, Eph. v. 32. Nor is it any objection to this interpretation of the word *mystery* here, that the Apostle alluded not to any fiction, but to an historical fact, the formation of Eve out of the body of Adam her husband. For, though there is no necessity that the story which supplies us with the body of the parable or allegory (if I may so express myself), be literally true; there is, on the other hand, no necessity that it be false. Passages of true history

* Diff. X. Part III, § 9.

history are sometimes allegorized by the sacred penmen. Witness the story of Abraham and his two sons, Isaac by his wife Sarah, and Ishmael by his bondwoman Hagar, of which the Apostle has made an allegory for representing the comparative natures of the Mosaic dispensation and the Christian, Gal. iv. 22, &c.

§ 8. As to the passage quoted from the Epistle to the Ephesians, let it be observed, that the word *μυστηριον* is there rendered, in the Vulgate *sacramentum*. Although this Latin word was long used very indefinitely, by ecclesiastical writers, it came, at length, with the more judicious, to acquire a meaning more precise and fixed. Firmilian calls Noah's ark the sacrament of the church of Christ*. It is manifest, from the illustration he subjoins, that he means the symbol, type, or emblem, of the church; alluding to an expression of the Apostle Peter, 1 Ep. iii. 20, 21. This may, on a superficial view, be thought nearly coincident with the second sense of the word *μυστηριον* above assigned. But, in fact, it is rather an inversion of it. It is not, in Scripture language, the type that is called the *mystery*, but the antitype; not the sign, in any figurative speech or action, but the thing signified. It would, therefore, have corresponded better to the import of the Greek word, to say, "The church of Christ is the sacrament of Noah's ark;" το *μυστηριον*, the secret antitype, which that vessel, destined for the salvation of the chosen few, from the deluge, was intended to adumbrate. This use, however, not uncommon among the fathers of the third century, has given rise to the definition of a sacrament, as *the visible sign of an invisible grace*; a definition to which some regard has been paid by most parties, Protestant as well as Romish.

§ 9. But to return to *μυστηριον*: it is plain that the earliest perversion of this word, from its genuine and original sense (a *secret*, or something concealed), was in making it to denote some solemn and sacred ceremony. Nor is it difficult to point out the causes that would naturally bring ecclesiastic writers to employ it in a sense, which has so close an affinity to a common application of the word in profane authors. Among the different ceremonies employed by the heathen, in their idolatrous superstitions, some were public and performed in the open courts, or in those parts of the temples to which all had access; others were more secretly performed in places from which the crowd was carefully excluded. To assist, or even be present at these, a select number only was admitted, to each of whom a formal and solemn initiation was necessary. These secret rites, on account of this very circumstance, their secrecy, were generally denominated *mysteries*. They were different, according to what was thought agreeable to the different deities, in whose honour they were celebrated. Thus they had the mysteries of Ceres, the mysteries of Proserpine,

* Cyp. Epist. 75. in some editions 45.

pine, the mysteries of Bacchus, &c. Now there were some things in the Christian worship, which, though essentially different from all Pagan rites, had as much resemblance in this circumstance, the exclusion of the multitude, as would give sufficient handle to the heathen, to style them the Christian mysteries.

§ 10. Probably the term would be first applied only to what was called in the primitive church, *the eucharist*, which we call *the Lord's supper*; and afterwards extended to *baptism* and other sacred ceremonies. In regard to the first mentioned ordinance, it cannot be denied, that in the article of concealment, there was a pretty close analogy. Not only were all infidels, both Jews and Gentiles, excluded from witnessing the commemoration of the death of Christ; but even many believers, particularly the catechumens and the penitents; the former, because not yet initiated by baptism into the church; the latter, because not yet restored to the communion of Christians, after having fallen into some scandalous sin. Besides, the secrecy that Christians were often, on account of the persecutions to which they were exposed, obliged to observe, which made them meet for social worship in the night-time, or very early in the morning, would naturally draw on their ceremonies, from the Gentiles, the name of *mysteries*. And it is not unreasonable to think, that a name which had its rise among their enemies, might afterwards be adopted by themselves. The name *Christians*, first used at Antioch, seems, from the manner wherein it is mentioned in the Acts, ch. xi. 26. to have been at first given contemptuously to the disciples by infidels, and not assumed by themselves. The common titles by which, for many years after that period, they continued to distinguish those of their own society, as we learn both from the Acts, and from Paul's Epistles, were *the faithful*, or believers, *the disciples*, and *the brethren*. Yet, before the expiration of the apostolic age, they adopted the name *Christian*, and gloried in it. The Apostle Peter uses it in one place, 1 Ep. iv. 16. the only place in Scripture wherein it is used by one of themselves. Some other words and phrases which became fashionable amongst ecclesiastical writers, might naturally enough be accounted for in the same manner.

§ 11. But how the Greek *μυστήριον* came first to be translated into Latin *sacramentum*, it is not easy to conjecture. None of the classical significations of the Latin word seems to have any affinity to the Greek term. For whether we understand it simply for a sacred ceremony, *sacramentum* from *sacrare*, as *juramentum* from *jurare*, or for the pledge deposited by the litigants in a process, to ensure obedience to the award of the judge, or for the military oath of fidelity, none of these conveys to us either of the senses of the word *μυστήριον* explained above. At the same

same time it is not denied that in the classical import, the Latin word may admit an allusive application to the more solemn ordinances of religion, as implying in the participants a sacred engagement equivalent to an oath. All that I here contend for, is that the Latin word *sacramentum* does not, in any of these senses, convey exactly the meaning of the Greek name *μυστήριον*, whose place it occupies in the Vulgate. Houbigant, a Romish priest, has, in his Latin translation of the Old Testament, used neither *sacramentum* nor *mysterium*; but where either of these terms had been employed in the Vulgate he substitutes *secretum*, *arcanum*, or *absconditum*. Erasmus, though he wrote at an earlier period, has only once admitted *sacramentum* into his version of the New Testament, and said with the Vulgate *sacramentum septem stellarum*.

Now it is to this practice, not easily accounted for, in the Old Latin translators, that we owe the ecclesiastical term *sacrament*, which, though not scriptural, even Protestants have not thought fit to reject: they have only confined it a little in the application, using it solely of the two primary institutions of the Gospel, *baptism* and *the Lord's supper*; whereas the Romanists apply it also to five other ceremonies, in all seven. Yet even this application is not of equal latitude with that wherein it is used in the Vulgate. The sacrament of God's will, Eph. i. 9. the sacrament of piety, 1 Tim. iii. 16. the sacrament of a dream, Dan. ii. 18. 30. 47. the sacrament of the seven stars, Rev. i. 20. and the sacrament of the woman, Rev. xvii. 7. are phrases which sound very strangely in our ears.

§ 12. So much for the introduction of the term *sacrament* into the Christian theology, which (however convenient it may be for expressing some important rites of our religion), has, in none of the places where it occurs in the Vulgate, a reference to any rite or ceremony whatever, but is always the version of the Greek word *μυστήριον*, or the corresponding term in Hebrew or Chaldee. Now the term *μυστήριον*, as has been shown, is always predicated of some doctrine, or of some matter of fact wherein it is the intention of the writer to denote that the information he gives either was a secret formerly, or is the latent meaning of some type, allegory, figurative description, dream, vision, or fact referred to. No religion abounded more in pompous rites and ordinances than the Jewish, yet they are never, in Scripture, (any more than the ceremonies of the New Testament) denominated either mysteries or sacraments. Indeed with us Protestants, the meanings in present use assigned to these two words, are so totally distinct, the one relating solely to doctrine, the other solely to positive institutions, that it may look a little oddly to bring them together, in the discussion of the same critical question. But to those who are acquainted with Christian anti-

quity, and foreign use in these matters, or have been accustomed to the Vulgate translation, there will be no occasion for an apology.

§ 13. Before I finish this topic, it is proper to take notice of one passage wherein the word *μυστηριον*, it may be plausibly urged, must have the same sense with that which present use gives to the English word *mystery*, and denote something which, though revealed, is inexplicable, and, to human faculties, unintelligible. The words are, *Without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory*, 1 Tim. iii. 16. I do not here enquire into the justness of this reading, though differing from that of the two most ancient versions, the Syriac and the Vulgate, and some of the oldest manuscripts. The words, as they stand, sufficiently answer my purpose. Admit then that some of the great articles enumerated may be justly called mysteries, in the ecclesiastical and present acceptation of the term; it does not follow that this is the sense of the term here. When a word in a sentence of holy writ is susceptible of two interpretations, so that the sentence, whichever of the two ways the word be interpreted, conveys a distinct meaning suitable to the scope of the place; and when one of these interpretations expresses the common import of the word in holy writ, and the other assigns it a meaning which it plainly has not in any other passage of Scripture, the rules of criticism manifestly require that we recur to the common acceptation of the term. Nothing can vindicate us in giving it a singular, or even a very uncommon signification, but that all the more usual meanings would make the sentence involve some absurdity or nonsense. This is not the case here. The purport of the sentence plainly is “Great unquestionably is the divine secret, of which our religion brings the discovery; God was manifest in the flesh, &c.”

P A R T II.

Of Blasphemy.

I PROPOSED, in the second place, to offer a few thoughts on the import of the word *βλασφημία*, frequently translated *blasphemy*. I am far from affirming that in the present use of the English word, there is such a departure from the import of the original, as in that remarked in the preceding article, between *μυστηριον* and *mystery*;

mystery: at the same time it is proper to observe, that in most cases there is not a perfect coincidence. *βλασφημία* properly denotes *calumny, detraction, reproachful or abusive language*, against whomsoever it be vented. There does not seem, therefore, to have been any necessity for adopting the Greek word into our language, one or other of the English expressions above mentioned, being, in every case, sufficient for conveying the sense. Here, as in other instances, we have, with other moderns, implicitly followed the Latins, who had in this no more occasion than we, for a phraseology not originally of their own growth. To have uniformly translated, and not transferred, the words *βλασφημία* and *βλασφημειν*, would have both contributed to perspicuity, and tended to detect the abuse of the terms when wrested from their proper meaning. That *βλασφημία* and its conjugates are in the New Testament very often applied to reproaches not aimed against God, is evident from the following passages: Matt. xii. 31, 32. xxvii. 39. Mark xv. 29. Luke xxii. 65. xxiii. 39. Rom. iii. 8. xiv. 16. 1 Cor. iv. 13. x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4. 14. Jude 9. 10. Acts vi. 11. 13. 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11.; in the much greater part of which the English translators, sensible that they could admit no such application, have not used the words *blaspheme* or *blasphemy*, but *rail, revile, speak evil*. &c. In one of the passages quoted, a reproachful charge brought even against the devil, is called *κρίσις βλασφημίας*, Jude 9. and rendered by them *railing accusation*. That the word in some other places (Acts xiii. 45. xviii. 6. xxvi. 11. Col. iii. 8. 1 Tim. i. 13. 2 Tim. iii. 2.) ought to have been rendered in the same general terms, I shall afterwards show. But with respect to the principal point, that the word comprehends all verbal abuse, against whomsoever uttered, God, angel, man, or devil; as it is universally admitted by the learned, it would be losing time to attempt to prove. The passages referred to will be more than sufficient to all who can read them in the original Greek.

§ 2. But it deserves our notice, and it is principally for this reason that I judged it proper to make some remarks on the word, that even when *βλασφημία* refers to reproachful speeches against God, and so comes nearer the meaning of our word *blasphemy*; still the primitive notion of this crime has undergone a considerable change in our way of conceiving it. The causes it would not perhaps be difficult to investigate, but the effect is undeniable. In theological disputes nothing is more common, to the great scandal of the Christian name, than the imputation of blasphemy thrown by each side upon the other. The injustice of the charge on both sides will be manifest on a little reflection, which it is the more necessary to bestow, as the commonness of the accusation, and the latent, but contagious, motives of employing it, have gradually perverted our conceptions of the thing.

§ 3. It has been remarked already, that the import of the word *βλασφημία* is *maledicentia*, in the largest acceptation, comprehending all sorts of verbal abuse, imprecation, reviling, and calumny. Now let it be observed, that when such abuse is mentioned as uttered against God, there is properly no change made on the signification of the word; the change is only in the application, that is, in the reference to a different object. The idea conveyed in the explanation now given is always included, against whomsoever the crime be committed. In this manner every term is understood that is applicable to both God and man. Thus the meaning of the word *disobey* is the same, whether we speak of disobeying God or of disobeying man. The same may be said of *believe*, *honour*, *fear*, &c. As therefore the sense of the term is the same, though differently applied, what is essential to constitute the crime of detraction in the one case, is essential also in the other. But it is essential to this crime as commonly understood, when committed by one man against another, that there be in the injurious person the will or disposition to detract from the person abused. Mere mistake in regard to character, especially when the mistake is not conceived by him who entertains it, to lessen the character, nay, is supposed, however erroneously, to exalt it, is never construed by any into the crime of defamation. Now, as blasphemy is, in its essence, the same crime, but immensely aggravated, by being committed against an object infinitely superior to man, what is fundamental to the very existence of the crime, will be found in this, as in every other species, which comes under the general name. There can be no blasphemy, therefore, where there is not an impious purpose to derogate from the divine majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God.

§ 4. Hence, we must be sensible of the injustice of so frequently using the odious epithet *blasphemous* in our controversial writings; an evil imputable solely to the malignity of temper, which a habit of such disputation rarely fails to produce. Hence it is, that the Arminian and the Calvinist, the Arian and the Athanasian, the Protestant and the Papist, the Jesuit and the Jansenist, throw and retort on each other the unchristian reproach. Yet it is no more than justice to say, that each of the disputants is so far from intending to diminish, in the opinion of others, the honour of the Almighty, that he is, on the contrary, fully convinced, that his own principles are better adapted to raise it than those of his antagonist, and, for that very reason, he is so strenuous in maintaining them. But to blacken, as much as possible, the designs of an adversary, in order the more effectually to render his opinions hateful, is one of the many common, but detestable resources of theological controvertists. It is to be hoped that the sense, not only of the injustice of this measure, but of its inefficacy

cacy for producing conviction in the mind of a reasonable antagonist, and of the bad impression it tends to make on the impartial and judicious, in regard both to the arguers and to the argument, will at length induce men to adopt more candid methods of managing their disputes; and even, when provoked by the calumnious and angry epithets of an opposer, not to think of retaliating; but to remember, that they will derive more honour from imitating, as is their duty, the conduct of Him who, when he was reviled, reviled not again.

§ 5. But, after observing that this perversion of the word *blasphemy* results, for the most part, from the intemperate heat and violence with which polemic writers manage their religious contests; it is no more than doing justice to theologians and ecclesiastics, though it may look like a digression, to remark that this evidence of undue acrimony is by no means peculiar to them. So uncontrollable is this propensity in men of violent passions, that even sceptics cannot pretend an entire exemption from it. Some allowances ought doubtless to be made for the rage of bigots inflamed by contradiction, from the infinite consequence they always ascribe to their own religious dogmas; but when a reasoner, an enquirer into truth, and consequently a dispassionate and unprejudiced person (as doubtless such a man as Bolingbroke chose to be accounted), falls into the same absurdity, adopts the furious language of fanaticism, and rails against those whose theory he combats, calling them impious blasphemers, to what allowance can we justly think him entitled? I know of none, except our pity, to which indeed a manner so much beneath the dignity of the philosopher, and unbecoming the patience and self-command implied in cool inquiry, seems to give him a reasonable claim. Since, however, with this defect of discernment, candour and moderation, philosophers as well as zealots, infidels as well as fanatics, and men of the world as well as priests, are sometimes chargeable, it may not be unreasonable to bestow a few reflections on it.

§ 6. First, to recur to analogy and the reason of the thing: I believe there are few who have not sometimes had occasion to hear a man warmly, and with the very best intentions, commend another, for an action which in reality merited not praise, but blame. Yet no man would call the person who, through simplicity, acted this part, a slanderer, whether the fact he related of his friend were true or false, since he seriously meant to raise esteem of him; for an intention to depreciate, is essential to the idea of slander. To praise injudiciously is one thing, to slander is another. The former perhaps will do as much hurt to the character, which is the subject of it, as the latter; but the merit of human actions depends entirely on the motive. There is a maliciousness in the calumniator, which no person who reflects is
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in danger of confounding with the unconscious blundering of a man whose praise detracts from the person whom he means to honour. The blasphemer is no other than the calumniator of Almighty God. To constitute the crime, it is as necessary that this species of calumny be intentional, as that the other be. He must be one, therefore, who by his impious talk endeavours to inspire others with the same irreverence towards the Deity, or perhaps abhorrence of him, which he indulges in himself. And though, for the honour of human nature, it is to be hoped that very few arrive at this enormous guilt, it ought not to be dissembled, that the habitual profanation of the name and attributes of God, by common swearing, is but too manifest an approach towards it. There is not an entire coincidence. The latter of these vices may be considered as resulting solely from the defect of what is good in principle and disposition; the former, from the acquisition of what is evil in the extreme: but there is a close connection between them, and an insensible gradation from the one to the other. To accustom one's self to treat the Sovereign of the universe with irreverent familiarity, is the first step; malignly to arraign his attributes, and revile his providence, is the last.

§ 7. But it may be said, that an inquiry into the proper notion of βλασφημια, in the sacred writings, is purely a matter of criticism, concerning the import of a word, whose signification must be ultimately determined by scriptural use. Our reasonings, therefore, are of no validity, unless they are supported by fact. True; but it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that as the word βλασφημειν, when men are the objects, is manifestly used for intentional abuse, the presumption is, that the signification is the same, when God is the object. Nay, according to the rules of criticism, it is evidence sufficient, unless a positive proof could be brought, that the word, in this application, undergoes a change of meaning. In the present instance, however, it is unnecessary to recur to the presumption, as positive testimony can be produced, that both the verb and the noun have the same meaning in these different applications.

§ 8. Let it be observed then that sometimes, in the same sentence, the word is applied in common both to divine and to human beings, which are specified as the objects, and construed with it, and sometimes the word, having been applied to one of these, is repeated in an application to the other; the sacred writers thereby shewing, that the evil is the same in kind in both cases, and that the cases are discriminated solely by the dignity of the object. Thus our Lord says, as in the common translation, *All manner of blasphemy, πασα βλασφημια, shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven*, Matt. xii. 31. (See the passage in this Translation, and the note upon it.) The difference in point of atrociousness is here exceedingly

ceedingly great, the one being represented as unpardonable, and the other as what may be pardoned; but this is exhibited as resulting purely from the infinite disparity of the objects. The application of the same name to the two crimes compared, gives us to understand the immense disproportion there is, in respect of guilt, between the same criminal behaviour, when aimed against our fellow-creatures, and when directed against the Author of our being. As the English word *blasphemy* is not of the same extent of signification with the Greek, and is not properly applied to any abuse vented against man, it would have been better here to have chosen a common term which would have admitted equally an application to either, such as *slander* or *detractio*n. The expression of the evangelist Mark, in the parallel place, Mark iii. 28, 29. is to the same purpose. Again, in the Acts, *We have heard him speak blasphemous words*, *ἐναντιὰ βλασφημῶν*, *against Moses and against God*, Acts vi. 11. Like to this is that passage in the Old Testament, where the false witnesses who were suborned to testify against Naboth say, *Thou didst blaspheme God and the king*, 1 Kings xxi. 10. Though the word in the Septuagint is not *βλασφημῶν*, it is a term which, in that version, is sometimes used synonymously, as indeed are all the terms which in the original denote *curfing*, *reviling*, *defaming*.

§ 9. Further, with the account given above, of the nature of *blasphemy*, the style of Scripture perfectly agrees. No errors concerning the divine perfections can be grosser than those of polytheists and idolaters, such as the ancient pagans. Errors on this, if on any subject, are surely fundamental. Yet those errors are never in holy writ brought under the denomination of blasphemy; nor are those who maintain them ever styled blasphemers. Nay, among those who are no idolaters, but acknowledge the unity and spirituality of the divine nature, as did all the Jewish sects, it is not sufficient to constitute this crime, that a man's opinions be, in their consequences, derogatory from the divine majesty, if they be not perceived to be so by him who holds them, and broached on purpose to diminish men's veneration of God. The opinions of the Sadducees appear in effect to have detracted from the justice, the goodness, and even the power of the Deity, as their tendency was but too manifestly to diminish in men the fear of God, and consequently to weaken their obligations to obey him. Yet neither our Saviour, nor any of the inspired writers, calls them blasphemous, as those opinions did not appear to themselves to detract, nor were advanced with the intention of detracting from the honour of God. Our Lord only said to the Sadducees, *Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God*, Matt. xxii 19. Nay, it does not appear that even their adversaries the Pharisees, though the first who seem to have perverted the word (as shall be remarked afterwards), and
though

though immoderately attached to their own tenets, ever reproached them as blasphemers, on account of their erroneous opinions. Nor is indeed the epithet *blasphemous*, or any synonymous term, ever coupled in Scripture, as is common in modern use, with *doctrines, thoughts, opinions*. It is never applied but to words and speeches. *A blasphemous opinion, or blasphemous doctrine*, are phrases, which (how familiar soever to us) are as unsuitable to the scriptural idiom, as a *railing opinion, or slanderous doctrine*, is to ours.

§ 10. But to proceed from what is not, to what is, called blasphemy in Scripture; the first divine law published against it, *He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, (or Jehovah, as it is in the Hebrew) shall be put to death*, Lev. xxiv. 16. when considered, along with the incident that occasioned it, suggests a very atrocious offence in words, no less than abuse or imprecations vented against the Deity. For, in what way soever the crime of the man there mentioned be interpreted, whether as committed against the true God, the God of Israel, or against any of the false gods whom his Egyptian father worshipped, the law in the words now quoted is sufficiently explicit; and the circumstances of the story plainly shew, that the words which he had used were derogatory from the Godhead, and shocking to the hearers.

And if we add to this, the only other memorable instance, in sacred history, namely that of Rabshakeh, it will lead us to conclude that it is solely a malignant attempt, in words, to lessen men's reverence of the true God, and, by vilifying his perfections, to prevent their placing confidence in him, which is called in Scripture blasphemy, when the word is employed to denote a sin committed directly against God. This was manifestly the attempt of Rabshakeh when he said, "Neither let Hezekiah make you trust in the Lord," (the word is Jehovah) "saying, Jehovah will surely deliver us. Hath any of the gods of the nations delivered his land out of the hand of the king of Assyria? Where are the gods of Hamath and of Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, Hena, and Ivah? Have they delivered Samaria out of my hand? Who are they among all the gods of the countries, that have delivered their country out of mine hand, that Jehovah should deliver Jerusalem out of mine hand?" 2 Kings xviii. 30. 33, 34, 35.

§ 11. Blasphemy, I acknowledge, like every other species of defamation, may proceed from ignorance combined with rashness and presumption; but it invariably implies (which is not implied in mere error) an expression of contempt or detestation, and a desire of producing the same passions in others. As this conduct, however, is more heinous in the knowing than in the ignorant, there are degrees of guilt even in blasphemy. God's
name.

name is said to be blasphemed among the heathen, through the scandalous conduct of his worshippers. And when Nathan said to David, *By this deed thou hast given occasion to the enemies of Jehovah to blaspheme*, 2 Sam. xii. 14. his design was evidently to charge on that monarch a considerable share of the guilt of those blasphemies to which his heinous transgression in the matter of Uriah would give rise, among their idolatrous neighbours; for here, as in other cases, the flagrant iniquity of the servant, rarely fails to bring reproach on the master, and on the service. It is, without doubt, a most flagitious kind of blasphemy whereof those men are guilty who, instead of being brought to repentance by the plagues wherewith God visits them for their sins, are fired with a monstrous kind of revenge against their Maker, which they vent in vain curses and impious reproaches. Thus, in the Apocalypse, we are informed of those who *blasphemed the God of heaven, because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds*. Rev. xvi. 11.

§ 12. It will perhaps be objected, that even the inspired penmen of the New Testament sometimes use the word with greater latitude than has here been given it. The Jews are said, by the sacred historian, *to have spoken against the things preached by Paul, contradicting and blaspheming*, Acts xiii. 45. And it is said of others of the same nation, *When they opposed themselves and blasphemed*, xviii. 6. Now, as zeal for God and religion was the constant pretext of the Jews for vindicating their opposition to Christianity, it cannot be imagined they would have thrown out any thing like direct blasphemy or reproaches against God. It may therefore be plausibly urged, that it must have been (if we may borrow a term from the law) such constructive blasphemy, as when we call fundamental errors in things divine, by that odious name. But the answer is easy. It has been shewn already, that the Greek word implies no more than to *revile, defame, or give abusive language*. As the term is general, and equally applicable, whether God be the object of the abuse, or man, it ought never to be rendered *blaspheme*, unless when the context manifestly restrains it to the former application. There is this advantage, if the case were dubious, in preserving the general term, that if God be meant as the object of their reproaches, still the version is just. In the story of the son of the Israelitish woman, the terms *curfing God* and *blaspheming him*, Lev. xxiv. 11. 14. are used synonymously; and, in regard to Rabshakeh's blasphemy, the phrases, *to reproach the living God* or *Jehovah*, and to *blaspheme him*, 2 Kings xix. 4. 16. 22. 23. are both used in the same way; but, on the other hand, if the writer meant abuse levelled against men, to render it *blaspheme* is a real mis-translation, inasmuch as, by representing the divine Majesty as

the object, which the English word *blaspheme* always does, the sense is totally altered.

Our translators have, on other occasions, been so sensible of this, that in none of the places marked in the margin * have they used *blaspheme*, or any of its conjugates; but, instead of it, the words *rail*, *revile*, *report slanderously*, *speak evil*, *defame*, though the word in the original is the same, nay, in some places, where Jesus Christ is the object, they translate it in the same manner, Matt. xxvii. 39. Mark xv. 29. Luke xxiii. 39. There can be no doubt, that in the two passages quoted from the Acts, the apostles themselves were the objects of the abuse which fiery zeal prompted their countrymen to throw out against the propagators of a doctrine considered by them as subversive of the religion of their fathers. Both passages are justly rendered by Calaneo; the first, "Judæi contradicebant iis quæ a Paulo dicebantur, reclamantes ac conviciantes;" the second, "Quumque illi resisterent ac maledicerent."

§ 13. The same will serve for answer to the objection founded on Paul's saying of himself before his conversion that he was a *blasphemer*, 1 Tim. i. 13. the word ought to have been rendered *defamer*. Of this we can make no doubt, when we consider the honourable testimony which this apostle, after his conversion, did not hesitate to give of his own piety when a Jew, *Brethren*, said he, *I have lived in all good conscience before God* (rather towards God, τῷ Θεῷ, not ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ) *until this day*, Acts xxiii. 1. This expression, therefore, regards what is strictly called *duty to God*. But could he have made this declaration, if his conscience had charged him with blasphemy, of all crimes against God the most heinous? Should it be asked, In what sense could he charge himself with defamation? Whom did he defame? The answer is obvious. Not only the Lord Jesus Christ the head, but the members also of the Christian community, both ministers and disciples. Not that he considered himself as guilty of this crime by implication, for disbelieving that Jesus is the Messiah; for neither Jews nor Pagans are ever represented as either blasphemers or calumniators, merely for their unbelief; but because he was conscious that his zeal had carried him much further, even to exhibit the author of this institution as an impostor and false prophet, and his apostles as his accomplices, in maliciously imposing upon the nation, and subverting the true religion. That he acted this part, the account given of his proceedings, not to mention this declaration, affords the most ample evidence. We are told that he breathed out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples, Acts ix. 1.; and he says himself, that he was exceedingly

* Rom. iii. 8. xiv. 6. 1 Cor. iv. 13. x. 30. Eph. iv. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 4. Tit. iii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 4. 14. 2 Pet. ii. 10, 11. Jude, 9, 10.

ingly mad against them, and even compelled them to join in the abuse and reproaches, (Acts xxvi. 11.) of which he accuses himself as setting the example. And though I doubt not that in this, Paul acted according to his judgment of things at the time, for he tells us expressly that he thought verily with himself that he *ought* to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus, Acts xxvi. 9. this ignorance did indeed extenuate his crime, but not excuse it; for it is not he only who invents, but he also who malignantly and rashly, or without examination and sufficient evidence, propagates an evil report against his neighbour, who is justly accounted a defamer.

Nor is the above-mentioned the only place wherein the word has been misinterpreted *blasphemer*. We have another example, in the character which the same apostle gives of some seducers who were to appear in the church, and of whom he tells us, that they would *have a form of godliness, but without the power*, 2 Tim. iii. 5. Now, blasphemy is alike incompatible with both, though experience has shewn, in all ages, that slander and abuse vented against men, however inconsistent with the power of godliness, are perfectly compatible with its form. Some other places in the New Testament, in which the word ought to have been translated in its greatest latitude, that is, in the sense of defamation, or reviling in general, are marked in the margin*. Indeed, as was hinted before, it ought always to be so, unless where the scope of the passage limits it to that impious defamation, whereof the Deity is the object.

§ 14. I know but one other argument that can be drawn from Scripture, in favour of what I call the controversial sense of the word blasphemy, that is, as applied to errors, which, in their consequences, may be thought to derogate from the perfections or providence of God. In this way the Pharisees, oftener than once, employ the term against our Lord; and, if their authority were to us a sufficient warrant, I should admit this plea to be decisive. But the question of importance to us is, Have we the authority of any of the sacred writers for this application of the word? Did our Lord himself, or any of his apostles, ever retort this charge upon the Pharisees? Yet it cannot be denied, that the doctrine then in vogue with them gave, in many things, if this had been a legitimate use of the term *blasphemy*, a fair handle for such recrimination. They made void, we are told, the commandment of God, to make room for their tradition, Matt. xv. 6. Mark vii. 13. and thus, in effect, set up their own authority in opposition to that of their Creator. They disparaged the moral duties of the law, in order to exalt positive and ceremonial

* Matt. xii. 31. xv. 19. Mark iii. 28, 29. vii. 22. Luke xxii. 65. Col. iii. 8. James ii. 7.

nial observances, Matt. xxiii. 23. Luke xi. 42. Now this cannot be done by the teachers of religion, without some misrepresentation of the moral attributes of the Lawgiver, whose character is thereby degraded in the minds of the people. Yet there is nowhere the most distant insinuation given that, on any of these accounts, they were liable to the charge of blasphemy.

But no sooner did Jesus say to the paralytic, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*, than the Scribes laid hold of the expression. *This man blasphemeth*, said they; *who can forgive sins but God?* Matt. ix. 3. Mark ii. 7. Their plea was, it is an invasion of the prerogative of God. Grotius observes justly of this application of the term, *Dicitur hic βλασφημεῖν, non qui Deo maledicit, sed qui quod Dei est, sibi arrogat.* Such undoubtedly was their notion of the matter. But I do not see any warrant they had for thus extending the signification of the word. In the simple and primitive import of the name *blasphemer*, it could not be more perfectly defined in Latin, than by these three words, *qui Deo maledicit*; and therefore, I cannot agree with the generality of expositors, who seem to think, that if Jesus had not been the Messiah, or authorized of God to declare to men the remission of their sins, the scribes would have been right in their verdict. On the contrary, if one, unauthorized of Heaven, had said what our Lord is recorded to have said to the paralytic, he would not, in my opinion, have been liable to that accusation; he would have been chargeable with great presumption, I acknowledge, and if he had been conscious that he had no authority, he would have been guilty of gross impiety; but every species of impiety is not blasphemy. Let us call things by their proper names. If any of us usurp a privilege that belongs exclusively to another man, or if we pretend to have his authority when we have it not, our conduct is very criminal; but nobody would confound this crime with calumny. No more can the other be termed blasphemy, especially when it results from misapprehension, and is unaccompanied with a malevolent intention, either to depreciate the character, or to defeat the purpose, of the Almighty. The false prophets, who knowingly told lies in the name of God, and pretended a commission from him, which they knew they had not, were liable to death; but they are no where said to blaspheme, that is, to revile, or to defame their Maker. Much less could it be said of those who told untruths through mistake, and without any design of detracting from God.

This polemic application of the term *blasphemy*, must, therefore have originated in the schools of the rabbies, and appears to have been in the time of our Lord and his apostles, in general vogue with the scribes. Nay, which is exceedingly repugnant to the original import of the name, they even applied it to expressions, the immediate object whereof is not persons, but things.

Thus,

Thus, the historian, in relating the charge brought against Stephen, acquaints us, Acts vi. 13. that *they set up false witnesses, which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words against this holy place, and the law*: an application of the word, perhaps till then unexampled. But we need not wonder at this liberty, when we consider that the perversion of the term answered for them a double purpose; first, it afforded them one easy expedient for rendering a person whom they disliked odious to the people, amongst whom the very suspicion of blasphemy excited great abhorrence; secondly, it increased their own jurisdiction. Blasphemy was a capital crime, the judgment whereof was in the sanhedrim, of whom the chief priests, and some of the scribes, always made the principal part. The farther the import of the word was extended, the more cases it brought under their cognizance, and the more persons into their power. Hence it proceeded, that the word *blasphemy*, which originally meant a crime no less than maliciously reviling the Lord of the universe, was at length construed to imply the broaching of any tenet, or the expressing of any sentiment (with whatever view it was done) which did not quadrate with the reigning doctrine. For that doctrine, being presupposed to be the infallible will of God, whatever opposed it was said, by implication, to revile its Author. Such will ever be the case, when the principles of human policy are grafted upon religion.

§ 15. When we consider this, and remark, at the same time, with what plainness our Lord condemned, in many particulars, both the maxims and the practice of the Pharisees, we cannot be surpris'd that, on more occasions than one, that vindictive and envious sect traduced him to the people, as a person chargeable with this infernal guilt. Once, indeed, some of them proceeded so far as to *take up stones to stone him*, John x. 31. 33.: for that was the punishment which the law had awarded against blasphemers. But he thought proper then to elude their malice, and, by the answer he gave to their unmerited reproach, evidently shew'd that their application of the term was unscriptural, John x. 34, 35, 36. Those who, on other occasions, watch'd our Lord to entrap him in his words, seem to have had it principally in view to extract either blasphemy or treason from what he said. By the first, they could expose him to the fury of the populace, or, perhaps, subject him to the Jewish rulers; and, by the second, render him obnoxious to the Roman procurator. What use they made of both articles at last, is known to every body. Nor let it be imagin'd that, at his trial, the circumstances, apparently slight, of the high-priest's rending his clothes, when he pronounced him a blasphemer, an example which must have been quickly followed by the whole sanhedrim, and all within hearing, was not a matter of the utmost consequence, for effecting their

their malicious purpose. We have reason to believe, that it contributed not a little, in working so wonderful a change in the multitude, and in bringing them to view the man with detestation, to whom so short while before they were almost ready to pay divine honours.

§ 16. But here it may be asked, 'Can we not then say, with truth, of any of the false teachers, who have arisen in the church, that they vented blasphemies?' To affirm that we cannot, would, I acknowledge, be to err in the opposite extreme. Justin Martyr says of Marcion *, that he taught many to blaspheme the Maker of the world. Now, it is impossible to deny the justice of this charge, if we admit the truth of what Irenæus †, and others, affirm concerning that bold heresiarch, to wit, that he maintained, that the author of our being, the God of Israel, who gave the law by Moses, and spoke by the Prophets, is one who perpetrates injuries, and delights in war, is fickle in his opinions, and inconsistent with himself. If this representation of Marcion's doctrine be just, who would not say that he reviled his Creator, and attempted to alienate from him the love and confidence of his creatures? The blasphemy of Rabshakeh was aimed only against the power of God; Marcion's, not so much against his power, as against his wisdom and his goodness. Both equally manifested an intention of subverting the faith and veneration of his worshippers. Now, it is only what can be called a direct attack, not such as is made out by implication, upon the perfections of the Lord of the universe, and what clearly displays the intention of lessening men's reverence of him, that is blasphemy, in the meaning (I say not of the rabbies, or of the canonists, but) of the sacred code. In short, such false and injurious language, as, when applied to men, would be denominated *reviling, abusing, defaming*, is, when applied to God, *blasphemy*. The same terms in the original tongues are used for both; and it would perhaps have been better, for preventing mistakes, that in modern tongues also, the same terms were employed. Indeed, if we can depend on the justness of the accounts, which remain of the oldest sectaries, there were some who went greater lengths in this way than even Marcion.

§ 17. Before I finish this topic, it will naturally occur to enquire, What that is, in particular, which our Lord denominates *blasphemy against the Holy Spirit*? Matt. xii. 31, 32. Mark iii. 28, 29. Luke xii. 10. It is foreign from my present purpose, to enter minutely into the discussion of this difficult question. Let it suffice here to observe, that this blasphemy is certainly not of the constructive kind, but direct, manifest, and malignant. First, it is mentioned as comprehended under the same genus with abuse against man, and contradistinguished only by the object.

* Apol. 2.

† Lib. i. c. 29.

ject. Secondly, it is further explained, by being called *speaking against*, in both cases. Ὁς ἀν εἶπη λόγον κατὰ τὴν υἱὸν τὴν ἀνθρώπου, — εἰ δ' ἀν εἶπη κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. The expressions are the same, in effect, in all the Evangelists who mention it, and imply such an opposition as is both intentional and malevolent. This cannot have been the case of all who disbelieved the mission of Jesus, and even decried his miracles; many of whom, we have reason to think, were afterwards converted by the Apostles. But it is not impossible, that it may have been the wretched case of some who, infligated by worldly ambition and avarice, have slandered what they knew to be the cause of God, and, against conviction, reviled his work as the operation of evil spirits.

§ 18. A late writer *, more ingenious than judicious, has, after making some just remarks on this subject, proceeded so far as to maintain that there can be no such crime as *blasphemy*. His argument (by substituting *defamation* for blasphemy, *defame* for blaspheme, and *man* for God) serves equally to prove that there is no such crime as defamation, and stands thus: ‘Defamation presupposes malice; where there is malice, there is misapprehension. Now the person who, misapprehending another defames him, does no more than put the *man's* name (I use the author's phraseology) to his own misapprehensions of him. This is so far from speaking evil of *the man*, that it is not speaking of him at all. It is only speaking evil of a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and existing nowhere but there †.’ From this clear manner of reasoning the following corollary, very comfortable to those whom the world has hitherto misnamed slanderers, may fairly be deduced. If you have a spite against any man, you may freely indulge your malevolence, in saying of him all the evil you can think of. That you cannot be justly charged with defamation, is demonstrable. If all that you say be true, he is not injured by you, and therefore you are no detractor. If the whole or part be false, what is false does not reach him. Your abuse in that case is levelled against an ideal being, a chimera to which you only affix his name (a mere trifle, for a name is but a sound), but with which the man's real character is not concerned. Therefore, when you have said the worst that malice and resentment can suggest, you are not chargeable with

* Independent Whig, No. 55.

† That the reader may be satisfied that I do not wrong this author, I shall annex, in his own words, part of his reasoning concerning blasphemy. “As it is a crime that implies malice against God, I am not able to conceive how any man can commit it. A man who knows God, cannot speak evil of him. And a man who knows him not, and reviles him, does therefore revile him, because he knows him not. He therefore puts the name of God to his own misapprehensions of God. This is so far from speaking evil of the Deity, that it is not speaking of the Deity at all. It is only speaking evil of a wild idea, of a creature of the imagination, and existing nowhere but there.”

with defamation, which was the point to be proved. Thus the argument of that volatile author goes further to emancipate men from all the restraints of reason and conscience than, I believe, he himself was aware. He only intended by it, as one would think, to release us from the fear of God; it is equally well calculated for freeing us from all regard to man. Are we from this to form an idea of the liberty, both sacred and civil, of which that author affected to be considered as the patron and friend; and of the deference he professes to entertain for the Scriptures and primitive Christianity? I hope not; for he is far from being at all times consistent with himself. Of the many evidences which might be brought of this charge, one is, that no man is readier than he to throw the imputation of blasphemy on those whose opinions differ from his own*.

P A R T III.

Of Schism.

THE next term I proposed to examine critically was σχισμα, *schism*. The Greek word frequently occurs in the New Testament, though it has only once been rendered *schism* by our translators. However, the frequency of the use among theologians has made it a kind of technical term in relation to ecclesiastical matters: and the way it has been bandied as a term of ignominy from sect to sect reciprocally, makes it a matter of some consequence to ascertain, if possible, the genuine meaning it bears in holy writ. In order to this, let us, abstracting alike from the uncandid representations of all zealous party-men, have recourse to the oracles of truth, the source of light and direction.

§ 2. As to the proper acceptation of the word σχισμα, when applied to objects merely material, there is no difference of sentiments amongst interpreters. Every one admits that it ought to be rendered *rent*, *breach*, or *separation*. In this sense it occurs in the Gospels, as where our Lord says, *No man putteth a piece*

* In the dedication of the book, to the lower house of convocation, the author advises them to clear themselves from the imputation of maintaining certain ungodly tenets, by exposing the *blasphemies* of those of their own body: in No. 23, we are told that false zeal talks *blasphemy* in the name of the Lord; in No. 24, that persecutors *blasphemously* pretend to be serving God; and in No. 27, that it is a kind of *blasphemy* to attempt to persuade people that God takes pleasure in vexing his creatures. More examples of the commission of this impracticable crime might be produced from that author, if necessary.

piece of new cloth to an old garment; for that which is put in to fill it up, taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse, Matt ix. 16. *Χείρον σχίσμα γίνεται.* The same phrase occurs in the parallel passage in Mark, ch. ii. 21. From this sense it is transferred by metaphor to things incorporeal. Thus it is used once and again by the Evangelist John, to signify a difference in opinion expressed in words. Of the contest among the Jews, concerning Jesus, some maintaining that he was, others that he was not, the Messiah; the sacred historian says, *Σχίσμα ἔν ἐν τῷ ὄχλῳ ἐγένετο δι' αὐτοῦ.* So there was a division among the people because of him, John vii. 43. Here it is plain the word is used in a sense perfectly indifferent; for it was neither in the true opinion supported by one side, nor in the false opinion supported by the other, that the *schism* or division lay, but in the opposition of these two opinions. In this sense of the word, there would have been no *schism*, if they had been all of one opinion, whether it had been the true opinion, or the false. The word is used precisely in the same signification by this Apostle, in two other places of his Gospel, ch. ix. 16. x. 19.

§ 3. But it is not barely to a declared deference in judgment, that even the metaphorical use of the word is confined. As *breach* or *rupture* is the literal import of it in our language; wherever these words may be figuratively applied, the term *σχίσμα* seems likewise capable of an application. It invariably presupposes that among those things whereof it is affirmed, there subsisted an union formerly, and as invariably denotes that the union subsists no longer. In this manner the Apostle Paul uses the word, applying it to a particular church or Christian congregation. Thus he adjures the Corinthians by the name of the Lord Jesus, that there be no divisions or schisms among them, 1 Cor. i. 10. *ἵνα μὴ ἦ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα;* and in another place of the same Epistle, ch. xi. 18. he tells them, *I bear that there are divisions or schisms among you, ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπαρχειν.* In order to obtain a proper idea of what is meant by a breach or schism in this application, we must form a just notion of that which constituted the union whereof the schism was a violation. Now the great and powerful cement which united the souls of Christians, was their mutual love. *Their hearts, in the emphatical language of holy writ, were knit together in love,* Col. ii. 2. This had been declared by their Master to be the distinguishing badge of their profession. *By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another,* John xiii. 35. Their partaking of the same baptism, their professing the same faith, their enjoying the same promises, and their joining in the same religious service, formed a connection merely external and of little significance, unless, agreeably to the Apostle's expression, Eph. iii. 17. it was rooted and grounded in love. As this, there,

fore, is the great criterion of the Christian character, and the foundation of the Christian unity, whatever alienates the affections of Christians from one another, is manifestly subversive of both, and may consequently, with the greatest truth and energy, be denominated *schism*. It is not so much what makes an outward distinction or separation (though this also may in a lower degree be so denominated), as what produces an alienation of the heart, which constitutes schism in the sense of the Apostle: for this strikes directly at the vitals of Christianity. Indeed both the evil and the danger of the former, that is, an external separation, is principally to be estimated from its influence upon the latter, that is, in producing an alienation of heart; for it is in the union of affection among Christians, that the spirit, the life, and the power, of religion, are principally placed.

§ 4. It may be said, Does it not rather appear, from the passage first quoted, to denote such a breach of that visible unity in the outward order settled in their assemblies, as results from some jarring in their religious opinions, and by consequence in the expressions they adopted? This, I own, is what the words in immediate connection, considered by themselves, would naturally suggest. *I beseech you, brethren, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions (schisms) among you, and that ye be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment,* 1 Cor. i. 10. It cannot be denied that a certain unanimity, or a declared assent to the great articles of the Christian profession, was necessary in every one, in order to his being admitted to, and kept in the communion of, the church. But then it must be allowed, on the other hand, that those articles were at that time, few, simple, and perspicuous. It is one of the many unhappy consequences of the disputes that have arisen in the church, and of the manner in which these have been managed, that such terms of communion have since been multiplied, in every part of the Christian world, and not a little perplexed with metaphysical subtleties, and scholastic quibbles. Whether this evil consequence was, in its nature, avoidable, or, if it was, in what manner it might have been avoided, are questions, though important, foreign to the present purpose. Certain it is, however, that several phrases used by the Apostles, in relation to this subject, such as *ἁμοφρονες, το αὐτο φρονεοντες*, and some others, commonly understood to mean unanimous in opinion, denote, more properly, coinciding in affection, concurring in love, desire, hatred, and aversion, agreeably to the common import of the verb *φρονειν* both in sacred authors and in profane, which is more strictly rendered *to savour, to relish*, than *to be of opinion*.

§ 5. Further, let it be observed, that in matters whereby the essentials of the faith are not affected, much greater indulgence to diversity of opinion was given, in those pure and primitive times, than

than has been allowed since, when the externals, or the form of religion, came to be raised on the ruins of the essentials, or the power, and a supposed correctness of judgment made of greater account than purity of heart. In the apostolic age, which may be styled the reign of charity, their mutual forbearance in regard to such differences, was at once an evidence, and an exercise, of this divine principle. *Him that is weak in the faith, says our Apostle, receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak, eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not; and let not him who eateth not, judge him that eateth, Rom. xiv. 1, 2, 3. One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. As to these disputable points, let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind, (Rom. xiv. 5.) and as far as he himself is concerned, act according to his persuasion. But he does not permit even him who is in the right, to disturb his brother's peace, by such unimportant inquiries. Hast thou faith? says he; the knowledge and conviction of the truth on the point in question? Have it to thyself before God. Happy is he who condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth, Rom. xiv. 22. And in another place, Let us, therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded; and if in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing, Phil. iii. 15, 16. We are to remember, that as the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, so neither is it logical acuteness in distinction, or grammatical accuracy of expression; but it is righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. For he that in these things serveth Christ, is acceptable to God, and approved of men, Rom. xiv. 17, 18.*

§ 6. Now, if we enquire, by an examination of the context, into the nature of those differences among the Corinthians, to which Paul affixes the name *σχισματα*, nothing is more certain, than that no cause of difference is suggested, which has any the least relation to the doctrines of religion, or to any opinions that might be formed concerning them. The fault which he stigmatised with that odious appellation, consisted then solely in an undue attachment to particular persons, under whom, as chiefs or leaders, the people severally ranked themselves, and thus, without making separate communions, formed distinctions among themselves, to the manifest prejudice of the common bond of charity, classing themselves under different heads. *Now this I say, adds the Apostle, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ, 1 Cor. i. 12.* It deserves to be remarked, that of the differences among the Roman converts, concerning the observance of days, and the distinction of meats, which we should think more material, as they
more

more nearly affect the justness of religious sentiments, and the purity of religious practice, the Apostle makes so little account, that he will not permit them to harass one another with such questions; but enjoins them to allow every one to follow his own judgment; at the same time that he is greatly alarmed at differences among the Corinthians, in which, as they result solely from particular attachments and personal esteem, neither the faith nor the practice of a Christian appears to have an immediate concern. But it was not without reason that he made this distinction. The hurt threatened by the latter was directly against that extensive love commanded by the Christian law; but not less truly, though more indirectly, against the Christian doctrine and manners. By attaching themselves strongly to human, and consequently fallible, teachers and guides, they weakened the tie which bound them to the only divine guide and teacher, the Messiah, and therefore to that also which bound them all one to another.

§ 7. What it was that gave rise to such distinctions in the church of Corinth, we are not informed, nor is it material for us to know. From what follows in the Epistle, it is not improbable, that they might have thought it proper in this manner to range themselves, under those who had been the instruments of their conversion to Christianity, or perhaps, those by whom they had been baptized, or for whom they had contracted a special veneration. It is evident, however, that these petty differences, as we should account them, had already begun to produce consequences unfriendly to the spirit of the Gospel; for it is in this point of view solely that the Apostle considers them, and not as having an immediate bad influence on its doctrine. Thus resuming the subject, he says, *Ye are yet carnal; for whereas there is among you envying and strife and divisions, are ye not carnal and walk as men? For while one saith, I am of Paul, and another I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?* 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4. Thus it is uncontrovertible, in the first place, that the accusation imports that the Corinthians, by their conduct, had given a wound to charity, and not that they had made any deviation from the faith; and in the second place, that, in the apostolical acceptation of the word, men may be schismatics, or guilty of schism, by such an alienation of affection from their brethren as violates the internal union subsisting in the hearts of Christians, though there be neither error in doctrine nor separation from communion, and consequently no violation of external unity in ceremonies and worship. Faustus, a Manichean bishop in the fourth century (however remote from truth the leading principles of his party were on more important articles), entertained sentiments on this subject entirely scriptural. “Schisma,” says he, “nisi fallor, est eadem opinantem atque eodem ritu collentem quo cæteri, solo
“congregationis

“congregationis delectari diffidio.” Faust. l. xx. C. iii. ap. August.

§ 8 After so clear a proof of the import of the term, if it should be thought of consequence to allege in confirmation what must be acknowledged to be more indirect, ye may consider the only other passage in which the term is used in the New Testament, and applied metaphorically to the human body. In the same Epistle, the Apostle having shown that the different spiritual gifts bestowed on Christians, rendered them mutually subservient, and made all, in their several ways, harmoniously contribute to the good of the Christian community, gives a beautiful illustration of this doctrine from the natural body, the different functions of whose members admirably conduce to the benefit and support of one another, and to the perfection and felicity of the whole. He concludes in these words: *God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked, that there should be no schism in the body, ἵνα μὴ ἦ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, but that the members should have the same care one for another: and whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it, or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it, 1 Cor. xii. 24, 25, 26.* It is obvious that the word *schism* is here employed to signify, not a separation from the body, such as is made by amputation or fracture, but such a defect in utility and congruity, as would destroy what he considers as the mutual sympathy of the members, and their care one of another.

§ 9. As to the distinctions on this subject, which in after-times obtained among theologians, it is proper to remark, that error in doctrine was not supposed essential to the notion of schism; its distinguishing badge was made separation from communion in religious offices, insomuch that the words *schismatic* and *separatist*, have been accounted synonymous. By this, divines commonly discriminate *schism* from *heresy*, the essence of which last is represented as consisting in an erroneous opinion obstinately maintained, concerning some fundamental doctrine of Christianity; and that whether it be accompanied with separation in respect of the ordinances of religion, or not. We have now seen that the former definition does not quadrate with the application of the word in the New Testament, and that *schism*, in scriptural use, is one thing, and *schism*, in ecclesiastical use, another.

P A R T IV.

Of Heresy.

LET US NOW enquire with the same freedom and impartiality, into the scriptural use of the other term. The Greek word *αἵρεσις*, which properly imports no more than *election*, or *choice*, was commonly employed by the Hellenist Jews, in our Saviour's time, when the people were much divided in their religious sentiments, to denote, in general, any branch of the division, and was nearly equivalent to the English words, *class*, *party*, *sect*. The word was not, in its earliest acceptation, conceived to convey any reproach in it, since it was indifferently used, either of a party approved, or of one disapproved, by the writer. In this way it occurs several times in the Acts of the Apostles, where it is always (one single passage excepted) rendered *sect*. We hear alike of the sect of the Sadducees, *αἵρεσις πῶν Σαδδουκαίων*, Acts v. 17. and of the sect of the Pharisees, *αἵρεσις τῶν Φαρισαίων*, Acts xv. 5. In both places the term is adopted by the historian, purely for distinction's sake, without the least appearance of intention to convey either praise or blame. Nay, on one occasion, Paul, in the defence he made for himself before king Agrippa, where it was manifestly his intention to exalt the party to which he had belonged, and to give their system the preference to every other system of Judaism, both in soundness of doctrine, and purity of morals, expresses himself thus: *My manner of life from my youth, which was at the first among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews, which knew me from the beginning, if they would testify; that after the most straitest sect of our religion, κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αἵρεσιν τῆς ἡμετέρας θρησκείας, I lived a Pharisee*, Acts xxvi. 4, 5.

§ 2. There is only one passage in that history, wherein there is an appearance that something reproachful is meant to be conveyed under the name *αἵρεσις*. It is in the accusation of Paul, by the orator Tertullus, on the part of the Jews, before the governor Felix; where, amongst other things, we have these words; *We have found this man a pestilent fellow, and a mover of sedition among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes, πρῶτος αὐτὴν τῆς τῶν Ναζωραίων αἵρεως*, Acts xxiv. 5. I should not, however, have imagined that any part of the obloquy lay in the application of the word last mentioned, if it had not been for the notice which the apostle takes of it in his answer. *But this I confess unto thee, that after the way*
which

which they call *heresy*, *ἡ λεγόμενη αἵρεσις*, so worship I the God of my fathers, Acts xxiv. 14.

§ 3. Here, by the way, I must remark a great impropriety in the English translation, though in this, I acknowledge, it does but follow the Vulgate. The same word is rendered one way in the charge brought against the prisoner, and another way in his answer for himself. The consequence is, that though nothing can be more apposite than his reply, in this instance, as it stands in the original, yet nothing can appear more foreign than this passage in the two versions above mentioned. The apostle seems to defend himself against crimes of which he is not accused. In both places, therefore, the word ought to have been translated in the same manner, whether *heresy* or *sect*. In my judgment, the last term is the only proper one; for the word *heresy*, in the modern acceptation, never suits the import of the original word, as used in Scripture. But, when one attends to the very critical circumstances of the apostle at this time, the difficulty in accounting for his having considered it as a reproach to be denominated of a *sect*, disclaimed by the whole nation, instantly vanishes. Let it be remembered, first, that, since the Jews had fallen under the power of the Romans, their ancient national religion had not only received the sanction of the civil powers for the continuance of its establishment in Judea, but had obtained a toleration in other parts of the empire; secondly, that Paul is now pleading before a Roman governor, a Pagan, who could not well be supposed to know much of the Jewish doctrine, worship or controversies: and that he had been arraigned by the rulers of his own nation, as belonging to a turbulent and upstart sect; for in this way they considered the Christians, whom they reproachfully named Nazarenes. The natural consequence of this charge, with one who understood so little of their affairs as Felix, was to make him look upon the prisoner, as an apostate from Judaism, and therefore, as not entitled to be protected, or even tolerated, on the score of religion. Against a danger of this kind, it was of the utmost importance to our apostle to defend himself.

§ 4. Accordingly, when he enters on this part of the charge, how solicitous is he to prove, that his belonging to that sect did not imply any defection from the religion of his ancestors; and thus to prevent any mistaken judgment, on this article of his arraignment, into which a heathen judge must have otherwise unavoidably fallen. His own words will, to the attentive, supersede all argument or illustration: *But this I confess to thee, that after the way which they call a sect, so worship I; whom? No new divinity, but, on the contrary, the God of our fathers: he adds, in order the more effectually to remove every suspicion of apostasy, Believing all things which are written in the law and*

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the prophets ; and have the same hope towards God, which they themselves also entertain, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust, Acts xxiv. 14, 15. Nothing could have been more ridiculous, than for the apostle seriously to defend his doctrine against the charge of heterodoxy, before an idolater and polytheist, who regarded both him and his accusers as superstitious fools, and consequently as, in this respect, precisely on a footing ; but it was entirely pertinent in him to evince before a Roman magistrate, that his faith and mode of worship, however much traduced by his enemies, were neither essentially different from, nor any way subversive of that religion which the senate and people of Rome were solemnly engaged to protect ; and that therefore he was not to be treated as an apostate, as his adversaries, by that article of accusation, that he was of the sect of the Nazarenes, shewed evidently that they desired he should. Thus the apostle, with great address, refutes the charge of having revolted from the religious institution of Moses, and, at the same time, is so far from disclaiming, that he glories in the name of a follower of Christ.

§ 5. There is only one other place in this history, in which the word occurs, namely, where the Jews at Rome (for whom Paul had sent on his arrival) speaking of the Christian society, address him in these words : *But we desire to hear of thee what thou thinkest ; for as concerning this sect, πει μεν γαρ της αιρεσως ταυτης, we know that it is every where spoken against*, Acts xxviii. 22. There cannot be a question here, of the propriety of rendering the word *αιρεσις*, *sect*, a term of a middle nature, not necessarily implying either good or bad. For, as to the disposition wherein those Jews were at this time, it is plain they did not think themselves qualified to pronounce either for or against it, till they should give Paul who patronised it a full hearing. This they were willing to do, and therefore only acquainted him, in general, that they found it to be a party that was universally decried. Thus, in the historical part of the New Testament, we find the word *αιρεσις* employed to denote *sect* or *party*, indiscriminately, whether good or bad. It has no necessary reference to opinions, true or false. Certain it is, that sects are commonly, not always, caused by difference in opinion, but the term is expressive of the effect only, not of the cause.

§ 6. In order to prevent mistakes, I shall here further observe, that the word *sect*, among the Jews, was not, in its application, entirely coincident with the same term as applied by Christians to the subdivisions subsisting among themselves. We, if I mistake not, invariably use it of those who form separate communions, and do not associate with one another in religious worship and ceremonies. Thus we call Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists, different sects, not so much on account of their differences in opi-
nion,

nion, as because they have established to themselves different fraternities, to which, in what regards public worship, they confine themselves, the several denominations above mentioned having no intercommunity with one another in sacred matters. High church and low church we call only parties, because they have not formed separate communions. Great and known differences in opinion, when followed by no external breach in the society, are not considered with us as constituting distinct sects, though their differences in opinion, may give rise to mutual aversion. Now, in the Jewish sects (if we except the Samaritans) there were no separate communities erected. The same temple, and the same synagogues, were attended alike by Pharisees and by Sadducees. Nay, there were often of both denominations in the Sanhedrim, and even in the priesthood.

Another difference was, that the name of the sect was not applied to all the people who adopted the same opinions, but solely to the men of eminence among them, who were considered as the leaders and instructors of the party. The much greater part of the nation, nay, the whole populace, received implicitly the doctrine of the Pharisees, yet Josephus never styles the common people Pharisees, but only followers and admirers of the Pharisees. Nay, this distinction appears sufficiently from sacred writ. *The Scribes and Pharisees*, says our Lord, Matt. xxiii. 2. *fit in Moses' seat.* This could not have been said so generally, if any thing further had been meant by Pharisees, but the teachers and guides of the party. Again, when the officers sent by the chief priests to apprehend our Lord, returned without bringing him, and excused themselves by saying, *Never man spake like this man*, they were asked, *Have any of the rulers or of the Pharisees believed on him?* John vii. 48. Now, in our way of using words, we should be apt to say, that all his adherents were of the Pharisees; for the Pharisaical was the only popular doctrine. But it was not to the followers, but to the leaders, that the name of the sect was applied. Here however we must except the Essenes, who, as they all, of whatever rank originally, entered into a solemn engagement, whereby they confined themselves to a peculiar mode of life, which, in a great measure, secluded them from the rest of mankind, were considered almost in the same manner as we do the Benedictines or Dominicans, or any order of monks or friars among the Romanists.

Josephus, in the account he has given of the Jewish sects, considers them all as parties who supported different systems of philosophy, and has been not a little censured for this by some critics. But as things were understood then, this manner of considering them was not unnatural. Theology, morality, and questions regarding the immortality of the soul and a future state, were principal branches of their philosophy. "Philosophia,"

says Cicero *, “ nos primum ad deorum cultum, deinde ad jus
 “ hominum quod fitum est in generis humani societate, tum ad
 “ modestiam, magnitudinemque animi erudit: eademque ab
 “ animo tanquam ab oculis, caliginem dispulit, ut omnia supera,
 “ infera, prima, ultima, media, videremus.” Besides, as it was
 only men of eminence qualified to guide and instruct the people,
 who were dignified with the title either of Pharisee or of Sadducee,
 there was nothing so analogous among the Pagans, as their
 different sects of philosophers, the Stoics, the Academics, and
 the Epicureans, to whom also the general term *αἵρεσις* was commonly
 applied. Epiphanius, a Christian writer of the fourth century,
 from the same view of things with Josephus, reckons, among the
αἵρεσις, sects or heresies, if you please to call them so, which
 arose among the Greeks, before the coming of Christ, these
 classes of philosophers, the Stoics, the Platonists, the Pythagoreans,
 and the Epicureans. Of this writer it may also be remarked,
 that in the first part of his work, he evidently uses the word
αἵρεσις in all the latitude in which it had been employed by
 the sacred writers, as signifying sect or party of any kind,
 and without any note of censure. Otherwise he would never
 have numbered Judaism, whose origin he derives from the command
 which God gave to Abraham to circumcise all the males of his
 family, among the original heresies. Thus, in laying down the
 plan of his work, he says, *Εν τῷ ἐν πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ πρώτου
 τοῦ αἵρεσις εἰκοσίν, αἱ εἰσὶν αὐτῆ, βαρβαρισμός, σκυθισμός, ἑλληνισμός, ἰσθαμισμός,
 κ. τ. ἑ.* This only by the way.

§ 7. But it may be asked, is not the acceptance of the word,
 in the Epistles, different from what it has been observed to be
 in the historical books of the New Testament? Is it not, in the
 former invariably used in a bad sense, as denoting something
 wrong, and blameable? That in those, indeed, it always denotes
 something faulty or even criminal, I am far from disputing: nevertheless,
 the acceptance is not materially different from that in which
 it always occurs in the Acts of the apostles. In order to remove
 the apparent inconsistency in what has been now advanced,
 let it be observed that the word *sect* has always something
 relative in it, and therefore in different applications, though the
 general import of the term be the same, it will convey a favourable
 idea, or an unfavourable, according to the particular relation
 it bears. I explain myself by examples. The word *sect* may
 be used along with the proper name, purely by way of distinction
 from another party of a different name, in which case the
 word is not understood to convey either praise or blame. Of
 this we have examples in the phrases above quoted, the sect of
 the Pharisees, the sect of the Sadducees, the sect of the Nazarenes.

* Tuscul. Quæst. lib. I.

renes. In this way we may speak of a strict sect, or a lax sect, or even of a good sect, or a bad sect. If any thing reprehensible or commendable be suggested, it is not suggested by the term sect, *αἵρεσις*, but by the words construed with it. Again, it may be applied to a formed party in a community, considered in reference to the whole. If the community, of which the sect is a part, be of such a nature as not to admit this subdivision without impairing and corrupting its constitution, to charge them with splitting into sects, or forming parties, is to charge them with corruption, in what is most essential to them as a society. Hence arises all the difference there is in the word, as used in the history, and as used in the Epistles of Peter and Paul; for these are the only apostles who employ it. In the history, the reference is always of the first kind; in the Epistles, always of the second. In these, the apostles address themselves only to Christians, and are not speaking of sects without the church, but either reprehending them for, or warning them against, forming sects among themselves, to the prejudice of charity, to the production of much mischief within their community, and of great scandal to the unconverted world without. So Paul's words to the Corinthians were understood by Chrysostom, and other ancient expositors. In both applications, however, the radical import of the word is the same.

§ 8. But even here, it has no necessary reference to doctrine, true or false. Let us attend to the first passage, in which it occurs in the Epistles, and we shall be fully satisfied of the truth of this remark. It follows one quoted in Part III. of this Dissertation. *For there must be also heresies among you*, 1 Cor. xi. 19. *Δει γὰρ καὶ αἵρεσις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι.* Ye must also have sects amongst you. It is plain, that what he reproves under the name *σχίσματα*, in the former verse, is in effect the same with what he here denominates *αἵρεσις*. Now, the term *σχίσμα*, I have shewn already to have there no relation to any erroneous tenet, but solely to undue regards to some individual teachers, to the prejudice of others, and of the common cause. In another passage of this Epistle, where, speaking of the very same reprehensible conduct, he uses the words strife and factions, *εἰς καὶ διχοστασίαι*, 1 Cor. iii. 3. words nearly coincident with *σχίσματα καὶ αἵρεσις*; his whole aim in these reprehensions is well expressed in these words, *that ye might learn in us* (that is, in himself and Apollos, whom he had named, for example's sake), *not to think of men above that which is written*, above what Scripture warrants, *that no one of you be puffed up for one*, make your boast of one, *against another*, 1 Cor. iv. 6.

§ 9. It may be said, Does not this explanation represent the two words *schism* and *heresy* as synonymous? That there is a great affinity in their significations is manifest, but they are not convertible terms. I do not find that the word *σχίσμα* is ever applied

applied in holy writ to a formed party, to which the word *αἵρεσις* is commonly applied. I understand them in the epistles of this apostle, as expressive of different degrees of the same evil. An undue attachment to one part, and a consequent alienation of affection from another part of the Christian community, comes under the denomination of *σχίσμα*. When this disposition has proceeded so far as to produce an actual party or faction among them, this effect is termed *αἵρεσις*. And it has been remarked, that even this term was at that time currently applied, when matters had not come to an open rupture and separation, in point of communion. There was no appearance of this, at the time referred to, among the Corinthians. And even in Judaism, the Pharisees and the Sadducees, the two principal sects, nay, the only sects mentioned in the Gospel, and (which is still more extraordinary) more widely different in their religious sentiments than any two Christian sects, still joined together, as was but just now observed, in all the offices of religious service, and had neither different priests and ministers, nor separate places for social worship, the reading of the law, or the observance of the ordinances.

§ 10. It will perhaps be said, that in the use at least which the apostle Peter has made of this word, it must be understood to include some gross errors subversive of the very foundations of the faith. The words in the common version are, "But there were false prophets also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction," 2 Pet. ii. 1. That the apostle in this passage foretells that there will arise such *αἵρεσις*, sects or factions, as will be artfully and surreptitiously formed by teachers, who will entertain such pernicious doctrines, is most certain; but there is not the least appearance that this last character was meant to be implied in the word *αἵρεσις*. So far from it, that this character is subjoined as additional information concerning, not the people seduced, or the party, but the seducing teachers; for it is of them only, (though one would judge differently from our version), that what is contained in the latter part of the verse is affirmed. The words in the original are, *Ἐν ὑμῖν εἰσονται ψευδοδιδασκαλοὶ, οἵτινες πειρῶσάξουσιν αἵρεσις ἀπωλείας, καὶ τὸν ἀγορεύσαντα αὐτοὺς ἀρνῆμενοι, ἐπαγόντες ἑαυτοῖς ταχίην ἀπωλείαν.* Observe it is *ἀρνῆμενοι* and *ἐπαγόντες*, in the masculine gender and nominative case, agreeing with *ψευδοδιδασκαλοὶ*, not *ἀρνῆμενας* and *ἐπαγούσας* in the feminine gender, and accusative case, agreeing with *αἵρεσις*. Again, if the word *αἵρεσις* did not imply the effect produced, sects or factions, but the opinions taught, whether true or false, which are often, not always, the secret spring of division, he would probably have expressed himself in this manner,

ψευδοδιδασκαλοὶ

ψευδοδιδασκαλοι οτινες διδασκουσι αιρεσεις απωλειας, who will teach damnable, or rather destructive heresies; for doctrine of every kind, sound and unsound, true and false, is properly said to be taught; but neither here, nor any where else in Scripture, I may safely add, nor in any of the writings of the two first centuries, do we ever find the word αιρεσεις construed with διδασκω, κηρυσσω, or any word of like import, or an opinion, true or false, denominated αιρεσεις. There are therefore two distinct and separate evils in those false teachers of which the apostle here gives warning. One is, their making division, by forming to themselves sects or parties of adherents; the other is, the destructive principles they will entertain, and, doubtless, as they find occasion, disseminate among their votaries.

§ II. The only other passage in which the word αιρεσεις occurs in the New Testament, is where Paul numbers αιρεσεις, *sects* among the works of the flesh, Gal. v. 20. and very properly subjoins them to διχوستασις, *factions*, as the word ought to be rendered, according to the sense in which the apostle always uses it. Such distinctions and divisions among themselves, he well knew, could not fail to alienate affection and infuse animosity. Hence we may learn to understand the admonition of the apostle, *A man that is a heretic, αιρετικον ανθρωπον, after the first and second admonition reject, knowing that he that is such, is subverted and sinneth, being condemned of himself*, Tit. iii. 10, 11. It is plain, from the character here given, as well as from the genius of the language, that the word αιρετικος in this place does not mean a member of an αιρεσεις or sect, who may be unconscious of any fault, and so is not equivalent to our word *sectary*; much less does it answer to the English word *heretic*, which always implies one who entertains opinions in religion, not only erroneous, but pernicious; whereas, we have shewn that the word αιρεσεις, in Scriptural use, has no necessary connection with opinion at all. Its immediate connection is with division or dissension, as it is thereby that sects and parties are formed. Αιρετικος ανθρωπος must therefore mean one who is the founder of a sect, or at least has the disposition to create αιρεσεις, or sects, in the community, and may properly be rendered a *factionous man*. This version perfectly coincides with the scope of the place, and suits the uniform import of the term αιρεσεις, from which it is derived. The admonition here given to Titus is the same, though differently expressed, with what he had given to the Romans, when he said, *Mark them which cause divisions, διχουσιας ποιουντας, make parties or factions, and avoid them*, Rom. xvi. 17. As far down indeed as the fifth century, and even lower, error alone, however gross, was not considered, as sufficient to warrant the charge of heresy. Malignity, or perverseness of disposition was held essential to this crime. Hence the famous adage of Augustine, "Errare possum,

sum, hæreticus esse nolo;" which plainly implies that no error in judgment, on any article, of what importance soever, can make a man a heretic, where there is not pravity of will. To this sentiment, even the schoolmen have shewn regard in their definitions. "Herefy," say they, "is an opinion maintained with obstinacy against the doctrine of the church." But if we examine a little their reasoning on the subject, we shall quickly find the qualifying phrase *maintained with obstinacy*, to be mere words which add nothing to the sense; for if what they account the church have declared against the opinion, a man's obstinacy is concluded from barely maintaining the opinion, in what way soever he maintain it, or from what motives soever he be actuated. Thus mere mistake is made at length to incur the reproach originally levelled against an inspiring factious temper, which would sacrifice the dearest interests of society to its own ambition.

§ 12. I cannot omit taking notice here, by the way, that the late Dr Foster, an eminent English dissenting minister, in a sermon he preached on this subject, has, in my opinion, quite mistaken the import of the term. He had the discernment to discover that the characters annexed would not suit the common acceptation of the word *heretic*; yet he was so far misled by that acceptation, as to think that error in doctrine must be included as part of the description, and therefore defined a *heretic* in the Apostle's sense, "a person who, to make himself considerable, propagates false and pernicious doctrine, knowing it to be such." Agreeably to this notion, the anonymous English translator renders with his usual freedom *ἀμαρτανει ὡν αὐτοκατακριτος*, *knows in his own conscience that his tenets are false*. To Foster's explanation there are insuperable objections. First, it is not agreeable to the rules of criticism, to assign, without any evidence from use, a meaning to a concrete term which does not suit the sense of the abstract. *ἄιρεσις* is the abstract, *ἄιρετικος* the concrete. If *ἄιρεσις* could be shewn, in any instance, to mean the profession and propagation of opinions not believed by him who professes and propagates them, I should admit that *ἄιρετικος* might denote the professor or propagator of such opinions. But it is not pretended that *ἄιρεσις*, in any use, scriptural, classical, or ecclesiastical, ever bore that meaning: there is therefore a very strong probability against the sense given by that author to the word *ἄιρετικος*. Secondly, this word, though it occurs but once in Scripture, is very common in ancient Christian writers, but has never been said, in any one of them, to bear the meaning which the Doctor has here fixed upon it. Thirdly, the apostolical precept in this way explained is of little or no use. Who can know whether a man's belief in the opinions professed by him, be sincere or hypocritical? Titus, you may say, had the gift of discerning spirits, and therefore might know. Was the precept, after his life-time,

to be of no service in the church? This I think incredible, especially as there is no other direction in the chapter, or even in the Epistle, which requires a supernatural gift to enable men to follow. To what purpose enjoin us to avoid a heretic, if it be impossible without a miracle to know him? In fine, though I would not say that such a species of hypocrisy as Foster makes essential to the character, has never appeared, I am persuaded, it very rarely appears. It is the natural tendency of vanity and ambition to make a man exert himself in gaining profelytes to his own notions, however trifling, and however rashly taken up. But it is not a natural effect of this passion to be zealous in promoting opinions which the promoter does not believe, and to the propagation of which he has no previous inducement from interest. It is sufficient to vindicate the application of the term *αυτοκατακριτος*, or *self-condemned*, that a factious or turbulent temper, like any other vicious disposition, can never be attended with peace of mind, but, in spite of all the influence of self-deceit, which is not greater in regard to this than in regard to other vices, must, for the mortal wounds it gives to peace and love, often be disquieted by the stings of conscience. In short, the *αιρετικος*, when that term is applied to a person professing Christianity, is the man who, either from pride, or from motives of ambition or interest, is led to violate these important precepts of our Lord, *Υμεις δε μη κληθητε ραββι*: *εις γαρ ειν υμων ο διδασκαλος, ο Χριστος. μηδε κληθητε καθηγηται*: *εις γαρ υμων ειν ο καθηγητης, ο Χριστος*: which I render thus: *But as for you, assume not the title of Rabbi; for ye have only one teacher, the Messiah: neither assume the title of leaders, for ye have only one leader, the Messiah*, Matt. xxiii. 8. 10.

§ 13. It deserves further to be remarked, that, in the early ages of the church, after the finishing of the canon, the word *αιρετικος* was not always limited (as the word *heretic* is in modern use) to those who, under some form or other, profess Christianity. We at present invariably distinguish the *heretic* from the *infidel*. The first is a corrupter of the Christian doctrine, of which he professes to be a believer and a friend; the second a declared unbeliever of that doctrine, and consequently an enemy: whereas, in the times I speak of, the head of a faction in religion, or in ethics (for the term seems not to have been applied at first to the inferior members), the founder, or at least a principal promoter of a sect or party, whether within or without the church; that is, whether of those who called themselves the disciples of Christ, or of those who openly denied him, was indiscriminately termed *αιρετικος*.

The not attending to this difference in the ancient application of the word, has given rise to some blunders and apparent contradictions in ecclesiastical history; in consequence of which, the

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early writers have been unjustly charged with confusion and inconsistency in their account of things; when, in fact, the blunders imputed to them by more modern authors, have arisen solely from an ignorance of their language. We confine their words by an usage of our own, which did not obtain in their time, though it came gradually to obtain some ages afterwards. Hence Dositheus, Simon Magus, Menander, and some others, are commonly ranked among the ancient heretics; though nothing can be more evident, from the accounts given by the most early writers, who so denominate them, than that they were deniers of Jesus Christ in every sense, and avowed opposers of the gospel. Dositheus gave himself out * to his countrymen, the Samaritans, for the Messiah promised by Moses. Simon Magus, as we learn from holy writ †, was baptised; but that, after the rebuke which he received from Peter, instead of repenting, he apostatized, the uniform voice of antiquity puts beyond a question. Origen says expressly ‡, “The Simonians by no means acknowledge Jesus to be the Son of God; on the contrary, they call Simon the power of God.” Accordingly, they were never confounded with the Christians in the time of persecution, or involved with them in any trouble or danger ||. Justin Martyr is another evidence of the same thing §; as is also Irenæus, in the account which, in his treatise against heresies, he gives ¶ of Simon and his disciple Menander. So is likewise Epiphanius. From them all it appears manifestly, that the above named persons were so far from being, in any sense, followers of Jesus Christ, that they presumed to arrogate to themselves his distinguishing titles and prerogatives, and might therefore be more justly called Antichrists than Christians. The like may be said of some other ancient sects which, through the same mistake of the import of the word, are commonly ranked among the heresies which arose in the church. Such were the *Opbites*, of whom Origen acquaints us, that they were so far from being Christians, that our Lord was reviled by them as much as by Celsus, and that they never admitted any one into their society, till he had vented curses against Jesus Christ *.

Mosheim, sensible of the impropriety of classing the declared enemies of Christ among the *heretics*, as the word is now universally applied, and, at the same time, afraid of appearing to contradict

* Orig. adv. Cels. lib. I.

† Acts viii. 13.

‡ Ουδαμως τον Ιησυν ομολογουσι υιον Θεου Σιμωνιανοι, αλλα δυναμιν Θεου λεγουσι τον Σιμωνα. Orig. adv. Cels. lib. V.

|| Orig. adv. Cels. lib. VI. † § Apol. 2da. Dialog. cum Tryphone.

¶ Adv. Hærefes, lib. I. cap. xx. xxi.

* Οφιανοι καλυμενοι τοσπον αποδιδουσι τε ειπαι Χριστιανοι, ως ει εν ελαττον Κελσου καταχερει αυτους τε Ιησν. Και μη προτερον προσειδαι τινη επι το συνεδριον ικυται, εαν μη αρασθηται κατα τε Ιησν. Adver. Cels. lib. VI.

tradict the unanimous testimony of the three first centuries, acknowledges that they cannot be suitably ranked with those sectaries who sprang up within the church, and apologizes, merely from the example of some moderns who thought as he did, for his not considering those ancient party-leaders in the same light wherein the early ecclesiastic authors, as he imagines, had considered them. But he has not said any thing to account for so glaring an inaccuracy, not of one or two, but of all the primitive writers who have taken notice of those sects. For even those who deny that they were Christians, call them *heretics* *. Now, I will take upon me to say, that though this, in one single writer, might be the effect of oversight, it is morally impossible that, in so many, it should be accounted for otherwise than by supposing that their sense of the word *αἱρετικοί* did not coincide with ours; and that it was therefore no blunder in them, that they did not employ their words according to an usage which came to be established long after their time. I am indeed surpris'd, that a man of Mosheim's critical sagacity, as well as profound knowledge of Christian antiquity, did not perceive that this was the only reasonable solution of the matter. But what might sometimes be thought the most obvious truth, is not always the first taken notice of. Now, I cannot help considering the easy manner in which this account removes the difficulty, as no small evidence of the explanation of the word in scriptural use, which

VOL. I.

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* " Quotquot tribus prioribus sæculis SIMONIS Magi meminerunt, etfi hæreticorum eum familiam ducere jubent, per ea tamen quæ de eo referunt, hæreticorum ordine excludunt, et inter Christianæ religionis hostes collocant. ORIGENES Simonianos disertissime ex Christianis sectis exturbat, eosque non Iesum Christum, sed Simonem colere narrat. Cum hoc cæteri omnes, alii claris verbis, alii sententiis quas SIMONI tribuunt, consentiunt: quæ quidem sententiæ ejus sunt generis, ut nulli conveniant quàm homini CHRISTO longissime se præferenti, et divini legati dignitatem sibi ipse arroganti. Hinc *Simoniani* etiam, quod ORIGENES et JUSTINUS MARTYR præter alios testantur, quum Christiani quotidianis periculis expositi essent, nullis molestiis et injuriis afficiebantur: CHRISTUM enim eos detestari, publice notum erat. Sic ego primus, nisi fallor, quum ante viginti annos de Simone sentirem, erant, quibus periculosum et nefas videbatur, tot sanctorum viroium, qui SIMONEM hæreticorum omnium patrem fecerunt, fidem in disceptationem vocare, tot sæculorum auctoritatem contemnere. Verum sensim plures hæc sententia patronos, per ipsam evidentiam suam sibi acquisivit. Et non ita pridem tantum potuit apud Jos. AUGUSTINUM ORSI, quem summo cum applausu ipsius Pontificis Maximi Romæ *Historiam Ecclesiasticam* Italico sermone scribere notum est, ut eam approbaret." *Mosheimius de Rebus Christianis ante Constantinum Magnum Commentarii* Sæculum Primum, § lxx. No. 3. The words in the text, to which the preceding note refers, are " Toti hæreticorum agmini, maxime cohorti gnosticæ, omnes veteris ecclesiæ doctores præponunt SIMONEM MAGUM — Omnia quæ de SIMONE memorie ipsi prodiderunt, manifestum faciunt, eum non in corruptorum religionis Christianæ, id est, hæreticorum, sed infensissimorum ejus hostium numero ponendum esse, qui et ipsum CHRISTUM maledictis insestabatur, et progredienti luci Christianæ quæ poterat, impedimenta objiciebat."

has been given above. To observe the gradual alterations which arise in the meanings of words, as it is a point of some nicety, is also of great consequence in criticism; and often proves a powerful means both of fixing the date of genuine writings, and of detecting the supposititious.

§ 14. I shall observe, in passing, that the want of due attention to this circumstance in another instance, has greatly contributed to several errors in relation to Christian antiquities, and, particularly, to the multiplication of the primitive martyrs, far beyond the limits of probability. The Greek word *μαρτυρ*, though signifying no more originally, than *witness*, in which sense it is always used in the New Testament, came, by degrees, in ecclesiastical use, to be considerably restrained in its signification. The phrase *ο μαρτυρς τς Ιησου*, *the witnesses of Jesus*, was, at first, in the church, applied, by way of eminence, only to the Apostles. The reality of this application, as well as the grounds of it, we learn from the Acts*. Afterwards, it was extended to all those who, for their public testimony to the truth of Christianity, especially when emitted before magistrates and judges, were sufferers in the cause, whether by death or by banishment, or in any other way. Lastly, the name *martyr* (for then the word was adopted into other languages) became appropriated to those who suffered death in consequence of their testimony: the term *εμολογητης*, *confessor*, being, for distinction's sake, assigned to those witnesses who, though they suffered in their persons, liberty, or goods, did not lose their lives in the cause. Now, several later writers, in interpreting the ancients, have been misled by the usage of their own time; and have understood them as speaking of those who died for the name of Jesus, when they spoke only of those who openly attested his miracles and mission, agreeably to the primitive and simple meaning of the word *μαρτυρ*. Of this Mosheim has justly taken notice in the work above quoted. I have here only observed it, by the way, for the sake of illustration; for, as to the sense wherein the word is used in the New Testament, no doubt seems ever to have arisen †.

§ 15.

* Acts i. 8. 22. ii. 32. iii. 15. v. 32. x. 39. xxii. 15. xxvi. 16. The last two passages quoted relate to Paul, who, by being designed of God a *witness of the Lord Jesus to all men*, was understood to be received into the apostleship, and into the society of the twelve.

* " Ipsa vocabuli *martyr* ambiguitas apud homines imperitos voluntatem pignere potuit fabulas de tragico eorum [apostulorum] exitu cogitandi. *Martyr* Græcorum sermone quemlibet *testem* significat. Sacro vero Christianorum sermone idem nomen eminentiore sensu *testem CHRISTI* sive hominem designat, qui moriendo testari voluit, spem omnem suam in CHRISTO positam esse. Priori sensu apostoli ab ipso CHRISTO *μαρτυρς* nominantur, et ipsi eodem vocabulo muneris sui naturam explicant. Fieri vero facile potuit, ut indocti homines ad hæc sacri codicis dicta posterorem vocabuli *Martyr* significationem transferrent, et temere sibi propterea persuaderent,

§ 15. I shall conclude, with adding to the observations on the words *schism* and *heresy*, that how much soever of a schismatical or heretical spirit, in the apostolic sense of the terms, may have contributed to the formation of the different sects into which the Christian world is at present divided; no person who, in the spirit of candour and charity, adheres to that which, to the best of his judgment, is right, though in this opinion he should be mistaken, is, in the scriptural sense, either schismatic or heretic, and that he, on the contrary, whatever sect he belong to, is more entitled to these odious appellations, who is most apt to throw the imputation upon others. Both terms, for they denote only different degrees of the same bad quality, always indicate a disposition and practice unfriendly to peace, harmony, and love.

DIS-

persuaderent, Apostolos inter eos poni debere, quos excellentiori sensu Christiani *Martyres* appellare solebant." Sæc. prim. § 16. No. Our historian is here, from the ambiguity of the word, accounting only for the alleged martyrdom of all the Apostles except John. But every body who reflects will be sensible, that the same mistake must have contributed to the increase of the number in other instances. For even in Apostolical times, others than the Apostles, though more rarely, were called *witnesses*. Stephen and Antipas are so denominated in sacred writ. And as both these were put to death for their testimony, this has probably given rise in after-times to the appropriation of the name *witness* or *martyr*, to those who suffered death in the cause.

DISSERTATION THE TENTH.

THE CHIEF THINGS TO BE ATTENDED TO IN TRANSLATING.—
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE OPPOSITE METHODS TAKEN
BY TRANSLATORS OF HOLY WRIT.

PART I.

The things to be attended to in translating.

To translate has been thought, by some, a very easy matter to one who understands tolerably the language from which, and has made some proficiency in the language into which, the translation is to be made. To translate well is, however, in my opinion, a task of more difficulty than is commonly imagined. That we may be the better able to judge in this question, let us consider what a translator, who would do justice to his author, and his subject, has to perform. The first thing, without doubt, which claims his attention, is to give a just representation of the sense of the original. This, it must be acknowledged, is the most essential of all. The second thing is, to convey into his version, as much as possible, in a consistency with the genius of the language which he writes, the author's spirit and manner, and, if I may so express myself, the very character of his style. The third and last thing is, to take care, that the version have, at least, so far the quality of an original performance, as to appear natural and easy, such as shall give no handle to the critic to charge the translator with applying words improperly, or in a meaning not warranted by use, or combining them in a way which renders the sense obscure, and the construction ungrammatical, or even harsh.

§ 2. Now, to adjust matters so as, in a considerable degree, to attain all these objects, will be found, upon inquiry, not a little arduous, even to men who are well acquainted with the two languages, and have great command of words. In pursuit of one of the ends above mentioned, we are often in danger of losing sight totally of another: nay, on some occasions, it will appear impossible to attain one, without sacrificing both the others. It
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may happen, that I cannot do justice to the sense, without frequent recourse to circumlocutions; for the words of no language whatever will, at all times, exactly correspond with those of another. Yet, by this method, a writer whose manner is concise, simple, and energetic, is exhibited, in the translation, as employing a style which is at once diffuse, complex, and languid. Again, in endeavouring to exhibit the author's manner, and to confine myself, as nearly as possible, to the same number of words, and the like turn of expression, I may very imperfectly render his sense, relating obscurely, ambiguously, and even improperly, what is expressed with great propriety and perspicuity in the original. And, in regard to the third object mentioned, it is evident, that when the two languages differ very much in their genius and structure, it must be exceedingly difficult for a translator to render this end perfectly compatible with the other two. It will perhaps be said, that this is of less importance, as it seems solely to regard the quality of the work, as a performance in the translator's language, whereas the other two regard the work only as an exhibition of the original. I admit that this is an object inferior to the other two; I meant it should be understood so, by mentioning it last. Yet even this is by no means so unimportant as some would imagine. That a writing be perspicuous in any language, much depends on the observance of propriety; and the beauty of the work (at least as far as purity is concerned) contributes not a little to its utility. What is well written, or well said, is always more attended to, better understood, and longer remembered, than what is improperly, weakly, or awkwardly expressed.

§ 3. Now, if translation is in general attended with so much difficulty, what must we think of the chance of success which a translator has, when the subject is of so great importance, that an uncommon degree of attention to all the above mentioned objects, will be exacted of him; and when the difference, in point of idiom, of the language from which, and of that into which the version is made, is as great, perhaps, as we have any example of. For, in translating the New Testament into English, it is not to the Greek idiom, nor to the Oriental, that we are required to adapt our own, but to a certain combination of both; often rather to the Hebrew and Chaldaic idioms, involved in Greek words and syntax. The analogy and prevailing usage in Greek, will, if we be not on our guard, sometimes mislead us. On the contrary, these are sometimes safe and proper guides. But, without a considerable acquaintance with both, it will be impossible to determine when we ought to be directed by the one, and when by the other.

§ 4. There are two extremes in translating, which are commonly taken notice of by those who examine this subject critically;

cally ; from one extreme, we derive what is called a close and literal, from the other, a loose and free translation. Each has its advocates. But though the latter kind is most patronized, when the subject is a performance merely human, the general sentiments, as far as I am able to collect them, seem rather to favour the former, when the subject is any part of holy writ. And this difference appears to proceed from a very laudable principle, that we are not entitled to use so much freedom with the dictates of inspiration, as with the works of a fellow-creature. It often happens however, on such general topics, when no particular version is referred to as an example of excess on one side or on the other, that people agree in words, when their opinions differ, and differ in words when their opinions agree. For, I may consider a translation as close, which another would denominate free, or as free, which another would denominate close. Indeed, I imagine that, in the best sense of the words, a good translation ought to have both these qualities. To avoid all ambiguity, therefore, we shall call one extreme *literal*, as manifesting a greater attention to the letter than to the meaning ; the other *loose*, as implying under it, not liberty, but licentiousness. In regard even to literal translations, there may be so many differences in degree, that, without specifying, it is in vain to argue, or to hope to lay down any principles that will prove entirely satisfactory.

P A R T II.

Strictures on Arias Montanus.

AMONG the Latin translations of Scripture, therefore, for I shall confine myself to these in this Dissertation, let us select *Arias Montanus* for an example of the literal. His version of both Testaments is very generally known, and commonly printed along with the original, not in separate columns, but, for the greater benefit of the learner, interlined. This work of Arias, of all that I know, goes the farthest in this way, being precisely on the model of the Jewish translations, not so much of the Septuagint, though the Septuagint certainly exceeds in this respect, as on the model of Aquila, which, from the fragments that still remain of that version, appears to have been servilely literal. Arias therefore is a fit example of what may be expected in this mode of translating.

§ 2. Now, that we may proceed more methodically in our examination, let us inquire how far every one of the three ends in translating, above mentioned, is answered by this version, or can be

be answered by a version constructed on the same plan. The first and principal end is to give a just representation of the sense of the original. But how, it may be asked, can a translator fail of attaining this end, who never wanders from the path marked out to him; who does not, like others, turn aside for a moment to pluck flowers by the way, wherewith to garnish his performance; who is, on the contrary, always found in his author's track; in short, who has it as his sole object, to give you, in the words of another language, exactly what his author says, and in the order and manner wherein he says it, and, I had almost added (for this too is his aim, though not always attainable) not one word more or less than he says? However he might fail in respect of the other ends mentioned, one would be apt to think he must certainly succeed in conveying the sentiments of his author. Yet, upon trial, we find that, in no point whatever does the literal translator fail more remarkably than in this, of exhibiting the sense. Nor will this be found so unaccountable upon reflection, as on a superficial view it may appear. Were the words of the one language exactly correspondent to those of the other, in meaning and extent; were the modes of combining the words in both entirely similar, and the grammatical or customary arrangement the same, and were the idioms and phrases resulting thence perfectly equivalent, such a conclusion might reasonably be deduced; but, when all the material circumstances are nearly the reverse, as is certainly the case of Hebrew compared with Latin; when the greater part of the words of one are far from corresponding accurately, either in meaning or in extent, to those of the other; when the construction is dissimilar, and the idioms, resulting from the like combinations of corresponding words, by no means equivalent, there is the greatest probability that an interpreter, of this stamp, will often exhibit to his readers what has no meaning at all, and sometimes a meaning very different from, or perhaps opposite to, that of his author.

§ 3. I shall briefly illustrate, from the aforesaid translation, what I have advanced, and that, first, in words, next, in phrases or idioms. I had occasion, in a former Dissertation*, to take notice of a pretty numerous class of words which, in no two languages whatever are found perfectly to correspond, though, in those tongues wherein there is a greater affinity, they come nearer to suit each other, than in those tongues wherein the affinity is less. In regard to such, I observed, that the translator's only possible method of rendering them justly, is by attending to the scope of the author, as discovered by the context, and chusing such a term in the language which he writes, as suits best the original term, in the particular situation in which he finds it.

§ 4. But

* Dissert. II. § 4.

§ 4. But this is far from being the method of the literal translator. The defenders of this manner would, if possible, have nothing subjected to the judgment of the interpreter, but have every thing determined by general and mechanical rules. Hence, they insist, above all things, on preserving uniformity, and rendering the same word in the original, wherever it occurs, or however it is connected, by the same word in the version. And as the much greater part of the words, not of one tongue only, but of every tongue, are equivocal, and have more significations than one, they have adopted these two rules for determining their choice, among the different meanings of which the term is susceptible. The first is, to adopt the meaning, wherever it is discoverable, to which etymology points, though in defiance of the meaning suggested, both by the context and by general use. When this rule does not answer, as when the derivation is uncertain, the second is, to adopt that which of all the senses of the word appears to the translator the most common, and adhere to it inflexibly, in every case, whatever absurdity or nonsense it may involve him in. Perhaps, not even the most literal interpreters observe inviolably these rules. But one thing is certain, that in those cases wherein they assume the privilege of dispensing with them, this measure is, in no respect, more necessary than in many of the cases wherein they rigidly observe them. I may add another thing as equally certain, that whenever they think proper to supersede those rules, they betray a consciousness of the insufficiency of the fundamental principles of their method, as well as of the necessity there is that the translator use his best discernment and skill for directing him, first, in the discovery of the meaning of his author, and, secondly, in the proper choice of words for expressing it in his version.

§ 5. I shall exemplify the observance of the two rules above mentioned, in the version I proposed to consider. And, first, for that of etymology; the passage in Genesis, ch. i. 20. which is properly rendered in the common translation, *Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature*: Arias renders, *Reptificent aquæ reptile*. It is true, that the word which he barbarously translates *reptificent* (for there is no such Latin word) is in the Hebrew conjugation called *bipbil*, of a verb which in *kal*, that is, in the simple and radical form, signifies *reperere*, *to creep*. Analogically, therefore, the verb in *bipbil* should import, *to cause to creep*. It had been accordingly rendered by Pagninus, a critic of the same stamp, but not such an adept as Arias, *reperere faciant*. But in Hebrew, as in all other languages, use, both in altering and in adding, exercises an uncontrollable dominion over all the parts of speech. We have just the same evidence that the original verb in *bipbil*, commonly signifies to produce in abundance, like fishes and reptiles, as we have that in *kal*, it signifies *to creep*.

creep. Now, passing the barbarism, *reptifcent*, the sense which this version conveys, if it convey any sense, is totally different from the manifest sense of the author. It is the creation or first production of things which Moses is relating. Arias, in this instance, as well as Pagnin, seems to exhibit things as already produced, and to relate only how they were set in motion. What other meaning can we give to words importing, "Let the waters cause the creeping thing to creep?" or if, by a similar barbarism in English, we may be allowed to give a more exact representation of the barbarous Latin of Arias, "Let the waters creepify the creeper?"

Another example of etymological version, in defiance of use and of common sense, we have in the beginning of the song of Moses, Deut. xxxii. 2. The words rendered in the English translation, *My doctrine shall drop as the rain*, Arias translates, "Stil-
"labit ut pluvia assumptio mea." The word here rendered *assumptio* has, for its etymon, a verb which commonly signifies *fumo, capio*. That sage interpreter, it seems, thought it of more importance to acquaint his reader with this circumstance, than with the obvious meaning of the word itself. And thus a passage which, in the original, is neither ambiguous nor obscure, is rendered in such a manner as would defy Oedipus to unrid-
dle.

§ 6. As to the second rule mentioned, of adopting that which of all the significations of the word, appears to the translator the most common, and to adhere to it inflexibly in every case, however unfuitable it may be to the context, and however much it may mar the sense of the discourse, there is hardly a page, nay, a paragraph, nay, a line in Arias, which does not furnish us with an example. Nor does it take place in one only, but in all the parts of speech. First, in nouns, Joshua v. 4. *Et hoc verbum quo circumcidit*. The Hebrew word rendered *verbum*, answers both to *verbum*, and to *res*; but as the more common meaning is *verbum*, it must, by this rule, be made always so, in spite of the connection. In this manner he corrects Pagnin, who had rendered the expression, justly and intelligibly, *Hæc est causa quare circumcidit*. In that expression, Gen. xlix. 22. *Filius fructescens Joseph super fontem*, we have both his rules exemplified, the first in the barbarous participle *fructescens*, which has a derivation similar to the Hebrew word; the second in the substantive *filius*, which is no doubt the most common signification of the Hebrew בן *ben*, and in the preposition *super*. In this manner he corrects Pagnin, who had said, not badly, *Ramus crescens Joseph juxta fontem*.

§ 7. And to shew that he made as little account of the reproach of solecism as of that of barbarism, he says, as absurdly as un-
meaningly, *Pater fuit sedentis tentorium*, Gen. iv. 23. giving a

regimen to a neuter verb. Pagnin had said, *inhabitantis*. That this is conformable to the signification of the Hebrew word in this passage, which the other is not, there can be no question; but it might fairly bear a question, whether *sedeo* or *inhabito* be the more common meaning of the Hebrew word. The same strange rule he follows in the indeclinable parts of speech, the prepositions in particular, which being few in Hebrew, and consequently of more extensive signification, he has chosen always to render the same way, thereby darkening the clearest passages, and expressing, in the most absurd manner, the most elegant.

As I would avoid being tedious, I shall produce but two other examples of this, having given one already from Jacob's benediction to his sons, though the whole work abounds with examples. The expression used by Pagnin, in the account of the creation, *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, Gen. i. 6. he has thus reformed, *Sit dividens inter aquas ad aquas*. The other is in the account of the murder of Abel, Gen. iv. 8. *Surrexit Cain ad Hebel*, where Pagnin had used the preposition *contra*. As a specimen of the servile manner in which he traces the arrangement and construction of the original, to the total subversion of all rule and order in the language which he writes, I shall give the following passage in the New Testament, not selected as peculiar, for such are to be found in every page: *De quidem enim ministerio in sanctos, ex abundanti mihi est scribere vobis*, 2 Cor. ix. 1.

§ 8. To proceed now, as I proposed, to phrases or combinations of words: I shall, first, produce some examples which convey a mere jargon of words, combined ungrammatically, and therefore to those who do not understand the language out of which the translation is made, unintelligibly. Such are the following: *Istæ generationes cæli et terræ, in creari ea, in die facere Deus terram et cælum*, Gen. ii. 4.—*Emisit eum Dominus ad colendam terram quod sumptus est inde*, Gen. iii. 23.—*Major iniquitas mea quam parcere*, Gen. iv. 13. But as, in certain cases, this manner of copying a foreign idiom, makes downright nonsense, in other cases, the like combinations of corresponding words, in different languages, though not unmeaning, do not convey the same meaning, nay, sometimes convey meanings the very reverse of one another. Thus, two negatives in Greek and French deny strongly, in Latin and English they affirm. כֹּל לֹא *col la*, in Hebrew is *none*: *non omnis*, in Latin, which is a literal version, and *not all*, in English, denote *some*. In like manner, οὐκ, construed with οὐδεις, in Greek, is still *nobody*; *non nemo*, in Latin, which is a literal version, is *somebody*. The words καὶ οὐ μελει σοι περι εὐδενος, Mark xii. 14. rendered properly in the common version, *and carest for no man*, are translated by Arias, *Et non cura est tibi de nullo*; the very opposite of the author's sentiment,

timent, which would have been more justly rendered, *Et cura est tibi de nullo*; or, as it is in the Vulgate, *Non curas quenquam*. In this, however, hardly any of the literal interpreters have judged proper to observe a strict uniformity; though I will venture to say, it would be impossible to assign a good reason why, in some instances, they depart from that method, whilst in others they tenaciously adhere to it.

§ 9. It ought, withal, to be observed, that several interpreters who, in translating single words, have not confined themselves to the absurd method above mentioned, could not be persuaded to take the same liberty with idioms and phrases. Thus Arias has but copied the Vulgate in translating, Ὅτι οὐκ ἀδυνατεῖ παρὰ τὸ Θεὸν παντὲς, Luke i. 37. *Quia non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum*. In this short sentence there are no fewer than three improprieties, one arising from the mis-translation of a noun, and the other two from mis-translated idioms. Πᾶν, in Hellenistic usage, is equivalent to the Hebrew דָּבָר *daber*, which, as has been observed, signifies not only *verbum*, a word, but *res*, or *negotium*, a thing; which last is the manifest sense of it in the passage quoted; the second is the rendering of οὐκ παν, *non omne*, and not, as it ought to have been, *nullum*; the third arises from using the future in Latin, in the enunciation of an universal truth. It ought to have been remembered, that the Hebrew has no present tense, and is consequently obliged often to use the other tenses, and especially the future, in enunciating general truths, for which, in all modern languages, as well as in Greek and Latin, we employ the present. In consequence of these blunders, the version, as it lies, is perfectly unmeaning; whereas, no person, that is even but a smatterer in Hebrew, will hesitate to declare, that the sense is completely expressed in English in these words, *For nothing is impossible with God*.

§ 10. There are few of the old versions which have kept entirely clear of this fault. In the ancient Latin translation called the Italic, whereof we have not now a complete copy remaining, there were many more barbarisms than in the present Vulgate. And even Jerom himself acquaints us that, when he set about making a new version, he left several things which he knew to be not properly expressed, for fear of giving offence to the weak, by his numerous and bold alterations. This idiom of *non omne*, for *nihil* or *nullum*, seems to have been one which, in many places, though not in all, he has corrected. Thus, what in the old Italic, after the Septuagint, was *Non est omne recens sub sole*, Eccles. i. 9. he has rendered perspicuously and properly, *Nihil sub sole novum*. A slavish attachment to the letter, in translating, without any regard to the meaning, is originally the offspring of the superstition, not of the church, but of the synagogue, where it would have been more suitable in Christian interpreters, the ministers,

ministers, not of the letter, but of the spirit, to have allowed it to remain.

§ 11. That this is not the way to answer the first and principal end of translating, has, I think, been sufficiently demonstrated. Instead of the sense of the original, it sometimes gives us downright nonsense; frequently a meaning quite different, and not seldom it makes the author say in another language, the reverse of what he said in his own. Can it then be doubted, that this is not the way to attain the second end in translating? Is this a method whereby a translator can convey into his version, as much as possible, in a consistency with the genius of a different language, the author's spirit and manner, and (so to speak) the very character of his style? It is evident, that the first end may be attained where this is not attained. An author's meaning may be given, but in a different manner; a concise writer may be made to express himself diffusely, or a diffuse writer concisely; the sense of an elegant work may be justly given, though in a homely dress. But it does not hold conversely, that the second end may be attained without the first; for when an author's sense is not given, he is not fairly represented. Can we do justice to his manner, if, when he reasons consequentially, he be exhibited as talking incoherently; if what he writes perspicuously, be rendered ambiguously or obscurely; if what flows from his pen naturally and easily, in the true idiom and construction of his language, be rendered ruggedly and unnaturally, by the violence perpetually done to the construction of the language, into which it is transmuted, rather than translated? The manner of a tall man, who walks with dignity, would be wretchedly represented by a dwarf who had no other mode of imitation, but to number and trace his footsteps. The immoderate strides and distortions which this ridiculous attempt would oblige the imitator to employ, could never convey to the spectators an idea of easy and graceful motion.

§ 12. The third end of translating, that of preserving purity and perspicuity in the language into which the version is made, is not so much as aimed at, by any of the literal tribe. Upon the whole, I cannot express my sentiments more justly both of Arias and of Pagnin, than in the words of Houbigant, who*, in assigning his reasons for not adopting the version of either, says, "Non facerem meam illam versionem Ariæ Montani horridam, inficetam, obscuram, talem denique qualem composuisset, si quis homines deterre ab sacris codicibus legendis voluisset. Non illam Pagnini, quam Arias, jam malam, fecit imitando ac interpolando pejorem." In this last remark, which may in part be justified by some of the foregoing examples, he perfectly agrees with father Simon, who says of Arias' amendments on Pagnin's

* Proleg. p. 178.

Pagnin's translation, *Quot correctiones, tot corruptiones*. For there is hardly any thing altered that is not for the worse. Such Latin versions would be quite unintelligible, if it were not for the knowledge we have of the original, and of the common English version, which is as literal as any version ought to be, and sometimes more so. The coincidence of two or three words recalls the whole passage to our memory; but we may venture to pronounce that, to an ancient Roman, who knew nothing of the learning or opinions of the East, the whole of Arias' Bible would appear no better than a jumble of words without meaning.

§ 13. To all the other evil consequences resulting from such versions, we ought to add that they necessarily lead the unlearned reader into an opinion that the original, which is susceptible of them, must be totally indefinite, equivocal, and obscure. Few, without making the experiment, can allow themselves to think that it is equally possible by this mode of translation, completely to disfigure and render unintelligible what is written with plainness and simplicity, and without any ambiguity in their mother tongue. Yet nothing is more certain than that the most perspicuous writing, in any language, may be totally disguised by this treatment*. Were the ancient Greek or Latin classics, in prose

or

* As it is impossible, without an example, to conceive how monstrous the transformation is which it occasions, I shall here subjoin a specimen of a few English sentences translated into Latin, in the taste and manner of Arias. "Ego inveni aliquod pecus in meo frumento, et posui illa in meam libram. Ego rogavi unum qui stabat per, si ille novit cujus illa erant. Sed ille vertit unam viam a me, et fecit non ita multum ut vindicare salvum ad redire mihi ullam responsonem. Super hoc ego rogavi unum alium qui dixit unam magnam tabulam abiegnam in replicatione quam ego feci non substare. Quam unquam ego volui non habere posita illa sursum, habui ego notum ad quem illa pertinebant; nam ego didici post custodias quod ille fuit unus ego fui multum aspectus ad." Were these few lines put into the hands of a learned foreigner, who does not understand English, he might sooner learn to read Chinese, than to divine their meaning. Yet a little attention would bring an Englishman, who knows Latin, soon to discover that they were intended as a version, if we may call it so, of the following words, which, in the manner of Arias, I give with the version interlined.

Ego inveni aliquod pecus in meo frumento, et posui illa in meam
I found some cattle in my corn, and put them into my
 libram. Ego rogavi unum qui stabat per si ille novit cujus illa erant.
pound. I asked one who stood by if he knew whose they were.
 Sed ille vertit unam viam a me, et fecit non ita multum ut vindicare
But he turned a way from me, and did not so much as touch
 salvum ad redire mihi ullam responsonem. Super hoc ego rogavi unum
safe to return me any answer. Upon this I asked ano-
 alium qui dixit unam magnam tabulam abiegnam in replicatione quam ego
ther who said a great deal in reply which I
 feci non substare. Quam unquam ego volui non habere posita illa sursum,
did not understand. How ever I would not have put them up,
 habui

or verse, to be thus rendered into any modern tongue, nobody could bear to read them. Strange indeed, that a treatment should ever have been accounted respectful to the sacred penmen, which, if given to any other writer, would be universally condemned, as no better than dressing him in a fool's coat.

I am not at all surpris'd that certain great men of the church of Rome, like Cardinal Cajetan, who, (though, with foreign assistance; he translated the Psalms) did not understand a word of Hebrew, shew themselves great admirers of this method. The more unintelligible the Scriptures are made, the greater is the need of an infallible interpreter, an article of which they never lose sight. But that others, who have not the same motive, and possess a degree of understanding superior to that of a Jewish cabalist, should recommend an expedient, which serves only for debasing and discrediting the dictates of the divine spirit, appears perfectly unaccountable. I shall only add, that versions of this kind are very improperly called translations. The French have

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habui ego notum ad quem illa pertinebant, nam ego didici post custodias
had I known to whom they belonged, for I learned afterwards
 quod ille fuit unus ego fui multum aspectus ad.
that he was one I was much beholden to.

Should one object that the Latin words here employed do not suit the sense of the corresponding words in the passage translated, it is admitted that they do not; but they are selected in exact conformity to the fundamental rules followed by Arias. Thus *una via* away. *vindicare salvum* vouchsafe, *quam unquam* however, *tabula abiegnæ* deal, *subflare* understand, *post custodias* afterwards, *aspectus* beholden, are all agreeable to the primary rule of etymology, and, in no respect, worse than *reptifico*, where both sense and use required *produco*; or *assumptio* for *doctrina*, to the utter destruction of all meaning, or *non omnis* for *nullus*, which gives a meaning quite different. But by what rule, it may be asked, is *pound* rendered *libra*, in a case wherein it manifestly means *septum*? By the same rule, it is answered, whereby *iasbab* is rendered *sedere*, in a case wherein both the sense and the construction required *inhabitare*, and *daber* is rendered *verbum* where it manifestly means *rei*, the golden rule of uniformity, by which every term ought always to be rendered the same way, and agreeably to its most common signification, without minding whether it make sense or nonsense so rendered. [The literal translator follows implicitly the sage direction given by Cajetan, "Non sit vobis curæ, si sensus non apparet, quia non est vestri officii exponere, sed interpretari: interpretamini sicut jacet, et relinquatis expositoribus curam intelligendi." Præf. Comment. in Psalm.] Now it is certain that *pound* occurs oftener in the sense of *libra* than in that of *septum*. But how do you admit such gross solecisms as *redire responsonem*? I answer, Is this more so than *sedere tentorium*? or do the prepositions as used here in *stabat per* and *aspectus ad*, make the construction more monstrous, than *inter ad* in that sentence *sit dividens inter aquas ad aquas*? Besides, there is not a word in the above specimen, which taken severally is not Latin: so much cannot be said for Arias, whose work is overrun with barbarisms as well as solecisms. Witness his *fructescens* and *reptiscent*, in the few examples above produced. And in regard to the total incoherence and want of construction, can any thing in this way exceed *in creari ea*, or *in die facere Deus*, or *ad terram quod sumptus est inde*, or *major iniquitas quam parcere*?

a convenient word *traveſty*, by which they denote the metamorphoſis of a ſerious work into mere burleſque by dreſſing it in ſuch language as renders it ridiculous, makes the nobleſt thoughts appear contemptible, the richeſt images beggarly, and the moſt judicious obſervations abſurd. I would not ſay, therefore, the Bible *translated*, but the Bible *traveſtied*, by Arias Montanus. For that can never deſerve the name of a tranſlation, which gives you neither the matter nor the manner of the author, but, on the contrary, often exhibits both as the reverſe of what they are. Malvenda, a Dominican, is another interpreter of the ſame tribe with his brother Pagnin, and with Arias, whom he is ſaid greatly to have exceeded in darkneſs, barbariſm and nonſenſe. I never ſaw his verſion, but have reaſon to believe, from the accounts given of it by good judges, that it can answer no valuable purpoſe.

PART III.

Strictures on the Vulgate.

I PROCEED now to conſider a little the merit of ſome other Latin tranſlations of holy writ. The firſt doubtleſs, that deſerves our attention, in reſpect both of antiquity, and I may ſay, of univerſality in the Weſtern churches, is the *Vulgate*. The verſion which is known by this name, at leaſt the greater part of it, is juſtly aſcribed to Jerom, and muſt therefore be dated from the end of the fourth, or the beginning of the fifth century. As its reception in the church was gradual, voluntary, and not in conſequence of the command of a ſuperior, and as, for ſome ages, the old Latin verſion, called the *Italic*, continued, partly from the influence of cuſtom, partly from reſpect to antiquity, to be regarded and uſed by many, there is reaſon to believe that a part of that verſion ſtill remains in the Vulgate, and is, in a manner, blended with it. One thing at leaſt is certain, that in ſeveral places of the Vulgate we find thoſe expreſſions and ways of rendering which that learned father in his works ſtrongly condemned, at the ſame time that, in other parts, we ſee his emendations regularly followed. Beſides, as I hinted before, there were ſeveral corrections, which, though his judgment approved them, he did not think it prudent to adopt, for fear of ſhocking the ſentiments of the people. From this it may naturally be inferred, that the manner and ſtyle of the Vulgate will not be found equal and uniform. And I believe no perſon who has examined it with a critical eye, will deny that this is the caſe.

§ 2. From what remains of the old Italic, it appears to have been much in the taste of almost all the Jewish translations, extremely literal, and consequently, in a great degree, obscure, ambiguous, and barbarous. To give a Latin translation of the Scriptures, which might at once be more perspicuous, and more just to the original, was the great and laudable design of that eminent light of the Western churches above mentioned. The Old Testament part of the Italic version had been made entirely from the Septuagint (for the Hebrew Scriptures were for some ages of no estimation in the church); but Jerom, being well skilled in Hebrew, undertook to translate from the original. This itself has made, in some passages, a considerable difference on the sense. And, as the version of the Seventy has generally the mark of a servile attachment to the letter, there can be no doubt that there must have been considerable differences of reading, in the Hebrew manuscripts extant at the times when the several parts of that version were made, from those in common use at present. And though I think upon the whole, that the Hebrew Scriptures are much preferable, an acquaintance with the Septuagint is of great importance for several reasons, and particularly for this, that it often assists in suggesting the true reading in cases where the present Hebrew copies are obscure, or appear to have been vitiated. Jerom judiciously recurred to that translation in such cases, and often borrowed light from it, when it was more perspicuous than the Hebrew, and when the meaning which it contained seemed better adapted to the context. Perhaps he would have done still better to have recurred oftener. For, however learned those Jews were, to whose assistance he owed the acquisition of the language, they were strongly tinctured with the cabalistical prejudices which prevailed, more or less, in all the literati of that nation. Hence they were sometimes led, on very fanciful grounds, to assign to words and phrases, meanings not supported by the obvious sense of the context, nor even by the most ancient versions and paraphrases. In this case, there can be no doubt that these were more to be confided in than his Jewish instructors.

§ 3. No intelligent person will question the fitness of that judicious and learned writer, for the task of translating the Bible into his native language. But that we may not be led too far in transferring to the work, the personal merit of the author, we ought to remember two things, first, that the Vulgate, as we have it at present, is not entirely the work of Jerom; and, secondly, that even in what Jerom translated, he left many things, as he himself acknowledges, which needed correction, but which he did not chuse to alter, lest the liberties taken with the old translation should scandalise the vulgar. It is no wonder, then, that great inequalities should be observable in the execution. In
many

many places it is excellent. The sense of the original is conveyed justly and perspicuously; no affectation in the style; on the contrary, the greatest simplicity combined with purity. But this cannot be said with truth of every part of that work.

§ 4. In a preceding part of this Dissertation, (§ 9.) I took notice of one passage rendered exactly in the manner of Arias, who found nothing to alter in it, in order to bring it down to his level. Indeed there are many such instances. Thus *οὐκ ἔστι σωθήναι πάντα τὰ σαρξ* is rendered, *Non fieret salva omnis caro*, Matt. xxiv. 22. In some places we find barbarisms and solecisms, to which it would be difficult to discover a temptation, the just expression being both as literal and as obvious as the improper one that has been preferred to it. Of this sort, we may call, *Neque nubent, neque nubentur*, Matt. xxii. 30. Mark xii. 25. *Nonne vos magis plures estis illis?* Matt. vi. 26. *Non capit prophetam perire extra Jerusalem*, Luke xiii. 33. and *Filius hominis non venit ministrari sed ministrare*, Matt. xx. 28. Yet, as to the last example, the same words in another Gospel are rendered without the solecism, *Filius hominis non venit ut ministraretur ei, sed ut ministraret*, Mark x. 45. Very often we meet with instances of the same original word rendered by the same Latin word, when the sense is manifestly different, and the idiom of the tongue does not admit it. This absurdity extends even to conjunctions. The Greek *ἰτι* answers frequently to the Latin *quia*, *because*, and not seldom, to *quod*, *that*. Here, however, it is almost uniformly rendered *quia* or *quoniam*, in defiance of grammar and common sense. Thus, *Tunc confitebor illis quia nunquam novi vos*, Matt. vii. 23. and *Magister scimus quia verax es*, Matt. xxii. 16. These expressions are no better Latin, than these which follow are English: *Then will I confess to them, because I never knew you*, and, *Master we know because thou art true*: words, which if they suggest any meaning, it is evidently not the meaning of the author; nor is it a meaning which the original would ever have suggested to one who understands the language.

Nay, sometimes even the favourite rule of uniformity is violated, but not for the sake of keeping to the sense, the sense being rather hurt by the violation. Thus *λαος* answering to *populus*, and commonly so rendered, is sometimes improperly translated *plebs*. *Ἐποίησεν λύτρωσιν τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ*, Luke i. 68. is rendered *Fecit redemptionem plebis sue*. Sometimes the most unmeaning barbarisms are adopted merely to represent the etymology of the original term. *Τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τον ἐπισκειον δος ἡμιν σιμαζεν*, is rendered *Panem nostrum super substantialem da nobis bodie*, Matt. vi. 11. *Panis super substantialis* is just as barbarous Latin as *super substantial bread* would be English, and equally unintelligible. There is an additional evil resulting from this manner of treating holy writ, that the solecisms, barbarisms, and nonsensical expressions

which it gives rise to, provè a fund of materials to the visionary, out of which his imagination frames a thousand mysteries.

§ 5. I would not, however, be understood by these remarks, as passing a general censure on this version, which, though not to be followed implicitly, may, I am convinced, be of great service to the critic. It ought to weigh with us, that even the latest part of this translation was made about fourteen hundred years ago, and is consequently many centuries prior to all the Latin translations now current, none of which can claim an earlier date than the revival of letters in the West. I do not use this argument from an immoderate regard to antiquity, or from the notion that age can give a sanction to error. But there are two things in this circumstance which ought to recommend the work in question to the attentive examination of the critic. First that, having been made from manuscripts older than most, perhaps than any, now extant, it serves, in some degree, to supply the place of those manuscripts, and furnish us with the probable means of discovering what the readings were, which Jerom found in the copies he so carefully collated. Another reason is, that being finished long before those controversies arose, which are the foundation of the sects now subsisting, we may rest assured that, in regard to these, there will be no bias from party zeal to either side of the question. We cannot say so much for the translations which have been made since the rise of Protestantism, either by Protestants or by Papists. And these are, in my opinion, two not inconsiderable advantages.

§ 6. I take notice of the last the rather, because many Protestants, on account of the declaration of its authenticity, solemnly pronounced by the council of Trent, cannot avoid considering it as a Popish Bible, calculated for supporting the Roman Catholic cause. Now this is an illiberal conclusion, the offspring of ignorance, which I think it of some consequence to refute. It is no further back than the sixteenth century, since that judgment was given in approbation of this version, the first authoritative declaration made in its favour. Yet the estimation in which it was universally held throughout the Western churches, was, to say the least, not inferior before that period to what it is at present. And, we may say with truth, that though no judicious Protestant will think more favourably of this translation, on account of their verdict; neither will he, on this account, think less favourably of it. It was not because this version was peculiarly adapted to the Romish system, that it received the sanction of that synod; but because it was the only Bible with which the far greater part of the members had from their infancy had the least acquaintance. There were but few in that assembly who understood either Greek or Hebrew. They had heard that the Protestants, the new heretics, as they called them, had frequent
recourse

recourse to the original, and were beginning to make versions from it; a practice of which their own ignorance of the original made them the more jealous. Their fears being thus alarmed, they were exceedingly anxious to interpose their authority, by the declaration above mentioned, for preventing new translations being obtruded on the people. They knew what the Vulgate contained; and had been early accustomed to explain it in their own way. But they did not know what might be produced from new translations. Therefore, to preoccupy men's minds, and prevent every true son of the church from reading other, especially modern, translations, and from paying any regard to what might be urged from the original, the very indefinite sentence was pronounced in favour of the Vulgate, *vetus et vulgata editio*, that in all disputes it should be held for authentic, *ut pro authentica habeatur*.

§ 7. Now if, instead of this measure, that council had ordered a translation to be made by men nominated by them, in opposition to those published by Protestants, the case would have been very different: for we may justly say, that amidst such a ferment as was then excited, there should have appeared, in a version so prepared, any thing like impartiality, candour, or discernment, would have been morally impossible. Yet even such a production would have been entitled to a fair examination from the critic, who ought never to disdain to receive information from an adversary, and to judge impartially of what he offers. As that, however, was not the case, we ought not to consider the version in question as either the better or the worse for their verdict. It is but doing justice to say, that it is noway calculated to support Romish errors and corruptions. It had been in current use in the church, for ages before the much greater part of those errors and corruptions was introduced. No doubt the schoolmen had acquired the knack of explaining it in such a way as favoured their own prejudices. But is this any more than what we find the most discordant sects acquire with regard to the original, or even to a translation which they use in common? For my own part, though it were my sole purpose, in recurring to a version, to refute the absurdities and corruptions of Popery, I should not desire other or better arguments than those I am supplied with by that very version, which one of their own councils has declared authentical.

§ 8. I am not ignorant that a few passages have been produced, wherein the Vulgate and the original convey different meanings, and wherein the meaning of the Vulgate appears to favour the abuses established in that church. Some of these, but neither many, nor of great moment, are no doubt corruptions in the text, probably not intentional, but accidental, to which the originals in Hebrew and Greek have been in like manner liable, and from
which

which no ancient book extant can be affirmed to be totally exempted. With respect to others of them, they will be found, upon a nearer inspection, as little favourable to Romish superstition, as the common reading in the Hebrew or the Greek. What is justly rendered, in our version, *I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel*, Gen. iii. 15. is in such a manner translated in the Vulgate, as to afford some colour for the extraordinary honours paid the virgin mother of our Lord. *Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem. et semen tuum et semen illius. Ipsa conteret caput tuum, et tu insidiaberis calcaneo ejus.* “She shall bruise thy head.” In this way it has been understood by some of their capital painters, who, in their pictures of the Virgin, have represented her treading on a serpent. It is, however, certain, that their best critics admit this to be an error, and recur to some ancient manuscripts of the Vulgate, which read *ipsum*, not *ipsa*.

A still grosser blunder, which seems to give countenance to the worship of relics, is in the passage thus rendered by our interpreters: *By faith, Jacob when he was a dying, blessed both the sons of Joseph; and worshipped, leaning upon the top of his staff*, Heb. xi. 21.: in the Vulgate thus: *Fide Jacob moriens singulos filiorum Joseph benedixit, et adoravit fastigium virgæ ejus; “adored the top of his rod;”* as the version made from the Vulgate by English Romanists, and published at Rheims, expresses it. But the best judges among Roman Catholics admit, that the Latin text is not entire in this place, and that there has been an accidental omission of the preposition, through the carelessness of transcribers. For they have not now a writer of any name who infers, from the declaration of authenticity, either the infallibility of the translator, or the exactness of the copiers. Houbigant, a priest of the Oratory, has not been restrained, by that sentence, from making a new translation of the Old Testament from the Hebrew into Latin, wherein he uses as much freedom with the Vulgate, in correcting what appeared to him faulty in it, as any reasonable Protestant, in this country, would do with the common English translation. Nay, which is more extraordinary, in the execution of this work, he had the countenance of the then reigning Pontiff. In his version he has corrected the passage quoted from Genesis, and said, “*Illud*” (not *illa*) “conteret caput tuum.” I make no doubt that he would have corrected the other passage also, if he had made a version of the New Testament.

§ 9. I know it has also been urged, that there are some things in the Vulgate, which favour the style and doctrine of Rome, particularly in what regards the sacraments; and that such things are to be found in places where there is no ground to suspect a
various

various reading, nor that the text of the Vulgate has undergone any alteration, either intentional or accidental. Could this point be evinced in a satisfactory manner, it would allow more to Popery, on the score of antiquity, than, in my opinion, she is entitled to. It is true, that marriage appears, in one passage, to be called a sacrament. Paul, after recommending the duties of husbands and wives, and enforcing his recommendations by the resemblance which marriage bears to the relation subsisting between Christ and his church, having quoted these words from Moses, *For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh*; adds, as it is expressed in the Vulgate, *Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia*, Eph. v. 32.; as expressed in the English translation, *This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church*; which is in effect, as I had occasion to observe in the preceding Dissertation, to which I refer the reader *, ‘This is capable of an important and figurative interpretation, I mean, as it relates to Christ and the church.’ Under the Mosaic economy, the relation wherein God stood to Israel, is often represented under the figure of marriage; and it is common, with the penmen of the New Testament, to transfer those images, whereby the union between God and his people is illustrated in the Old, to that which subsists between Christ and his church. It is evident, that by the Latin word *sacramentum*, the Greek *μυστήριον* is frequently rendered in the New Testament; and it is no less evident, not only from the application of the word in that version, but from the general use of it, in ecclesiastical writers, in the primitive ages, that it often denoted no more than an allegorical or figurative meaning, which may be assigned to any narrative or injunction; a meaning more sublime than that which is at first suggested by the words. Thus, the moral conveyed under an apologue or parable was with them the *sacrament*, that is, the hidden meaning of the apologue or parable. Thus, in *ego dicam tibi sacramentum mulieris et bestię quę portat eam*, Rev. xvii. 7. I will tell thee the mystery of the woman, and of the beast which carrieth her; it is indubitable, that *μυστήριον*, or *sacramentum*, means the hidden meaning of that vision. It is very plain that, in their use, the sense of the word *sacramentum*, was totally different from that which it has at present, either among Protestants or among Papists †. At the same time, there can be no question, that the misunderstanding of the passage quoted above, from the Epistle to the Ephesians, has given rise to the exaltation of matrimony into a sacrament. Such are the effects of the perversion of words, through the gradual change of customs; a perversion incident to every language, but which no translator can foresee.

No,

* Differ. IX. Part I. § 7, 8.

† Diff. IX. Part I.

No more is their doctrine of merit supported by the following expression, *Talibus hostiis promeretur Deus*, Heb. xiii. 16. which, though faulty in point of purity, means no more than is expressed in the English translation, in these words: *With such sacrifices God is well pleased*. It is by common use, and not by scholastic quibbles, that the language of the sacred writers ought to be interpreted. Again, the command which so often occurs in the gospel, *pœnitentiam agite*, seems at first to favour the Popish doctrine of *penance*. In conformity to this idea, the Rheinish translators render it *do penance*. But nothing is more evident, than that this is a perversion of the phrase from its ancient meaning, occasioned by the corruptions which have insensibly crept into the church. That the words, as used by the Latin translator, meant originally as much, at least, as the English word *repent*, cannot admit a question; and thus much is allowed by the critics of that communion. In this manner, Maldonat, a learned Jesuit, in his Commentary on Matt. vii. 15. explains *pœnitentiam agite*, as of the same import with *parate vias Domini, rectas facite semitas ejus*; and both as signifying *Relinquitte errores et sequimini veritatem; discedite a malo, et facite bonum*. He understood no otherwise the *agite pœnitentiam* of the Latin translator, than we understand the $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\tau\epsilon$ of the evangelist. Accordingly, the same Greek word is in one place of that version rendered *pœnitementi*, Mark i. 15. But the introduction of the doctrine of auricular confession, of the necessity for obtaining absolution, of submitting to the punishment prescribed by the priest for the sins confessed, which they have come to denominate *pœnitentia*, and their styling the whole of this institution of theirs the *sacrament of penance*, which is of a much later date than that version, has diverted men's minds from attending to the primitive and only proper import of the phrase. *Agite pœnitentiam* was not, therefore, originally a mis-translation of the Greek $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\tau\epsilon$, though not sufficiently expressive; but the abuse which has gradually taken place in the Latin church, and the misapplication of the term which it has occasioned, have in a manner jostled out the original meaning, and rendered the words, in their present acceptation, totally improper*.

§ 10. Several other words and expressions give scope for the like observations. But after what has been said, it is not necessary to enter further into particulars. The Vulgate may reasonably be pronounced upon the whole, a good and faithful version. That it is unequal in the style, in respect both of purity and of perspicuity, is very evident; nay, to such a degree, as plainly to evince that it has not all issued from the same pen. Considered in gross, we have reason to think it greatly inferior to Jerom's translation, as finished by himself. I may add, we have reason

also

* For further illustration on this article, see Dissert. XI. Part II. § 4.

also to consider the version which Jerom actually made, as greatly inferior to what he could have made, and would have made, if he had thought himself at liberty to follow entirely his own judgment, and had not been much restrained by the prejudices of the people. I have already observed the advantages redounding to the critic from the use of this version, which are in some degree peculiar. I shall only add, that its language, barbarous as it often is, has its use in assisting us to understand more perfectly the Latin ecclesiastical writers of the early ages.

PART IV.

Strictures on Castalio.

HAVING shewn, that it is impossible to do justice to an author, or to his subject, by attempting to track him, and always to be found in his footsteps, I shall now animadvert a little on those translators who are in the opposite extreme; whose manner is so loose, rambling and desultory, that though they move nearly in the same direction with their author, pointing to the same object, they keep scarcely within sight of his path. Of the former excess, Arias Montanus is a perfect model; the Vulgate is often too much so. Of the latter, the most remarkable example we have in Latin, is Castalio. Yet Castalio's work is no paraphrase, such as we have sometimes seen under the name of *liberal translations*; for in these, there are always interwoven with the thoughts of the author, those of his interpreter, under the notion of their importance, either for illustrating, or for enforcing the sentiments of the original. The paraphrast does not confine himself to the humble task of the translator, who proposes to exhibit, pure and unmixed, the sentiments of another, clothed indeed in a different dress, namely, such as the country into which he introduces them, can supply him with. The paraphrast, on the contrary, claims to share with the author in the merit of the work, not in respect of the language merely, for to this every interpreter has a claim, but in respect of what is much more important, the sense; nay, further, if the sentiments of these two happen to jar, no uncommon case, it is easy to conjecture whose will predominate in the paraphrase. But it is not with paraphrasts that I have here to do. A loose manner of translating is sometimes adopted, not for the sake of insinuating artfully the translator's opinions, by blending them with the sentiments of

the author, but merely for the sake of expressing with elegance, and in an oratorical manner, the sense of the original.

§ 2. This was acknowledged to be in a high degree Castalio's object in translating. He had observed, with grief, that great numbers were withheld from reading the Scriptures, that is, the Vulgate, the only version of any account then extant, by the rudeness, as well as the obscurity of the style. To give the public a Bible more elegantly and perspicuously written, he considered as at least an innocent, if not a laudable artifice, for inducing students, especially those of the younger sort, to read the Scriptures with attention, and to throw aside books full of indecencies then much in vogue, because recommended by the beauty and ornaments of language. "Cupiebam," says he *, "extare Latiniorem aliquam, necnon fidelio rem, et magis perspicuam sacrarum literarum translationem, ex qua posset eadem opera pietas cum Latino sermone disci, ut hac ratione et tempori consuleretur, et homines ad legenda sacra pellicerentur." The motive was surely commendable; and the reason whereon it was founded, a general disuse of the Scriptures, on account of the badness of their language, is but too notorious. Cardinal Bembo, a man of some note and literature under the pontificate of Leo X. in whose time the Reformation commenced, is said to have expressed himself strongly on this subject, that he durst not read the Bible for fear of corrupting his style; an expression which had a very unfavourable aspect, especially in a churchman. Nevertheless, when we consider that by the Bible he meant the Vulgate, and by his style his Latinity, this declaration will not be found to merit all the censure which Brown †, and others, have bestowed upon it. For surely no one who understands Latin will say, that he wishes to form his style, in that language on the Vulgate. Nor does any reflection on the language of that translation affect, in the smallest degree, the sacred writers. The character of Moses' style, in particular, is simplicity, seriousness, perspicuity, and purity. The first and second of these qualities are, in general, well exhibited in the Vulgate; the third is sometimes violated, and the fourth often.

§ 3. But, to return to Castalio; he was not entirely disappointed in his principal aim. Many Romanists, as well as Protestants, who could not endure the foreign idioms and obscurity of the Vulgate, attracted by the fluency, the perspicuity, and partly, no doubt, by the novelty of Castalio's diction, as employed for conveying *the mind of the Spirit*, were delighted with the performance; whilst the same quality of novelty, along with what looked like affectation in the change, exceedingly disgusted others. One thing is very evident, in regard to this translator, that when

his

* Cast. Defens. Translat. &c.

† Essays on the Characteristics.

his work first made its appearance, nobody seemed to judge of it with coolness and moderation. Almost every person either admired or abhorred it. At this distant period, there is a greater probability of judging equitably than there was when it was first published, and men's passions, from the circumstances of the times, were so liable to be inflamed on every new topic of discussion, wherein religion was concerned.

§ 4. If we examine this work by the three great ends of translating, above observed, we shall be qualified to form some judgment of his merit in this department. As to the first and principal end, conveying the true sense of his author, I think he has succeeded, at least as well as most other translators into Latin, and better than some of those who, with much virulence, traduced his character and decried his work. He had indeed one great advantage, in being an excellent linguist, and knowing more of the three languages, Hebrew, Greek and Latin, than most of the critics of his time; but that his immoderate passion for classical elocution did sometimes lead him to adopt expressions which were feeble, obscure and improper, is very certain. And it must be owned, notwithstanding his plausible defence, that Beza had reason to affirm, that the words *ὅτι ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ ἐποίησε λυτρωσίν τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ*, Luke i. 68. are but ambiguously and frigidly rendered, *qui populi sui liberationem procuret*. The difference is immense, between the notions of Pagans concerning the agency of their gods in human affairs, and the ideas which Scripture gives us of the divine efficiency; and therefore even Cicero, in a case of this kind, is no authority. The following instance, cited by Houbigant, is an example of obscurity arising from the same cause, Proleg. "Tu isti populo terræ hæreditatem hercisceris," Josh. i. 6. *Hercisco* is merely a juridical term which, though it might have been proper, in a treatise on the civil law, or in pleading in a court of judicature, no Roman author, of any name, would have used in a work intended for the people. But to no sort of style are technical terms more unsuitable than to that of holy writ. It was the more inexcusable in this place, where the simple and natural expression was so obvious: "Tu terram—dabis isti populo possidendam." Whereas, the phrase which Castalio has adopted, would have probably been unintelligible to the much greater part of the people, even in Rome, at the time when Latin was their mother tongue.

§ 5. As to the second object of translating, the conveyance of the spirit and manner of the author, in a just exhibition of the character of his style; I hinted before that, in this particular, he failed *entirely*, and I may even add *intentionally*. The first characteristic quality of the historic style of holy writ, *simplicity*, he has totally renounced. The simple style is opposed both to the complex, and to the highly ornamented. The complex is,

when the diction abounds in periods, or in sentences consisting of several members, artfully combined. This is much the manner of Castalio, but far from that of the sacred historians. In a former Dissertation *, I gave a specimen of this difference, in his manner of rendering the first five verses of Genesis. Now, for the transformation he has made them undergo, he has no excuse from either necessity or perspicuity. The simple style will suit any tongue, (though the complex will not always), and is remarkably perspicuous. His affecting so often, without any necessity, to give, in the way of narrative, what, in the original, is in the way of dialogue, is another flagrant violation of ancient simplicity.

Nor is simplicity alone hurt by this change. How cold and inanimate, as well as indefinite, is the oblique but classical turn, which Castalio has endeavoured to give to Laban's salutation of Abraham's servant: "Eumque a Jova salvere jussim, hortatur, ne foris maneat:" compared with the direct and vivid address in the Vulgate, literally from the Hebrew, "Dixitque, Ingredere, benedictæ Domini: cur foris stas?" Or, as it is in the English translation, *Come in, thou blessed of the Lord; wherefore standest thou without?* Gen. xxiv. 31. That he transgresses in this respect also, by a profusion of ornament, is undeniable. By his accumulated diminutives, both in names and epithets, in the manner of Catullus, intended surely to be ornamental, he has injured the dignity, as well as the simplicity and seriousness of Solomon's Song.

Another ornament, in the same taste, by which the simplicity of the sacred writers has been greatly hurt in his translation, is the attempt, when the same ideas recur, of expressing them almost always in different words and varied phrases. It is not only essential to the simplicity, but it adds to the majesty of the inspired penmen, that there never appears in them any solicitude about their words. No pursuit of variety, or indeed of any thing in point of diction, out of the common road. Very different is the manner of this interpreter. I had occasion to remark before, (Diss. VI. Part iii. § 11.) that there were no fewer than seven or eight phrases, employed by Castalio, in different places of the New Testament, for expressing the import of the single verb *μτανοιω*, though used always in the same acceptation. And as another specimen of this inordinate passion, I shall add, that, to express *διωγμος*, he uses, beside the word *persequutio*, the far too general terms, *vexatio*, *afflictio*, *insectatio*, *adversa*, *res adversæ*. Nay, in some instances, his love of variety has carried him so far as to sacrifice, not barely the style of his author, but his sense. What can be a stronger example of it than his denominating
God

* Diss. III. § 4.

God, *Deus obtrectator*, Josh. xxiv. 19. rather than recur, with his author, to any term he had employed before. For the Hebrew קנא *kone*, rendered *jealous* in the English translation, he had used, in one place, *emulus*, in another, *socii impatiens*, and in a third, *rivalis impatiens*. Though some exception might be made to the two last, the first was as good as the language afforded. Another translator would not have thought there was any occasion for a fourth; but so differently thought our classical interpreter, in matters of this kind, that he preferred a most improper word, which might contribute to give his style the graces of novelty and variety, to an apposite, but more common term, which he had employed before. The word *obtrectator* is never used, as far as I remember, but in a bad sense. It is acknowledged, that when jealousy is ascribed to God, the expression is not strictly proper. He is spoken of after the manner of men. But then the term, by itself, does not imply any thing vicious. We may say of a man properly in certain cases, that he had reason to be *jealous*, but with no propriety can we say, in any case, that a man had reason to be *envious*, that he had reason to be *calumnious*. These epithets are better suited to the diabolical nature than to the divine. Yet both are included in the word *obtrectator*.

In short, his affectation of the manner of some of the poets and orators, has metamorphosed the authors he interpreted, and stript them of the venerable signatures of antiquity, which so admirably besit them; and which, serving as intrinsic evidence of their authenticity, recommend their writings to the serious and judicious. Whereas, when accoutred in this new fashion, nobody would imagine them to have been Hebrews; and yet (as some critics have justly remarked) it has not been within the compass of Castalio's art to make them look like Romans.

§ 6. I am far from thinking that Castalio merited, on this account, the bitter invectives vented against him by Beza, and others, as a wilful corrupter of the word of God. His intention was good; it was to entice all ranks, as much as possible, to the study of the divine oracles. The expedient he used appeared at least harmless. It was, in his judgment, at the worst, but like that which Horace observes, was often practised by good natured teachers:

Ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi
Doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima.

He regarded the thoughts solely as the result of inspiration, the words and idiom as merely circumstantial. "Erant Apostoli," says he *, "natu Hebræi; et peregrina, hoc est Græca lingua
" scribingentes

* Defens.

“ scribentes hebraizabant ; non quod id juberet spiritus : neque “ enim pluris facit spiritus Hebraismos quam Græcismos.” Indeed, if the liberty Castalio has taken with the diction had extended no further than to reject those Hebraisms which, how perspicuous soever they are in the original, occasion either obscurity or ambiguity, when verbally translated, and to supply their place by simple expressions in the Latin idiom, clearly conveying the same sense, no person who is not tinctured with the cabalistical superstition of the Jews could have censured his conduct.

Very often, the freedoms he used with the style of the sacred penmen aimed no higher. Thus, the expression of the prophet, which is literally in English, *My beloved had a vineyard in a born of the son of oil* ; and which is rendered in the Vulgate, “ *Vinea facta est dilecto meo in cornu filio olei* ;” Castalio has translated much better, because intelligibly, “ *Habebat amicus “ meus vineam in quodam pingui dorso.*” Had he used the more familiar term, *collis*, instead of *dorsum*, it would have been still better. The English translation expresses the sense very properly, *My well beloved hath a vineyard in a very fruitful hill*, Isa. v. 1. But, as I have shewn, the freedoms taken by Castalio went sometimes a great deal further than this, and tended to lessen the respect due to the sacred oracles, by putting them too much on a footing with compositions merely human, and by changing their serious manner for one comparatively light and trifling, nay, even playful and childish.

§ 7. As to the other two qualities of the historical style of Scripture, perspicuity and purity, he seems in general, to have been observant of them. To the latter he is censured chiefly for having sacrificed too much. Yet his attention to this quality has proved a principal means of securing his perspicuity ; as it is certain that the excessive attempts of others to preserve in their version the Oriental idiom, have both rendered the plainest passages unintelligible, and given bad Latin for what was good Hebrew or Chaldee. The example last quoted is an evidence of this ; and surely none can doubt that it has more perspicuity, as well as propriety, to say in Latin, *ut nemo usque evaderet* with Castalio, than to say, *ut non fieret salva omnis caro* with the Vulgate ; and, *Nulla res est quam Deus facere non possit* with the former, than *non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum* with the latter. Nevertheless, in a few instances, an immoderate passion for classical phraseology has, as we have seen, betrayed him into obscurities, and even blunders, of which inferior interpreters were in no danger.

§ 8. To illustrate the different effects on the appearance of the sacred penmen, produced by the opposite modes of translating, which Arias and Castalio have adopted, I shall employ a similitude of which Castalio himself has given me the hint. In his epistle

epistle dedicatory to king Edward, he has these words: "Quod ad latinitatem attinet, est oratio nihil aliud quam rei quædam quasi vestis, et nos factores sumus." In conformity to this idea, I should say that those venerable writers, the apostles and evangelists, appear, in their own country, in a garb plain indeed, and even homely, but grave withal, decent, and well fitted to the wearers. Arias, intending to introduce them to the Latins, has, to make them look as little as possible like other men, and, one would think, to frighten every body from desiring their acquaintance, clothed them in filthy rags, which are indeed of Roman manufacture, but have no other relation to any thing worn in the country, being alike unfit for every purpose of decency and use. For surely that style is most aptly compared to tattered garments, in which the words can, by no rule of syntax in the language, be rendered coherent, or expressive of any sense. Castalio, on the contrary, not satisfied that when abroad they should be gravely and properly habited, as they were at home, will have them tricked up in finery and lace, that they may appear like men of fashion, and even make some figure in what the world calls good company. But though I consider both these interpreters as in extremes, I am far from thinking their performances are to be deemed, in any respect, equivalent. It is not in my power to discover a good use that can be made of Arias' version, unless to give some assistance to a school-boy in acquiring the elements of the language. Castalio's, with one great fault, has many excellent qualities.

§ 9. In regard to the third object of translating, which is to write so far properly and agreeably in the language into which the translation is made, as may, independently of its exactness, serve to recommend it as a valuable work in that tongue; if Castalio failed here, he has been particularly unlucky, since the latinity and elegance of the work must, by his own acknowledgment, have been more an object to him than to other translators, this being the great means by which he wanted to draw the attention of the youth of that age to the study of the holy Scriptures. But however much his taste may, in this respect, have been adapted to the times wherein he lived, we cannot consider it as perfectly chaste and faultless. Sufficient grounds for this censure may be collected from the remarks already made. The superficial and the shining qualities of style seem often to have had more attractions with him than the solid and the useful.

§ 10. In other respects he appears to have been well qualified for the task of translating. Conversant in the learned languages, possessed of a good understanding and no inconsiderable share of critical acuteness, candid in his disposition, and not over confident of his own abilities, or excessively tenacious of his own opinion, he was ever ready to hearken, and, when convinced, to submit

to reason, whether presented by a friend or by a foe, whether in terms of amity and love, or of reproach and hatred. Of this he gave very ample evidence in the corrections which he made on some of the later editions of his Bible.

He was far from pretending, like some interpreters and commentators, to understand every thing. When he was uncertain about the sense, he could do no other than follow the words in translating. This expression of the Apostle Peter, 1 Pet. iv. 6. *Εἰς τὸ το γὰρ καὶ νεκροῖς εὐηγγελισθῆναι, ἵνα κριθῶσι μὲν κατὰ ἀνθρώπων σαρκί, ζῶσι δὲ κατὰ Θεοῦ πνεύματι*, he translates in this manner, *Nam ideo mortuis quoque nunciatus est, ut et secundum homines carne judicentur, et secundum Deum spiritu vivant*; adding this note on the margin: *Hunc locum non intelligo, ideoque ad verbum transtuli*. There are several other such instances. In one place he has on the margin: *Hos duos versus non intelligo, ideoque de mea translatione dubito*, Isa. xxvii. 6, 7. It is worth while to take notice of the manner in which he himself speaks of such passages: “*Quod autem alicubi scribo, me aliquem locum non intelligere: id non ita accipi volo, quasi cætera plane intelligam: sed ut sciatur, me in aliis aliquid saltem obscuræ lucis habere, in illis nihil: tum autem ut meæ translationi in quibusdam hujusmodi locis non nimium confidatur. Neque tamen ubique quid non intelligam ostendo: esset enim hoc infinitum*.*”

§ II. In regard to the changes he made in adopting classical terms instead of certain words and phrases, which had been long in use amongst ecclesiastic writers, and were supposed to be universally understood, I cannot agree entirely with, either his sentiments, or those of his adversaries. In the first place, I do not think, as he seems once to have thought (though in this respect he afterwards altered his conduct, and consequently, we may suppose, his opinion), that no word deserved admission into his version, which had not the sanction of some Pagan classic. For this reason, the words *baptisma, angelus, ecclesia, profelytus, synagoga, propheta, patriarcha, mediator, daemonicus, hypocrita, benedictus*, and the words *fides* and *fidelis*, when used in the theological sense, he set aside for *lotio, genius, respublica, adventitius, collegium, vates, summus pater, sequester, furiosus, simulator, collaudandus, fiducia, fidens*. Some of the more usual terms, as *angelus, baptisma, ecclesia, synagoga*, were, in later editions, restored. In regard to some others, considering the plan he had adopted, his choice cannot be much blamed, as they were sufficiently expressive of the sense of the original. A few, indeed, were not so.

Genius is not a version of *αγγελος*, nor *furiosus* of *δαμονιζομενος*. The notions entertained by the heathen of their *genii*, no more corresponded to the ideas of the Hebrews, in regard to *angels*, than the fancies which our ancestors entertained of *elves* and *fairies*,

* Ad lectores amonitio.

fairies, corresponded to the Christian doctrine concerning the heavenly inhabitants. *Αγγελος* was a literal version made by the Seventy into Greek, of the Hebrew *מלאך* *malach*, a name of office, which, if Castalio after them had literally rendered into Latin, calling it *nuntius*, it would have been as little liable to exception, as his rendering the words *βυτυλις* and *ὑποκριτης*, *rex* and *minister*. *Furiosus* is not a just translation of *δαίμονιοζομενος*. The import of the original name, which only suggests the cause, is confined, by the translator's opinion, to the nature of the disorder: *furiosus* means no more than *mad*, whereas *δαίμονιοζομενος* is, repeatedly in Scripture, given as equivalent to, *δαίμονιον εχων*. Nor does the disease of those unhappy persons appear to have been always *madness*. And if, in this, we regard etymology alone, the traditionary fables, about the three infernal goddesses, called *furies*, are noway suited to the ancient popular faith, of either Jews or Pagans, concerning demons. And, even though *adventitious* corresponds exactly in etymology with *προσηλυτος*, the Latin word does not convey the idea which, in the Hellenistic idiom, is conveyed by the Greek. *Simulator* can hardly be objected to, as a version of *ὑποκριτης*. In some instances, it answers better than *hypocrita*. This name is, in Latin, confined, by use, to those who lead a life of dissimulation in what regards religion; whereas the Greek term is sometimes employed in the New Testament, in all the latitude in which we commonly use the word *disssembler*, for one who is insincere in a particular instance. But the classical word *collaudandus* does not suit the Greek *εὐλογητος* as used in holy writ, near so well as does the ecclesiastical epithet *benedictus*. And *summus pater* is too indefinite a version of *πατριάρχης*.

It is a good rule, in every language, to take the necessary terms in every branch of knowledge or business, from those best acquainted with that branch: because, among them, the extent of the terms, and their respective differences, will be most accurately distinguished. In what, therefore, peculiarly concerned the undisputed tenets, or rites, either of Judaism or of Christianity, it was much more reasonable to adopt the style used by Latin Jews or Christians, in those early ages, before they were corrupted with philosophy, than, with the assistance of but a remote analogy, to transfer terms used by Pagan writers, to the doctrines and ceremonies of a religion with which they were totally unacquainted. I must, therefore, consider the rejection of several terms established by ecclesiastic use, and conveying precisely the idea intended by the sacred penmen, as an indication of an excessive squeamishness in point of Latinity. Such terms, in my judgment, are, in matters of revelation, entitled even to be preferred to classical words. For, though the latter may nearly suit the idea, they cannot

cannot have, to the same degree as the former, the sanction of use in that application.

§ 12. But let it be observed, on the other hand, that the preference above mentioned, is limited by this express condition, that the ecclesiastic term, in its common acceptation, plainly convey to the reader the same idea which the original word, used by the sacred penmen, was intended to convey to the readers for whom they wrote. To plead, on the contrary, with Father Simon and others, for the preferable adoption of certain theologic words and phrases consecrated by long use, as they are pleased to term it, though admitted to be obscure, ambiguous, or even improper, is to me the greatest absurdity. It is really to make the sacred authors give place to their ancient interpreters: it is to throw away the sense of the former in compliment to the words of the latter. We must surely consider inspiration as a thing of very little consequence, when we sacrifice it knowingly to human errors. This would, in effect, condemn all new translations, whatever occasion there might be for them, for correcting the faults of former versions. But into the truth of this sentiment I shall have occasion to enquire more fully afterwards. Only let it be remembered, that the limitation now mentioned affects two classes of words, first, those by which the original terms were early mis-translated; secondly, those which, though at first they exhibited the true sense of the original, have come gradually to convey a different meaning. For these, in consequence of a change insensibly introduced in the application, are become now, whatever they were formerly, either improper or ambiguous.

There are some terms in the Vulgate which, in my judgment, were never perfectly adapted to those in the original, in whose place they were substituted. Whether *sacramentum* for *μυστήριον* were originally of this number or not, it is certain that the theological meaning, now constantly affixed to that word, does not suit the sense of the sacred authors, which is fully and intelligibly expressed in Latin, as Castalio and Houbigant have commonly done, by the word *arcanum*. The Vulgate sometimes renders it *mysterium*, which is not much better than *sacramentum*. For *mysterium*, not being Latin, and being variously used as a technical term by theologians, must be vague and obscure. Many other latinized Greek words (as *scandalizo*, *blasphemia*, *hæresis*, *schisma*) are in some measure liable to the same objection. The original terms are none of those, which were observed formerly*, not to be susceptible of a translation into another language. And in that case to transfer the words, leaving them untranslated, rarely fails either to keep the reader in ignorance, or to lead him into error. For this reason I am far from condemning with Boys, Simon,

* Diss. II. Part I. § 5.

Simon, and some others, the modern translators, particularly Castalio, for rendering them into proper Latin. I intend, in another Dissertation, to evince that they would not have executed faithfully the office they had undertaken, if they had not done it. The words with which Castalio has commonly supplied us, instead of those above mentioned (*officio, maledictum, or impia dicta, secta, diffidium, or factio*), are in general as apposite for expressing the sense of the original, as any other words of the same class. And even the Vulgate is not uniform in regard to those words. *Ageris* is, in several places of that version, rendered *secta*, and *σχισμα sciffura* and *dissensio*. But of this I have treated already in the preceding Dissertation.

§ 13. After all the zeal Castalio has shown, and the stretches he has made for preserving classical purity, could it have been imagined that he would have admitted into his version manifest barbarisms, both words and idioms of no authority whatever? Yet that he has afforded a few instances of this strange inconsistency, is unquestionable. It would not be easy to assign a satisfactory reason for his rejecting the term *idolum* idol, a classical word, and used by Pagans in the same meaning in which it is used by us. If it be said, that in their use, it was not accompanied with the same kind of sentiment as when used by us; as much may be affirmed, with truth, of *Deus, Numen*, and every word that relates to religion, which could not fail to affect differently the mind of a heathen, from the way in which it affects the mind of a Jew or a Christian. Ought we to have different names for the Pagan deities, Jupiter, Juno, &c. because the mention of them was attended with reverence in Pagans, and with contempt in Christians?

But what shall we say of his supplying *idolum* by a barbarism of his own, *deaster*, a word of no authority, sacred or profane? It suited the fundamental principles of his undertaking to reject *idolatra*, idolater, because, though analogically formed from a good word, it could plead only ecclesiastic use. But by what principle he has introduced such a monster as *deastricola*, that was never heard of before, it would be impossible to say. He could be at no loss for a proper expression. *Idolorum* or *simulacrorum cultor* would have served. He has given but too good reason, by such uncouth sounds as *deaster*, *deastricola*, and *infidens* infidel, to say that his objections lay only against the liberties in language which had been taken by others. Castalio argues against barbarisms as being obscure; surely this argument strikes more against those of his own coining, than against those (if they can be called barbarisms) which are recommended by so long continued, and so extensive, an use. For, though he should not allow the use of theologians to be perfectly good, it is surely, on those subjects, sufficient for removing the objection of obscurity.

I do not see any thing in his work which has so much the appearance of self conceit as this. In other respects, I find him modest and unassuming. It has been also observed, that his idioms are not always pure. *Dominus, ad cujus normam*, is not in the Latin idiom. *Norma legis* is proper, not *norma dei*, or *norma hominis*. But this I consider as an oversight, the other as affectation.

§ 14. I shall add a few words on the subject of Hebraisms, which Castalio is accused of rejecting altogether. This charge he is so far from denying, that he endeavours to justify his conduct in this particular. Herein, I think, if his adversaries went too far on one side, in preferring the mere form of the expression, to the perspicuous enunciation of the sense, this interpreter went too far on the opposite side, as he made no account of giving to his version the strong signatures which the original bears of the antiquity, the manners, and the character, of the age and nation of the writers. Yet both the credibility of the narrative, and the impression which the sentiments are adapted to make on the readers, are not a little affected by that circumstance. That those are in the worse extreme of the two, who would sacrifice perspicuity and propriety (in other words, the sense itself) to that circumstance, is not indeed to be doubted. The patrons of the literal method do not advert, that by carrying the point too far, the very exhibition of the style and manner of the author, is, with both the other ends of translating, totally annihilated. “ Quo pertinent,” says Houbigant *, “ istiusmodi interpretationes, quæ nihil quidquam resonant, nisi adhibes interpretis alterum interpretem?” Again, “ Num proprietas hæc censenda est, quæ mihi exprimat obscure ac inhumane, id quod sacri scriptores, dilucide ac liberaliter expresserunt?” The sentiments of this author, in regard to the proper mean between both extremes, as they seem entirely reasonable, and equally applicable to any language (though expressed in reference to Latin versions only), I shall subjoin to the foregoing observations on Castalio: “ Utroque in genere tam metrico quam soluto, retinendas esse veteres loquendi formas, nec ab ista linea unquam discedendum, nisi gravibus de causis, quæ quidem nobis esse tres videntur: primo, si Hebraismi veteres, cum retinentur, fiunt Latino in sermone, vel obscuri vel ambigui; secundo, si eorum significantia minuitur, nisi circuitione quadam uteris; tertio, si vergant ad aliam, quam Hebraica verba, sententiam †.”

§ 15. I shall finish my critique on this translator, with some remarks on a charge brought against him by Beaufobre and Leufant, who affirm that ‡, abstracting from the false elegance of his style,

* Proleg.

† Ibidem.

‡ Preface Generale, P. II. des Versions du N. T.

style, he takes greater liberty (they must certainly mean with the sense) than a faithful interpreter ought to take. Of this his version of the following passage, Acts xxvi. 18. is given as an example. Τὸ ἐπιστρέψαι ἀπο σκοτῶς εἰς φῶς, καὶ τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ Σατανα ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν, τὸ λαβεῖν αὐτὸς ἀφεσὶν ἁμαρτιῶν, καὶ κληροῦν ἐν τοῖς ἁγιασμένοις, πιστεῖ τῇ εἰς ἐμὲ; which is thus rendered by Castalio: “Ut ex tenebris in lucem, et ex Satanæ potestate ad Deum se convertant, et ita peccatorum veniam, et eandem cum iis sortem consequantur, qui fide mihi habenda sancti facti fuerint:” and by Beza, whom they here oppose to him: “Et convertas eos a tenebris ad lucem, et a potestate Satanæ ad Deum, ut remissionem peccatorum et sortem inter sanctificatos accipiant per fidem quæ est in me.” In my opinion there is a real ambiguity in the original, which, if Castalio be blameable for fixing in one way, Beza is not less blameable for fixing it, in another. The words πιστεῖ τῇ εἰς ἐμὲ, may be construed with the verb λαβεῖν at some distance, or with the participle ἁγιασμένοις immediately preceding. In the common way of reckoning, if one of these methods were to be styled a stretch, or a liberty, it would be Beza’s, and not Castalio’s, both because the latter keeps closer to the arrangement of the original, and because the Apostle, not having used the adjective ἁγίους, but the participle ἁγιασμένοις, gives some ground to regard the following words as its regimen. Accordingly, Beza has considered the version of Erasmus, which is to the same purpose with Castalio’s, and with which the Tigurine version also agrees; “ut accipiant remissionem peccatorum, et sortem inter eos qui sanctificati sunt, per fidem quæ est erga me;” as exhibiting a sense quite different from his own; at the same time, he freely acknowledges, that the original is susceptible of either meaning. “Τῇ πιστεῖ. Potest quidem hoc referri ad participium ἁγιασμένοις, quemadmodum retulit Erasmus.” In this instance Beza, though not remarkable for moderation, has judged more equitably than the French translators above mentioned, who had no reason to affirm, dogmatically, that the words ought to be joined in the one way, and not in the other; or to conclude, that Castalio affected to give the words this turn, in order to exclude the idea of *absolute election*. Did the English translators, for this purpose, render the passage after Erasmus and Castalio, not after Beza, *That they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me?* Nobody, I dare say, will suspect it.

I cannot help thinking those critics unlucky in their choice of an example: for had there been more to say, in opposition to this version of the passage, than has yet been urged, it would still have been hard to treat that as a liberty peculiar to Castalio, in which he was evidently not the first, and in which he has had the concurrence of more translators than can be produced on the other

other side. For my part, as I acknowledge that such transpositions are not unfrequent in holy writ, my opinion is, that the connection and scope of the place ought chiefly to determine us in doubtful cases. In the present case, it appears to me to yield the clearest sense, and to be every way the most eligible, to join the words πισει τη εις εμε, neither to ηγιατισμοις, nor to λαβειν, but to the foregoing verb επισχεψαι; for when the regimen is thrown to the end of the sentence, it is better to join it to the first verb, with which it can be suitably construed, than to an intermediate verb, explicative of the former. Nothing can give a more plain, or a more apposite meaning, than the words under examination, thus construed; *To bring them by the faith that is in me* (that is, by my doctrine, the faith, η πισεις being often used by the sacred writers for the object of faith, or *thing believed*,) *from darkness to light*, &c.

§ 16. Thus, I have endeavoured to examine, with impartiality, Castalio's character as a translator, without assuming the province of either the accuser or the apologist. I have neither exaggerated, nor extenuated, either his faults or his virtues, and can pronounce truly, upon the whole, that though there are none (Arias and Pagnin excepted), whose general manner of translating is more to be disapproved; I know not any by which a student may be more assisted in attaining the true sense of many places, very obscure in most translations, than by Castalio's.

P A R T V.

Strictures on Beza.

BEZA, the celebrated Geneva translator of the New Testament, cannot be accused of having gone to either of the extremes in which we find Arias and Castalio. In general, he is neither servilely literal, barbarous, and unintelligible, with the former; nor does he appear ashamed of the unadorned simplicity of the original, with the latter. It was, therefore, at first, my intention not to criticise his version, no more than to enquire into the manner of all the Latin translators of sacred writ, but barely to point out the most egregious faults in the plan of translating sometimes adopted, specifying, in the way of example and illustration, those versions only, wherein such faults were most conspicuous. On more mature reflection, I have judged it proper to bestow a few thoughts on Beza, as his translation has, in a great measure, been made the standard of most of the translations of the reformed churches

churches (I do not include the Lutheran) into modern tongues. He has, perhaps, had less influence on the English translators, than on those of other countries; but he has not been entirely without influence, even on them. And though he writes with a good deal of purity and clearness, without florid and ostentatious ornaments; there are some faults, which it is of great moment to avoid, and with which he is, upon the whole, more chargeable, than any other translator of the New Testament I know.

§ 2. His version of the New Testament is nearly in the same taste with that of the Old, by Junius and Tremellius, but better executed. These two translations are commonly bound together, to complete the version of holy writ. Junius and Tremellius have been accused of obtruding upon the sacred text, a number of pronouns, *ille*, *hic*, and *iste*, for which the original gives no warrant. Their excuse was, that the Latin has not articles, as the Hebrew, and that there is no other way of supplying the articles, but by pronouns. But it may with reason be questioned, whether it were not better, except in a few cases, to leave them unsupplied, than to substitute what may darken the expression, and even render it more indefinite, nay, what may sometimes alter the sense. At the same time, I acknowledge that there are cases in which this method is entirely proper. In the addition of an emphatic epithet, the article is fitly supplied by the pronoun. Thus the words, *Ἐπεσε Βαβυλων ἡ πόλις ἡ μεγάλη*, Rev. xiv. 8. are justly translated by Beza, *Cecidit Babylon urbs illa magna*: and the expression used by Nathan to David, *Thou art the man*, 2 Sam. xii. 7. is properly rendered by Junius, *Tu vir ille es*. The necessity of recurring to the pronoun, in these instances, has been perceived also by the old translator and Castalio.

Nor are these the only cases wherein the Greek or Hebrew article may, not only in Latin, but even in English, which has articles, be rendered properly by the pronoun. For example, a particular species is distinguished from others of the same genus, by some attributive conjoined with it; but when the occasion of mentioning that species soon recurs, the attributive is sufficiently supplied by the article; and, in such instances, it often happens, that the article is best supplied, in another language, by the pronoun. In the question put to our Lord, *Τι ἀγαθόν ποιῶσω, ἵνα ἐχῶ ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, Matt. xix. 16. a species of life to which the question relates, is distinguished from all others, by the epithet *αἰώνιον*. The article would contribute nothing here to the distinction. But when, in the answer, ver. 17. the same subject is referred to, the epithet is dropped, and the article is prefixed to *ζωὴν*, which ascertains the meaning with equal perspicuity. *Εἰ δὲ θελεῖς εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*. I have seen no Latin translation, no not Beza's, which renders it, *Si vis in vitam illam ingredi*; and yet it is evident, that such is, in this passage, the force of the article. The

English

English idiom rarely permits us to give articles to abstract nouns. For this reason, it would not be a just expression of the sense to say, *If thou wouldst enter into the life*, to wit, *eternal life*, the life enquired about. Our only way of marking the reference to the question, is by saying, *If thou wouldst enter into that life*. As, in French, the article is, on the contrary, added to all abstract nouns, the pronoun is equally necessary with them as with us, for making the distinction. There is, besides, something like an impropriety in saying to the living, *If thou wouldst enter into life*.

But there are unquestionably cases in which the Genevese interpreters employ the pronoun unnecessarily, awkwardly, and even improperly. *In that day shall the deaf bear the words of the book*, Isa. xxix. 18. say the English translators. *Audient die illa surdi isti verba literarum*, say Junius and his associate. Any person who understands Latin, on hearing the verse read by itself, will suppose that there must have been mention of some deaf persons in the foregoing verses, to which the pronoun *isti*, in this verse has a reference. But, on inquiry, he will find there is no such thing; and that it is deaf persons in general of whom the prophet speaks. The introduction of the pronoun, therefore, serves only to mislead. “*Matthæus ille publicanus*,” Matt. x. 3. in Beza’s version, evidently suggests that Matthew was a man famous as a publican, before he became an apostle. In some places, it not only appears awkward, but injures the simplicity of the style. Junius says, in his account of the creation, “*Dixit Deus, Esto lux, et fuit lux; viditque Deus lucem hanc esse bonam: et distinctionem fecit Deus inter hanc lucem et tenebras*,” Gen. i. 3, 4. Here I think the pronoun is not only unnecessary and affected, but suggests something ridiculous, as if that light only had been distinguished from darkness. However, as *lux* is first mentioned, without an attendant, the pronoun which attends it, when mentioned afterwards, does not make the expression so indefinite and obscure as in the former example. But, when Beza makes the evangelist say, Matt. i. 11, 12. “*Jonas genuit Jechoniam in transportatione illa Babylonica; post autem transportationem illam Babylonicam, Jechonias genuit Salathielem*,” what more is expressed, in relation to the period, than if he had said simply, “*in transportatione Babylonica, et post transportationem Babylonicam?*” The addition of this epithet makes the noun sufficiently definite, without any pronoun. Nay, does not the pronoun, thus superadded, suggest one of two things; either that the transportation here referred to, had been mentioned in the preceding words, or that the historiãñ meant to distinguish, out of several transportations, one more noted than the rest? Now, neither of these was the case; no mention had been made before of the Babylonian transportation, and there were not more
Babylonian

Babylonian transportations, or more transportations any whither, than one which the Jewish nation had undergone. With this fault Erasmus also is chargeable, but much seldomer. Greek, as well as Hebrew, has an article, and so have modern languages. But, in translating out of these into Latin, nobody, I believe, has ever, either before or since, thought of making the pronoun supply the article, except in a few special instances, such as those above excepted. In such instances, I acknowledge, there is an evident propriety.

§ 3. Beza, with natural talents considerably above the middle rate, had a good deal of learning, and understood well both Greek and Latin; but he neither knew Hebrew (though he had the assistance of some who knew it) nor does he seem to have been much conversant in the translation of the Seventy. Hence it has happened, that his critical acuteness is not always so well directed as it might have been. The significations of words and idioms are often determined by him from classical authority, which might, with greater ease and more precision, have been ascertained by the usage of the sacred writers, and their ancient interpreters. As to words which do not occur in other Greek writers, or but rarely, or in a sense manifestly different from what they bear in Scripture, Beza's chief aid was etymology. This has occasioned his frequent recourse, without necessity, to circumlocution, to the prejudice always of the diction, and sometimes of the sense. Examples of this we have in his manner of rendering *σπλαγχνίζομαι*, Mat. ix. 36. *κληρονομῶ*, Mat. v. 5. *πληροφορῶ*, Luke i. 1. *συκοφαντῶ*, Luke xix. 8. *χειροτονῶ*, Acts xiv. 23. and several others. On the last of these, I shall soon have occasion to make some remarks. For the other four, I shall only refer to my notes on those passages in the Gospels. It is, no doubt, to this attempt at tracing the origin of the words in his version, that he alludes in that expression, "Verborum proprietatem studiose sum sectatus*." This however has been shewn not to be always the surest method of attaining the signification wanted †.

§ 4. But of all the faults with which Beza is chargeable as a translator, the greatest is, undoubtedly, that he was too violent a party-man to possess that impartiality, without which it is impossible to succeed as an interpreter of holy writ. It requires but a very little of a critical eye to discern in him a constant effort to accommodate the style of the sacred writers to that of his sect. Nay, what he has done in this way is done so openly, I might have said avowedly, that it is astonishing it has not more discredited his work.

In this particular, as in the application of the pronouns above mentioned,

* Epist. ad Elis. Reg. Angl.

† Diff. IV. § 15. &c.

mentioned, Junius and Tremellius have also justly fallen under the animadversion of all impartial judges. What is thus well expressed in the English translation, *They gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading*, Neh. viii. 8. is rendered by these interpreters, "Exponendo sensum dabant intelligentiam PER SCRIPTURAM IPSAM." The three last words are an evident interpolation. There is no ellipsis in the sentence; they are no way necessary, for the sense is complete without them: but with them it is most unwarrantably limited to express the private opinion of the translators. I am as zealously attached as any man to the doctrine that Scripture will ever be found its own best interpreter, an opinion which I have considered in a former dissertation *, and which is sufficiently supported by the principles of sound criticism and common sense. But no person can detest more strongly a method of defending even a true opinion, so unjustifiable as that of foisting it into the sacred Scriptures. If any thing can serve to render a just sentiment questionable, it is the detection of such gross unfairness in the expedients employed for promoting it. Yet this has been copied into the Geneva French version, after it had received the corrections of Bertram, by whom it has been made to say, "Ils en donnoient l'intelligence, la faisant entendre par l'écriture meme." It is but just to observe, that neither Olivetan, the translator, nor Calvin, who afterwards revised his work, had discovered any warrant for the last clause in the original, or had admitted it into the version.

The insertion of this comment has here this additional bad consequence, that it misleads the reader in regard to the exposition meant by the sacred penman. Who would not conclude, from the version of Junius, that Ezra, or some of the Levites who attended, after reading a portion of Scripture, pronounced an explanatory discourse (such as in some Christian societies is called a lecture) on the passage. Whereas the whole import appears to be that, as the people, after the captivity, did not perfectly understand the ancient Hebrew, in which the law was written, this judicious teacher found it expedient, by himself or others, to interpret what was read, one paragraph after another, into that dialect of Chaldee which was current among them; a practice long after continued in the synagogue, and not improbably, as learned men have thought, that which gave rise to the *targums* or paraphrases in that tongue extant to this day.

I do not remember a passage wherein Beza has gone quite so far, as Junius and Tremellius have presumed to do in this instance; but that he has shewn throughout the whole work, a manifest partiality to the theology then prevalent in Geneva, is beyond

* Diff. II. Part II.

yond a doubt. I shall select a few examples out of a much greater number, which might be brought.

§ 5. The first shall be from that celebrated discourse of our Lord's, commonly called his sermon on the mount, wherein these words, *ἤκουσατε ὅτι ἐρεθίσθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις*, Matt. v. 21. 27. 33. are always rendered, *Audistis dictum fuisse a veteribus*; in contradiction to all the versions which had preceded, Oriental and Occidental, and in opposition to the uniform idiom of the sacred writers. [See the note on that passage in this version.] Beza does not hesitate in his annotations to assign his reason, which is drawn not from any principle of criticism, not from a different reading in any ancient manuscripts, of which he had several, but professedly from the fitness of this version for supporting his own doctrine. "Præstat τοῖς ἀρχαίοις explicare quasi scriptum sit ὑπο τῶν ἀρχαίων (ut sic notentur *synagogæ doctores*, jam pridem sic docentes, qui solebant patrum et majorum nomina suis falsis interpretationibus prætexere) quam ad auditores referre." But this correction of the ancient version was every way unsuitable, and the expedient weak. It was essential to the Pharisaical notion of traditions, to consider them as precepts which God himself had given to their fathers verbally, and which were therefore called the *oral law*, in contradistinction to the *written law*, or the Scriptures. Consequently Beza's representation of their presumption is far short of the truth. He ought to have said, *Qui solebant* (not *patrum et majorum nomina*, but) *Dei nomen* (for the fact is indubitable) *suis falsis interpretationibus prætexere*. And let it be observed, that our Lord does not here give any sanction to their distinction of the law into *oral* and *written*. He does not once say, *It was said to the ancients*, but uniformly, *Ye have heard that it was said*. He speaks not of what God did, but of what they pretended that he did.

His words, therefore, and the doctrine of the Pharisees, are alike misrepresented by this bold interpreter; and that for the sake of an advantage merely imaginary against an adverse sect. The one interpretation is not more favourable to the Socinians than the other. But if it had been otherwise, no person will consider that as a good reason for misrepresenting, unless he is more solicitous of accommodating Scripture to his sentiments, than of accommodating his sentiments to Scripture. The former has indeed been but too common with interpreters, though with few so much and so barefacedly, as with Beza. I am sorry to add that, in the instance we have been considering, Beza has been followed by most of the Protestant translators of his day, Italian, French and English.

§ 6. The following is another example of the strong inclination which this translator had, even in the smallest matters, to make his version conformable to his own prepossessions. He

renders these words, *συν γυναίξει*, Acts i. 14. though without either article or pronoun, *cum uxoribus*, as though the expression had been *συν ταῖς γυναίξιν αὐτῶν*. In this manner he excuses himself in the notes: "Conveniebat apostolorum etiam uxores confirmari, quas vel peregrinationis illorum comites esse oportebat, vel eorum absentiam domi patienter expectare." Very well; and because Theodore Beza judges it to have been convenient that the apostles' wives, for their own confirmation, should be there, he takes the liberty to make the sacred historian say, that they were there, when, in fact, he does not so much as insinuate that there were any wives among them. The use of the Greek word *γυνή* is entirely similar to that of the French word *femme*. Nobody that understands French would translate *avec les femmes* with the wives, but with the women, whereas the proper translation of *avec leurs femmes* is, with their wives.

It is impossible for one who knows the state of things at the time when that version was made, not to perceive the design of this mis-interpretation. The Protestant ministers, amongst whom marriage was common were exposed to much obloquy among the Romanists, through the absurd prejudices of the latter, in favour of celibacy. It was, therefore, deemed of great consequence to the party, to represent the apostles as married men. But could one imagine that this consideration would have weight enough to lead a man of Beza's abilities and character into such a flagrant, though not very material mis-translation? A translator ought surely to express the full meaning of his author, as far as the language which he writes is capable of expressing it. But here there is an evident restriction of his author's meaning.

The remark of the canon of Ely is unanswerable: "Qui mulieres dicit, uxores etiam sub eadem appellatione comprehendere potest. At qui uxores nominat, solas illas nominat.— Igitur quo generalior eo tutior erit, et Græcis convenientior interpretatio." Besides, there may have been, for aught we know, no wives in the company, in which case Beza's words include a direct falsehood. And this falsehood he boldly puts into the mouth of the sacred penman. We know that Peter had once a wife, as we learn from the Gospel, that his wife's mother was cured by Jesus of a fever, Matt. viii. 14, 15. But whether she was living at the time referred to in the Acts, or whether any more of the apostles were married, or whether their wives were disciples, we know not. Now, this falsification, though in a little matter, is strongly characteristic of that interpreter. I am glad to add, that in this he has been deserted by all the Protestant translators I know.

A similar instance the very next chapter presents us with, Acts ii. 27. The words *κα εγκαταλείψεις τὴν ψυχὴν μου εἰς ἄβυσσον*, he translates, *Non derelinques cadaver meum in sepulchro*, not only rendering

rendering *ὡς sepulchrum*, according to an opinion which, though shewn above *, to be ill-founded. is pretty common; but *ψυχὴ cadaver*, carcase, wherein, I believe he is singular. His motive is still of the same kind. The common version, though unexceptionable, might be thought to support the Popish limbo. “*Quod autem annotavi ex veteri versione animam meam natum esse errorem, ac propterea me maluisse aliud nomen usurpare, non temere feci, cum hunc præcipue locum a Papiſtis torqueri ad suum limbum constituendum videamus, et veteres etiam inde descensum illum animæ Christi ad inferos excogitarint †.*”

This specimen from Beza, it may be thought, should have been overlooked, because, though inserted in the first, it was corrected in the subsequent editions of his version. This, I confess, was my own opinion, till I observed, that in the annotations of those very editions, he vindicates his first translation of the words, and acknowledges that he had altered it, not from the conviction of an error, but to gratify those who, without reason, were, through ignorance of the Latin idiom, dissatisfied with the manner in which he had first rendered it. “*In priore nostra editione,*” says he †, “*recte interpretatus eram, NON DERELINQUES CADAVÉR, &c. quod tamen nunc mutavi, ut iis obsequar, qui conquesti sunt me a Græcis verbis discessisse, et nomine cadaveris (inscitia certe potius Latini sermonis quam recto ullo judicio) offenduntur.*”

To Beza’s reason for rejecting the common version, Castalio retorts, very justly, that if the possibility of wresting a passage in support of error, were held a good reason for translating it otherwise, Beza’s own version of the passage in question, would be more exceptionable than what he had pretended to correct. “*Deinde non minus ex ejus translatione possit error nasci, et quidem longe perniciosior. Cum enim animam Christi vertat in cadaver, periculum est ne quis animam Christi putet nihil fuisse nisi cadaver ||.*” And even this opinion, which denies that Jesus Christ had a human soul, has not been unexampled. It was maintained by Beryllus, bishop of Bosra in Arabia, in the third century. But on this strange principle of Beza’s, where is the version of any part of Scripture in which we could safely acquiesce?

§ 7. A third example of the same undue bias (for I reckon not the last, because corrected, whatever was the motive) we have in his version of these words, *Χειροτονησάντες δὲ αυτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους*, Acts xiv. 23. which he renders *Quumque ipsi per suffragia creassent presbyteros*. The word *χειροτονησάντες* he translates from etymology, a manner

* Diss. VI. Part II § 4. &c.

† Bezae Resp. ad Cast.

‡ Bezae Annotationes, ed. 1598.

|| Cast. Defens. adversarii Errores.

manner which, as was observed before, he sometimes uses. *χειροτονω* literally signifies, *to stretch out the hand*. From the use of this manner, in popular elections, it came to denote *to elect*, and thence again, *to nominate*, or appoint any how. Now Beza, that his intention might not escape us, tells us in the note, “Est nota tanda vis hujus verbi, ut Paulum ac Barnabam sciamus nil privato arbitrio gessisse, nec ullam in ecclesia exercuisse tyrannidem: nil denique tale fecisse quale hodie Romanus papa et ipsius affectæ, quos ordinarios vocant.” Now, though no man is more an enemy to ecclesiastic tyranny than I am, I would not employ against it weapons borrowed from falsehood and sophistry. I cannot help, therefore, declaring, that the version which the Vulgate has given of that passage, *Et quum constituisent illis presbyteros*, fully expresses the sense of the Greek, and consequently that the words *per suffragia*, are a mere interpolation, for the sake of answering a particular purpose. It was observed before *, that use, where it can be discovered, must determine the signification in preference to etymology. And here we are at no loss to affirm that *χειροτονω*, whatever were its origin, is not confined to electing or constituting by a plurality of voices.

But whatever be in this, in the instance before us, the *χειροτονωσαντες*, or electors, were no more than Paul and Barnabas; and it could not, with any propriety, be said of two, that they elected by a majority of votes, since there can be no doubt that they must have both agreed in the appointment; and if it had been the disciples, and not the two apostles, who had given their suffrages, it would have been of the disciples, and of them only, not of the apostles, that the term *χειροτονωσαντες* could have been used, which the construction of the sentence manifestly shews that here it is not. The sense of the word here given by Beza, is therefore totally unexampled; for, according to him, it must signify not *to elect*, but *to constitute those whom others have elected*. For if this be not what he means by *per suffragia creassent*, applied to no more than two, it will not be easy to divine his meaning, or to discover in what manner it answered the purpose expressed in his note. And if this be what he means, he has given a sense to the word, for which I have not seen an authority from any author, sacred or profane. The common import of the word is no more than to constitute, ordain, or appoint any how, by election, or otherwise, by one, two, or more. When it is by election, it is solely from the scope of the passage that we must collect it. In the only other place, 2 Cor. viii. 19. where it occurs in the New Testament, it no doubt relates to a proper election. But it is from the words immediately connected, *χειροτονωθεις ὑπο των εκκλησιων*, we learn that this is the sense there; as it is

from

* Diss. IV. § 15. &c.

from the words immediately connected that we learn, with equal certainty, that it relates here to an appointment made by two persons only.

The word occurs once in composition with the preposition *πρὸς*. *Ἀλλὰ μαρτυροῦσι τοῖς προεχειροτονημένοις ὑπὸ τῶ Θεοῦ*, Acts x. 41. rendered by Beza himself, *sed testibus quos ipse prius designaverat*. Here there can be no question that it refers to a destination, of which God alone is the author, and in which, therefore, there could be no suffrages. For even Beza will not be hardy enough to pretend, that such is the force of this verb, as to show, that God did nothing but by common consent, and only destined those whom others had elected. That the word *χειροτονεῖν* was commonly used in all the latitude here assigned to it, Dr Hammond has, from Philo, Josephus, and Pagan writers of undoubted authority, given the amplest evidence in his Commentary.

But, so great was the authority of Beza with the Protestant translators, who favoured the model of Geneva, that his exposition of this passage, however singular, was generally adopted. Diodati says, still more explicitly, *E dopo ch' ebbero loro ordinati PER VOTI COMUNI, degli antiani*. The French, *Et apres que PAR L'AVIS DES ASSEMBLEES, ils eurent etabli des anciens*. The English Geneva Bible, *And when they had ordained them elders BY ELECTION*. The words in these versions, distinguished by the character, are those which, after Beza's example are interpolated. In the English translation, these words are discarded. Our translators did not concur in sentiments with the Genevese, at least in this article.

§ 8. Again, that he might avoid every expression which appeared to favour the doctrine of universal redemption, the words of the Apostle, concerning God, *Ὁς παντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι*, 1 Tim. ii. 4. literally rendered in the Vulgate, *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri*, he translates, *Qui quosvis homines vult servari**. A little after, in the same Epistle, *Ὁς ἐστὶ σωτὴρ παντῶν ἀνθρώπων, μαλιστα πιστῶν*, 1 Tim. iv. 10. in the Vulgate, *Qui est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium*; Beza renders, *Qui est conservator*

* In the same manner he renders these words, Tit. ii. 11. *Ἐπιφανὴ γὰρ ἡ χάρις τῆ Θεοῦ ἢ σωτηρίας πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*, "Illuxit enim gratia illa Dei salutifera quibusvis (not omnibus) hominibus." No modern translation that I am acquainted with follows Beza in his interpretation of this verse. The Geneva French says, *Car la grace de Dieu salutaire a tous hommes, est clairement apparue*. The Geneva English, *For that grace of God that bringeth salvation unto all men, hath appeared*. The translators of the version in common use, have considered *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις* as governed by *ἐπιφανῆ*, and not by *σωτηρίας*, rendering it, *For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men*. Of this version the original is evidently capable. Diodati has done still better in retaining the ambiguity. *Percioche e apparita la gratia di Dio salutare a tutti gli huomini*.

conservator omnium hominum, maxime vero fidelium. Let it be observed, that this is the only place, in his version, where σωτηρ is rendered *conservator*, preserver: in every other passage but one, where he uses a periphrasis, the word is *servator*, answering to *salvator*, in the Vulgate, *saviour*. If it had not been for the annexed clause, *καλιστα πιστων*, Beza, I suppose, would have retained the word *servator*, and had recourse to the expedient he had used so lately for eluding the difficulty, by saying, *Servator quorumvis hominum*. But he perceived, that *παντων ανθρωπων* must be here taken in the most comprehensive sense, being contradistinguished to *πιστων*. I do not mean, by these remarks, to affirm, whether or not the word *conservator* be equivalent to the import of the original term, as used in this place. It is enough for my purpose, that as this difference of meaning does not necessarily result, either from the words in immediate connection, or from the purport of the Epistle, no person is entitled to alter the expression, in order to accommodate it to his own opinions.

An exact counterpart to this is the manner in which an anonymous English translator has rendered these words of our Lord, *Το περι πολλων εκχυτομενον εις αφεσιν αμαρτιων*, Matt. xxvi. 28. *which is shed for mankind, for the remission of sins*; defending himself in a note, by observing, that “*πολλοι* is frequently used for ALL.” Admit it were. The common acceptation of the word is doubtless *many*, and not *all*. And if no good reason for departing from the common meaning can be alleged, either from the words in construction, or from the scope of the passage, it ought to remain unchanged: otherwise, all dependence on translations, except for the theological system of the translator, is destroyed. Of the conduct of both translators, in these instances, though acting in support of opposite opinions, the error is the same. And the plea which vindicates this writer, will equally vindicate Beza, and the plea which vindicates Beza, will equally vindicate this writer. The analogy of the faith, that is, the conformity to his particular system, is the genuine plea of each.

The safest and the fairest way for a translator is, in every disputable point, to make no distinction, where the divine Spirit has not distinguished. To apply to this the words used by Boys, in a similar case, “*Cur enim cautiores sumus, magisque religiosi quam Spiritus Sanctus? Si Spiritus Sanctus non dubitavit dicere παντας et σωτηρ, cur nos vereamur dicere omnes et servator?*” In the same manner would I expostulate with certain divines amongst ourselves, who, I have observed, in quoting the preceding passages of Scripture, never say, *would have all men to be saved*, and, *the Saviour of all men*, but invariably, *all sorts of men*; charitably intending, by this prudent correction, to secure the unwary from being seduced by the latitudinarian expressions of the Apostle. If this be not being *wise above what is written*, I know

know not what is. In the first of the two passages quoted, I know no translator who has chosen to imitate Beza; in the second he is followed by the Geneva French only, who says, *Le conservateur de tous hommes*. But it is proper to add, that it was not so in that version, till it had undergone a second or third revival: for the corrections have not been all for the better.

§ 9. Further, the words *χαρακτηρ της υποστασεως αυτης*, Heb. i. 3. rendered, in the Vulgate, *figura substantiæ ejus*, he has translated, *character personæ illius*. My only objection here is, to his rendering *υποστασις personæ*. However much this may suit the scholastic style, which began to be introduced into theology in the fourth century, it by no means suits the idiom of a period so early as that in which the books of the New Testament were written. It is of real consequence to scriptural criticism, not to confound the language of the sacred penmen with that of the writers of the fourth, or any subsequent century. The change in style was gradual, but in process of time became very considerable. There was scarcely a new controversy started, which did not prove the source of new terms and phrases, as well as of new or unusual applications of the old. The word *υποστασις* occurs four times in the New Testament, but in no other place is it rendered *person*. It occurs often in the Septuagint, but it is never the version of a Hebrew word which can be rendered *person*. Jerom, though he lived when the Sabellian and Arian controversies were fresh in the minds of men, did not discover any reason to induce him to change the word *substantia*, which he found in the former version, called the Italic. I take notice of this, principally (for I acknowledge that the expression is obscure, either way rendered) on account of the manner wherein Beza defends his version. “*Quominus substantiam interpretarer, eo sum adductus, quod*” “*videam plerisque υποστασις hoc loco pro οσια esse interpretatos,*” “*perinde ac si inter essentiam et substantiam nihil interesset—*” “*Deinde hoc etiam commodi habet ista interpretatio quod hypo-*” “*stases adversus Sabellium aperte distinguit et το ουσιαστικον confir-*” “*mat adversus Arianos.*” Here we have a man who, in effect, acknowledges that he would not have translated some things in the way he has done, if it were not that he could thereby strike a severer blow against some adverse sect, or ward off a blow, which an adversary might aim against him. Of these great objects he never loses sight. Accordingly, the controvertist predominates throughout his whole version, as well as commentary; the translator is, in him, but a subordinate character; insomuch that he may justly be called what Jerom calls Aquila, *contentiosus interpres*.

I own, indeed, that my ideas on this subject are so much the reverse of Beza's, that I think a translator is bound to abstract from, and, as far as possible, forget all sects and systems, together
with

with all the polemic jargon which they have been the occasion of introducing. His aim ought to be invariably to give the untainted sentiments of the author, and to express himself in such a manner as men would do, or (which is the same thing) as those men actually did, amongst whom such disputes had never been agitated. In this last example, Beza is followed by the French and the English translators, but not by the Italian.

§ 10. Again, in the same Epistle it is said, Ὁ θεὸς δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται· καὶ ἐὰν ὑποβληθῆται, οὐκ εὐδοκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐν αὐτῷ, Heb. x. 38. In the Vulgate, rightly, *Iustus autem meus ex fide vivet: quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animæ meæ.* In Beza's version, *Iustus autem ex fide vivet; at si quis se subduxerit, non est gratum animo meo.* Here we have two errors. First, the word *quis* is, to the manifest injury of the meaning, foisted into the text. Yet there can be no pretence of necessity, as there is no ellipsis in the sentence. By the syntactic order, ὁ δίκαιος is understood as the nominative to ὑποβληθῆται; the power of the personal pronoun being, in Greek and Latin, sufficiently expressed by the inflection of the verb. Secondly, the consequent displeasure of God is transferred from the person to the action; *non est gratum*; as though ἐν αὐτῷ could be explained otherwise than as referring to δίκαιος. This perversion of the sense is, in my judgment, so gross, as fully to vindicate from undue severity, the censure pronounced by bishop Pearson*. *Illa verba a Theodoro Beza haud bona fide sunt translata.* But this is one of the many passages in which this interpreter has judged that the sacred penmen, having expressed themselves incautiously, and given a handle to the patrons of erroneous tenets, stood in need of him more as a corrector than as a translator. In this manner Beza supports the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, having been followed, in the first of these errors, by the French and English translators, but not in the second: and not by the Italian translator in either, though as much a Calvinist as any of them. In the old English Bibles, the expression was, *If he withdraw himself.*

§ 11. In order to evade, as much as possible, the appearance of regard, in the dispensation of grace, to the disposition of the receiver, the words of the Apostle, Τὸν προτιρον οὐτα βλασφημον καὶ διωκτην, καὶ ὑβριστὴν ἀλλ' ἠλειθην, ὅτι ἀγνοῶν νποίησα ἐν ἀπιστιᾳ, 1 Tim. i. 13. he renders, *Qui prius eram blasphemus et persecutor, et injuriis alios afficiens: sed misericordia sum donatus. Nam ignorans id faciebam: nempe fidei expertus.* Here I observe, first, that he divides the sentence into two, making a full stop at ἠλειθην, and thus disjoins a clause which, in Greek, is intimately connected, and had always been so understood, as appears from all the ancient versions and commentaries: and, secondly, that he introduces this sentence

* See his Præfatio Pærenetica, prefixed to Grabe's Septuagint.

sentence with *nam*, as if, in Greek, it had been *γὰρ*, instead of *quia*, the proper version of *ὅτι*. Both are casual conjunctions; but as the former is generally employed in uniting different sentences, and the latter in uniting the different members of the same sentence, the union occasioned by the former is looser and more indefinite than that produced by the latter. The one expresses a connection with the general scope of what was said, the other with a particular clause immediately preceding. This second sentence, as Beza exhibits it, may be explained as an extenuation suggested by the Apostle, after confessing so black a crime. As if he had said: "For I would not have acted thus, but I knew not what I was doing, as I was then an unbeliever." It is evident that the words of the original are not susceptible of this interpretation. Beza has not been followed in this, either by Diodati, or by the English translators. The Geneva French, and the Geneva English, have both imitated his manner.

§ 12. I shall produce but one other instance. The words of the beloved disciple, Πῆς ὁ γεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ, 1 John iii. 9.; rendered in the Vulgate, *Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit*, Beza translates, *Quisquis natus est ex Deo, peccato non dat operam*; by this last phrase, endeavouring to elude the support which the original appears to give to the doctrine of the sinless perfection of the saints in the present life. That this was his view, is evident from what he had urged in defence of the phrase, in his annotations on the fourth verse, to which he has subjoined these words: "Itaque non homines sed monstra hominum (such was his polemic style) sunt Pelagiani, Cathari, Cœlestiani, Donatistæ, Anabaptistæ, Libertini, qui ex hoc loco perfectionem illam somniant, à qua absunt ipsi omnium hominum longissime." His only argument, worthy of notice, is the seeming inconsistency of this verse, with what the Apostle had advanced a little before, *Εάν υπάρμεν ὅτι ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ἐχομεν, ἐαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν*, 1 John i. 8. *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.* But he has not considered, that if one of those human monsters (as he meekly calls them) should render this verse, *If we say that we have never sinned* (which is not a greater stretch than he has made in rendering the other), the reconciliation of the two passages is equally well effected as by his method. But as, in fact, neither of these expedients can be vindicated, the only fair way is, to exhibit both verses in as general terms as the inspired penman has left them in; and thus to put, as nearly as possible, the readers of the translation on the same footing on which the sacred writers have put the readers of the original!

There is still another reason which seems to have influenced Beza in rendering ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖ *peccato dat operam*, which is kindly to favour sinners, not exorbitantly profligate, so far as to dispel

all fear about their admission into the kingdom of heaven. This construction may be thought uncharitable. I own I should have thought so myself, if he had not explicitly shown his principles, on this subject, in other places. That expression, in the sermon on the mount, *Αποχωρεῖτε ἀπ' ἐμῆς οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι τὴν ανομίαν*, Matt. vii. 23. he renders, *Abscedite a me qui operam datis iniquitati*. And though he is singular in using this phrase, I should not, even from it, have concluded so harshly of his motive, if his explanation in the note had not put it beyond doubt. *Οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι τὴν ανομίαν*, “id est, OMNIBUS sceleribus et flagitiis additi homines—qui velut artem peccandi exercent, sicut Latini medicinam, argentariam facere dicunt.” Thus, if he wound the sense in the version, he kills it outright in the commentary. In another edition, wherein he renders the text simply *facitis iniquitatem*, he says, still more expressly, “Dicuntur ergo *facere iniquitatem*, et a Christo rejiciuntur hoc in loco, non qui uno et altero scelere sunt contaminati, sed qui hanc velut artem faciunt, ut scelestè agendo vitam tolerant, et Dei nomine abutantur ad quæstum, quo cupiditatibus suis satisfaciunt.” Castalio, after quoting these words, says *, very justly, and even moderately, “Hæc sunt ejus [Bezæ] verba, quibus mihi videtur (si modo de habitu loquitur, sicut antithesis ostendere videtur) nimis latam salutis viam facere: quasi Christus non rejiciat sceleratos, sed duntaxat sceleratissimos. Enimvero longe aliter loquuntur sacræ literæ.”

Not only Scripture in general, he might have said, but that discourse in particular, on which Beza was then commenting, speaks a very different language: *Except your righteousness*, says Jesus, Matt. v. 20. *shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven*. It would have better suited Beza's system of Christian morality, to have said, *Except your unrighteousness shall exceed the unrighteousness of publicans and harlots, ye shall in no case be excluded from the kingdom of heaven*. But as our Lord's declaration was the reverse, it is worth while to observe in what manner this champion of Geneva eludes its force, and reconciles it to his own licentious maxims. Hear his note upon the place: “Justitiæ nomine intellige sinceram tum doctrinam tum vitam, cum verbo Dei videlicet, quod est justitiæ vera norma, congruentem. Sed, de doctrina potissimum hic agi liquet ex sequenti reprehensione falsarum legis interpretationum.” And on the last clause of the sentence, *nequaquam ingressuros in regnum cælorum*, he says, “Id est, indignos fore qui in ecclesia doceatis. Nec enim de quorumvis piorum officio, sed de solis doctoribus agit: et nomine regni cælorum, ut alibi sæpe, non triumphantem” (ut

* Cas. Defens. Adversarii Errores.

“ (ut vulgo loquuntur), sed adhuc militantem, et ministerio partorum egentem ecclesiam intelligit.”

According to this learned commentator, then, *your righteousness* here means, chiefly or solely, *your orthodoxy*; I say *chiefly* or *solely*: for, observe his artful climax, in speaking of teachers and teaching. When first he obtrudes the word *doctrine*, in explanation of the word *righteousness*, he puts it only on the level with a good life; it is “tum doctrinam tum vitam.” When mentioned the second time, a good life is dropt, because, as he affirms, “de doctrina potissimum hic agi liquet.” When the subject is again resumed, in explaining the latter part of the sentence, every thing which relates to life and practice is excluded from a share in what is said; for after this gradual preparation of his readers, they are plainly told, “de solis doctoribus hic agit.” Now, every body knows, that Beza meant, by orthodoxy, or sound doctrine, an exact conformity to the Genevese standard. The import of our Lord’s declaration, then, according to this bold expositor, amounts to no more than this, ‘If ye be not completely orthodox, ye shall not be teachers in the church.’ In this way of expounding Scripture, what purposes may it not be made to serve? For my part, I have seen nothing, in any commentator or casuist, which bears a stronger resemblance to that mode of subverting, under pretence of explaining the divine law, which was adopted by the Scribes, and so severely reprehended by our Lord. In the passage taken from John’s Epistle, I do not find that Beza has had any imitators. In the version of the like phrase in the Gospel, he has been followed by the Geneva French, which says, *Vous qui faites le metier d’iniquite*.

§ 13. I might collect many more passages, but I suppose that those which have been given, will sufficiently verify what has been advanced of this translator’s partiality. Any one who critically examines his translation, will see how much he strains in every page, especially in Paul’s Epistles, to find a place for the favourite terms and phrases of his party. A French projector, Monsieur Le Cene (whose project for a new translation was, in what regards one article, considered already), seems, though of a party in many things opposite to Beza’s, to have entertained certain loose notions of translating, which in general coincide with his; but by reason of their different parties, would have produced, in the application, contrary effects. As a contrast to Beza’s corrections of the unguarded style (as he certainly thought it) of the sacred penmen, I shall give a few of Le Cene’s corrections, which he proposed, with the same pious purpose of securing the unlearned reader against seduction, (Proj. &c. ch. xiv.) The words of the Apostle, rendered by Beza, *Qui credit in eum qui justificat impium*, Rom. iv. 5. Le Cene thus translates into French:

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Qui croit en celui qui justifie CELUI QUI AVOIT ETE un impie. The expression rendered by Beza, *Quem autem vult indurat*, Rom. ix. 18, Le Cene thinks ought to be corrected; and though he does not, in so many words, say how, it is plain, from the tenor of his remark, that he would have it *permittit ut seipsum induret*. He adds, "It behoveth also to reform (I use his own style, *Il faudroit aussi reformer*) what the Vulgate and Genevese versions (he might have added, Moses and Paul) represent God as saying to Pharaoh, *In hoc ipsum excitavi te, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam*, Rom. ix. 17. Exod. ix. 16.; but does not mention the reformation necessary.

I cannot help observing here, by the way, that though Castalio was, in regard to the subject of the chapter from which some of the foregoing quotations are taken, of sentiments, as appears from his notes, opposite to Beza's, and coincident with Le Cene's, he has translated the whole with the utmost fairness. Nor has he employed any of those glossing arts recommended by Le Cene, and so much practised by Beza, when encountering a passage that appeared favourable to an adversary. Merely from his translation, we should not discover that his opinions of the divine decrees and the freedom of human actions, differed from Beza's. If both interpreters, however, have sometimes failed in their representations of the sacred authors, the difference between them lies in this: the liberties which Castalio has taken, are almost solely in what regards their style and manner; the freedoms used by Beza affect their sentiments and doctrine.

But to return to Le Cene, of whom I shall give but one other specimen; the words rendered by Beza, *Quia iterum dixit Esaias, Excæcavit oculos eorum et obduravit cor eorum; ne videant oculis, et sint intelligentes corde, et sese convertant et sanem eos*, John xii. 39, 40.; he proposes in this manner to express in French: *Ce qui avoit fait dire a Isaïe; ils ont aveugles leurs yeux et endurci leur cœur, pour ne pas voir de leurs yeux, et pour n'entendre point du cœur, et de peur de se convertir, et d'être gueris*. "They have blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart," &c. instead of, "He hath blinded, &c." Surely, the difference between these interpretations, regards more the sense than the expression. In the later instances we have the Arminian using the same weapons against the Calvinist, which, in the former, we saw the Calvinist employ against the Arminian; a conduct alike unjustifiable in both.

§ 14. These examples may suffice to show, that if translators shall think themselves entitled, with Beza and Le Cene, and the anonymous English translator above quoted, to use such liberties with the original, in order to make it speak their own sentiments, or the sentiments of the party to which they have attached themselves, we shall soon have as many Bibles as we have sects, each adapted

adapted to support a different system of doctrine and morality; a Calvinistic Bible, and an Arminian, an Antinomian Bible, a Pelagian, and I know not how many more. Hitherto, notwithstanding our disputes, we have recurred to a common standard; and this circumstance, however lightly it may be thought of, has not been without its utility, especially in countries where the Christian principle of toleration is understood and practised. It has abated the violence of all sides, inspiring men with candour and moderation in judging of one another, and of the importance of the tenets which discriminate them. The reverse would take place, if every faction had a standard of its own, so prepared, as to be clearly decisive in supporting all its favourite dogmas, and in condemning those of every other faction. It may be said, that the original would still be a sort of common standard, whose authority would be acknowledged by them all. It no doubt would: but when we consider how small a proportion of the people, of any party, are qualified to read the original, and how much it would be the business of the leading partisans, in every sect, to preoccupy the minds of the people, in regard to the fidelity of their own version, and the partiality of every other, we cannot imagine, that the possession of a standard, to which hardly one in a thousand could have recourse, would have a sensible effect upon the party. Of so much consequence it is, in a translator, to banish all party-considerations, to forget, as far as possible, that he is connected with any party: and to be ever on his guard, lest the spirit of the sect absorb the spirit of the Christian, and he appear to be more the follower of some human teacher, a Calvin, an Arminius, a Socinus, a Pelagius, an Arius, or an Athanasius, than of our only divine and rightful teacher, Christ.

§ 15. Some allowance is, no doubt, to be made for the influence of polemic theology, the epidemic disease of those times wherein most of the versions, which I have been examining, were composed. The imaginations of men were heated, and their spirits embittered with continual wranglings, not easily avoidable in their circumstances: and those who were daily accustomed to strain every expression of the sacred writers, in their debates one with another, were surely not the fittest for examining them with that temper and coolness, which are necessary in persons who would approve themselves unbiassed translators. Besides, criticism, especially sacred criticism, was then but in its infancy. Many improvements, through the united labours of the learned in different parts of Europe, have since accrued to that science. Much of our scholastic controversy on abstruse and undeterminable questions, well characterised by the Apostle, *strifes of words, which minister not to godly edifying*, 1 Tim. vi. 3. &c. are now happily laid aside. It may be hoped,

hoped, that some of the blunders into which the rage of disputation has formerly betrayed interpreters, may, with proper care, be avoided; and that the dotage about questions, which gender contention, (questions than which nothing can be more hollow or unsound *), being over, some will dare to speak, and others bear to hear, the things which become sound doctrine, the doctrine according to godliness.

DIS-

* See an excellent sermon on this subject, by my learned colleague, Dr Gerard, vol. II. p. 129.

 DISSERTATION THE ELEVENTH.

OF THE REGARD WHICH, IN TRANSLATING SCRIPTURE INTO ENGLISH, IS DUE TO THE PRACTICE OF FORMER TRANSLATORS, PARTICULARLY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE LATIN VULGATE, AND OF THE COMMON ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

P A R T I.

The Regard due to the Vulgate.

IN the former Dissertation *, I took occasion to consider what are the chief things to be attended to by every translator, but more especially a translator of holy writ. They appeared to be the three following; first, to give a just and clear representation of the sense of his original; secondly, to convey into his version as much of his author's spirit and manner as the genius of the language, which he writes, will admit; thirdly, as far as may be in a consistency with the two other ends, to express himself with purity in the language of the version. If these be the principal objects, as in my opinion they are, they will supply us with a good rule for determining the precise degree of regard which is due to former translators of reputation, whose works may have had influence sufficient to give a currency to the terms and phrases they have adopted. When the terms and phrases employed by former interpreters are well adapted for conveying the sense of the author, when they are also suited to his manner, and do no such violence to the idiom of the language into which they are transferred, as is incompatible with propriety and perspicuity, they are justly preferred to other words equally expressive and proper, but which, not having been used by former interpreters

* Diss. X. Part I.

terpreters of name, are not current in that application. This, in my opinion, is the furthest we can go, without making greater account of translations than of the original, and shewing more respect to the words and idioms of fallible men, than to the instructions given by the unerring Spirit of God.

§ 2. If, in respect of any of the three ends above mentioned, former translators, on the most impartial examination, appear to have failed, shall we either copy or imitate their errors? When the question is thus put in plain terms, I do not know any critic that is hardy enough to answer in the affirmative. But we no sooner descend to particulars, than we find that those very persons who gave us reason to believe that they agree with us in the general principles, so totally differ in the application, as to shew themselves disposed to sacrifice all those primary objects in translating to the phraseology of a favourite translator. Even father Simon could admit, that *it would be wrong to imitate the faults of saint Jerom, and to pay greater deference to his authority than to the truth* *. How far the verdicts he has pronounced on particular passages in the several versions criticised by him, are consistent with this judgment shall be shewn in the sequel.

§ 3. But, before I proceed farther, it may not be amiss to make some remarks on what appears to have been Simon's great scope and design in the Critical History; for, in the examination of certain points strenuously maintained by him, I shall chiefly be employed in this Dissertation. His opinions in what regards biblical criticism, have long had great influence on the judgment of the learned, both Popish and Protestant. His profound erudition in Oriental matters, joined with uncommon penetration, and, I may add, strong appearances of moderation, have procured him, on this subject, a kind of superiority which is hardly disputed by any. Indeed, if I had not read the answers made to those who attacked his work, which are subjoined to his Critical History, and commonly, if I mistake not, thought to be his, though bearing different names, I should not have spoken so dubiously of his title to the virtue of moderation. But throughout these tracts, I acknowledge there reigns much of the illiberal spirit of the controvertist. None of the little arts, however foreign to the subject in debate, by which contempt and odium are thrown upon an adversary, are omitted. And, we may say with truth, that by assuming too high an ascendant over Le Clerc and his other antagonists, he has degraded himself below them, farther, I believe, than by any other method he could have so easily effected.

§ 4. In

* En effet, il [Pagnin] auroit eu tort d'imiter les fautes de St Jerome, et de defier plus à l'autorité de ce pere, qu' à la verité. Hist. Crit. du Vieux Testament, liv. II. ch. xx.

§ 4. In regard to Simon's principal work, which I have so often had occasion to mention, *The Critical History of the Old and New Testaments*, its merit is so well known and established in the learned world, as to render it superfluous now to attempt its character. I shall only animadvert a little on what appear to me, after repeated perusals, to be the chief objects of the author, and on his manner of pursuing these objects. It will scarcely admit a doubt, that his primary scope throughout the whole performance, is to represent Scripture as, in every thing of moment, either unintelligible or ambiguous. His view in this is sufficiently glaring; it is to convince his readers that, without the aid of tradition, whereof the church is both the depository and the interpreter, no one article of Christianity, with evidence sufficient to satisfy a rational inquirer, can be deduced from Scripture. A second aim, but in sub-ordination to the former, is to bring his readers to such an acquiescence in the Latin Vulgate, which he calls the translation of the church, as to consider the deviations from it in modern versions, from whatever cause they spring, attention to the meaning or to the letter of the original, as erroneous and indefensible.

The manner in which the first of these aims has been pursued by him, I took occasion to consider in a former dissertation*, to which I must refer my reader; I intend now to inquire a little into the method by which he supports this secondary aim, the faithfulness of the Vulgate, and, if not its absolute perfection, its superiority, at least, to every other attempt that has been made, in the Western churches, towards translating the Bible. This inquiry naturally falls in with the first part of my subject in the present dissertation, in which I hope to shew, to the satisfaction of the reader, that Mr Simon might, with equal plausibility, have maintained the superiority of that version over every translation which ever shall, or can be made of holy writ.

§ 5. From the view which I have given of his design with respect to the Vulgate, one would naturally expect, that he must rate very highly the verdict of the council of Trent in favour of that version, that he must derive its excellence, as others of his order have done, from immediate inspiration, and conclude it to be infallible. Had this been his method of proceeding, his book would have excited little attention from the beginning, except from those whose minds were pre-engaged on the same side by bigotry or interest, and would probably long ere now have been forgotten. What person of common sense in these days ever thinks of the ravings of Harduin the Jesuit, who, in opposition to antiquity and all the world, maintained, that the apostles and evangelists wrote in Latin, that the Vulgate was the original, and

the Greek New Testament a version, and that consequently the latter ought to be corrected by the former, not the former by the latter, with many other absurdities, to which Michaelis has done too much honour, in attempting to refute them in his lectures?

But Simon's method was, in fact, the reverse. The sentence of the council, as was hinted formerly, he has explained in such a manner as to denote no more than would be readily admitted by every moderate and judicious Protestant. The inspiration of the translator he disclaims, and consequently the infallibility of the version. He ascribes no superiority to it above the original. This superiority was but too plainly implied in the indecent comparison which Cardinal Ximenes made of the Vulgate as printed in his edition (the Complutensian) between the Hebrew and the Septuagint, to our Lord crucified between two thieves, making the Hebrew represent the hardened thief, and the Greek the penitent. Simon, on the contrary, shews no disposition to detract from the merit either of the original, or of any ancient version; though not inclinable to allow more to the editions and transcripts we are at present possessed of, than the principles of sound criticism appear to warrant. He admits that we have yet no perfect version of holy writ, and does not deny that a better may be made than any extant*. In short, nothing can be more equitable than the general maxims he establishes. It is by this method that he insensibly gains upon his readers, insinuates himself into their good graces, and brings them, before they are aware, to repose an implicit confidence in his discernment, and to admit, without examining, the equity of his particular decisions. Now all these decisions are made artfully to conduct them to one point, which he is the surer to carry, as he never openly proposes it, namely, to consider the Vulgate as the standard, by a conformity to which, the value of every other version ought to be estimated.

§ 6. In consequence of this settled purpose, not declared in words, but without difficulty discovered by an attentive reader, he finds every other version which he examines either too literal or too loose, in rendering almost every passage which he specifies, according as it is more or less so, than that which he has tacitly made to serve as the common measure for them all. And though it is manifest, that even the most literal are not more blameably literal in any place than the Vulgate is in other places, or even the most loose translations more wide of the sense than in some instances that version may be shewn to be; he has always the address to bring his readers (at least on their first reading his book) to believe with him, that the excess, of whatever kind it be,

* Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. III. ch. i.

be, is in the other versions, and not in the Vulgate. In order to this, he is often obliged to argue from contrary topics, and at one time to defend a mode of interpreting which he condemns at another. And though this inevitably involves him in contradictions, these, on a single, or even a second or third perusal, are apt to be overlooked by a reader who is not uncommonly attentive. The inconsistencies elude the reader's notice the more readily, as they are not brought under his view at once, but must be gathered from parts of the work not immediately connected; and, as the individual passages in question are always different, though the manner in which they are translated, and on which the criticism turns, is the same. Add to this, that our critic's mode of arguing is the more specious and unsuspected, because it is remarkably simple and dispassionate. It will be necessary, therefore, though it may be accounted a bold and even invidious undertaking, to re-examine a few of the passages examined by father Simon, that we may, if possible, discover whether there be reason for the charge of partiality and inconsistency, which has been just now brought against him.

§ 7. In his examination of Erasmus' version of the New Testament, he has the following observation: "Where we have in the Greek *τὸ ἐπίσθεντος υἱὸς Θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει*, Rom. i. 2. the ancient Latin interpreter has very well and literally rendered it, *qui prædestinatus est filius Dei in virtute*, which was also the version used in the Western churches before Saint Jerom, who has made no change on this place. I do not inquire whether that interpreter has read *προορισθέντος*, as some believe; for *prædestinatus* signifies no more here than *destinatus*: and one might put in the translation *prædestinatus*, who read *ἐπίσθεντος*, as we read at present in all the Greek copies; and there is nothing here that concerns what theologians commonly call *predestination*. Erasmus however has forsaken the ancient version, and said, *qui declaratus fuit filius Dei cum potentia*. It is true, that many learned Greek fathers have explained the Greek participle *ἐπίσθεντος* by *δείχθεντος ἀποφαινέντος*; that is, *demonstrated* or *declared*; but an explanation is not a translation. One may remark, in a note, that that is the sense which Saint Chrysostom has given the passage, without changing the ancient version, as it very well expresses the energy of the Greek word, which signifies rather *destinatus* and *definitus* than *declaratus* *. Thus far Simon.

Admit

* Ou il y a dans le Grec, *τὸ ἐπίσθεντος υἱὸς Θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει*, l'ancien interprete Latin a fort bien traduit a la lettre, *qui prædestinatus est filius Dei in virtute*; et c'est même la version qui étoit en usage dans les eglises d'Occident avant Saint Jerome, qui n'y a rien changé en cet endroit. Je n'examine point si cet interprete a *■ προορισθέντος*, comme quelques uns le croyent:

Admit that the Vulgate is here literal, since this critic is pleased to call it so; it is at the same time obscure, if not unmeaning. What the import of the word *predestinated* may be when, as he says, it has no relation to what divines call *predestination*, and consequently cannot be synonymous with *predetermined*, *fore-ordained*, he has not been so kind as to tell us; and it will not be in every body's power to guess. For my part, I do not comprehend that curious aphorism as here applied, *An explanation is not a translation*. Translation is undoubtedly one species, and that both the simplest and the most important species, of explanation; and when a word is found in one language, which exactly hits the sense of a word in another language as used in a particular passage, though it should not reach the meaning in other places, it is certainly both the proper translation, and the best explanation, of the word in that passage.

And, for the truth of this sentiment, I am happy to have it in my power to add, that I have the concurrence of Mr Simon himself most explicitly declared. Speaking of a Spanish translation of the Old Testament by a Portuguese Jew, which is very literal, as all Jewish translations are, he says *, “ This grammatical rigor does not often suit the sense. We must distinguish between a dictionary and a translation. In the former, one explains the words according to their proper signification, whereas, in the latter, it is sometimes necessary to divert them from their proper and primitive signification, in order to adjust them to the other words with which they are connected.” In another place †, “ He (Pagnin) has imagined that, in order to make

a

croient: car *prædestinatus* ne signifie en ce lieu la que *designatus*; et ainsi l'on a pu traduire *prædestinatus* en lisant *ἐξοδητος*, comme on lit présentement dans tous les exemplaires Grecs, et il ne s'agit nullement de ce que les théologiens appellent ordinairement *predestination*. Erasme cependant s'est éloigné de cette ancienne version, ayant traduit *qui declaratus fuit filius Dei cum potentia*. Il est vrai que plusieurs doctes peres Grecs ont expliqué le verbe Grec *ἐξοδητος* par *δειχθητος αποφωδητος*, c'est-à-dire *démontre ou declare*: mais une explication n'est pas une traduction. L'on peut marquer dans une note que c'est la le sens que Saint Chrysostome a donné à ce passage, sans changer pour cela la version ancienne, qui exprime très-bien la force du mot Grec, qui signifie plutôt *designatus, definitus* que *declaratus*. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxi.

* Cette rigueur de grammaire ne s'accorde pas souvent avec le sens. Il faut mettre de la différence entre un dictionnaire et une traduction. Dans le premier on explique les mots selon leur signification propre, au-lieu que dans l'autre il est quelquefois nécessaire de détourner les mots de leur significations propres et primitives, pour les ajuster aux autres mots avec lesquels ils sont joints. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xix.

† Il s'est imaginé que pour faire une traduction fidelle de l'Ecriture, il étoit nécessaire de suivre la lettre exactement et selon la rigueur de la grammaire; ce qui est tout-à-fait opposé à cette prétendue exactitude, parce qu'il est rare que deux langues se rencontrent dans leurs facons de parler :

“ a faithful translation of Scripture, it was necessary to follow
 “ the letter exactly, and according to the rigour of grammar ; a
 “ practice quite opposite to that pretended exactness, because it
 “ rarely happens that two languages agree in their idioms ; and
 “ thus, so far from expressing his original in the same purity
 “ wherein it is written, he disfigures it, and spoils it of all its or-
 “ naments.” In the former of these quotations, the author shews
 that the literal method is totally unfit for conveying an author’s
 sense, and therefore ill-suited for answering the first great end in
 translating ; and in the latter, that it is no better adapted either
 for doing justice to an author’s manner, or for producing a work
 which can be useful or agreeable, and therefore equally unfit for
 all the primary purposes of translating. Had it been this author’s
 declared intention to refute his own criticism on the passage quo-
 ted from Erasmus, he could have said nothing stronger or more
 pertinent.

I shall just add to his manner of reasoning on this subject, a
 particular example, which may serve as a counterpart to the re-
 mark on Erasmus above quoted. Speaking of the translators of
 Port Royal, he says *, “ They have followed the grammatical
 “ sense of the Greek text in translating John xvi. 13. *Il vous fera*
 “ *entrer dans toutes les verites*, as if this other sense, which is in
 “ the Vulgate, and which they have put into their note, *il vous*
 “ *enseignera toute verite*, did not answer exactly to the Greek.
 “ But John Bois has not thought the new translators worthy of
 “ approbation for changing *docebit*, which is, in our Latin edi-
 “ tion, into another word. *Vetus*, says this learned Protestant,
 “ *docebit, non male nam et ὁ διδάσκων suo modo ἰδηγῆι et ὁ ἰδηγῶν suo*
 “ *modo διδάσκει.*” Yet let it be observed, that here it is the new
 interpreters, and not the Vulgate, who very well express the
 energy of the Greek word, and that without either deserting the
 meaning, or darkening it, as the Vulgate, in the former case, has
 not scrupled to do. Here he has given, indeed, the most ample
 scope for retorting upon the Vulgate, in his own words, that
ἰδηγῆι may indeed be explained by *docebit*, “ but an explanation
 “ is not a translation.”

§ 8. But this is not all. Our critic objects also to the freedom
 which Erasmus has taken in translating the Greek preposition *ἐν*
 in

parler : et ainsi bien loin d’exprimer son original dans la meme purete
 qu’il est ecrit, il le desfigure, et le depouille de tous ses ornemens. Hist.
 Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

* Ils ont suivi le sens grammatical du texte Grec en traduisant, *il vous
 fera entrer*, &c. comme si cet autre sens qui est dans la Vulgate, et qu’ils
 ont mis dans leur note, *il vous enseignera*, &c. ne reponoit pas exacte-
 ment au Grec. Mais Jean Bois n’a pu approuver les nouveaux traduc-
 teurs, qui ont change *docebit*, qui est dans notre edition Latine en un autre
 mot. *Vetus*, &c. Hist. Crit. de Versions du N. T. ch. xxxvi.

in the forecited passage by the Latin *cum*. “ Besides,” says he *, “ although the Greek particle *εν* signifies, in the style of the writers of the New Testament, which is conformable to that of the Seventy, *in* and *cum*, it had been better to translate, as it is in the Vulgate, *in virtute*, or *in potentia*, and to write on the margin that *in* signifies also *cum*, because there is but one single preposition which answers to them both in the Hebrew or Chaldaic language, with which the Greek of the New Testament often agrees, especially in this sort of prepositions.”

Now it is very remarkable, that there is nothing which he treats as more contemptible and even absurd in Arias Montanus, than this very attempt at uniformity in translating the Hebrew prepositions and other particles. “ Can one,” says he †, “ give the title of a very exact interpreter, to a translator, who almost every where confounds the sense of his text? In effect, all his erudition consists in translating the Hebrew words literally, according to their most ordinary signification, without minding whether it agree or not with the context where he employs it. When the Hebrew words are equivocal, one ought, methinks, to have some regard to that signification which suits them in the places where they are found; and it is ridiculous to assign them indifferently every sort of signification suitable or unsuitable. Yet this fault abounds in every part of the version of Arias Montanus, who has herein displayed very little judgment. He has, for example, translated, in almost every pas-

“ sage,

* De plus, bien que la particule Grecque *εν* signifie dans le stile des ecrivains du Nouveau Testament qui est conforme a celui des Septante, *in* et *cum*, il eut ete mieux de traduire, comme il y a dans la Vulgate *in virtute* ou *in potentia*, et de mettre a la marge que *in* signifie aussi *cum*; parce qu'il n'y a qu'une seule preposition qui reponde a ces deux-la dans la langue Ebraique ou Caldaïque, a laquelle le Grec du N. T. est souvent conforme, sur-tout dans ces sortes de prepositions. N. T. liv. II. ch. xxii.

† Peut on donner la qualite d'interprete tres exact a un traducteur qui renverse presque par tout le sens de son texte? En-effet, toute son erudition consiste a traduire les mots Hebreux a la lettre, selon leur signification la plus ordinaire, sans prendre garde si elle convient ou non, aux endroits ou il l'employ. Quand les mots Hebreux sont equivokes. on doit, ce semble, avoir egard a la signification qui leur est propre selon les lieux ou ils se trouvent, et il est ridicule de mettre indifferement toute sorte de signification, soit qu'elle convienne, ou qu'elle ne convienne pas. Ce defaut est cependant repandu dans toute la version d'Arias Montanus, qui a fait paroître en cela tres-peu de jugement. Il a traduit, par exemple, presque en tous les endroits la preposition Ebraique *al* par la preposition Latine *super*: et cependant on sait, que cette preposition signifie dans l'Ebreu tantot *super*, tautot *juxta*, et quelquefois *cum*. Il a fait la meme chose a l'egard de la lettre *Lamed* laquelle repond au *pour* des Francois, ou elle est une marque du datif. C'est ainsi qu'au chapitre premier de la Genese, verset fixieme ou Pagnin avoit traduit assez nettement *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, il a traduit sans aucun sens *Dividat aquas ad aquas*. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

“ sage, the Hebrew preposition *al* by the Latin *super* ; whereas
 “ it is well known that this preposition signifies in Hebrew,
 “ sometimes *super*, sometimes *juxta*, sometimes *cum*. He has
 “ done the same in regard to the letter *lamed*, which answers to
 “ the French *pour*, where it is a mark of the dative. Thus the
 “ words of Genesis, which Pagnin had rendered clearly enough,
 “ *Dividat aquas ab aquis*, he has translated, without any meaning,
 “ *Dividat aquas ad aquas.*”

Here in two parallel cases, for the question is the same in both, whether the sense or the letter merit most the attention of the translator, or more particularly, whether or not the prepositions of the original ought uniformly to be translated in the same way, without regard to the sense, our learned critic has pronounced two sentences perfectly opposite to each other. This opposition is the more flagrant, as Arias had actually taken the method which Simon insists that Erasmus ought to have taken. He followed the letter in the text, and gave the meaning by way of comment, on the margin. The second decision, however, we may reasonably conclude, is the decision of his judgment, as neither of the interpreters compared, Pagnin nor Arias, is a favourite with him ; whereas the first is the decision merely of his affection, as Erasmus was opposed to the Vulgate.

§ 9. In further confirmation of the judgment I have just now given, it may be observed, that in every case wherein the Vulgate is not concerned, his verdict is uniform in preferring the sense to the letter. “ There is,” says he *, “ in this last revival of the
 “ version of Geneva, *Alors on commença d'appeller du nom de*
 “ *l'Eternel*, which yields an obscure and even absurd meaning.
 “ It is indeed true that Aquila has translated word for word af-
 “ ter the same manner ; but he has followed literally the gram-
 “ matical sense. Now, with the aid of a very slight acquaint-
 “ ance with Hebrew, one might know that this phrase *appeller*
 “ *du nom* signifies to invoke the name, especially when the dis-
 “ course is of God.” In like manner, when the Vulgate is concerned in the question, and happens to follow the sense in an instance wherein the version compared with it prefers the letter, we may be certain that our author's decision is then for the sense. “ The Seventy,” he tells us †, have rendered *Επικαταρατος ου απο*
 “ *παντων*

* Il y a dans cette dernière révision [de la version de Geneve] *Alors on commença d'appeller du nom de l'Eternel*. Ce qui fait un sens obscur, et même impertinent. Il est bien vrai qu' Aquila a traduit mot pour mot de la même manière : mais il a suivi à la lettre le sens grammatical, et pour peu qu'on ait lu d'Ébreu, on fait que cette façon de parler *appeller du nom* signifie invoquer le nom de quelqu'un, principalement quand il est parlé de Dieu. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxiv.

† Les Septante ont traduit *Επικαταρατος ου απο παντων κτηνων*, ou il y a dans la Vulgate, *Maledictus et inter omnia animalia* : le mot *Giec απο*, dont

“ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΚΤΗΝΩΝ, where we have in the Vulgate, *maledictus es inter omnia animantia* : the Greek word *απο*, used by the Septuagint in this place, is unsuitable and nonsensical.” Such is the sentence which our author invariably pronounces on this truly senseless mode of translating.

But still it is with a secret exception of all the instances wherein this senseless mode of translating has been adopted by the Vulgate. For this adoption has instantly converted it into the only proper method, and the version which the plain sense of the passage indicates, must then be consigned to the margin ; for *an explanation is not a translation*.

§ 10. To the preceding remarks, I shall subjoin two more of Father Simon on the version of Erasmus, in which he cannot indeed accuse that learned interpreter of departing further either from the letter, or from the sense, than the Vulgate itself, but merely of leaving the Vulgate, and rendering the Greek word differently. Simon has in this cause a powerful ally, John Bois canon of Ely, a man whom, not without reason, he extols for his learning and critical sagacity ; and one who had, besides, such an attachment to the Vulgate, as exactly tallied with his own. For Bois, in every instance wherein the Vulgate is literal, finds a freer method loose, profane, and intolerable ; and when the Vulgate follows more the sense than the letter, which is not unfrequently the case, no person can be more decisive than he, that the literal method is servile, barbarous, unmeaning, and such as befits only a school-boy.

But to return to Simon : “ Erasmus,” says he *, “ rendered “ not very appositely *obscurant* what in the Vulgate was *exterminant*, and in the Greek *αφανιζει*. John Bois, who has “ defended in this place the Latin interpreter, by the authority of “ Saint Chrysostom, who explains the verb *αφανιζει* by *διαφθειρει*, “ *they corrupt*, maintains that we ought to give this meaning to “ the Latin verb *exterminant*. He condemns the new interpre- “ ters who have translated otherwise under pretence that this “ word is not good Latin. *Parum fortasse eleganter*,” says he, “ *verbum αφανιζει sic redidit, sed apposite ut qui maxime.*” But how is the authority of Chrysostom concerned in the question?

Chrysostom,

dont les Septante se sont servis en cet endroit, n'y convient point, et ne fait aucun sens. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. v.

* Il n'étoit pas à propos qu'Erasmus traduisit *obscurant*, ou il y a dans la Vulgate *exterminant*, et dans le Grec *αφανιζει* (Mat. vi. 16.) Jean Bois qui a défendu en cet endroit l'interprete Latin par l'autorite de Saint Chrysostome, lequel explique le verbe *αφανιζει* par *διαφθειρει*, *corrompent*, pretend qu'en doit donner ce sens au verbe Latin *exterminant*. Il condamne les nouveaux interpretes qui ont traduit autrement, sous pretexte que ce mot n'est pas assez Latin. Si cette expression, dit-il, n'a rien d'elegant, au moins elle est tres propre. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

Chryſoſtom, indeed, affirms that *αφανίζουσι* is in this place equivalent to *διαφθιμίζουσι*, but ſays nothing at all of *exterminant*; the only word about which we are in doubt.

For my part, I believe I ſhall not be ſingular in thinking, that it is far from being appoſite in the preſent application. “John Bois,” he ſays, “maintains that we ought to give the ſame meaning with *διαφθιμίζουσι* to the Latin verb.” But is it in the power of John Bois, or of Richard Simon, or of both, to give what ſenſe they pleaſe to a Latin verb? On this hypotheſis, indeed, they may translate in any way, and defend any tranſlation which they chuſe to patroniſe. But if in Latin, as in all other languages, propriety muſt be determined by uſe, the word *exterminant* is in this place, I ſay not inelegant, but improper. It is not chargeable with inelegance, becauſe uſed by good writers, but is charged with impropriety, becauſe unauthoriſed in this acceptation. And even if it ſhould not be quite unexampled, it muſt be admitted to be obſcure and indefinite, on account of the uncommonneſs of the application.

§ II. The other example follows*: “Erasmus’ deſertion of the ancient edition has often ariſen from the belief that the Latin was not pure enough. For example, inſtead of ſaying *noluit conſolari*, he has ſaid *noluit conſolationem admittere*. Yet *conſolari* occurs in the paſſive in ſome ancient authors. Beſides, this great exactneſs about the propriety of the Latin words in a verſion of the Scriptures is not always reaſonable. The interpreter’s principal care ſhould be to expreſs well the ſenſe of the original.” True. But to expreſs the ſenſe well, and to give it in proper words, are, in my apprehenſion, very nearly, if not entirely, coincident. I admit, indeed (if that be the author’s meaning), that it would not be reaſonable to recur to circumlocution, or to affected and far fetched expreſſions, and avoid ſuch as are ſimple and perſpicuous, becauſe not uſed by the moſt elegant writers. But this is not the caſe here. The expreſſion which Erasmus has adopted, is ſufficiently plain and ſimple; and, though *conſolari* may ſometimes be found in a paſſive ſignification, there can be no doubt that the active meaning is far the more common. Now, to avoid even the ſlighteſt ambiguity in the verſion, where there is nothing ambiguous in the original, would be a ſufficient reaſon with any man but an Arias

* Cet éloignement vient ſouvent de ce qu’il [Eraſme] a cru que l’ancienne édition n’eſt pas aſſez Latine. Par exemple (dans Mat. ii. 18.) au lieu de *noluit conſolari*, il a mis *noluit conſolationem admittere*. On trouve cependant *conſolari* au paſſif, dans d’anciens auteurs; outre que cette grande exactitude pour la propriété des mots Latins, dans une verſion de l’Ecriture, n’eſt pas toujours de ſaiſon. L’ou doit principalement prendre garde à bien expriſer le ſens de l’original. Hist. Crit. des Verſions du N. T. ch. xxii.

or an Aquila, for a greater deviation from the form of the expression, than this can reasonably be accounted.

§ 12. This critical historian is indeed so sensible of the futility of the greater part of his remarks on the version of Erasmus, that he, in a manner, apologises for it. "This sort of alterations," says he *, "so frequent in Erasmus's version, is generally of no importance; but it would have been more judicious to alter nothing in the ancient interpreter of the church, but what it was absolutely necessary to correct, in order to render him more exact: and perhaps it would have been better to put the corrections in the margin in the form of remarks." This is a topic to which he is perpetually recurring. It was not unfruitful for one who thought as Father Simon seems sometimes to have done, to use this plea as an argument against making new translations of the Bible into Latin: but it is not at all pertinent to obtrude it upon the readers (as he often does), in the examination of the versions actually made. The question, in regard to these, is, or ought to be, solely concerning the justness of the version. Nor is it easy to conceive another motive for confounding topics so different, but to excite such prejudices in the readers, as may preclude a candid examination.

As to his critique upon the translation made by Erasmus, it appears to me, I own, exceedingly trifling. I believe every impartial reader will be disposed to conclude as much from the examples above produced. And I cannot help adding, in regard to the whole of his criticisms on that version, with the exception of a very few, that they are either injudicious, the changes made by the interpreter being for the better, or frivolous, the changes being, at least, not for the worse. I admit a few exceptions. Thus, the *cui servio* of the Vulgate, is preferable to the *quem colo* of Erasmus, as a version of *ἀλατρευω*, Rom. i. 9. and better suited to the scope of the passage. *Λειτουργούντων δὲ αὐτῶν*, Acts xiii. 2. could not have been more justly rendered than by the Vulgate, *ministrantibus autem illis*. The expression adopted by Erasmus, *Cum autem illi sacrificarent*, is like one of Beza's stretches, though on a different side. Simon's censure of this passage deserves to be recorded as an evidence of his impartiality, in his theological capacity at least, however much we may think him sometimes biassed as a critic. "Erasmus," says he †, "has limited to the
"sacrifice,

* Ces fortes de changemens qui sont frequents dans la Version d'Erasmus, sont la plupart de nulle importance; mais il étoit plus judicieux de ne changer dans l'ancien interprete de l'église, que ce qu'il étoit absolument nécessaire de corriger, pour le rendre plus exact: et peut-être même étoit il mieux de mettre les corrections a la marge en forme de remarque. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

† Il a limite au sacrifice ou a l'action publique que les Grecs appellent *liturgie*, et les Latins *messe*, ce qu'on doit entendre en ce lieu-la generale-
ment

“ sacrifice, or the public action which the Greeks call *liturgy*,
 “ and the Latins *mass*, that which, in this place, ought to be
 “ understood of the ministry and functions in general, of the first
 “ ministers of the church. He had, therefore, no reason to re-
 “ form the version of the ancient interpreter, who expresses
 “ agreeably both to the letter and to the sense, the Greek verb
 “ *λειτεργειν*.”

Erasmus soon had his imitators, in this particular, among the
 Romish translators into modern languages. *Corbin*, in his French
 version, rendered that passage, *Eux celebrans le saint sacrifice de*
la messe. After him, Father *Veron*, *Les Apotres celebrent la*
messe au Seigneur. “ The reason,” says Simon *, “ which Ve-
 “ ron offers for translating it in this manner, is because the Cal-
 “ vinists had often asked him in what passage of Scripture it was
 “ mentioned that the Apostles ever said *mass*.” This plea of
 Veron is not unlike the mode of reasoning in his own defence,
 of which I had occasion formerly to produce some examples from
 Beza †. That father, that he might not again be at a loss for
 an answer to such troublesome querists as he had found in those
 disciples of Calvin, was resolved that, whether the *mass* had a
 place in the original or not, or even in the Vulgate, it should
 stand forth conspicuous in his translation, so that no person could
 mistake it. The reader will not be surpris'd to learn, that he
 was a controvertist by profession, as appears from his addition in
 the title of his book, “ Docteur en Theologie, Predicateur et
 “ Lecteur du Roi pour les Controverses, Depute par Nosseigneurs
 “ du Clerge, pour ecrire sur icelles.” And to show of what con-
 sequence he thought these particulars were to qualify him as a
 translator, he observes in the preface ‡, that “ the quality of holy
 “ writ well deserves, on several important accounts, that its tran-
 “ slators should be doctors in theology, and especially well versed
 “ in controversies.” Simon’s observation on this sentiment
 merits our utmost attention: “ It is true,” says he ||, “ that it
 “ were

ment du ministere et des fonctions des premiers ministres de l’eglise. Il
 n’a donc pas eu raison de reformer la version de l’ancien interprete, qui
 exprime tres-bien a la lettre, et selon le sens, le verbe Grec *λειτεργειν*.
 Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxii.

* La raison qu’il apporte de sa traduction en cet endroit, est que les
 Calvinistes lui avoient souvent demande en quel lieu de l’Ecriture il etoit
 marque que les apotres eussent dit la messe. Hist. Crit. des Versions du
 N. T. ch. xxxi.

† Diff. X. Part V. § 5, 6, 9.

‡ La qualite de l’Ecriture sainte merite bien aussi pour divers chefs que
 ses traducteurs soient docteurs en theologie, et bien versez specialement
 aux controverses. Ibid.

|| Il est vrai qu’il seroit a desirer que ceux qui se melent de traduire la
 Bible fussent scavans dans la theologie : mais ce doit etre une autre theo-
 logie que celle qui regarde la controverse ; car il arrive souvent que les
 controvertistes

“ were to be wished that those who meddle with translating the Bible, were learned in theology ; but it should be another sort of theology than the controversial ; for it frequently happens, that controvertists discover in the Bible things not in it, and that they limit the significations of the words by their own ideas.”

§ 13. But, to return to the detection I have attempted of Simon's partiality as a critic, and of the contradictory arguments in which he is often involved by it ; we should think him sometimes as much attached to the letter, and even to the arrangement of the words in the original, as any devotee of the synagogue ; and at other times disposed to allow great freedoms in both respects. When we examine into the reason of this inconsistency, we always find that the former is a prelude to the defence of the Vulgate in general, or of some obscure and barbarous expression in that version ; the latter is often, but not always, in vindication of something in the Vulgate, expressed more freely than perhaps was expedient, or, at least, necessary ; for there are great inequalities in that translation. I say, in this case, *often*, but not *always* ; because, as was hinted before, when there is no scope for party-attachment, his own good sense determines him to prefer those who keep close to the meaning before those who keep close to the letter.

“ It flows,” says he *, “ from want of respect for the writings of the Apostles, to transpose the order of their words, under pretence that this transposition forms a clearer and more natural sense. This may properly be remarked, but it is not allowable to make such a change in the text.” Again †, “ People of sense will prefer the barbarism of the ancient Latin edition to the politeness of Erasmus, because it is no fault, in an interpreter of Scripture, to follow closely his original, and to exhibit even its transpositions of words. If the interpreter of the church does not employ Latin terms sufficiently pure, it is
“ because

controvertistes voyent dans la Bible des choses qui n'y sont point, et qu'ils en limitent quelquefois les mots selon leurs idées. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxi.

* Ce n'est pas aussi avoir assez de respect pour les écrits des apôtres, que de transposer l'ordre des mots sous prétexte que cette transposition forme un sens plus net et plus naturel. Il est bon le remarquer ; mais il ne l'est pas permis de faire ce changement dans le texte. Hist. Crit. des Com. du N. T. ch. lx.

† Le gens de bon sens préféreront la barbarie de l'ancienne édition Latine à la politesse d'Érasme, parceque ce n'est pas un défaut dans un interprète de l'Écriture de suivre fidèlement son original, et d'en représenter jusqu'aux hyperbates. Si l'interprète de l'église ne s'explique pas en des termes Latins assez purs c'est qu'il s'est attaché à rendre fidèlement le mots de son original. Il est aisé de remédier à ces prétendus défauts par de petites notes.

“because he is determined to render faithfully the words of his original. It is easy to remedy, by short notes, such pretended faults.”

The preceding observations and reasoning he has himself answered in another place, in a way that is quite satisfactory. “A translator of Scripture,” says he *, “ought to take care not to attach himself entirely to the order of the words in the original; otherwise, it will be impossible for him to avoid falling into ambiguities; because the languages do not accord with each other in every thing.” Again †: “A translator ought not simply to count the words; but he ought, besides, to examine in what manner they may be joined together, so as to form a good meaning; otherwise his translation will be puerile and ridiculous.” In another place he is still more indulgent ‡: “One ought, doubtless, to consider the difference of the languages: our manners and our expressions do not suit those of the ancient Orientals. For this reason, I agree with Father Amelote, that it was not necessary that he should employ the conjunction *and* in all the places where it is found in the New Testament, because this repetition shocks us; as do also these other particles, *behold, now, then, because*. I am convinced that Amelote did right in substituting others in their stead.”

If it should be asked, Why does not Simon enjoin rather, in those places, to trace the letter, at all hazards, in the text, and recur to the margin, his never-failing resource on other occasions, for what regards the meaning? I know no pertinent answer that can be given, unless that, in the places just now quoted, he is not engaged in defending the obscurities, and even the nonsense, of the Vulgate, against the plain sense of other versions.

§ 14. To those above cited, I shall add but a few other specimens.

* Un traducteur de l'Ecriture doit prendre garde a ne s'attacher pas entierement a l'ordre des mots qui est dans l'original; autrement il sera impossible qu'il ne tombe dans des equivoques, parce que les langues ne se rapportent pas en tout les unes aux autres. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. III. ch. ii.

† Un traducteur ne doit pas compter simplement les mots; mais il doit de plus examiner, de quelle maniere on les peut joindre ensemble pour former un bon sens; autrement sa traduction sera puerile et ridicule. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

‡ On doit a la verite considerer la difference de langues, nos manieres et nos expressions ne s'accordant point avec celles des anciens peuples d'Orient. Sur ce pied-la je conviens, avec le P. Amelote, qu'il n'a pas ete necessaire qu'il employat la conjonction *et* dans tous les endroits ou elle se trouve dans le Nouveau Testament, parce que cette repetition nous choque, aussi bien que ces autres particules, *voila, donc, or, parce que*. Je suis meme persuade qu'il en a pu substituer d'autres en leur place. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxiii.

mens. "It is," says he*, "much more proper, in a translation of the sacred books into the vulgar tongue, to attach one's self, as much as possible to the letter, than to give meanings too free in quitting it." Again †, "This respect is due to the sacred books, which cannot be too literally interpreted, provided they be made intelligible." This sentiment appears moderate, on a general view; yet, when applied to particular cases, it will not be found to be that author's sentiment. And, what may be thought more extraordinary, this rule of his will be found to require, when judged by his own criticisms, both too much and too little.

First, it requires too much; because it implies that we are never to forsake the letter, unless when, by adhering to it, the expression might be rendered unintelligible. Yet, in a quotation lately given from that author, he admits, that the particles *and*, *behold*, *now*, *then*, *because*, may be either omitted or changed, and that not on account of their hurting the sense, which they rarely do, but expressly, because the frequent recurrence of such words shocks us, that is, offends our ears. An additional evidence of the same thing is, the exception he takes to Munster's translation, which he declares to be too literal, and consequently rude, though, at the same time, he acknowledges it to be sufficiently intelligible ‡. The sacred books, then, may be too literally interpreted, though they be made intelligible. Assertions more manifestly contradictory it is impossible to conceive.

Secondly, the rule he has given us requires too little; because it evidently implies that the letter ought to be deserted, when to do so is necessary for expressing the sense perspicuously. Now, if that had been uniformly our critic's opinion, we should never have had so many recommendations of the margin for correcting the ambiguities, false meanings, and no meanings, which a rigorous adherence to the letter had brought into the text of the Vulgate, and which he will not permit to be changed in other versions.

§ 15. I have already given it as my opinion, that Father Simon's sentiments on this subject, when unbiassed by any special purpose, were rational and liberal. I have given some evidences of this, and intend here to add a few more. Speaking of the
Greek

* Il est bien plus a propos dans une traduction des livres sacres en langue vulgaire, de s'attacher a la lettre autant qu'il est possible que de donner des sens trop libres en la quitant. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

† On doit avoir ce respect pour les livres sacres qui ne peuvent etre traduits trop a la lettre, pourveu qu'on se fasse entendre. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

‡ Quoique sa version soit assez intelligible, elle a neanmoins quelque chose de inde, parce qu'elle suit trop la lettre du texte Ebreu. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxi.

Greek version of the Old Testament, by Aquila the Jew, he says *, “ One cannot excuse this interpreter’s vicious affectation “ (which St Jerom has named *κακοζηλια* or *ridiculous zeal*), in “ translating every word of his text entirely by the letter, and “ in so rigid a manner, as to render his version altogether barba- “ rous.” Again †, “ The Seventy, who translate the Hebrew “ often too literally, and sometimes even without minding the “ sense, do not always exactly hit the meaning ; and they render “ themselves obscure, by an excessive attachment to the letter.” Of Arias’s translation he says ‡ : “ It is true, that this version “ may be useful to those who are learning Hebrew, because it “ renders the Hebrew word for word, according to the gramma- “ tical sense ; but I do not think that one ought therefore to give “ Arias Montanus the character of *a most faithful interpreter* : “ on the contrary, one will do him much more justice, in naming “ him *a most trifling interpreter*.”

Agreeably to this more enlarged, and indeed, more accurate way of thinking, the critic did not hesitate to pronounce this expression of Munster : *Fruetificate et augefcite, et implete aquas in fretis*, much inferior to that of the Vulgate, *Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete aquas maris* ||. I am of the same opinion as to the passages compared, though I have no partiality to the Vulgate. Yet, by Simon’s rule, above quoted, Munster’s version here ought to be preferred. It is equally intelligible, and more literal. Nor is the word *fruetificate* more exceptionable in point of Latinity, than many words in the Vulgate which he strenuously defends : accusing those who object to them, of an excess of delicacy, but ill suited to the subject. His friend, the canon of Ely, if it had been a term of the ancient interpreter, would have told us boldly, and, in my opinion, with better reason than when he so expressed himself, *Parum fortasse eleganter verbum פְּרִיעוּ pberu, sic reddidit ; sed apposite, ut qui maxime*. The same fault, of being too literal, and sometimes tracing etymologies, he finds

* On ne peut pas excuser cet interprete d’une affectation vicieuse (que St Jerome a nomme *κακοζηλια*, ou *zele ridicule*) d’autant qu’il a traduit chaque mot de son texte entierement a la lettre, et d’une maniere si rigoureuse, que cela a rendu sa version tout-a-fait barbare. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II.

† Les Septante qui traduisent souvent l’Ebreu trop a la lettre, et quelquefois meme sans prendre garde au sens, ne sont pas toujours un choix exact du veritable sens, et ils se rendent obscurs, pour s’attacher trop a la lettre. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xiii.

‡ Il est vrai que cette version peut etre utile a ceux qui veulent apprendre la langue Ebraique, parce qu’elle rend l’Hebreu mot pour mot, et selon le sens grammatical : mais je ne croi pas qu’on doive donner pour cela a Arias Montanus la qualite de *fidissimus interpres* : au contraire on lui fera beaucoup plus de justice, en le nommant *ineptissimus*. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xx.

* Gen. i. 2. Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. II. ch. xxi.

finds in Beza. "What has often deceived Beza," says he*, "and the other translators of Geneva, is their thinking to render the Greek more literally, by attaching themselves to express etymologies. They have not considered that it is proper only for school-boys to translate in this manner." To these let me add the testimony of his apologist, Hieronymus Le Camus †: "When they render the Hebrew word for word, they do not speak pure Greek. This Simon calls *κακοζηλια*, or a vicious affectation familiar to Jewish interpreters, and occurring sometimes in the Septuagint. Thus, when they turn some prepositions from Hebrew into Greek, they retain the Hebrew idiom; for example, in Hebrew, the comparative is expressed by the preposition *min*, which the Seventy, and Aquila, often render *απο*, *from*; in which case, this *κακοζηλια* darkens the sense." Was there none of this *κακοζηλια* then, in using the preposition *in* (where the idiom of the Latin, and the sense of the expression, required *cum*), in the phrase *in virtute* of the Vulgate ‡?

§ 16. But it is certain that, whatever were his general sentiments on the subject, he no sooner descended to particular instances, than he patronized the free or the literal manner, just as the one or the other had been followed by the Vulgate. If he had said, in so many words, that the example of the ancient interpreter was a sufficient reason, the question would have been more simple. But, whatever weight this sentiment might have had with Romanists, to whom that version serves as a standard, it could not surely have had influence enough on Protestants, to make them sacrifice what they judged to be the sense of the unerring Spirit, in deference to the discovered mistakes of a fallible translator. It was, therefore, of importance to Father Simon, for the conviction of his Protestant readers, to shew, from the authentic principles of criticism, that, in every thing material, the old translator had judged better than any of the latter interpreters: and, in prosecution of this momentous point, I have given a specimen of his wonderful versatility in arguing. That I may

* Ce qui a souvent trompe Beze et les autres traducteurs de Geneve, c'est qu'ils ont cru rendre les mots Grecs plus a la lettre, s'ils s'attachoient a exprimer jusqu'aux etymologies. Ils n'ont pas considere qu'il n'y a que des ecoliers qui soient capables de traduire de cette maniere. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxvi.

† Quando verba Ebraica ita reddunt, ut verbum de verbo exprimant, minus Græce loquantur; et hoc Simonius vocavit *κακοζηλια* seu pravam affectationem Judæis interpretibus familiarem, quæ etiam interdum in septuaginta interpretibus occurrit. Sic dum quasdam præpositiones ex Ebræo faciunt Græcas, retinent dictionem Ebraicam: exempli causa, sermo Ebraicus comparativum exprimit per *min* quod 70 cum Aquila haud infrequenter reddunt *απο* *ab*. Tunc ista *κακοζηλια* sensum efficit obscurum. Hier. le Cam. De Responsione Vossii, edit. Edinb. 1685. p. 50.

‡ Rom. i. 2. See § 7. of this Dissertation.

may not be misunderstood, I must, at the same time, add, that he does not carry his partiality so far as to refuse acknowledging, in the Vulgate, a few slips of no consequence, and nowise affecting the sense. To have acted otherwise, would have been too inartificial in that critic, as it would have exposed the great object of his treatise too much. Some concessions it was necessary that he should employ, as an expedient for gaining the acquiescence of his readers in points incomparably more important.

§ 17. I shall now finish what I have to remark upon his criticisms, with some reflections on those words which, in consequence of the frequency of their occurrence, both in the Vulgate, and in ancient ecclesiastical writers, he considers as consecrated, and as therefore entitled to be preferred to other words, which are equally significant, but have not had the same advantage of antiquity and theological use. I readily admit the title claimed in behalf of such words, when they convey exactly the idea denoted by the original terms, and are neither obscure nor ambiguous; nay, I do not object even to their ambiguity, when the same ambiguity is in the original term. And this is, in my opinion, the utmost which ought to be either demanded on one side, or yielded on the other. If, on account of the usage of any former interpreter, I admit words which convey not the same idea with the original, or which convey it darkly, or which convey also other ideas that may be mistaken for the true, or confounded with it; I make a sacrifice of the truths of the Spirit, that I may pay a vain compliment to antiquity, in adopting its phraseology, even when it may mislead. That the words themselves be equally plain and pertinent with any other words which might occur, appears to me so reasonable a limitation to the preference granted in favour of those used in any former version, that I do not know any topic by which I could convince persons of a different opinion, if the bare stating of the matter, as is done above, be not sufficient. But, perhaps, it will answer better to descend to particulars. It is only thus a person can be assured of making himself thoroughly understood.

§ 18. Simon, speaking of the Lutheran and Port Royal versions, says *, “Neither of them retains almost any thing of that venerable

* Les uns et les autres ne retiennent presque rien de cet air venerable et tout divin que l'Ecriture a dans les langues originales. On n'y trouve point cette simplicité de stile qui est repandue dans les ecrits des Evangelistes et des Apotres. Cela paroît des les premiers mots de la traduction de Mons, ou nous lisons, *la genealogie de Jesus Christ*: et en effet ces deux mots Latins, *liber generationis*, qui repondent a deux autres qui sont dans le Grec, signifient *genealogie*. Mais un interprete qui voudra conserver cet air simple que les livres sacres ont dans les langues originales, aimera mieux traduire simplement *le livre de la generation*. Il remarquera en meme tems a la marge, que dans le stile de la bible on appelle βίβλος γενεαις ce que les Grecs nomment γενεαλογια, *genealogie*: que les Apotres

“venerable and quite divine appearance which Scripture has in
 “the original languages. One does not find in these versions,
 “that simplicity of style which is diffused through the writings
 “of the apostles and evangelists. This appears from the first
 “words of the translation of Mons, where we read, *La genea-*
 “*logie de Jesus Christ* : in effect, the two Latin words, *liber ge-*
 “*nerationis*, answering to two others in the Greek, signify *ge-*
 “*nealogy*. But an interpreter, who chuses to preserve that sim-
 “ple air which the sacred books have in the original tongues,
 “will rather translate simply *the book of the generation*. He will
 “remark, at the same time, on the margin, that in the style of
 “the Bible, one calls βιβλος γενεως, what the Greeks name γενεα-
 “λογια, *genealogy* ; that the apostles have adopted this expression
 “from the Greek version of the Seventy, who have thus ex-
 “pressed the *sepher-toldoth* of the Hebrews.”

Now it may be observed, that Simon himself speaks of it as unquestionable, that *genealogie* expresses the meaning. But he objects, that it is not so simple an expression as *le livre de la generation*. If he had called it too learned a term for ushering in so plain a narrative as the Gospel, I should have thought the objection plausible. But when he speaks of simplicity, I am afraid that he has some meaning to that word which I am not acquainted with. I should never imagine, that of different ways of expressing the same idea, supposing the expressions in other respects equal, that should be accounted the least simple, which is in the fewest words. Or if the phrase, *le livre de la generation*, do not derive its superior simplicity from its being more complex ; does it derive that quality from its being more obscure than *la genealogie* ? I have been accustomed to consider plainness, rather than obscurity, as characteristic of simplicity. And, indeed, the chief fault I find in the former of these expressions, is its obscurity. The word *livre* is here used in a sense which it never has in French ; as much may be said of the word *generation* ; and consequently the phrase does not convey intelligibly the idea of the writer, or indeed any idea whatever. Our author's answer to this is, ‘Give the sense on the margin ;’ that is, in other words, give the etymology of the phrase in the text, and the translation in the margin. Is not this the very method taken by Arias Montanus, whom our critic has, nevertheless, treated very contemptuously ? Is not this hunting after etymological significations, the very thing he condemns so strongly in Beza, and some other modern interpreters ? And where is the difference, whether the expression to be explained be a phrase or a compound word ; for

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ont pris cette expression de la version Grecque des Septante, qui ont ainsi interprete le *sepher-toldoth* des Ebreux. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

a compound word is no other than a contracted phrase? Γενεαλογία is but two words, γενεας λογος, contracted into one. This our author admits to be a just (and, I add, a literal) version of *sepber zoldoth*. Now, if the evangelist had employed this, instead of βιβλος γενεσεως, Simon would have had the same reason for insisting that it ought to be rendered, in the text, *la parole de la generation*, and that the meaning should be explained in the margin.

Sometimes, indeed, this way of interpreting, by tracing the etymology, is proper, because sometimes it conveys the sense with sufficient perspicuity, and with as much brevity as the language admits; but this is not the case always. Every body will allow, that φιλιδονοι could not be more justly rendered than *lovers of pleasure*, or φιλοθειοι than *lovers of God*. But συκοφανται is much better translated *false accusers*, than *informers concerning figs*; φιλοσοφει, *philosophers*, than *lovers of wisdom*. The apostolical admonition, Col. ii. 8. Βλεπετε μη τις υμας εσαι ο συλαγωγων δια της φιλοσοφιας, is certainly better rendered, *Beware lest any man seduce you through philosophy*, than, *Beware lest any man carry you off a prey, through the love of wisdom*; which, though it traces the letter, does not give the sense. Yet, in these cases, the terms may be pertinently explained in the margin, as well as in that mentioned by the critic. Now, to qualify one for the office of interpreter, it is requisite that he be capable of giving the received use of the phrases, as well as of the compound words, and of the compound words, as well as of the simple words.

There are cases in which I have acknowledged, that recourse to the margin is necessary; but such cases are totally different from the present, as will appear to the satisfaction of any one who has attended to what has been said * on that subject. But the method so often recommended by Simon, is, in my apprehension, the most bungling imaginable. It is unnaturally to disjoin two essential parts of the translator's business, the interpretation of words, and the interpretation of idioms, or phrases, allotting the text, or body of the book, for the one, and referring the margin for the other. In consequence of which, the text will be often no better than a collection of riddles, or, what is worse, a jargon of unmeaning words; whilst that which alone deserves the name of interpretation, will be found in the margin. This naturally suggests a query, Whether the text might not as well be dispensed with altogether, as it would only serve to interrupt a reader's progress, distract his attention, and divide his thoughts? To this let me add another query, Whether there be any thing in the translations of Aquila, Malvenda, Arias Montanus, Pagnin, and Beza (for they all incur this stigma from our
author,

* Diff. II. Part I. § 5. Diff. VIII. throughout.

author, when they translate more literally than the Vulgate), which better deserves the denomination of a school-boy's version, than that which the author, in this place, so strongly patronizes?

§ 19. I observed, that compound words are nearly on the same footing with such phrases as βιβλος γενεσεως. This holds more manifestly in Hebrew, where the nouns which are said, by their grammarians, to be *in statu constructo*, are, in effect, compound terms. To combine them the more easily, a change is, in certain cases, made on the letters of the word which we should call the governing word; and when there is no change in the letters, there is often, by the Masoretic reading, a change in the vowel-points to facilitate the pronunciation of them as one word. In this way, *sepher-toldoth* is as truly one compound word in Hebrew, as γενεαλογια is in Greek, and of the same signification. There is a similar idiom in the French language, for supplying names, by what may be termed indifferently, phrases, or compound nouns. Such are, *gens d'armes, jet d'eau, aide de camp*. We should think a translator had much of the κακοζηλια, the vicious affectation so oft above mentioned, who should render them into English, *people of arms, cast of water, help of field*. Another evidence that this may justly be regarded as a kind of composition in Hebrew, is that, when there is occasion for the affix pronouns, though their connection be in strictness with the first of the two terms, they are annexed to the second, which would be utterly repugnant to their syntax, if both were not considered as making but one word, and consequently as not admitting the insertion of a pronoun between them. Thus, what is rendered, Isaiah ii. 20. *his idols of silver, and his idols of gold*, if the two nouns in each phrase were not conceived as combined into one compound term, ought to be translated *idols of his silver, and idols of his gold*, ואת אלילי זהבו את אלילי כסף, which is not according to the genius of that language, for the affix pronouns are never transposed.

But when the words are considered in this (which I think is the true) light, as one compound name, there is the same reason for rendering them as our interpreters have done, that there would be to render ἡ φιλανθρωπικη αὐτου, *his love to men*, and not *love to his men*. In the same manner, שם קדשי *shem kodshi*, is *my holy name*, הר קדשי *har kodshi*, *my holy mountain*, and שנו קדשי *shemen kodshi*, *my holy oil*. These, if we should follow the letter in translating them, or, which is the same thing, trace the form of the composition, must be, *the name of my holiness, the mountain of my holiness, and the oil of my holiness*. In translating צדקי אלהי, Psal. iv. 1. *elobe tsidki*, rendered, in the common version, *O God of my right coufness*, I see no occasion with Dr Taylor, to make a stretch to find a meaning to the word an-

answering

swering to *righteousness*; the word, agreeably to the Hebrew idiom above exemplified, has there manifestly the force of an epithet, and the expression implies no more than *my righteous God*. In this way יְהוָה קָדוֹשׁ , Isa. lxiii. 18. *gham kodshecha* (which is exactly similar), translated in the English Bible, after Tremellius, and much in the manner of Arias, *the people of thy holiness*, is rendered in the Vulgate, and by Houbigant, *populum sanctum tuum, thy holy people*, and to the same purpose by the translator of Zurich and Castalio. This very thing, therefore, that the Seventy did not render *sepher-toldoth, γενεαλογια*, to which it literally, and in signification, answers, but $\beta\iota\beta\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \gamma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ is an example of that $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\zeta\eta\lambda\iota\alpha$ of which Jerom justly accuses them, and which Simon never fails to censure with severity in every translation where he finds it, except the Vulgate. As this phrase however, in consequence of its introduction by these interpreters, obtained a currency among the Hellenist Jews, and was quite intelligible to them, being in the national idiom, it was proper in the evangelist to adopt it. The case was totally different with those for whom the Latin version was made; whose idiom the words *liber generationis* did not suit, and to whose ears they conveyed only unmeaning sounds.

§ 20. I have never seen Mr Simon's French translation of the New Testament from the Vulgate, but I have an English version of his version, by William Webster, curate of St Dunstan's in the West. The English translator professes, in his dedication, to have translated literally from the French. Yet Matthew's Gospel begins in this manner: *The genealogy of Jesus Christ*. If Mr Webster has taken the freedom to alter Simon's phrase, he has acted very strangely, as it is hardly in the power of imagination to conceive a good reason for turning that work (which is itself but a translation of a translation) into English; unless to show, as nearly as possible, that eminent critic's manner of applying his own rules, and to let us into his notions of the proper method of translating holy writ. And if, on the other hand, Simon has actually rendered it in French, *La genealogie*, it is no less strange that, without assigning a reason for his change of opinion, or so much as mentioning, in the preface, or in a note, that he had changed it, he should employ an expression which he had, in a work of high reputation, censured with so much severity in another*.

§ 21.

* I have, since these Dissertations were finished, been fortunate enough to procure a copy of Simon's French translation of the New Testament; from which I find that his English translator has not misrepresented him; Without any apology either in the preface or in the notes, he adopts the very expression which he had in so decisive a manner condemned in the Gentlemen of Port Royal. Nay, so little does he value the rule which he had so often prescribed to others, to give a literal version in the text,
and

§ 21. Now if, from what has been said, it be evident, that his own principles, explicitly declared in numberless parts of his book, as well as right reason, condemn the servile method of tracing etymologies in words or phrases (for there is no material difference in the cases), to the manifest injury of perspicuity, and, consequently, of the sense; I know no tolerable plea which can be advanced in favour of such phrases, unless that to which he often recurs in other cases, *consecration by long use*. “Why,” he asks*, speaking of the Port Royal translation, “have they “banished from this version many words which long use has “authorized, and which have been, so to speak, canonized in the “Western churches?” He does not, indeed, plead this in defence of the words *liber generationis*, though in my opinion, the most plausible argument he had to offer. But as it is a principal topic with him, to which he often finds it necessary to recur, it will require a more particular examination.

§ 22. Where we have, in the Greek, says he †, *ευαγγελιζονται*, “and in the Vulgate *evangelizantur*, Erasmus has translated, “*Lætum evangelii accipiunt nuntium*. He explains, by several “words, what might have been rendered by one only, which is “not, indeed, Latin, but, as the learned John Bois remarks, it is “ancient, and is, besides, as current as several other words which “ecclesiastic use has rendered familiar. He adds, in the same “place, that he is not shocked with this expression in our Vulgate, *qui non fuerit scandalizatus*, because he is for allowing “the Gospel to speak after its own manner. Erasmus has “translated *Quisquis non fuerit offensus*, which is better Latin.” In

and the meaning in the margin, that in most cases, as in the present, he reverses it; he gives the meaning in the text, and the literal version in the margin. I think, that in so doing, he judges much better; but if further experience produced this alteration in his sentiments, it is strange that he seems never to have reflected that he owed to the public some account of so glaring an inconsistency in his conduct; and to those translators whose judgment he had treated with so little ceremony, an acknowledgment of his error. Simon’s translation, is, upon the whole, a good one, but it will not bear to be examined by his own rules and maxims.

* Pou: quoy a-t-on banni plusieurs mots qu’un long usage a autorizes et qui ont ete, pour ainsi dire, canonises dans les eglises d’Occident. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxiv.

† Ou il y a dans le Grec (Mat. xi. 5.) *ευαγγελιζονται*, et dans la Vulgate *evangelizantur*, Erasme a traduit *lætum Evangelii accipiunt nuntium*. Il explique par plusieurs mots ce qu’il pouvoit rendre par un seul, qui n’est pas a la verite Latin, mais, comme le docte Jean Bois a remarque, il est ancien, et il est aussi bien de mise que plusieurs autres mots auxquels l’usage de l’eglise a donne cours. Il ajoute au meme endroit, qu’il n’est point choqué de cette expression qui est dans notre Vulgate, *qui non fuerit scandalizatus*, parce qu’il souffre volontiers que l’Evangile parle a sa maniere. Erasme a traduit, *quisquis non fuerit offensus*; ce qui est plus Latin. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiii.

In regard to the last expression, he has a similar remark in his critique on the version of Mons. "These words," says he * "Si oculus tuus dexter scandalizat te, the gentlemen of Port Royal have translated, Si votre œil droit vous est un sujet de scandale et de chute. They say that the word *scandale*, by itself, conveys commonly another idea, denoting that which shocks us, not that which makes us fall. But St Jerom, whom they pretend to imitate, was not so delicate. We should not, however, have found fault with their explaining the word *scandale*, scandal, by the word *chute*, fall: but this explanation ought to have been in the margin, rather than in the text of the version."

§ 23. As to what regards the proper version of the words *εὐαγγελίζω* and *εὐαγγέλιον*, I have explained myself fully in some former Dissertations †, and shall only add here a few things suggested by the remarks above quoted. First, then, Mr Simon condemns it much in a translator, to explain, by several words, what might have been rendered by one only. I condemn it no less than he. But by the examples produced, one would conclude that he had meant, not *what might have been*, but *what could not have been*, rendered by one only; for *evangelizantur* is not a version of *εὐαγγελίζονται*, nor *scandalizatus fuerit* of *σκανδαλισθη*. This is merely to give the Greek words something of a Latin form, and so evade translating them altogether. A version, composed on this plan, if without absurdity we could call it a version, would be completely barbarous and unintelligible. There are a very few cases wherein it is necessary to retain the original term. These I have described already ‡. But neither of the words now mentioned falls under the description. And common sense is enough to satisfy us, that when a word cannot be translated intelligibly by one word only, the interpreter ought to employ more. *Verba ponderanda sunt*, says Houbigant §, *non numeranda—Neque enim fieri potest, ut duarum linguarum paria semper verba paribus respondeant.*

Secondly, That a word is familiar to us, is no evidence that we understand it, though this circumstance, its familiarity, often prevents our discovering that we do not understand it.

Thirdly,

* Ces paroles (Mat. v. 29), *Si oculus tuus dexter scandalizat te*, Messieurs de Port Royale ont traduit par celles ci, *Si votre œil droit vous est un sujet de scandale et de chute*. Ils disent que le mot de *scandale* tout seul donne d'ordinaire une autre idee, et qu'ils se prend pour ce qui nous choque, et non pas pour ce qui nous fait tomber. Mais St Jerome qu'ils pretendent imiter, n'a point eu cette delicatesse. On ne trouve pas néanmoins mauvais qu'ils aient explique le mot de *scandale* par celui de *chute*: mais cette explication devoit plutot etre a la marge, que dans le texte de la version. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxxv.

† Diff. V. Part II. Diff. VI. Part V.

‡ Diff. VIII. passim.

§ P roleg. Cap. V. Art. III.

Thirdly ecclesiastical use is no security that the word, though it be understood, conveys to us the same idea which the original term did to those to whom the Gospels were first promulged. In a former Dissertation, the fullest evidence has been given, that in regard to several words, the meaning which has been long established by ecclesiastic use, is very different from that which they have in the writings of the New Testament.

Fourthly, that to render the plain Greek words *σκανδαλιζω* and *ευαγγελιζω* into Latin, by the words *scandalizo* and *evangelizo*, which are not Latin words, is so far from allowing the Gospel to speak after its own manner (as Bois calls it), that it is, on the contrary, giving it a manner of speaking the most different from its own that can be imagined. This I intend soon to evince, even from Simon himself, though, in the passage above referred to, he seems to have adopted the sentiment of the English critic.

Lastly, the argument implied in the remark, that Jerom had not so much delicacy as the translators of Port Royal, because he did not scruple to employ the word *scandalizo*, though not Latin, in his Latin version, admits a twofold answer. The first is, Jerom did wrong in so doing. Simon acknowledges that he was neither infallible nor inspired; he acknowledges, further, that he might, and in a few instances, did mistake, and is, by consequence, not implicitly to be followed. "It would be wrong," says the critic, in a passage formerly quoted, "to imitate the faults of St Jerom, and to pay greater deference to his authority than to the truth." The second answer is, that the cases are not parallel. *Scandalum* was not a Latin word; consequently, to those who understood no Greek, it was obscure, or if you will, unintelligible. This is the worst that could be said. Jerom, or whoever first introduced it into the Latin version, had it in his power to assign it, in a note, what sense he pleased. But *scandale* was a French word, before the translators of Mons had a being; and it was not in their power to divert it from the meaning which general use had given it long before. Now, as they justly observe, in their own vindication, the import of the French word did not coincide with that of the original; they were, therefore, by all the rules of interpretation, obliged to adopt another. Jerom, by adopting the word *scandalum*, darkened the meaning; they, by using the word *scandale*, would have given a false meaning. Their only fault, in my opinion, was their admitting an improper word into their version, even though coupled with another which expresses the sense.

§ 24. But, as our author frequently recurs to this topic, the consecration of such words by long use, it will be proper to consider it more narrowly. Some have gone further on this article than

than our author is willing to justify. "Sutor," says he *, "pretended, that it was not more allowable to make new translations of the Bible, than to change the style of Cicero into another. *Nonne injuriam faceret Tullio, qui ejus stylum immutare vellet?* But, by the leave of this Paritian theologift," says Simon, "there is a great difference between reforming the style of a book, and making a version of that book. One may make a translation of the New Testament from the Greek, or from the Latin, without making any change in that Greek or that Latin." The justness of this sentiment is self evident; and it is a necessary consequence from it, that if the words and phrases in the version convey the same ideas and thoughts to the readers, which those of the original convey, it is a just translation, whatever conformity or disconformity in sound and etymology there may be between its words and phrases, and the words and phrases of the original, or of other translations.

Of this Simon appears, on several occasions, to be perfectly sensible, insomuch that he has, on this very article, taken up the defence of Castalio against Beza, who had attacked, with much acrimony, his innovations in point of language. "It is not, as Beza very well said," (I quote Beza here as quoted by Simon †) "so much my opinion, as that of the ablest ecclesiastical writers, who, when they discourse with the greatest elegance concerning sacred things, make no alteration on the passages of Scripture which they quote." Though this verdict of Beza is introduced with manifest approbation, *dit il fort bien*, and though, in confirmation of it, he adds, that both Beza and Castalio have taken, in this respect, unpardonable liberties, yet it is very soon followed by such a censure as, in my opinion, invalidates the whole. "There is, nevertheless," says he ‡, "some exaggeration in this reproach. For the question here is about the version of the sacred books, and not about the original; so that one cannot object to Castalio, as Beza does, his having chang-

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* Sutor pretendoit qu'il n'etoit pas plus permis de faire de nouvelles traductions de la Bible, que de changer le stile de Ciceron en un autre. *Nonne injuriam faceret Tullio, qui ejus stylum immutare vellet?* Mais n'en deplaise a ce theologien de Paris, il y a bien de la difference entre reformer le stile d'un livre, et faire une version de ce meme livre. On peut faire une traduction du Nouveau Testament sur le Grec, ou sur le Latin, sans toucher a ce Grec, ni a ce Latin. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxi.

† Ce n'est pas, dit il fort bien, tant mon sentiment. que celui des plus habiles ecrivains ecclesiastiques, lesquels, quand meme ils parlent avec le plus de politesse des choses sacrees, ne changent rien dans les passages de l'Ecriture qu'ils citent. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

‡ Il y a néanmoins de l'exaggeration dans ce reproche. Car il n'est ici question que de la version des livres sacres, et non pas de l'original; et ainsi l'on ne peut pas objecter a Castalio, comme fait Beza, d'avoir change

“ ed the words of the Holy Spirit, or, as he expresses it, *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*. It is certain to adopt the style of the ministers of Geneva, that the Holy Spirit did not not speak Latin. Wherefore, Castalio might well put, in his Latin translation, *lotio* and *genii*, instead of *baptisma* and *angeli*, without changing aught in the expressions of the Holy Spirit.” The moderation and justness of his sentiments here, do not well accord either with the high claims which, in favour of ecclesiastic terms, he makes to consecration, canonization, &c. or with the accusations brought, on this very article, against Erasmus and others.

Wherein does the expression of Theodore Beza, in calling those ancient words and phrases of the Vulgate, *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*, differ, in import, from that given by John Bois, who says in reference to them, *Libenter audio Scripturam suo quidem modo, suoque velut idiomate loquentem*? May it not be replied, just as pertinently to Bois as to Beza: “ The question here is about the version of the sacred books, and not about the original. It is certain that as the Holy Spirit did not speak Latin, the Scriptures were not written in that language.” Their phrases and idioms, therefore, are not concerned in the dispute; for, if those expressions, concerning which we are now enquiring, be not the language of the Holy Spirit, as Simon himself maintains that they are not; neither are they the language of the Scriptures. Thus, the same sentiment, with an inconsiderable difference in the expression, is quoted by our author, with high approbation from the canon of Ely, as worthy of being turned into a general rule *, and with no little censure from the minister of Geneva.

§ 25. I have often had occasion to speak of the obscurity of such terms, and I have shown † the impropriety of several of them, as conveying ideas very different from those conveyed by the words of the original, rightly understood: and though this alone would be a sufficient reason for setting them aside, sufficient, I mean, to any person who makes more account of obtaining the mind of the Spirit, than of acquiring the dialect of uninspired interpreters; the very reason for which the use of them is so strenuously urged by

les paroles du Saint Esprit, ou, comme il parle, *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*. Il est certain que le Saint Esprit, pour me servir des termes des ministres de Geneve, n'a point parle Latin. C'est pourquoi Castalio a pu mettre dans sa traduction Latine *lotio* et *genii* au lieu de *baptisma* et *angeli*, sans rien changer pour cela dans les expressions du Saint Esprit. Hist. Crit. des Versions du N. T. ch. xxiv.

* Cette reflexion doit servir de regle pour une infinite d'endroits du Nouveau Testament, ou les nouveaux traducteurs ont affecte de s'eloigner de l'ancienne edition Latine. Ibid. ch. xxii.

† Diff. IX. throughout.

by Simon and others, appears to me a very weighty reason against employing them. They are, say these critics, consecrated words; that is, in plain language, they are, by the use of ecclesiastic writers, become a sort of technical terms in theology. This is really the fact. Accordingly, those words hardly enter into common use at all. They are appropriated as terms of art, which have no relation to the ordinary commerce of life. Now, nothing can be more repugnant to the character of the diction employed by the sacred writers; their being, in their language, nothing to which we can apply the words scholastic or technical. On the contrary, the inspired penmen always adopted such terms as were in familiar use with their readers on the most common occurrences. When the Evangelist tells us, in Greek, Luke ii. 10. that the angel said to the shepherds, *Ευαγγελίζομαι ὑμῖν*, he represents him as speaking in as plain terms to all who understood Greek, as one who says in English, *I bring you good news*, speaks to those who understand English. But will it be said, that the Latin interpreter spoke as plainly to every reader of Latin, when he said, *Evangelizo vobis*? Or does that deserve to be called a version, which conveys neither the matter nor the manner of the author? Not the matter, because an unintelligible word conveys no meaning; not the manner, because what the author said simply and familiarly, the translator says scholastically and pedantically. Of this, however, I do not accuse Jerom. The phrase in question was doubtless one of those which he did not think it prudent to meddle with.

§ 26. Nor will their method of obviating all difficulties, by means of the margin, ever satisfy a reasonable person. Is it proper, in translating an author, to make a piece of patchwork of the version, by translating one word, and mis-translating, or leaving untranslated, another, with perpetual references to the margin, for correcting the blunders intentionally committed in the text? And if former translators have, from superstition, from excessive deference to their predecessors, from fear of giving offence, or from any other motive, been induced to adopt so absurd a method, shall we think ourselves obliged to imitate them? Some seem strangely to imagine, that to have, in the translation, as many as possible of the articulate sounds, the letters and syllables of the original, is to be very literal, and consequently, very close. If any chuse to call this literal, I should think it idle to dispute with him about the word; but I could not help observing that, in this way, a version may be very literal, and perfectly foreign from the purpose. Nobody will question that the English word *pharmacy* is immediately derived from the Greek *φαρμακεια*, of which it retains almost all the letters. Ought we, for that reason, to render the Greek word *φαρμακεια*, *pharmacy*, in the catalogue

logue the apostle has given us of the works of the flesh, Gal. v. 19, 20, 21. ? Must we render *παροξυσμος* *paroxysm*, Acts xv. 39. and *παρεδόξα* *paradoxes* ? Luke v. 26. *Idiot* is, by this rule, a literal version of the Greek *ιδιωτης*. But an interpreter would be thought not much above that character, who should render it so in several places of Scripture, Acts iv. 13. 1 Cor. xiv. 16. 23, 24. 2 Cor. xi. 6. Yet, if this be not exhibiting what Beza denominates *divinam illam Spiritus Sancti eloquentiam*; or what Bois, with no better reason, calls *Scripturam suo quidem modo, suoque velut idiomate loquentem*, it will not be easy to assign an intelligible meaning to these phrases.

But, if such be the proper exhibition of the eloquence of the Spirit, and of the idiom of Scripture, it will naturally occur to ask, Why have we so little, even in the Vulgate, of this divine eloquence? Why do we so seldom hear the Scripture, even there, speak in its own way and in its native idiom? It would have been easy to mutilate all, or most of the Greek words, forming them in the same manner as *evangelizatus* and *scandalizatus* are formed, and so to turn the whole into a gibberish, that would have been neither Greek nor Latin, though it might have had something of the articulation of the one language, and of the structure of the other. But it is an abuse of speech, to call a jargon of words, wherein we have nothing but a resemblance in sound, without sense, the eloquence of the Holy Spirit, or the idiom of the Scriptures.

It is sometimes made the pretence for retaining the original word, that it has different significations, and, therefore, an interpreter, by preferring one of these, is in danger of hurting the sense. Thus, the Rhemish translators, who render *αλλον παρακλητον δωσει υμιν*, John xiv. 16. *He will give you another paraclete*, subjoin this note: “*Paraclete*, by interpretation, is either a comforter, or an advocate; and therefore, to translate it by any one of them only, is, perhaps, to abridge the sense of this place:” to which Fulke, who publishes their New Testament along with the then common version, answers very pertinently, in the note immediately following: “If you will not translate any words that have diverse significations, you must leave five hundred more untranslated than you have done.” But there is not even this poor pretence for all the consecrated barbarisms. The verb *εναγγελιζομαι* never occurs in the Gospels in any sense but one, a sense easily expressed in the language of every people.

§ 27 It may be replied, ‘If you will not admit with Beza, that this mode of writing is the eloquence of the Spirit, or with Bois, that it is the idiom of Scripture, you must at least allow, with Melancthon, that it is the language and style of the church: *Nos loquamur cum ecclesia. Ne pudeat nos materni sermonis. Ecclesia est mater nostra. Sic autem loquitur ecclesia.*’

This

This comes indeed nearer the point in hand. The language of the Latin church is, in many things, founded in the style introduced by the ancient interpreters. But it ought to be remembered, that even the Latin church herself does not present those interpreters to us as infallible, or affirm that their language is irreprehensible. And if she herself has been anyhow induced to adopt a style that is not well calculated for conveying the mind of the Lord: nay, which in many things darkens, and in some misrepresents it, shall we make less account of communicating clearly the truths revealed by the Spirit, than of perpetuating a phraseology which contributes to the advancement of ignorance, and of an implicit deference in spiritual matters to human authority? On the contrary, if the church has, in process of time, contracted somewhat of a Babylonish dialect, and thereby lost a great deal of her primitive simplicity, purity, and plainness of manner; her language cannot be too soon cleared of the unnatural mixture, and we cannot too soon resume her native idiom. To act thus is so far from being imputable to the love of novelty, that it results from that veneration of antiquity which leads men to ask for the old paths, and makes the votaries of the true religion desirous to return to the undisguised sentiments, manner, and style of holy writ, which are evidently more ancient than the oldest of these canonized corruptions. This is not to relinquish, it is to restore the true idiom of Scripture: with as little propriety is such a truly primitive manner charged with the want of simplicity. A technical or learned style is of all styles the least entitled to be called *simple*; for it is the least fitted for conveying instruction to the simple, to *babes* in knowledge, the character by which those to whom the Gospel was first published, were particularly distinguished, Matt. xi. 25. Luke x. 21. Whereas the tendency of a scholastic phraseology, is, on the contrary, to hide divine things from babes and simple persons, and to reveal them only to sages and scholars. Never, therefore, was controvertist more unlucky in his choice of arguments than our opponents on this article are in urging the plea of simplicity and that of Scripture idiom, topics manifestly subversive of their cause.

§ 28. The impropriety of changing, on any pretext, the consecrated terms, and the impropriety of giving to the people within the pale of the Roman church, any translation of Scripture into their mother-tongue, unless from the Vulgate, are topics to which Father Simon frequently recurs. And it must be acknowledged, that on this hypothesis, which puts the authority of tradition on the same foot with that of Scripture, and makes the church the depositary and interpreter of both, there appears a suitableness in his doctrine. He admits, however, that the translation she has adopted, is not entirely exempted from errors,
though

though free from such as affect the articles of faith, or rules of practice. The propriety of translating only from the Vulgate, he maintains from this single consideration, its being that which is read for Scripture daily in their churches.

Now this argument is of no weight with Protestants, and appears not to be entitled to much weight even with Roman Catholics. If there be no impropriety in their being supplied with an exact version of what is read in their churches; neither is there any impropriety in their being supplied with an exact version of what was written by the inspired penmen, for the instruction of the first Christians. This appears as reasonable and as laudable an object of curiosity even to Romanists as the other. Nay, I should think this, even on Simon's own principles, defensible. The sacred penmen were infallible, so was not the ancient interpreter. He will reply, 'But ye have not the very hand-writings of the Apostles and Evangelists. There are different readings in different Greek copies. Ye are not, therefore, absolutely certain of the conformity of your Greek in every thing, any more than we are of our Latin to those original writings.' This we admit, but still insist that there is a difference. The Latin has been equally exposed with the Greek to the blunders of transcribers. And as, in some things, different Greek copies read differently, we receive that version, with other ancient translations, to assist us in doubtful cases to discover the true reading. But the Vulgate, with every other version, labours under this additional disadvantage, that, along with the errors arising from the blunders of copiers, it has those also arising from the mistakes of the interpreter.

§ 29. But, in fact, the secret reason both for preserving the consecrated terms, and for translating only from the Vulgate, is no other than to avoid, as much as possible, whatever might suggest to the people, that the Spirit says one thing and the Church another. It is not according to the true principles of ecclesiastical policy, that such differences should be exposed to the vulgar. This the true sons of the church have discovered long ago. "Gardiner," says bishop Burnet †, "had a singular conceit. He fancied there were many words in the New Testament of such majesty that they were not to be translated, but must stand in the English Bible as they were in the Latin. A hundred of these he put into a writing, which was read in convocation. His design in this was visible, that if a translation must be made, it should be so daubed all through with Latin words, that the people should not understand it much the better for its being in English. A taste of this the reader may have by the first twenty of them; *ecclesia, pœnitentia, pontifex, ancilla, contritus,*
" *olocausta,*

* History of the Reformation in England, book iii. year 1542.

“ *olocausta, justitia, justificatio, idiota, elementa, baptizare, martyr, adorare, scandalum, simplex, tetrarcha, sacramentum, simulacrum, gloria.* The design he had of keeping some of these, particularly the last save one, is plain enough, that the people might not discover that visible opposition which was between the Scriptures and the Roman Church, in the matter of images. This could not be better palliated, than by disguising these places with words that the people understood not.” Thus far the bishop.

§ 30. It would not be easy to conjecture why Gardiner, that zealous opposer of the reformation, selected some of the words above mentioned as proper to be retained, unless by their number and frequent recurrence, to give an uncouth and exotic appearance to the whole translation. In regard to others of them, as the bishop justly remarks, the reason is obvious. And it is to be regretted that that historian has not inserted in his valuable work the whole catalogue. Nothing could serve better to expose the latent but genuine purpose of the consecrated terms. Not that any judicious person can be at a loss to discover it; but the more numerous the examples are the evidence is the stronger. The meaning of common words is learnt solely from common usage, but the import of canonized words can be got only from canonical usage. We all know what an *image* is, it being a word in familiar use; we therefore find no difficulty in discovering what we are forbidden to worship by the command which forbids the worship of images. Whereas, had the word *simulacrum*, quite unused before, been substituted for image, it would have, doubtless, acquired a currency on theological subjects; but, being confined to these, would have been no better than a technical term in theology, for the meaning of which recourse must be had to men of the profession. Nor would it have required of the casuist any metaphysical acuteness in distinguishing, to satisfy those whom he taught to worship *images*, that they were in no danger of adoring a *simulacrum*.

§ 31. To prevent mistakes, it may not be improper to observe that the word *simulacrum* in the Vulgate itself is no more a term of art than *similitudo* or *imago* are, for they are all words in familiar use in Latin; but *simulacrum* is not in familiar use in English, though *similitudo* and *image* are, which are both formed from Latin words of the same signification. It is not, therefore, their affinity, or even identity in respect of sound, but their difference in respect of use, which stamps nearly related words, or what we call convertible terms with these different characters, in different languages. Thus *εὐαγγελίζω* and *σκαιδαλίζω* are common, not technical terms in the Greek New Testament; but *evangelizo* and *scandalizo* in the Vulgate are the reverse, technical not common. Now it is for this reason, I say, that to adopt, with-

out necessity, such terms in a language to which they do not belong, and in which consequently they are unknown, or known merely as professional terms, is to form a style the very reverse of what I should call the eloquence of the Holy Spirit, and the proper idiom of the Scriptures. For a greater contrast to the plain and familiar idiom of Scripture, and the eloquence of the Spirit, addressed entirely to the people, than a style that is justly denominated dark, learned and technical, it is impossible to conceive.

Let it be observed, therefore, that it is the use, not the etymology, to which, in translating, we ought to have respect, either in adopting, or in rejecting an expression. A word is neither the better nor the worse for its being of Greek or Latin origin. But our first care ought to be, that it convey the same meaning with the original term; the second, that it convey it as nearly as possible in the same manner, that is, with the same plainness, simplicity, and perspicuity. If this can be done with equal advantage by terms which have obtained the sanction of ecclesiastical use, such terms ought to be preferred. For this reason, I prefer *just* to virtuous, *redeemer* to ransomer, *saviour* to deliverer. But if the same meaning be not conveyed by them, or not conveyed in the same manner, they ought to be rejected. Otherwise the real dictates of the Spirit and the unadulterated idiom of Scripture, are sacrificed to the shadowy resemblance, in sound and etymology, of technical words and scholastic phrases.

§ 32. Such, upon the whole, are my sentiments of the regard which, in translating holy writ into modern languages, is due to the practice of former translators, especially of the authors of the Latin Vulgate. And such, in particular, is my notion of those words which, by some critics, are called *consecrated*, and which, in general, in respect of the sense, will not be found the most eligible; nay, by the use of which, there is greater hazard of deserting that plainness and that simplicity which are the best characteristics of the Scripture style, than by any other means I know.

P A R T II.

The Regard due to the English Translation.

HAVING been so particular in the discussion of the first part of this inquiry, namely, the regard which, in translating the Scriptures, is due to the manner wherein the words and phrases have been rendered by the authors of the Vulgate, it will not be necessary

ecessary to enter so minutely into the second part, concerning the regard which an English translator owes to the expressions adopted in the common translation. The reasons for adopting, or for rejecting, many of them, are so nearly the same in both cases, that, to avoid prolixity by unnecessary repetitions, I shall confine myself to a few observations which the special circumstances affecting the common English version naturally give rise to.

§ 2. That translation, we all know, was made at a time when the study of the original languages, which had been long neglected, was just revived in Europe. To this, the invention of printing first, and the reformation soon afterwards, had greatly contributed. As it grew to be a received doctrine among Protestants, that the word of God, contained in the Scriptures, is the sole infallible rule which he has given us of faith and manners, the ineffable importance of the study of Scripture was perceived more and more every day. New translations were made, first into Latin, the common language of the learned, and afterwards into most European tongues. The study of the languages naturally introduces the study of criticism, I mean that branch of criticism which has language for its object; and which is, in effect, no other than the utmost improvement of the grammatical art. But this, it must be acknowledged, was not then arrived at that perfection, which, in consequence of the labours of many learned and ingenious men, of different parties and professions, it has reached since. What greatly retarded the progress of this study in the first age of the reformation, was the incessant disputes in which the reformers were engaged about the articles of doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, and ceremonies, both with the Romanists, and among themselves. This led them insensibly to recur to the weapons which had been employed against them, and of which they had at first spoken very contemptuously, the metaphysical and unintelligible subtleties of school divinity.

This recourse was productive of two bad consequences. First, it diverted them from the critical study of the sacred languages, the surest human means for discovering the mind of the Spirit; secondly, it infused into the heads of the disputants, prepossessions in favour of such particular words and phrases as are adapted to the dialect and system of the parties to which they severally attached themselves; and in prejudice of those words and phrases which seem more suitable to the style and sentiments of their adversaries. There is, perhaps, but too good reason for adding an evil consequence produced also upon the heart, in kindling wrath and quenching charity. It was when matters were in this situation, that several of the first translations were made. Men's minds were then too much heated with their polemic squabbles, to be capable of that impartial, candid and dispassionate examination, which is so necessary in those who would approve

themselves faithful interpreters of the oracles of God. Of an undue bias on the judgment in translating, in consequence of such perpetual wranglings, I have given some specimens in a former Dissertation*.

§ 3. In regard to the common translation, though not entirely exempted from the influence of party and example, as I formerly had occasion to shew †, it is, upon the whole, one of the best of those composed so soon after the Reformation. I may say justly that, if it had not been for an immoderate attachment, in its authors, to the Genevese translators, Junius, Tremellius and Beza, it had been still better than it is; for the greatest faults with which it is chargeable are derived from this source. But since that time, it must be owned, things are greatly altered in the church. The rage of disputation on points rather curious than edifying, or, as the apostle calls it, 1 Tim. vi. 4. the dotage about questions and strifes of words, has, at least among men of talents and erudition, in a great measure subsided. The reign of scholastic sophistry and altercation is pretty well over. Now, when to this reflection we add a proper attention to the great acquisitions in literature which have of late been made, in respect not only of languages, but also of antiquities and criticism, it cannot be thought derogatory from the merit and abilities of those worthy men who formerly bestowed their time and labour on that important work, to suppose that many mistakes, which were then inevitable, we are now in a condition to correct.

To effect this, is the first, and ought, doubtless, to be the principal motive for attempting another version. Whatever is discovered to be the sense of the Spirit, speaking in the Scriptures, ought to be regarded by us as of the greatest consequence; nor will any judicious person, who has not been accustomed to consider religion in a political light, as a mere engine of state, deny, that where the truth appears, in any instance, to have been either misrepresented, or but obscurely represented, in a former version, the fault ought, in an attempt like the present, as far as possible, to be corrected. To say the contrary, is to make the honourable distinction of being instruments in promoting the knowledge of God of less moment, than paying a vain compliment to former translators, or, perhaps, shewing an immoderate deference to popular humour, which is always attached to customary phrases, whether they convey the true meaning, or a false meaning, or any meaning at all. This, therefore, is unquestionably a good ground for varying from those who preceded us.

§ 4. It deserves further to be remarked that, from the changes incident to all languages, it sometimes happens that words which expressed

* Diss. X. Part V. § 4, &c.

† Ibid.

expressed the true sense at the time when a translation was made, come afterwards to express a different sense; in consequence whereof, though those terms were once a proper version of the words in the original, they are not so after such an alteration, having acquired a meaning different from that which they had formerly. In this case it cannot be doubted that, in a new translation, such terms ought to be changed. I hinted before *, that I look upon this as having been the case with some of the expressions employed in the Vulgate. They conveyed the meaning at the time that version was made, but do not so now. I shall instance only in two. The phrase *pœnitentiam agite* was, in Jerom's time, nearly equivalent in signification to the Greek *μετανοεῖτε*. It is not so at present. In consequence of the usages which have crept in, and obtained an establishment in the churches subject to Rome, it no longer conveys the same idea; for having become merely an ecclesiastic term, its acceptation is regulated only by ecclesiastic use. Now, in that use, it exactly corresponds to the English words *do penance*, by which indeed the Rhemish translators, who translate from the Vulgate, have rendered it in their New Testament. Now, as no person of common sense, who understands the language, will pretend, that to enjoin us to *do penance*, and to enjoin us to *reform*, or *repent*, is to enjoin the same thing; both Erasmus and Beza were excusable, notwithstanding the censure pronounced by Bois and Simon, in deserting the Vulgate in this place, and employing the unambiguous term *resipiscite*, in preference to a phrase, now at least become so equivocal as *pœnitentiam agite*. We may warrantably say more, and affirm, that they would not have acted the part of faithful translators, if they had done otherwise.

It was, to appearance, the uniform object of the priest of the Oratory (I know not what may have biased the canon of Ely) to put honour upon the church, by which he meant the church of Rome, to respect above all things, and at all hazards, her dogmas, her usages, her ceremonies, her very words and phrases. The object of Christian interpreters is, above all things, and at all hazards, to convey, as perspicuously as they can, the truths of the Spirit. If the former ought to be the principal object of the translators of holy writ, Simon was undoubtedly in the right; if the latter, he was undoubtedly in the wrong. The other expression in the Vulgate, which may not improbably have been proper at the time when that translation was made, though not at present, is *sacramentum* for *μυστήριον*, in the second Scriptural sense which I observed to be sometimes given to the Greek word †. But, in consequence of the alterations which have since taken place in ecclesiastical use, the Latin term has acquired a meaning

* Part III. § 9.

† Diff. IX. Part I. § 7.

meaning totally different, and is therefore now no suitable expression of the sense.

§ 5. Now, what has been observed of the Latin words above mentioned, has already happened to several words employed in the common English translation. Though this may appear at first extraordinary, as it is not yet two centuries since that version was made, it is nevertheless unquestionable. The number of changes whereby a living language is affected in particular periods, is not always in proportion to the extent of time. It depends on the stage of advancement, in which the language happens to be during the period, more than on the length of the period. The English tongue, and the French too, if I mistake not, have undergone a much greater change than the Italian, in the last three hundred years; and perhaps as great as the Greek underwent, from the time of Homer to that of Plutarch, which was more than four times as long. It is not merely the number of writings in any language, but it is rather their merit and eminence, which confers stability on its words, phrases and idioms.

Certain it is, that there is a considerable change in our own since the time mentioned; a change in respect of the construction, as well as of the significations of the words. In some cases, we combine the words differently from the way in which they were combined at the time above referred to; we have acquired many words which were not used then, and many then in use are now either obsolete, or used in a different sense. These changes I shall here briefly exemplify. As habit is apt to mislead us, and we are little disposed to suspect that that meaning of a word or phrase, to which we are familiarised, was not always the meaning; to give some examples of such alterations, may prevent us from rashly accusing former translators for improprieties where-with they are not chargeable; and to specify alterations on our own language, may serve to remove the doubts of those who imagine there is an improbability in what I have formerly maintained, concerning the variations which several words in ancient languages have undergone in different periods. Now, this is a point of so great moment to the literary critic and antiquary, that it is impossible thoroughly to understand, or accurately to interpret, ancient authors, without paying due regard to it. Through want of this regard, many things in ecclesiastic history have been much misunderstood, and grossly misrepresented. Unluckily, on this subject, powerful secular motives interfering, have seduced men to contribute to the general deception, and to explain ancient names by usages and opinions comparatively modern. But this by the way; I proceed to the examples.

§ 6. I intend to consider, first, the instances affected by the last of the circumstances above mentioned, namely, those wherein the
 signification

signification is changed, though the term itself remains. O such I shall now produce some examples; first, in nouns: The word *conversation*, which means no more at present than *familiar discourse* of two or more persons, did, at the time the Bible was translated, denote *behaviour* in the largest acceptation. The Latin word *conversatio*, which is that generally used in the Vulgate, answering to the Greek *αναστροφη*, has commonly this meaning. But the English word has never, as far as I have observed, this acceptation in the present use, except in the law phrase, *criminal conversation*. And I have reason to believe that, in the New Testament, it is universally mistaken by the unlearned, as signifying no more than familiar talk or discourse. Hence it has also happened, that hypocrites and fanatics have thought themselves authorized, by the words of Scripture, in placing almost the whole of practical religion in this alone. Yet I do not remember that the word occurs, so much as once, in Scripture in this sense. What we call *conversation* must, indeed, be considered as included, because it is a very important part of behaviour, but it is not to be understood as particularly specified. In one passage, it is expressly distinguished from familiar discourse or conversation, in the modern import of the word. *Τυπος γυναικων των πιστων εν λογω, εν αναστροφη*, rendered in the common version, "Be an example of the believers *in word, in conversation,*" 1 Tim. iv. 12. That these words *λογω* and *αναστροφη*, are not synonymous, the repeating of the preposition sufficiently shews. Though, therefore, not improperly rendered at that time, when the English term was used in a greater latitude of signification, they ought manifestly to be rendered now, *in conversation, in behaviour*; the first answering to *λογος*, the second to *αναστροφη*.

Another instance of such a variation we have in the word *thief*, which, in the language of Scripture, is confounded with *robber*, and probably was so also, in common language at that time, but is now invariably distinguished. They are always carefully distinguished in the original, the former being *κλεπτης*, the latter *ληστης*. The two criminals who were crucified with our Lord, are always called by the two evangelists who specify their crime, *λησαι*, (Mat. xxvii. 38. 44. Mark xv. 27.) never *κλεπται*. Yet our translators have always rendered it *thieves* never *robbers*. This is the more remarkable, as what we now call *theft* was not a capital crime among the Jews. Yet the penitent malefactor confessed upon the cross, that he and his companion suffered *justly*, receiving *the due reward of their deeds*, Luke xxiii. 41. He probably would not have expressed himself in this manner, if their condemnation had not been warranted by the law of Moses. And though, doubtless, the English word, at that time, was used with greater latitude than it is at present; yet, as they had rendered the same original term *ληστης*, when applied to Ba-

rabbas,

rabbas, *robber*, John xviii. 40. they ought to have given the same interpretation of the word, as applied to the two malefactors, who, on the same occasion, were accused of the same crime. In like manner, in the parable of the compassionate Samaritan, the words rendered, *fell among thieves*, Luke x. 30. are, *λησαις περιπεισεν*. Hardly would any person now confound the character there represented, with that of thieves.

Again, the expression, *the uppermost rooms*, Matt. xxiii. 6. does not suggest to men of this age, the idea of the chief places at table, but that of the apartments of the highest story. *The good man of the house*, Matt. xx. 11. though sufficiently intelligible, is become too homely (not to say ludicrous) a phrase for the master of the family. The word *lust*, Rom. vii. 7. is used in the common translation in an extent which it has not now; so also is *usury*, Matt. xxv. 27. Luke xix. 23. *Worship*, Luke xiv. 10. for honour, or civil respect paid to men, does not suit the present idiom. The words *lewd* and *lewdness**, in the New Testament, convey a meaning totally different from that in which they are now constantly used. The word *pitiful*, with us, never means, as it does in Scripture, James v. 11. in conformity to etymology, compassionate, merciful; but always paltry, contemptible. In the following words, also, there is a deviation, though not so considerable, from the ancient import. *Meat*, Matt. iii. 4. and food, are not now synonymous terms, neither are *cunning* (Exod. xxxviii. 23.) and skilful, *honest* (2 Cor. viii. 21.) and decent or becoming, *more* (Acts xix. 32.) and greater, *quick* (Acts x. 42.) and living, *faithless* (John xx. 27.) and incredulous, *coasts* (Matt. ii. 16.) and territories, or borders not confining with the sea.

The like variations have happened in verbs. *To prevent*, 1 Thess. iv. 15. is hardly ever now used in prose for to go before; *to faint*, Matt. xv. 32. Luke xviii. 1. for to grow faint, to fail in strength; *to ensue*, 1 Pet. iii. 11. for to pursue; *to provoke*, Heb. x. 24. for to excite to what is proper and commendable; *to entreat*, Luke xx. 11. for to treat; and *to learn*, for to teach, Psal. xxv. 4. Common Prayer. Even adverbs and particles have shared the general fate. *Yea* and *nay*, Matt. v. 37. though still words in the language, are not the expressions of affirmation and negation as formerly; *instantly*, Luke vii. 4. we never use for earnestly, nor *hitherto*, Job xxxviii. 11. for thus far. Yet this was, no doubt, its original meaning, and is more conformable to etymology than the present meaning; *hither* being an adverb of place and not of time. More instances might be given if necessary.

Now

* See an excellent illustration of the remark, in regard to these two words, in the Disquisitions concerning the Antiquities of the Christian Church, p. 4. note.

Now to employ words which, though still remaining in the language, have not the sanction of present use for the sense assigned to them, cannot fail to render the passages where they occur, almost always obscure, and sometimes ambiguous. But as every thing which may either mislead the reader, or darken the meaning, ought carefully to be avoided by the interpreter, no example, however respectable, will, in such things, authorise our imitation. An alteration here implies nothing to the disadvantage of preceding translators, unless it can be supposed to detract from them, that they did not foresee the changes which in after-times would come upon the language. They employed the words according to the usage which prevailed in their time. The same reason which made them adopt those words then, to wit, regard to perspicuity, by conforming to present use, would, if they were now alive, and revising their own work, induce them to substitute others in their place.

§ 7. Another case in which a translator ought not implicitly to follow his predecessors, is, in the use of words now become obsolete. There is little or no scope for this rule, when the subject is a version into a dead language like the Latin, which, except in the instances of some ecclesiastic terms, such as those above taken notice of, is not liable to be affected by the changes to which a living tongue is continually exposed. The very notion of a dead language refers us to a period which is past, whose usages are now over, and may therefore be considered as unchangeable. But in living languages, wherein use gradually varies, the greatest attention ought to be given to what obtains at present, on which both propriety and perspicuity must depend. Now, with respect to our common version, some words are disused only in a particular signification, others are become obsolete in every meaning. The former ought to be avoided, in such acceptations only as are not now favoured by use. The reason is obvious; because it is only in such cases that they suggest a false meaning. The latter ought to be avoided in every case wherein they do not clearly suggest the meaning. I admit that there are certain cases in which even an obsolete word may clearly suggest the meaning. For, first, the sense of an unusual or unknown word may be so ascertained by the words in connection, as to leave no doubt concerning its meaning; secondly, the frequent occurrence of some words in the common translation, and in the English liturgy, must hinder us from considering them, though not in common use, as unintelligible to persons acquainted with those books. The danger, therefore, from using words now obsolete, but frequently occurring in the English translation, is not near so great as the danger arising from employing words not obsolete, in an obsolete meaning, or a meaning which they formerly

merly had, but have not at present. For these rarely fail to mislead.

Further, a distinction ought to be made in obsolete words, between those which in Scripture occur frequently, and whose meaning is generally known, and those which occur but rarely, and may therefore be more readily misunderstood. The use of old words, when generally understood, has, in such a book as the Bible, some advantages over newer terms, however apposite. A version of holy writ ought, no doubt, above all things, to be simple and perspicuous; but still it ought to appear, as it really is, the exhibition of a work of a remote age and distant country. When, therefore, the terms of a former version are, by reason of their frequent occurrence there, universally understood, though no longer current with us, either in conversation or in writing, I should account them preferable to familiar terms. Their antiquity renders them venerable. It adds even an air of credibility to the narrative, when we consider it as relating to the actions, customs, and opinions of a people very ancient, and in all the respects now mentioned, very different from us. There may, therefore, be an excess in the familiarity of the style, though, whilst we are just to the original, there can be no excess in simplicity and perspicuity. It is for this reason that the interjections *lo* and *behold*, which, though antiquated, are well understood, I have retained sometimes as emphatical; and that the obsolete word *host*, in such phrases as *the host of heaven*, *the Lord of hosts*; and that the terms *tribulation*, *damsel*, *publican*, and a few others, are considered as of more dignity, than *army*, *trouble*, *girl*, *toll-gatherer*; and therefore worthy to be retained. For the like reason the term of salutation *bail*, though now totally disused, except in poetry, has generally, in the sacred writings, a much better effect than any modern form which we could put in its place. To these we may add words which (though not properly obsolete) are hardly ever used, except when the subject, in some way or other, concerns religion. Of this kind are the words *sin*, *godly*, *righteous*, and some others, with their derivatives. Such terms, as they are neither obscure nor ambiguous, are entitled to be preferred to more familiar words. And if the plea for consecrated words extended no further, I should cheerfully subscribe to it. I cannot agree with Dr Heylin, who declares explicitly* against the last mentioned term, though, by his own explanation, it, in many cases, conveys more exactly the sense of the original, than the word *just* which he prefers to it. The practice of translators into other languages, where they are confined by the genius of their language, is of no weight with us. The French have two words, *pouvoir* and *puissance*; The English word *power* answers to both. But, because we must make one term serve

for

* Theol. Lect. vol. i. p. 7.

for both theirs, will they, in complaisance to us, think they are obliged to confine themselves to one? And as to those over-delicate ears, to which, he says, cant and fanaticism have tarnished and debased the words *righteous* and *righteousness*; were this consideration to influence us in the choice of words, we should soon find that this would not be the only sacrifice it would be necessary to make. It is but too much the character of the age to nauseate whatever, in the intercourse of society, has any thing of a religious or moral appearance, a disposition which will never be satisfied, till every thing serious and devout be banished, not from the precincts of conversation only, but from the language.

But to return: when words totally unsupported by present use, occur in Scripture but rarely, they are accompanied with a degree of obscurity which renders them unfit for a book intended for the instruction of all men, the meanest not excepted. Of this class are the words *leasng*, for lies; *ravin*, for prey; *bruit*, for rumour; *marvel*, for wonder; *worth*, for be; *wot* and *wist*, for know and knew; *to bewray*, for to expose; *to eschew*, for to avoid: *to skill*, for to be knowing in, or dexterous at; *to wax*, for to become; *to lease*, for to lose; and, *to lack*, for to need or be wanting. Terms such as some of these, like old vessels, are, I may say, so buried in rust, as to render it difficult to discover their use. When words become not entirely obsolete, but fall into low or ludicrous use, it is then also proper to lay them aside. Thus *folk*, for people; *trow*, for think; *seethe*, for boil; *sod* and *sodden*, for boiled; *score*, for twenty; *twain*, for two; *clean* and *fore*, when used adverbially, for entirely and very much; *all to*, *albeit*, and *howbeit*, may easily be given up. To these we may add the words that differ so little from those which have still a currency, that it would appear like affectation to prefer them to terms equally proper and more obvious. Of this kind is *mo*, for more; *strait* and *straitly*, for strict and strictly; *durctb*, for endureth; *camp*, for encamp; *minish*, for diminish; *an hungred*, for hungry; *garner*, for granary; *trump*, for trumpet; *sib*, for since; *set*, for fetched; *ensample*, for example; *mids*, for midst. I shall only add, that when old words are of low origin, harsh sound, or difficult pronunciation; or when they appear too much like learned words, familiar terms, if equally apposite, are more eligible. For this reason, the nouns *backslidings*, *shamefacedness*, *jeopardy*, and *concupiscence*, may well be dispensed with.

Upon the whole, there is still some danger in retaining words which are become obsolete, though they continue to be intelligible. Words hardly sooner contract the appearance of antiquity, by being abandoned by good use, than they are picked up as lawful prize by writers in burlesque, who, by means of them, often add much poignancy to their writings. This prostitution, when frequent, produces an association in the minds of readers,

the reverse of that which originally accompanied them. Hence it is, that though nothing is better suited to the seriousness and importance of the subject of holy writ, than solemnity of style; nothing is, at the same time, more hazardous, as no species of diction borders on the ludicrous oftener than the solemn. Let it suffice, therefore, if without venturing far from the style of conversation, in quest of a more dignified elocution, we can unite gravity with simplicity and purity, which commonly secure perspicuity. With these qualities there can be no material defect in the expression. The sprightly, the animated, the nervous, would not, in such a work, be beauties, but blemishes. They would look too much like meretricious ornaments, when compared with the artless, the free, yet unassuming manner of the sacred writers.

§ 8. But if it be of consequence to avoid antiquated words, it is not less so to avoid antiquated phrases, and an antiquated construction. No writing in our language, as far as I know, is less chargeable with idiomatical phrases, vulgarisms, or any peculiarities of expression, than the common translation of the Bible; and to this it is, in a great measure imputable, that the diction remains still so perspicuous, and that it is universally accounted superior to that of any other English book of the same period. But though remarkably pure in respect of style, we cannot suppose that no idiomatical phrases should have escaped the translators, especially when we consider the frequency of such phrases in the writings of their contemporaries. Yet, in all the four Gospels, I recollect only two or three which come under that denomination. These are, *the goodman of the house, they laughed him to scorn, and they cast the same in his teeth*; expressions for which the interpreters had not the apology that may be pleaded in defence of some idioms in the Old Testament history, that they are literal translations from the original, (Matt. xx. 11. *εικοδοστου*. Matt. ix. 24. *κατεγίλων αυτη*. xxvii. 44. *Το αυτο ανειδιζον αυτω*). That the English construction has undergone several alterations since the establishment of the Protestant religion in England, it would be easy to evince. Some verbs often then used impersonally, and some reciprocally, are hardly ever so used at present. *It pitieth them*, (Psal. cii. 14. Common Prayer,) would never be said now. *It repented him*, Gen. vi. 6. may possibly be found in modern language, but never *he repented himself*, Matt. xxvii. 3. There is a difference also in the use of the prepositions. *In* (Matt. vi. 10.) was then sometimes used for *upon*, and *unto* instead of *for*, John xv. 7. *Of* was frequently used before the cause or the instrument, where we now invariably use *by*, Matt. i. 18.; *of* was also employed in certain cases where present use requires *off* or *from*, Matt. vii. 16. Like differences might be observed in the pronouns. One thing is certain, that the old usages in construction,

struction, oftener occasioned ambiguity than the present, which is an additional reason for preferring the latter.

§ 9. Finally, in regard to what may be called *technical*, or, in Simon's phrase, *consecrated* terms, our translators, though not entirely free from such, have been comparatively sparing of them. In this they have acted judiciously. A technical style is a learned style. That of the Scriptures, especially of the historical part, is the reverse; it is plain and familiar. If we except a few terms, such as *angel*, *apostle*, *baptism*, *heresy*, *mystery*, which, after the example of other Western churches, the English have adopted from the Vulgate; and for adopting some of which, as has been observed, good reasons might be offered; the instances are but few wherein the common name has been rejected, in preference to a learned and peculiar term.

Nay, some learned terms, which have been admitted into the liturgy, at least into the rubric, the interpreters have not thought proper to introduce into the Scriptures. Thus, the words, *the nativity*, for Christ's birth, *advent*, for his coming, *epiphany*, for his manifestation to the Magians by the star, do very well in the titles of the several divisions in the Book of Common Prayer, being there a sort of proper names for denoting the whole circumstantiated event, or rather the times destined for the celebration of the festivals, and are convenient as they save circumlocution; but would by no means suit the simple and familiar phraseology of the sacred historians, who never affect uncommon and especially learned words. Thus, in the titles of the books of Moses, the Greek names of the Septuagint, *Genesis*, *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, *Deuteronomy*, are not unjustly preserved in modern translations, and are become the proper names of the books. But where the Greek word *genesis*, which signifies generation, occurs in that ancient version of the book so named, it would have been very improper to transfer it into a modern translation, and to say, for example, "This is the *genesis* of the heavens and the earth," Gen. ii. 4. In like manner, *Exodus*, which signifies departure, answers very well as a proper name of the second book, which begins with an account of the departure of the Israelites out of Egypt; but it would be downright pedantry to introduce the term *exodus*, *exody*, or *exod* (for in all these shapes some have affected to usher it into the language), into the body of the history.

I remember but one passage in the New Testament, in which our translators have preferred a scholastic to the vulgar name, where both signified the same thing; so that there was no plea from necessity. The expression alluded to is, "to whom he showed himself alive after his *passion*," Acts i. 3. *Passion*, in ordinary speech, means solely a fit of anger, or any violent commotion of the mind. It is only in theological or learned use that

it means the sufferings of Christ. The Evangelist wrote to the people in their own dialect. Besides, as he wrote for the conviction of infidels, as well as for the instruction of believers, it is not natural to suppose that he would use words or phrases, in a particular acceptation, which could be known only to the latter. His expression, *μετα το παθειν αυτου*, which is literally, *after his suffering*, is plain and unambiguous, and might have been said of any man who had undergone the like fate. Such is constantly the way of the sacred writers; nor is any thing in language more repugnant to their manner, than the use of what is called consecrated words. I admit, at the same time, that *post passionem suam*, in the Vulgate, is unexceptionable, because it suits the common acceptation of the word *passio* in the Latin language. Just so, the expression *accipiens calicem*, in the Vulgate, Mat. xxvi. 27. is natural and proper. *Calix* is a common name for cup, and is so used in several places of that version: whereas, *taking the chalice*, as the Rhemish translators render it, presents us with a technical term not strictly proper, inasmuch as it suggests the previous consecration of the vessel to a special purpose, by certain ceremonies, an idea not suggested by either the Greek *περὶ τοῦ*, or the Latin *calix*. I do not mean, however, to controvert the propriety of adopting an unfamiliar word, when necessary for expressing what is of an unfamiliar or, perhaps, singular nature. Thus, to denote the change produced on our Saviour's body, when on the mount with the three disciples, Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, a more apposite word than *transfigured* could not have been found. The English word *transformed*, which comes nearest, and is more familiar than the other, would have expressed too much.

§ 10. To conclude, the reasons which appear sufficient to justify a change of the words and expressions of even the most respectable predecessors in the business of translating, is when there is ground to think, that the meaning of the author can be either more exactly or more perspicuously rendered; or even when his manner, that is, when the essential qualities of his style, not the sound or the etymology of his words, can be more adequately represented. For, to one or other of these three, all the above cases will be found reducible.

DISSERTATION THE TWELFTH.

AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS ATTEMPTED IN THE TRANSLATION
OF THE GOSPELS, AND IN THE NOTES HERE OFFERED TO
THE PUBLIC.

THE things which will be treated in this Dissertation may, for the sake of order, be classed under the five following heads: the first comprehends all that concerns the essential qualities of the version; the second, what relates to the readings (where there is a diversity of reading in the original) which are here preferred; the third contains a few remarks on the particular dialect of our language employed in this version; the fourth, what regards the outward form in which it is exhibited; and the fifth, some account of the notes with which it is accompanied.

P A R T I.

The essential Qualities of the Version.

THE three principal objects to be attended to, by every translator, were explained in a former Dissertation*. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to say, that to them I have endeavoured to give a constant attention. It is not, however, to be dissembled, that even those principal objects themselves sometimes interfere. And though an order, in respect of importance, when they are compared together, has been also laid down, which will, in many cases, determine the preference, it will not always determine it. I may find a word, for example, which hits the sense of the author precisely, but which, not being in familiar use, is obscure. Though, therefore, in itself a just expression of the sentiment, it may not clearly convey the sentiment to many readers, because
they

† Diss. X. Part I.

they are unacquainted with it. It is, therefore, but ill fitted, to represent the plain and familiar manner of the sacred writers, or, indeed, to answer the great end of translation, to convey distinctly, to the reader, the meaning of the original. Yet there may be a hazard, on the other hand, that a term more perspicuous, but less apposite, may convey somewhat of a different meaning, an error more to be avoided than the other. Recourse to circumlocution is sometimes necessary; for the terms of no two languages can be always made to correspond: but, frequent recourse to this mode of rendering, effaces the native simplicity found in the original, and in some measure disfigures the work. Though, therefore, in general, an obscure is preferable to an unfaithful translation, there is a degree of precision in the correspondence of the terms, which an interpreter ought to dispense with, rather than involve his version in such darkness, as will render it useless to the generality of readers. This shows sufficiently, that no rule will universally answer the translator's purpose; but that he must often carefully balance the degrees of perspicuity on one hand, against those of precision on the other, and determine, from the circumstances of the case, concerning their comparative importance. I acknowledge that, in several instances, the counterpoise may be so equal, that the most judicious interpreters may be divided in opinion; nay, the same interpreter may hesitate long in forming a decision, or even account it a matter of indifference to which side he inclines.

§ 2. I shall only say, in general, that however much a word may be adapted to express the sense, it is a strong objection against the use of it, that it is too fine a word, too learned, or too modern. For, though there should be a suitability, in the import of the term, to the principal idea intended to be conveyed, there is an unsuitableness in the associated or secondary ideas, which never fail to accompany such terms. These tend to fix on the Evangelists the imputation of affecting elegance, depth in literature or science, or at least, a modish and flowery phraseology, than which nothing can be more repugnant to the genuine character of their style, a style eminently natural, simple, and familiar. The sentiment of *Jacques le Fevre* *, which shows, at once, his good taste and knowledge of the subject, is here entirely apposite: "What many think elegance, is, in God's account, inelegance and painted words."

§ 3. On the other hand, a bad effect is also produced by words, which are too low and vulgar. The danger here is not, indeed, so great, provided there be nothing ludicrous in the expression,
which

* An old French translator, who published a version of the Gospels into French in 1523; his words are: "Ce que plusieurs estiment elegance, est inelegance et parole fardee devant Dieu."

which is sometimes the case with terms of this denomination. When things themselves are of a kind which gives few occasions of introducing the mention of them into the conversation of the higher ranks, and still fewer of naming them in books, their names are considered as partaking in the meanness of the use, and of the things signified. But this sort of vulgarity seems not to have been minded by the inspired authors. When there was a just occasion to speak of the thing, they appear never to have been ashamed to employ the name by which it was commonly distinguished. They did not recur, as modern delicacy prompts us to do, to periphrasis, unusual, or figurative expressions, but always adopted such terms as most readily suggested themselves. There is nothing more indelicate, than an unseasonable display of delicacy; for which reason, the naked simplicity wherewith the sacred penmen express themselves on particular subjects, has much more modesty in it than the artificial, but transparent, disguises which, on like occasions, would be employed by modern writers*.

A certain correctness of taste, as well as acuteness of discernment, taught a late ingenious author † to remark this wonderful union of plainness and chastity in the language of the Bible, which a composer of these days, in any European tongue, would in vain attempt to imitate. Yet it is manifest, that it is not to justness of taste, but to purity of mind in the sacred authors, that this happy singularity in their writings ought to be ascribed. This, however, is an evidence that they did not consider it as mean or unbecoming, to call low or common things by their common names. But there are other sorts of vulgarisms in language, with which they are never chargeable, the use of such terms as we call cant words, which belong peculiarly to particu-
lar

* I can scarcely give a better illustration of this remark than in the correction proposed by Dr Delany, of the phrase *him that pisseth against the wall*, which occurs sometimes in the Old Testament, and which, he thinks, should be changed into *him that watereth against the wall*. I am surprised that a correction like this should have the approbation of so excellent a writer as the bishop of Waterford. (See the preface to his Version of the Minor Prophets.) To me the latter expression is much more exceptionable than the former. The former may be compared to the simplicity of a savage who goes naked without appearing to know it, or ever thinking of clothes; the other is like the awkward and unsuccessful attempt of an European, to hide the nakedness of which, by the very attempt, he shews himself to be both conscious and ashamed. The same offensive idea is suggested by the word which Delany proposes, as is conveyed by the common term; but it is suggested in so affected a manner, as necessarily fixes a reader's attention upon it, and shows it to have been particularly thought of by the writer. Can any critic seriously think that more is necessary in this case than to say, *Every male?*

† Rousseau.

lar professions, or classes of men, and contemptuous or ludicrous expressions, such as are always accompanied with ideas of low mirth and ridicule.

§ 4. Of both the extremes in language above mentioned, I shall give examples from an anonymous English translator in 1729, whose version, upon the whole, is the most exceptionable of all I am acquainted with in any language; and yet it is but doing justice to the author to add, that in rendering some passages, he has been more fortunate than much better translators. For brevity's sake I shall here only mention the words I think censurable. Of learned words the following are a specimen: *verbose*, Mat. vi. 7.; *loquaciousness*, Ibid.; *advent*, xxiv. 27; *chiasm*, Luke xvi. 26; *grumes*, xxii. 44.; *steril*, i. 17.; *phenomena*, xii. 56.; *consolated*, Acts xv. 32.; *investigate*, xvii. 22.; *innate*, Eph. iv. 18.: *saliva*, John ix. 6.; concerning which, and some others of the same kind, his critical examiner, Mr Twell, says justly, that they are unintelligible to the ignorant, and offensive to the knowing. His fine words and fashionable phrases, which, on account of their affinity, I shall throw together, the following may serve to exemplify: *detachment*, Mat. ii. 16. *foot-guards*, xxvii. 27.; *parade*, 2 Theff. ii. 9.; *brigue*, 1 Theff v. 13.; *chicanery*, 1 Tim. vi. 4. *Zacharias*, we are told, Luke i. 67. *vented his divine enthusiasm*; that is, when translated into common speech, *prophesied*. A later translator, or rather paraphrast, is not much happier in his expression, *he was seized with a divine afflatus*, here spoken of as a disease. *Zaccheus*, for chief of the publicans, is made *collector-general of the customs*, Luke xix. 2. *Simon Magus*, in his hands, becomes *the plenipotentiary of God*, Acts viii. 10. Jesus Christ is titled *guarantee of the alliance*, Heb. vii. 22. and the Lord of hosts, *the lord of the celestial militia*, James v. 4. And, to avoid the flatness of plain prose, he sometimes gives a poetical turn to the expression. *Before the cock crow*, becomes in his hands, *Before the cock proclaims the day*, Luke xxii. 34.

The foppery of these last expressions is, if possible, more unsufferable than the pedantry of the first. They are, besides, so far from conveying the sense of the author, that they all, less or more, misrepresent it. As to low and ludicrous terms, there is sometimes a greater coincidence in these with quaint and modish words, than one at first would imagine. It would not be easy to assign a motive for rendering *οικονομος* *yeoman*, Mat. xiii. 27. but it is still worse to translate *οσοι την θαλασσαν εργαζονται* *supercargoes*, Rev. xviii. 17., *αρπαζειν* *raparees*, 1 Cor. v. 10, which he explains in the margin to mean *kidnappers*, and *μεθυστων* *sots*, Mat. xxiv. 49. I am surpris'd he has not found a place for *sharpers*, *gamblers*, and *swindlers*, fit company in every sense for his *sots* and *raparees*. *Γλωσσοκομειν* is distended into a *bank*, John xii. 6.

and

and κλεπτης dwindles into a *pilferer*, Ibid : την χειρα τῆ κυριῆ σου is degraded into *thy master's diversions*, Mat. xxv. 21. and αινος is swoln into a *consort of praise*, xxi. 16. The laudable and successful importunity of the two blind men, who, notwithstanding the checks they received from the multitude, persisted in their application to Jesus for relief, is contemptuously denoted *howling out*, Mat. xx 31. When we are told that our Lord *silenced*, ἐφίμωσε, the *sadducees*, this author acquaints us that he *dumbfound*-*ed* them, xxii. 34. In short, what by magnifying, what by diminishing, what by distorting and disfiguring, he has, in many places, burlesqued the original. For answering this bad purpose, the extremes of cant and bombast are equally well adapted. The excess in the instances now given is so manifest, as entirely to supersede both argument and illustration.

§ 5. But in regard to the use of what may be called learned words, it must be owned after all, that it is not easy, in every case, to fix the boundaries. We sometimes find classed under that denomination, all the words of Greek and Latin etymology, which are not current among the inferior orders of the people. Yet I acknowledge, that if we were rigidly to exclude all such terms, we should be too often obliged either to adopt circumlocution, or to express the sentiment weakly and improperly. There are other disadvantages to be remarked afterwards, which might result from the exclusion of every term that may be comprehended in the definition above given. The common translation, if we except the consecrated terms, as some call them, which are not many, is universally admitted to be written in a style that is not only natural, but easily understood by the people: yet, in the common translation, there are many words which can hardly be supposed ever to have been quite familiar among the lower ranks. There is, however, one advantage possessed by that version, over every other book composed at that period, which is, that from the universality of its use, and (we may now add) its long continuance, it must have greatly contributed to give a currency to those words which are frequently employed in it. Now, it would be absurd in an interpreter of this age, to expect a similar effect from any private version. A new translation, even though it were authorised by the public, would not have the same advantage at present, when our language is in a more advanced stage.

§ 6 I should not be surpris'd that a reader not accustomed narrowly to attend to these matters, were dispos'd, at first hearing, to question the fact, that there are many words in the vulgar translation which were not in common use at the time among the lower orders. But I am persuad'd that a little reflection must soon convince him of it; abstracting from those terms which have been transferred from the original languages, because there

were no corresponding names in our tongue, such as *phylactery*, *tetrarch*, *synagogue*, *profelyte*, *centurion*, *quaternion*, *legion*, there are many in the English Bible, which cannot be considered as having been at that time level to the meanest capacities. They are scarcely so yet, notwithstanding all the advantage which their occurring in that translation has given them. Of such words I shall give a pretty large specimen in the margin*. Nor can it be said of those there specified, that more familiar terms could not have been found equally expressive. For though this may be true of some of them, it is not true of them all. *Calling* is equivalent to vocation, *comfort* to consolation, *destruction* to perdition, *forgiveness* to remission, *defilement* to pollution, *almighty* to omnipotent, *enlightened* to illuminated, *watchful* to vigilant, *delightful* to delectable, *unchangeable* to immutable, *heavenly* to celestial, and *earthly* to terrestrial. Nay, the first six in the marginal list might have been not badly supplied by the more homely terms, *writer scholar*, *comparison*, *letter*, *unbeliever*, *womb*. Yet I would not be understood by this remark, as intending to throw any blame upon the translators for the choice they have sometimes made of words, which, though not obscure, were not the most familiar that it was possible to find. There are several reasons to be given immediately, which may justly determine the translator, on some occasions, to desert the common rule of adopting always the most obvious words. At the same time there are certain excesses in this way, whereof I have also given examples, into which a judicious interpreter will never be in danger of falling. The reasons which ought, on the other hand, to determine a translator, not to confine himself to the words which are current in the familiar tattle of the lower ranks in society, are as follows :

§ 7. First, in all compositions not in the form of dialogue, even the

First, of nouns : scribe, disciple, parable, epistle, infidel, matrix, lunatic, exile, exorcist, suppliant, residue, genealogy, appetite, audience, pollution, perdition, partition, potentate, progenitor, liberality, occurrent, immutability, pre-eminence, remission, diversity, fragment, abjects, frontier, tradition, importunity, concupiscence, redemption, intercession, superscription, inquisition, insurrection, communion, instructor, mediator, exactor, intercessor, benefactor, malefactor, prognosticator, ambassador, ambassage, ambushment, meditation, ministratation, administratation, abomination, consummation, convocation, constellation, consolation, consultation, acceptation, communication, disputation, cogitation, estimation, operation, divination, vocation, desolation, tribulation, regeneration, propitiation, justification, sanctification, salutation, interpretation, supplication, exaction, unction. *Second, of adjectives* : barbed, circumspect, conversant, extinct, vigilant, inordinate, delectable, tributary, impotent, magnificent, immutable, innumerable, celestial, incorruptible, terrestrial, omnipotent. *Third, of verbs and participles* : laud, distil, remit, adjure, implead, estimate, ascend, descend, frustrate, disannul, meditate, premeditate, predestinate, comfort, amerce, transferred, transfigured, illuminated, consecrated, translated, incensed, mollified.

he simplest, there is some superiority in the style to the language of conversation among the common people; and even the common people themselves understand many words which, far from having any currency among them, never enter into their ordinary talk. This is particularly the case with those of them who have had any sort of education, were it but the lowest. One ought, therefore, to consider accurately the degree of the uncommonness of the term, before it be rejected; as it may not be easy to supply its place with one more familiar and equally apposite. Unnecessary circumlocutions are cumbersome, and ought always to be avoided. They are unfriendly alike to simplicity and to energy, and sometimes even to propriety and perspicuity.

§ 8. Secondly, there are cases wherein some things may be done, nay, ought to be done, by a translator for the sake of variety. I acknowledge that this is a subordinate consideration, and that variety is never to be purchased at the expence of either perspicuity or simplicity. But even the sacred historians, though eminently simple and perspicuous, do not always confine themselves to the same words in expressing the same thoughts. Not that there appears in their manner any aim at varying the expression; but it is well known that, without such an aim, the same subject, even in conversation, is hardly ever twice spoken of precisely in the same words. To a certain degree, this is a consequence of that quality I have had occasion, oftener than once, to observe in them, a freedom from all solicitude about their language. Whereas an unvarying recourse to the same words for expressing the same thoughts, would, in fact, require one to be solicitous about uniformity, and uncommonly attentive to it. But in the use of the terms of principal consequence, in which the association between the words and the ideas is much stronger, they are pretty uniform in recurring to the same words, though they are not so in matters of little moment. Yet, in these, the variety is no greater than is perfectly natural in men, whose thoughts are engrossed by their subject, and who never search about in quest of words. Now it is only in consequence of some attention to language in a translator, that he is capable of doing justice to this inattention, if I may so denominate it, of his author.

§ 9. Thirdly, it was remarked before *, that though there is a sameness of idiom in the writers of the New Testament, particularly the evangelists, there is a diversity in their styles. Hence it arises, that different terms are sometimes employed by the different historians in relating the same fact. But as this circumstance has not much engaged the attention of interpreters, it often happens that in the translations of the Gospels (for this is not peculiar

* Diss. I. Part II.

peculiar to any one translation), there appears in the version a greater coincidence in the style of the evangelists, than is found in the original. Now there are very good reasons to determine us to avoid, as much as possible, a sameness which is not authorized by the original. There are cases, I own, in which it is unavoidable. It often happens that two or more words, in the language of the author, are synonymous, and may therefore be used indiscriminately for expressing the same thing, when it is impossible to find more than one, in the language of the translator, which can be used with propriety. When our Lord fed the five thousand men in the desert, the order he gave to the people immediately before, was, as expressed by Matthew, ch. xiv. 19. *ανακλιθηναι επι τας χορτας*; as expressed by Mark, ch. vi. 39. *ανακλιναι επι τω χλωρω χορτω*; as expressed by Luke, ch. ix. 14. *κατακλινατε αυτες*; and, as expressed by John, ch. vi. 10. *ποιησατε αναπτεσεν*. Here every one of the evangelists conveys the same order in a different phrase, all of them, however, both naturally and simply. This variety it would be impossible to imitate in English, without recurring to unnatural and affected expressions. The three last evangelists use different verbs to express the posture, namely *ανακλινω*, *κατακλινω*, and *αναπιπτω*. And even in the first, the expression is, I may say, equally varied, as one of the two who use that verb employs the passive voice, the other the active. Now, in the common translation, the phrase *to sit down*, signifying the posture, is the same in them all. I do not here animadvert on the impropriety of this version.* I took occasion formerly*, to observe that those Greek words denote always *to lie*, and not *to sit*. My intention at present is only to shew, that the simplicity of the sacred writers does not entirely exclude variety. Even the three terms above mentioned, are not all that occur in the Gospels for expressing the posture then used at table. *Ανακειμαι*, and *κατακειμαι*, are also employed. It would be in vain to attempt, in modern tongues, which are comparatively scanty, to equal the copiousness of Greek; but, as far as the language which we use will permit, we ought not to overlook even these little variations.

§ 10. The evangelists have been thought, by many, so much to coincide in their narratives, as to give scope for suspecting that some of those who wrote more lately, copied those who wrote before them. Though it must be owned, that there is often a coincidence, both in matter and in expression, it will not be found so great in the original, nor so frequent as, perhaps, in all translations ancient and modern. Many translators have considered it as a matter of no moment, provided the sense be justly rendered, whether the differences in the manner were minded

* Diff. VIII. Part III. § 3, &c.

miinded or not. Nay, in certain cases wherein it would have been easy to attain, in the version, all the variety of the original, some interpreters seem studiously to have avoided it. Perhaps, they did not judge it convenient to make the appearance of a difference between the sacred writers in words, when there was none in meaning. In this, however, I think they judged wrong. An agreement in the sense is all that ought to be desired in them; more especially, as they wrote in a language different from that spoken by the persons whose history they relate. When this is the case, the most tenacious memory will not account for a perfect identity of expression in the witnesses. Their testimony is given in Greek. The language spoken by those whose story they relate, was a dialect of Chaldee. They were themselves, therefore, at least three of them, the translators of the speeches and conversations recorded in their histories. The utmost that is expected from different translators, is a coincidence in sense; a perfect coincidence in words, in a work of such extent as the Gospel, is, without previous concert, impossible. Consequently, an appearance of difference, arising solely from the use of different expressions, is of much less prejudice to the credibility of their narration, than the appearance of concert or copying would have been.

When, therefore, the language of the interpreter of the Gospels will admit an imitation of such diversities in the style, it ought not to be overlooked. If possible, their narratives should be neither more nor less coincident in the version than they are in the original. And to this end, namely, that the phraseology may nearly differ as much in English as it does in Greek, I have, on some occasions, chosen not the very best word which might have been found, satisfying myself with this, that there is nothing in the word I have employed, unsuitable, dark, or ambiguous. But, as was signified before, it is not possible so to diversify the style of a version, as to make it always correspond, in this respect, to the original. Nor ought a correspondence of this kind ever to be attempted, at the expence of either perspicuity or propriety. I shall only add, that a little elevation of style may naturally be expected in quotations from the Prophets, and the Psalms, and in the short Canticles which we have in the two first chapters of Luke; for in these, though not written in verse, the expression is poetical.

§ 11. Fourthly, not only the differences in the styles of the different evangelists ought not to pass entirely unnoticed, but the same thing may be affirmed of the changes sometimes found in the terms used by the same evangelist. Here again I must observe, that it were in vain to attempt an exact correspondence in this respect. There is a superior richness in the language of the sacred writers, which even their style, though simple and unaf-
fected,

fected, (for they never step out of their way in quest of ornament), cannot entirely conceal. They use considerable variety of terms for expressing those ordinary exertions for which our modern tongues hardly admit any variety. I have given one specimen of this, in the words whereby they express the posture then used at meals. I shall here add some other examples. The following words occur in the New Testament, *λεγω, ερω, φημι, φασκω, φραζω, ξρω, ερω, εξω*, all answering to the English verb *say*. Of these we may affirm with truth, that it is but rarely that any of them admits a different rendering in our language. The words *κοιτω, μολυνω, μιαινω, σπιλω, ρυπω*, correspond to the English verb *defile*, by which they are commonly rendered. The greater part of the words subjoined are, in the common translation, rendered always, and the rest occasionally, by the English verb *see*; *ωδω, απειδω, οπταμαι, οπτανω, βλεπω, εμβλεπω, οραω, καθοραω, θεωραμαι, θεωρω, ισορω*. Yet, in none of the lists afore mentioned are the words perfectly synonymous, nor can they be said to be always used promiscuously by the inspired penmen. They are consequently of use, not only for diversifying the style, but for giving it also a degree of precision which poorer languages cannot supply.

The same thing may be exemplified in the nouns, though not perhaps in the same degree as in the verbs. *Αγς, αρνιον, αμνος*, are used by the evangelists, the first by Luke, the other two by John; and are all rendered, in the common translation, *lamb*: *δικτυον, αμφιβληστρον, σαγγηνη* in the Gospels, are all translated *net*. And though the latter might have been varied in the version, the other could not with propriety. Sometimes we are obliged to render different words which occur pretty often, but are not entirely synonymous, by the same English word, for want of distinct terms adapted to each meaning. Thus the words *παιδια* and *τεκνα* are, if I mistake not, uniformly rendered *children*; though the former word particularly respects the age and size, the latter solely the relation. The first answers to the Latin *pueruli*, the second to *liberi*. The English word *children* is well adapted to the former, though sometimes but awkwardly employed to denote the latter. Yet, for want of another term to express the offspring, without limiting it to either sex, we find it necessary to use the English word in this application. The word *ο κλησιον*, used by the evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke, *γειτων* by Luke and John, and *περιαικος* only by Luke, are all rendered *neighbour*. And though they are evidently not of the same³⁰ signification, it would be difficult, in our language, to express the sense of any of them in one word, which would answer so well as this. Yet, that they are not synonymous, every one who understands Greek must be sensible on reflection. For if, instead of *πλησιον*, in the commandment, *Αγαπησεις τον πλησιον σου ως σεαυτον*, *Thou shalt love*

love thy neighbour as thyself, we should substitute either *γείτονα*, or *πείσιονον*, we should totally alter the precept; for these terms would comprehend none but those who live within what is strictly called the neighbourhood. The translation, indeed, into English ought to be the same; and, to say the truth, it would be a more exact version of that precept, than it is of the precept, as we actually find it in the Gospel. For let it be observed, that the word *neighbour*, is one of those which, for want of more apposite terms, we are obliged to admit, in Scripture, in a meaning not perfectly warranted by common use.

I shall add but one other example. The word *φίλος*, used by Matthew, Luke, and John, and *ἑταίρος*, used only by Matthew, are both rendered *friend*, yet in their genuine signification, there is but little affinity between them. The former always implies affection and regard, the latter does not. The latter, not the former, was employed as a civil compellation to strangers and indifferent persons. It is that which is given, in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, Matt. xx. 13. to the envious and dissatisfied labourer; in the parable of the marriage feast, ch. xxii. 12. to the guest who had not the wedding-garment; and it was given by our Lord to the traitor Judas, ch. xxvi. 50. when he came to deliver him up to his enemies. I do not say that *ἑταίρις* is not rightly translated *friend* in these instances; for common use permits us to employ the word in this latitude. But it is to be regretted, that we have not a word better adapted to such cases, but are obliged to prostitute a name so respectable as that of *friend*. Besides, it is manifest that, for this prostitution, we cannot plead the example of the evangelists. I make this remark the more willingly, as I have heard some unlearned readers express their surprize that our Lord should have paid so much deference to the insincere modes of civility established by the corrupt customs of the world, as to denominate a man *friend*, whom he knew to harbour the basest and the most hostile intentions. But defects of this kind are not peculiar to our language. They are, on the contrary, to be found in every tongue. All the Latin translations render the word, in the passages above mentioned, *amicus*; and all the versions into modern tongues, with which I am acquainted, except one, act in the same manner. The exception meant is the Geneva French, which says not *mon ami*, as others, but *compagnon*, in all the three places mentioned. This is more literal, for *ἑταίρις* is, strictly, *socius*, or *sodalis*, not *amicus*. But it may be questioned whether such a compellation suits the idiom of that tongue, as it appears to have been adopted by no other French interpreter.

§ 12. I shall now give, from the first list of verbs above mentioned, an instance or two of the uniformity commonly observed in the use of this variety, a uniformity which sufficiently evinces, that

that the terms were not conceived by the writers to be perfectly synonymous. Our Lord says, in his sermon on the mount, Matt. v. 21, 22. *Ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἔΡΡΕΘΗ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις· Οὐ φονεύεις—Ἐγὼ δὲ ΔΕΓΩ ὑμῖν, ὅτι—ὅς ἂν ΕἶΠῃ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ, Ρακά :*—In the common translation, *Ye have heard that it was SAID by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill—But I SAY unto you, that—whosoever shall SAY to his brother, Raca—*In the English, the verb *say* occurs thrice in this short passage; in the Greek, there are three different verbs employed. Yet so little does there appear in the author a disposition to change, for the sake of changing, that wherever the case is perfectly similar to that wherein any of the three verbs above mentioned is used in this quotation, the word will be found to be the same throughout the whole discourse. Thus, through the whole of this discourse, what our Lord authoritatively gives in charge as from himself, is signified by the same phrase, *ἐγὼ λέγω ὑμῖν*; whatever is mentioned as standing on the foot of oral tradition, is expressed by *εἰρηθῆ*, part of the verb *εἶπω*; and what is mentioned as neither precept nor maxim of any kind, but as what may pass incidentally in conversation, is denoted by the verb *εἶπω*. Another example of the different application of such words, we have in our Lord's conversation with the chief priests and elders, in relation to the authority by which he acted, Matt. xxi. 25. 27. *Ὅτι δὲ διελογίζοντο παρ' αὐτοῖς, ΛΕΓΟΝΤΕΣ, Ἐὰν ΕἶΠΩΜΕΝ, ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ΕΠΕΙ ἡμῖν· Διὰ τί οὐ οὐκ ἐπιστεύσατε αὐτῷ ;* A little after, *ΕΦῆ αὐτοῖς καὶ αὐτός.* In the common translation, *And they reasoned with themselves, SAYING, If we shall SAY from heaven, he will SAY unto us, Why did ye not then believe him? Afterwards, And he SAID unto them.* Here the same repetition in the version is contrasted with a still greater variety in the original; for we have no fewer than four different words in the Greek, rendered into our language, by repeating the same English verb four times. The sense of *εἶπω* is the same in both passages; the word *λέγω* is used here more indefinitely than in the former; the verb *εἶρω* approaches in meaning to the word *retort*, and seems to preclude reply.

On comparing, we must perceive, that there is not only an awkwardness in the repetitions which modern languages sometimes render necessary, but even a feebleness in the enunciation of the sentiment. This consideration, when attended to, will be found to warrant our taking the greater liberty in diversifying the expression wherever our language permits it. For if we are often obliged to repeat the same, where the original employs different words, and if we also retain the same words, where the original retains the same, though our own tongue would allow a change, the style of the version must be a bad representation of that of the original. It will have all the defects of both languages, and none of the riches of either. I have, therefore, taken

ken the liberty to vary the expression a little, where the genius of our tongue, in a consistency with simplicity, propriety, and perspicuity, permitted it; as it was only thus I could compensate for the restraints I was obliged to submit to, in cases wherein the sacred penmen had taken a freer range.

§ 13. Concerning the diversity of styles in the different evangelists, which I cannot help considering as entitled to more attention than translators seem to have given it, I shall beg leave to make a few more observations. Of the words which I have mentioned as nearly synonymous, or at least as rendered by most interpreters in the same manner, some, though common in some of the Gospels, do not occur in others; yet, in no version that I know, is this always to be discovered. The verb *ερω*, *I say*, is used by Matthew often, by Mark once, but never by either Luke or John. The synonyme *ειρω* is used by all except John, and *ερω* by all except Mark. *Ανακλινω*, *I lay down*, occurs in all the Gospels except John's; *κατακειμαι*, *I lie down*, in all except Matthew's. Every one of the evangelists has also many words to be found in none of the rest; and that not only when peculiar things are mentioned by him, but when the same things the same actions, the same circumstances, which are taken notice of by other evangelists are related. These it is sometimes impossible to translate justly in different words. Luke sometimes, in addressing God, uses the word *δοποτης*, which is not in any of the other evangelists, and can hardly be rendered otherwise than *Lord*, the term whereby *κυριος*, which occurs in them all, is commonly translated. Luke is also peculiar in giving Jesus Christ the title *επιστατης*, which cannot well be rendered otherwise than *master*, the common rendering of *διδασκαλος*, though, as Grotius observes, the words are not perfectly equivalent. Matthew has, in one passage, applied to our Lord a title not used by any other, *καθηγητης*, which our translators have also rendered *master*, and have thereby impaired the sense. In like manner, the multiplicity of inflections in the tenses, moods, and voices of their verbs, supplies them with a variety of expressions which serves to diversify their style in a manner not to be imitated in modern tongues, and less perhaps in English, which has very few inflections, than in any other. Add to the aforesaid advantages, in respect of variety, which the writers of the New Testament derived from their language, the derivatives and compounds with which that copious tongue so remarkably abounds.

Now, I do not know any stronger indications of a native difference of style than those above mentioned, and in part exemplified. And, as this difference conveys some evidence of the authenticity of the writings, it ought not to be always disregarded by translators, merely because it is not possible always to preserve it in their versions. It is then in effect preserved, when

they give such a turn to the expression, as renders the difference of phraseology nearly equal upon the whole. This, however, ought never to be attempted, when either the sense may be ever so little altered by it, or the simplicity and perspicuity of the sentence may be injured. What has been now observed will account for my employing words sometimes, which, though not unusual or obscure, are not the most obvious, and for giving such a turn to the expression, as renders it less literal than it might otherwise have been.

§ 14. I have avoided, as much as possible, the use of circumlocution: yet there are certain cases where we cannot avoid it entirely, and do justice to our author. I do not mean barely, when there is not a single word in the language of the translation which conveys the sense of the original term; but when there is something, either in the application or in the argument, that cannot be fully exhibited without the aid of some additional terms. It has been often observed that, in no two languages, do the words so perfectly correspond, that the same terms in one will always express the sense of the same terms in the other. There is a difference of extent in meaning which hinders them from suiting exactly, even when they coincide in the general import. The epithet *αχρηστος*, as applied in the Gospel of Luke, ch. xvii. 10. is so far from suiting the sense of the English word *unprofitable*, by which it is rendered in the common translation, that if we were to give a definition of an unprofitable servant, we should hardly think of another than the reverse of the character given in that passage, but should say, ‘he is one who does not that to his master which is his duty to do.’ From the context, however, no person can be at a loss to see, that the import of the word is, “We have conferred no favour, we have only fulfilled the terms which we were bound to perform.” I know that because the sentiment is not expressed with the brevity of the original, many would call this a comment, or rather a paraphrase, and not a version. It is expressed, I acknowledge, by a periphrasis; but periphrasis and paraphrase are not synonymous terms. The former is in every translation sometimes necessary, in order to transmit the genuine thought and reasoning of the author: it is only when more than this is attempted, and when other sentiments are introduced or suggested, for the sake of illustrating an author’s thoughts, or enforcing his arguments, that men employ paraphrase. It is not denied, that periphrasis in translating, ought to be avoided, if possible; but it is not always possible to avoid it, and periphrasis is preferable to single words, which either convey no meaning, or convey a meaning different from the author’s.

The word *βαπτισμα*, in the question put by our Lord, Το βαπ-

τισμα

τισμα Ιωαννης ποδιν ην *; does not answer the word *baptism*, as used by us; nor does αναστασις, in the account given of the Sadducees †, correspond entirely to the English word *resurrection*: the word επαγγελια is, for the most part, rendered *promise*, and means neither more nor less. In a few cases, however, it does not signify the promise itself, but the thing promised. Now the English word is never so applied. Hence the obscurity, not to say impropriety, of that expression, *I send the promise of my Father upon you* ‡, which, if it can be said to suggest any thing to an English reader, suggests awkwardly, *I give you a promise on the part of my Father*. Yet this is not the sense. What is here meant is the fulfilment of a promise formerly given them by his Father, and is therefore properly rendered, *I send you that which my Father hath promised*. Through not attending to this difference, our translators have thrown great darkness on some passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews. *These all* (says the writer, speaking of Abraham, Sarah, and others) *died in the faith, not having received the promises, μη λαβοντες τας επαγγελιας*, Heb. xi. 13. Yet this way interpreted, the assertion is contradictory, not only to the patriarchal history, but to what is said expressly of Abraham in the same chapter, Heb. xi. 14. The words, therefore, ought to have been rendered, *not having received the promised inheritance*; for it is the land of Canaan promised to Abraham and his posterity, to which the writer particularly refers, giving as an evidence that they had not received it, their acknowledging themselves to be *strangers and sojourners in the land*; not *on the earth*, as it is, particularly in this place, very improperly translated.

§ 15. Again, suppose, which is not uncommon, that the original word has two different, but related senses, and that the author had an allusion to both. Suppose also that in the language of the interpreter there is a term adapted to each of those senses, but not any one word that will suit both. In such cases perspicuity requires somewhat of periphrasis. If we abruptly change the word in the same sentence, or in the same argument, there will appear an incoherence in the version, where there appears a close connection in the original; and if we retain the same term, there will be both obscurity and impropriety in the version. I shall explain my meaning by examples, the only way of making such criticisms understood.

In one place in Matthew, ch. xv. 4, 5. the verb τιμαω is employed, as usual, to express the duty which children owe to their parents. *To honour* is that commonly used in English. Yet this word is not equivalent in import to the Greek verb, much less

* Mat. xxi. 25. † Mat. xxii 23. ‡ Luke xxiv. 49. See all these passages in this translation, and the notes upon them.

less to the Hebrew **עָבָד** *chabad*, translated *τιμω* by the Seventy in the place quoted by the Evangelist. This is one of the causes of the obscurity and apparent inconsequence of that passage in the Gospel. I have, therefore, rendered the word, where it occurs the second time in the argument used by our Lord, *honour by his assistance*; for the original implies no less.

The Apostle Paul, writing to the Romans (for it is not necessary here to confine myself to the Gospels), says, Rom. x. 16, 17. as it is expressed in the common version, *But they have not all obeyed the Gospel; for Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report? So then, saith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.* What the Apostle introduces here with *So then*, as a direct conclusion from the words of the Prophet, cannot fail to appear remote to an English reader, and to require some intermediate ideas to make out the connection. The incoherency disappears entirely, when we recur to the original, where the words are: *Αλλ' ὃ πάντες ὑπήκουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ. Ἰσαίας γὰρ λέγει, Κύριε, τίς πιστεύσει τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; Ἀρα ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς ἢ δι' ἀκοῆν δια ρηματος Θεοῦ.* Nothing can be more clearly consequential, than the argument as expressed here. Isaiiah had said, complaining of the people, *Τίς πιστεύσει τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν*; from which the Apostle infers, that it commonly holds *ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΕΞ ΑΚΟΗΣ*, otherwise there had been no scope for complaint. But, by the change of the term in English, from *report* to *hearing*, however nearly the ideas are related, the expression is remarkably obscured. It must be owned, that we have no word, in English, of equal extent, in signification, with the Greek *ακοη*, which denotes both the *report*, or the thing heard, and the sensation of hearing; though, in regard to the sense of seeing, the English word *sight* is of equal latitude; for it denotes both the thing seen, and the perception received by the eye*. But, when such a difference as this happens, between the import of their words and ours, one does more justice to the original, and interprets more strictly, by giving the sentence such a turn as will preserve the verbal allusion, than by such a change of the terms as our translators have adopted, to the no small injury of perspicuity. The passage may, therefore, properly be rendered thus: *For Isaiiah saith, "Lord, who believeth what he beareth us preach?" So then, belief cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God preached.* Nor is the addition of the participle *preached*, to be considered as a supply, from conjecture, of what is not expressed in the original; for, in fact, the word *ακοη* here implies it. Diodati has not badly translated it *preaching*. *Signore, chi a creduto alla nostra predicatione? La fede adunque e dalla predicatione.* This is better than the English

* See an excellent illustration of this in Dr Beattie's Essay on Truth, Part II. Ch. II. Sect. I.

glish version, as it preserves clearly the connection of the two verses. It is, nevertheless, of importance, not to suppress the other signification of *ακον*, to wit, *bearing*, as, by means of it, the connection is rendered clearer, both with the preceding words, *How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?* Rom. x. 14. and with the following, *But, I say, Have they not heard?* ver. 18. I shall only add, that where the coincidence in the sense is very clear, the grammatical relation between the words is of less importance. There is, in this passage, a verbal connection, not only between the words *ακωω* and *ακον*, but also between *πισυω* and *πισις*. But the English word *faith*, being fully equivalent to the Greek word *πισις*, and its connection with believing being evident, it is not of great moment to preserve in English the affinity in sound. As such resemblances, however, always in some degree assist attention, and add a sort of evidence, it is rather better to retain them, where it can be done without hurting the sense. For this reason, I prefer the word *belief*, here, to the word *faith*.

I shall give but one other example, which, though not requiring the aid of circumlocution, is of a nature somewhat similar to the former. A verb, or an epithet, in the original, is sometimes construed with a noun, used figuratively, and is also construed, because use permits the application, with that which is represented by the figure; whereas, in the translator's language, the term, by which the verb or epithet is commonly rendered, is not equally susceptible of both applications. In such cases, it is better, when the thing is practicable, to change the word for one which, though less common, suits both. The following passage will illustrate my meaning. 1 Pet. ii. 6, 7. : Περιεχει εν τη γραφη "Ιδω τιθη-
 "μι εν Σιον λιθον ακρογωνιαιον, εκλεκτον, εντιμον' και ο πισυων επ' αυτω, ε μ'η
 "καταισχυνηθι." Υμιν εν η τιμη ταις πισυωσιν' απιδουσι δε, λιθον ον απιδου-
 "μισαν οι οικοδομουντες, υτος ηγνηθη εις κεφαλην γωνιας : which our transla-
 tors render thus : *It is contained in the Scripture, "Behold, I*
lay in Sion a chief corner stone, elect, precious : and he that be-
lieveth on him shall not be confounded." *Unto you, therefore,*
which believe, he is precious : but unto them which be disobedient,
the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head
of the corner. Here the type and the antitype are so blended, as
 to hurt, alike, both perspicuity and propriety. To speak of *be-*
lieving in a stone, an elect stone, and to apply the pronoun *him* to
 a stone, sound very oddly in our language; but *πισυω επι*, in the
 Hellenistic idiom, and *εκλεκτος*, admit an application either to per-
 sons or to things. The Apostle said, *επ' αυτω*, because *λιθος* is of
 the masculine gender : for the like reason he would have said,
επ' αυτη, had he used *πετρα* instead of *λιθος*. Would our translators
 in that case, have rendered it, *He who believeth on her?* Now,
 the English verb *to confide*, and the participle *selected*, are suscep-
 tible

tible of both applications. Let the passage, then, be rendered thus: *It is said in Scripture, "Behold, I lay in Sion a chief corner-stone, selected and precious: whosoever confideth in it shall not be ashamed."* There is honour, therefore, to you who confide; but to the mistrustful, the stone which the builders rejected, is made the head of the corner. I may remark, in passing, that ἡ τιμη is here evidently opposed to ἡ αἰσχυνη, the import of which is included in the verb καταισχυνθη; instead of *shame* ye shall have *honour*; but by no rule, that I know, can it be translated, *he is precious*. Ἀπειθεσι, though often justly rendered *disobedient*, rather signifies here, *mistrustful, incredulous*, being contrasted to πιστευσι. All the above examples are calculated to show, that it is as impossible for a translator, if he preserve that uniformity in translating so much insisted on by some, to convey perspicuously, or even intelligibly, the meaning of the author, and to give a just representation of his manner, as it is to retain any regard to purity in the language which he writes: and that, therefore, this absurd κακοζηλια subverts, alike, all the principal ends which he ought to have in view.

§ 16. It was admitted, that it is necessary to employ more words than one in the version, when the original term requires more for conveying the sense into the language of the translator. Nobody doubts the propriety of rendering προσωποληπτις, *respecter of persons*, φιλαργυρια, *love of money*, or αποσυναγωγος, *expelled the synagogue*; and it is hardly possible to give the meaning in another language without the aid of some such periphrasis. Yet even this rule, however general it may appear, does not hold invariably. There are cases wherein it is better to leave part of the meaning unexpressed, than, by employing circumlocution, not only to desert simplicity, but to suggest something foreign to the intention of the author. That this will sometimes be the consequence of an over-scrupulous solicitude to comprehend every thing that may be implied in the original term, will be evident on reflection. Zaccheus, the publican, said to our Lord, Luke xix. 8. Εἰ τινος τι εσυκοφάνησα, ἀποδίδωμι τετραπλᾶν, which our translators have rendered, *If I have taken any thing from any man by false accusation, I restore him fourfold*. In this they have followed Beza, and Leo Juda, who say, *Si quid cuiquam per calumniam eripui, reddo quadruplum*. Admitting the justness of the note subjoined by the latter, in regard to the artifices of the publicans, I approve much more the version of the word in the Vulgate and Erasmus, *Si quid aliquem defraudavi*, or in Castalio, to the same purpose, *Si quem ulla re fraudavi*, "If in aught I have wronged any man;" than those anxious attempts, by tracing little circumstances, to reach the full import of the original. My objection to such attempts, is not so much because they render the expression unnecessarily complex, but because something foreign

reign to the intention of the author, rarely fails to be suggested by them. However paradoxical it may at first appear, it is certainly true, that to express a thing in one word, and to express it in several, makes sometimes a difference, not only in the style, but in the meaning. I need not go further for an example than the words on which I am remarking. For a man, in the station of Zaccheus, who was probably not liable to the charge of being injurious in any other way than that to which his business exposed him, nothing could be more natural, or more apposite, than the expression which the Evangelist represents him as having used, *εἰ τιος τι σονκοραβησα*. On the contrary, it would not have been natural in him to say, *εἰ τι εκλεψα*, or *εἰ τι σουλησα*, because his manner of life, and his circumstances, set him above the suspicion of the crimes of theft and robbery. Such things, therefore, are not supposed to enter the person's mind. But when we substitute a circumlocution, that is, a definition, for the name of the crime, other kindred crimes are necessarily conceived to be in view; because it is always by the aid of the genus, and the difference, somehow signified, that the species is defined. Now, in a case like the present, wherein the purpose of restitution is explicitly declared, to introduce mention of the genus, with the limitation denoted by the specific difference, is an implicit declaration, that the promise of reparation shall not be understood to extend to any other species of injuries. Had our language been that spoken in Judea, and had this humble publican, when he made his penitent declaration to his Lord, said in English, *I will restore fourfold, if in aught I have wronged any man*; can we imagine, that he would have clogged his pious purpose, with the reserve which the additional words, *by false accusation*, manifestly imply? Who sees not that, in this manner introduced, they are such a restriction of the promise, as is equivalent to the retracting of it in part, and saying, 'Let it be observed, that as to any other sort of wrong I may have committed, I promise nothing?' But when the thing is expressed in one word, as in the Greek, no such effect is produced. Much, therefore, of the meaning, depends on the form of the expression, as well as on the import of the words.

§ 17. But this is not the only bad consequence which results from the excessive solicitude of interpreters, to comprehend in their translation, by the aid of periphrasis, every thing supposed to be included in the original term. A single word is sometimes used, with energy and perspicuity, as a trope. But if we substitute a definition for the single word, we destroy the trope, and often render the sentence nonsensical. To say, *The meek shall inherit the earth*, Mat. v. 6. is to employ the word *inherit* in a figurative sense, which can hardly be misunderstood by any body as denoting the facility with which they shall obtain possession, and the stability of the possession obtained. But, if

we employ circumlocution, and say, in the manner of some interpreters, *The meek shall succeed to the earth by hereditary right*; by so explicit, and so formal a limitation of the manner, we exclude the trope, and affirm what is palpably inapplicable, and therefore ridiculous; for, *to obtain by hereditary right*, is to succeed, in right of consanguinity, to the former possessor, now deceased. In such cases, if the translator's language cannot convey the trope, in one word, with sufficient clearness, a plain and proper term is much preferable to such attempts at expressing, in several words, a figure, whose whole effect results from its simplicity and conciseness.

§ 18. It is proper also to observe, that the idiom of one language will admit, in a consistency with elegance and energy, redundancies in expression, which have a very different effect, translated into another language. A few examples of this occur in the New Testament. Ὑποπόδιον των ποδων αυτου, Mat. v. 35. is adequately rendered, in the common translation, *his footstool*, but is literally *footstool of his feet*. It is the version given by the Seventy of the Hebrew phrase רַגְלָיו הָרֵם, in which there is no pleonasm. Our translators have imitated them in rendering ποιμη των προβατων *shepherd of the sheep*, John x. 2.; for here the redundancy is only in the version. The words αυτη and αυθραπος, are often by Greek authors, especially the Attic, construed with other substantives which, by a peculiar idiom, are used adjectively*. Matthew joins αυθραπος with εμπορος, Mat. xiii. 45.; with εικοδισποτης, Mat. xiii. 52.; with βασιλευς, Mat. xviii. 23.; and John prefixes it to αμαρτωλος, John ix. 16. Luke, in similar cases, employs αυτη, joining it to αμαρτωλος, Luke v. 8. xix. 7.; προφητης, Luke xxiv. 19.; φονευς, Acts iii. 14. In some instances our translators have very properly dropt the redundant term; in others, for I know not what reason, they have retained it. Thus dropping it, they say *a prophet, a murderer, and a certain king*. On another occasion, in order to include both words, they say *a merchant-man*. But use, whose decisions are very arbitrary, has long appropriated this name to *a trading ship*. They say also *a man that is an householder, a man that is a sinner*, Luke xix. 7. John ix. 16. and in one place, not badly, *a sinful man*, Luke v. 8. In these, however, we must acknowledge, there is no deviation from the meaning. Such superfluous words as some of those now mentioned, enfeeble the expression, but without altering or darkening the sense.

But there is one case wherein this use of the noun αυτη, has, in the common version, occasioned a small deviation from the meaning.

* This idiom is not peculiarly Greek. In Genesis, xiii. 8. *We are brethren*, is, in Hebrew, אָנָּחִים אָנָּחִים, in the Septuagint, αιδροποι αδελφοι ημεις εσμεν, *We are men brethren*. Other examples might be produced.

ing. The words *ανδρες αδελφοι* frequently occur in the Acts, and are always rendered, by our translators, *Men and brethren*, as if the phrase were *ανδρες και αδελφοι*, thereby making two distinct appellations. This I once thought peculiar to English translators, but have since found that the same method is in one place adopted by Luther. in his German translation, who says, *Ihr manner und bruder*, Acts i. 16. Some foreign versions have scrupulously preserved the pleonastic form; one says *hommes freres*, another *buomini fratelli*; which are equally awkward in French and Italian, as *men brethren* would be in English; but into none of the versions in these languages which I have seen is the conjunction inserted. Our interpreters must have proceeded on the supposition, that the Apostles, by such compilations, divided their hearers into two classes, one of whom they barely denominated *men*, the other they more affectionately saluted *brethren*. But that there is no foundation for this conceit is manifest; first, in that case by the syntatic order, the copulative *και* must have been inserted between the titles. Yet, though *ανδρες αδελφοι* occurs in the Acts no fewer than thirteen times, no example of *ανδρες και αδελφοι* is to be found. Secondly, it is, as was signified above, entirely in the Greek idiom. *Ανδρες στρατιωται soldiers*, *ανδρες δικασται judges*, in like manner as *ανδρες Αθηναιοι Athenians*, are warranted by the example of Demosthenes, and the best writers in Greece. Thirdly, there is the same reason to introduce the copulative in the other examples above quoted, and to render *ανθρωπος εμπορος a man and a merchant*, *ανησ αμαρτολος a man and a sinner*, and so of the rest, as *ανδρες αδελφοι men and brethren*. It may be thought that in the address *Ανδρες αδελφοι και πατριες*, as no conjunction is needed in the version but what is expressed in the original, the word *men* ought to be preserved. But the use above examined sufficiently shows that, in all such cases, the word *ανδρες* is to be considered, not as a separate title, but as an idiomatic supplement to *αδελφοι και πατριες*, the only titles given, and that, therefore, in translations into modern tongues, it ought to be dropped as an expletive which does not suit their idiom. The above criticism will also serve as one of the many evidences, that what is vulgarly called the most literal translation, is not always the most close.

§ 19. It may be proper also to observe, that the import of diminutives is not always to be determined by the general rules laid down by grammarians. *Βιβλιον* is only in form a diminutive of *βιβλος*, *οικια* of *οικος*, *δαίμονιον* of *δαίμων*; the same may be said of *επιφιον* as used in the Gospel. It cannot be understood as expressing littleness; for what is called *επιφια* in the only place where the word occurs, Mat. xxv. 33. is *επιφοι* in the verse immediately preceding. The like may be said of *ουαριον* and *ονος*. And the application in that passage shows sufficiently, that it is not an

expression of affection or tenderness. Πανακιδιον in Luke, ch. i. 63, denotes a thing differing rather in kind and use, than in dimensions from παναξ, as used by the same Evangelist, Luke xi. 39. Some diminutives are intended to mark a distinction only in age or in size, as θυγατριον, βιβλαριδιον, οψαριον, ιχθυδιον, κλιτιδιον, πλοιαριον, παιδιον, παιδαριον; and may be rendered into English by the aid of the epithet *little*, as *little daughter*, *little book*, *little fish*, or by a single word adapted to the meaning in the passage where it occurs, as *couch*, *boat*, *child*, *boy*, *infant*. Τικτιον appears, on the contrary, more expressive of affection than of size; τικτια is therefore better rendered *dear children* than *little children*, which, when addressed to grown persons, sounds very oddly. Sometimes the diminutive expresses contempt. In this way the word γυναικισσα is used by Paul, 2 Tim. iii. 6. and is not badly translated *silly women*. But in many cases it must be acknowledged that the difference which a diminutive makes, though real, is of too delicate a nature to be transfused into a version. For when a translator, because the language which he writes, does not afford a term exactly equivalent, makes a stretch for a word; that word often farther exceeds the import of the original, than the common term would have fallen below it. For example, in the check which our Lord at first gave to the application of the Syrophenician woman, I consider the diminutive κυναριον as more emphatical in that place than κυνις: yet I think it is incomparably better rendered in the common version *dogs*, than in that of the anonymous translator *puppies*.

Nay, in the few cases (for they are but few) in which our language has provided us in diminutives, it is not always proper to render the Greek diminutive by the English. Αρνιον, for example, is in Greek the diminutive of αρς, so is *lambkin* of *lamb* in English, which is the only proper version of αρς. To translate αρνιον *lambkin*, must therefore be entirely agreeable to the laws of literal interpretation. Yet who, that understands English, would hesitate to affirm that a translator who should so render the word, wherever it occurs in the New Testament, would betray a great defect both of taste and of judgment? This is one of the many evidences we have, that without knowing somewhat of the sentiments and manners of a people, with which the genius of their language is intimately connected, we may, in translating their works, exhibit an uncouth representation of the dead letter, but are not qualified for transfusing the sense and spirit of their writings into the version. The Greek abounds in diminutives of every kind, though used but sparingly in the Gospels; nay, even in the diminutives of diminutives. They are admitted into all kinds of composition, both prosaic and poetical, the most solemn as well as the most ludicrous. It is quite otherwise with us. We have but few of that denomination, and those few are hard-

ly ever admitted into grave discussions. They are, in a manner, confined to pastoral poetry, and romance, or at best, to performances whose end is amusement rather than instruction. It is only in these that such words as *lordling*, *baby*, *manikin*, could be tolerated. *Αγριος*, in Greek, is a word of sufficient dignity, which *lambkin* in English is not. This term shows rather a playful than a serious disposition in the person who uses it. I have been the more particular here in order to show, that if we would translate with propriety, more knowledge is requisite, than can be furnished by lexicons and grammars. So much for what, in translating, concerns the justness of expression necessary for promoting the author's intention, and conveying his sentiments.

§ 20. Next to the justness, the perspicuity of what is said, will be universally admitted to be, of all the qualities of style, the most essential. Some indeed seem to think that this is peculiarly the author's province, and no farther the translator's, than he has the warrant of his original. Such was the opinion of Le Clerc, a man of considerable name in literature. "Quamvis
 "Latina lingua," says he *, "perspicuitate multo magis quam
 "Hebraica gaudeat, imo vero obscuritatem, quantum potest, vitare soleat; ubi Hebraica obscura sunt, translationem nostram
 "obscuriorem esse non diffitemur. Sed ut ea demum effigies
 "laudatur, non quæ vultum formosum spectandum, sed qualis
 "est revera, spectantium oculis offert; sic translatio, ubi archetypus sermo clarus est, clara; ubi obscurus obscura esse debet." This judgment he qualifies with the following words: "Obscure
 "autem hic vocamus, non quæ Hebraicæ linguæ nesciis obscura sunt, sic enim pleræque loquutiones scripturæ obscuræ
 "essent, sed quæ a linguæ non imperitis hodie non satis intelliguntur. Contra vero clara esse dicimus, non ea tantum quæ
 "omnibus, etiam imperitis aperta sunt, sed quæ linguæ peritioribus nullum negotium faceffunt." But even with this qualification the sentiment does not appear defensible. It makes the standard of perspicuity what it is impossible for any person exactly to know, namely, the degree of knowledge in the original attained (not by the translator, but) by the learned in general in the Oriental languages at the time. "Obscure vocamus quæ a
 "linguæ non imperitis hodie, non satis intelliguntur." In consequence of which the Scriptures ought to be translated more perspicuously at one time than at another, because the original is better understood at one time than at another. That in fact they will be so, when in the hands of a translator of superior capacity and knowledge cannot be questioned. But by this critic's rule, if I understand him right, the interpreter ought not to avail himself of greater abilities, if he have greater abilities; but, however

* Proleg. in Pent. Diss. II. § 4.

ver clear the sentiments are to him, he ought to render them obscurely, if the original appear obscure to the critics of the age. In this case, it would be of little consequence, whether the translator were profoundly skilled in the languages or not. The only thing of importance would be, that he were well versed in the interpretations and comments of others. This is so absurd, that I cannot allow myself to think that it was the fixed opinion of that critic, or the rule by which he conducted himself in translating; yet it is hardly possible to put another construction upon his words.

§ 21. Houbigant, without minding the qualification above quoted, severely censures the general position, that the obscurities of an author ought to be rendered obscurely. "Obscurus," says he*, "est non semel Horatius; num igitur laudanda ea erit Horatii Gallica interpretatio, quæ Horatium faciet Gallico sermone, ubi clarus est, clare, ubi obscurus, obscure loquentem?" I must, however, say so much for Le Clerc, as to acknowledge, that the cases compared by Houbigant are not parallel. Greater freedom may reasonably be used with profane authors than with the sacred. If the general tenor and connection be preserved in the thoughts of a Greek or Latin poet, and if the diction be harmonious and elegant, a few mistakes about the import of words, by which the scope of the whole is little affected, will be thought, even by the most fastidious critics, a more pardonable fault than such obscurity as interrupts a reader, and makes it difficult for him to divine the sense. But it is otherwise with a book of so great authority as the Scriptures. It is better that in them the reader should sometimes be at a loss about the sentiment, than that he should have a false sentiment imposed upon him for a dictate of the Spirit of God. I approve much more what follows in Houbigant: "Humani ingenii est, non linguæ cujuscunque obscuritas, divini sermonis dos perpetua, ut dignitas, ita etiam perspicuitas. Ut quanquam obscura nunc esset Hebraica lingua, tamen dubitandum non esset, quæ sacri autores scripserunt, perspicue scripsisse: nobis igitur esse maxime elaborandum, ut quæ nunc nobis obscura esse videantur, ad pristinam nam nativamque perspicuitatem, quoad fieri potest, revocemus; non autem nos nobis contentos esse debere, si quæ prima specie obscura erant, obscure converterimus." I have already given my reasons † for thinking that the historical style of the Scriptures, in consequence of its greater simplicity, is naturally more perspicuous than that of most other writings. But it is impossible that their sense should appear, even to men of profound erudition, with the same facility and clearness, as it did to the countrymen and contemporaries of the inspired writers, men familiarized

* Proleg. Cap. V. Art. III.

† Diss. III.

ized to their idiom, and well acquainted with all the customs and manners to which there are, in those writings, incidental allusions. If then, to adopt Le Clerc's similitude, we prefer likeness to the original before beauty, we must endeavour to make our translation as perspicuous to our readers as we have reason to think the writings of Moses were, not to modern linguists, but to the ancient Israelites, and the writings of the evangelists to the Hellenist Jews. This is the only way, in my judgment, in which, consistently with common sense, we can say that a resemblance in perspicuity is preserved in the translation.

§ 22. But it may be asked, Is there then no case whatever, wherein it may be pardonable, or even proper, to be, in some degree, obscure? I acknowledge that there are such cases, though they occur but seldom in the historical books. First it is pardonable to be obscure, or even ambiguous, when it is necessary for avoiding a greater evil. I consider it as a greater evil in a translator, to assign a meaning merely from conjecture, for which he is conscious he has little or no foundation. In such cases, the method taken by Castalio is the only unexceptionable method, to give a literal translation of the words, and acknowledge our ignorance of the meaning. For the same reason, there will be a propriety in retaining even some ambiguities in the version. But this method ought to be taken only when the interpreter, using his best judgment, thinks there is ground to doubt which of the two senses, suggested by the words is the meaning of the author. If the language of the version be susceptible of the same ambiguity which he finds in the original, it ought to be preserved; but if the language be not susceptible of it, which often happens, the translator should insert the meaning he prefers in the text, and take notice of the other in the notes, or on the margin.

I shall give some examples of both. The evangelist John says, i. 9. Ην το φως το αληθινον ο φωτιζει παντα ανθρωπον ερχομενον εις τον κοσμον. Here we have an ambiguity in the word ερχομενον, which may be either the nominative neuter, agreeing with φως, or the accusative masculine, agreeing with ανθρωπον. Our translators have preferred the latter meaning, and said, *That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.* It was hardly possible to preserve the native simplicity of the expression, and retain the ambiguity in English. I have, therefore, as I preferred the former meaning, rendered the verse, *The true light was he, who coming into the world, enlighteneth every man,* and mentioned the other sense in the note, assigning the reasons which determined my choice.

Another evangelist represents our Lord as saying, Mat. xix. 28. Λεγω υμιν, οτι υμεις οι ακολουθησαντες μοι, εν τη παλιγγενεσια, οταν καθιση υμεις τε ανδραπυ επι θρωνω δεξης αυτω, καθισισθε και υμεις επι δαδικα θρωνω, κρινοντες

πρῖνοιτες τας δωδεκα φυλας τῆς Ἰσραηλ. Here the clause, ἐν τῇ καλιγγενσια, may be construed either with the preceding words, or with the following. In the former of these ways our translators have understood them, and have, therefore, rendered the verse, *I say unto you, that ye which have followed me in the regeneration; when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.* I think, on the contrary, that the words ought to be understood in the latter way, and have, therefore, translated them in this manner: *I say unto you, that at the renovation, when the Son of man shall be seated on his glorious throne, ye my followers, sitting also upon twelve thrones, shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel.* For this choice I have assigned my reasons in the note on the passage.

§ 23. But it sometimes happens, that the preference of one of the meanings of an equivocal word or phrase, cannot be determined with probability sufficient to satisfy a candid critic. In this case, when the version can be rendered equally susceptible of the different meanings, candour itself requires, that the interpreter give it this turn. By so doing, he puts the unlearned reader on the same footing on which the learned reader is put by the author. It does not often happen that this is possible, but it happens sometimes. The word αἰων may denote, either the world, in the largest acceptation, or the age, state, or dispensation of things, answering nearly to the Latin *seculum*. There are some passages in the New Testament, on which probable arguments may be advanced in favour of each interpretation. Nay, some have plausibly contended, that in the prophetic style, there is no impropriety in admitting both senses. Now, by rendering αἰων, in those doubtful cases, *state*, the same latitude is given the sentiment in English, which the words have in the original. See the note on this passage in Matthew, ch. xii. 32. καὶ ἀφεθησεται αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰωνι, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μελλόντι, which I have rendered, *will never be pardoned, either in the present state, or in the future.*

§ 24. There are, moreover, a few instances, in which it cannot be doubted that there is an intentional obscurity. In these it is plain, that the same degree of darkness which is found in the original ought, as far as possible, to be preserved in the version. Predictions are rarely intended to be perfectly understood till after their fulfilment, and are intended to be then understood by means of their fulfilment. When our Lord said to his disciples, in his last consolatory discourse, John xvi. 16. *Within a little while ye shall not see me, a little while after ye shall see me, because I go to the Father,* we learn, from what follows, that they did not understand him. Yet, though he perceived they were puzzled, he did not think proper to clear up the matter; but, that his words might make the deeper impression upon their minds, he mentioned some additional circumstances, the triumph
of

of the world, the sorrow of the disciples at first, and joy afterwards. He knew that his death and resurrection, which were soon to follow, would totally dissipate all doubts about his meaning. It must be injudicious, therefore, to render the verse in such a manner as to leave no room, to persons in their circumstances, for doubt and perplexity. Yet in one version it is thus translated: "In a very little time you will not see me—in a very little time you will see me again—for I am going to the Father, shortly to return." The last clause, *shortly to return*, for which there is no warrant in the original, removes the difficulty at once, and, consequently, makes the disciples appear, in the subsequent verses, in a very strange light, as being at a loss to understand what is expressed in the clearest manner. It holds, therefore, true in general, that in translating prophecy, we ought to avoid giving the version either more or less light than is found in the original. The anonymous translator often errs in this way. Thus, in the prophecy on mount Olivet, where our Lord says, Mat. xxiv. 6. *These things must happen, but the end is not yet*, the last clause, *ἔτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος*, he renders, *the end of the Jewish age is not yet*. There is nothing answering to the words of *the Jewish age* in the gospel. It is not certain that the word *τέλος* here relates to the same event which is called *συντελεία τῆς αἰωνίου* a little before, ver. 3. At any rate, there is no mention of *Jews*, or *Jewish*, in the whole prophecy. Nay, if it were absolutely certain, that the meaning is what this interpreter has expressed, it would be wrong to render it so, because we have reason to conclude, that it was not without design that our Lord, on that occasion, employed more general terms.

§ 25. In some cases, it is particularly unsuitable to be more explicit than the sacred authors, how certain soever we be that we express the meaning. A little reflection must satisfy every reasonable person, that events depending on the agency of men, cannot, with propriety, be revealed, so as to be perfectly intelligible to those on whose agency they depend. For, if we suppose that the things predicted, are such as they would not knowingly be the instruments of executing, either it will be in their power to defeat the intention of the prophecy, or they must be over ruled in their actions by some blind fatality, and consequently cannot be free agents in accomplishing the prediction. Neither of these suits the methods of Providence. God does not force the wills of his creatures; but he makes both their errors and their vices conduce to effect his wise and gracious purposes. This conduct of Providence was never more eminently displayed, than in what related to the death and sufferings of the Son of God. The predictions of the ancient Prophets are so apposite, and so clearly explained by the events, that we are at no loss to apply them; nay, we find some difficulty in conceiving how they could fail

of being understood by those who were the instruments of their accomplishment. Yet, that they were misunderstood by them, we have the best authority to affirm: *I wot*, says Peter, Acts iii. 17. 18. to the people of Jerusalem, who had, with clamour, demanded of Pilate the crucifixion of Jesus, *that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers; but those things which God before had showed by the mouth of all his Prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled.* The predictions in the Gospel are conveyed in the same idiom, and under the like figurative expressions, as are those of the Old Testament. And though many of the events foretold, which are now accomplished, have put the meaning of such prophecies beyond all question, we ought not, in translating them, to add any light borrowed merely from the accomplishment. By so doing, we may even materially injure the history, and render those mistakes incredible, which, on a more exact representation of things, as they must have appeared at the time, were entirely natural.

§ 26. The commentator's business ought never to be confounded with the translator's. It is the duty of the latter to give every thing to his readers, as much as possible, with the same advantages, neither more nor fewer, with which the sacred author gave it to his contemporaries. There were some things that our Saviour said, as well as some things that he did to his disciples, which it was not intended that they should understand then, but which, if taken notice of then, and remembered, they would understand afterwards. *These things*, said our Lord, John xvi. 25. *I have spoken to you in figures; the time cometh when I shall no longer speak to you in figures; but instruct you plainly concerning the Father.* It was, therefore, not intended that every thing in the Gospel should be announced, at first, with plainness. It is, withal, certain, that the veil of figurative language thrown over some things, was employed to shade them only for a time, and, in the end, to conduce to their evidence and greater lustre. *For there was no secret that was not to be discovered; nor was aught concealed which was not to be divulged*, Mark iv. 22. Now, justice is not done to this wise conduct of the Spirit, unless things be represented in this respect also, as nearly as possible, in his own manner. And those translators who have not attended to this, have sometimes, by throwing more light than was proper on particular expressions, involved the whole passage in greater darkness, and made it harder to account for the facts recorded.

§ 27. At the same time, let it be remembered, that the case of prophecy is in a great measure peculiar; and we have reason to think, that there is hardly any other case in which we are in danger of exceeding in perspicuity. Even in those places of the Gospel, about the meaning of which expositors are divided, there is ground to believe, that there is no intended obscurity in the original;

original; but that the difficulty arises merely from an allusion to some custom, or an application of some term at that time familiar, but at present not easily discovered. Where the translator is in the dark, his version ought not to be decisive. But where he has rational grounds for forming a judgment, what he judges to be the sense, he ought to express with clearness.

§ 28. I have oftener than once had occasion to observe, that wherever propriety, perspicuity, and the idiom of the tongue employed, permit an interpreter to be *close*, the more he is so, the better. But what it is to be *literal*, I have never yet seen defined by any critic or grammarian, or even by any advocate for the literal manner of translating. A resemblance in sound, by the frequent use of derivatives from the words of the original, cannot, where there is no coincidence in the sense, confer on a translator, even the slight praise of being literal. Who would honour with this denomination one who, in translating Scripture, should render *συμφωνια* *sympphony*, *ὑπερβολη* *hyperbole*, *παροξύσμις* *paroxyzm*, *φαρμακεια* *pharmacy*, *συκοφαντειν* *to play the sycophant*, *παροδοξα* *paradoxes*, and *ιδιωτης* *idiot*? Yet some of the consecrated words have no better title to this distinction.

I once met with a criticism, I do not remember where, on a passage in the Epistle of James, ch. i. 17. in which God is called the *Father of lights*, *παρ ὃ ἐκ ἐνι παραλλαιη, η τρεπισ αποσκιασμα*. The critic profoundly supposes, that the sacred penman, though writing to the Christian converts of the dispersed Jews, amongst whom there certainly were not many noble, or rich, or learned, addressed them in the language of astronomy; and therefore renders *παραλλαιη* *parallax*, and *τρεπη* *tropic*. If this be to translate very literally, it is also to translate very absurdly. And surely the plea is not stronger, that is urged in favour of those interpreters who, without regard to usage in their own language, scrupulously exhibit, in their versions, the etymologies of their author's words, especially compound words. Such, if they would preserve consistency, ought to translate *ευηθης* *well-bred*, *εμδιεργια* *easy work*, *σπεριμολογος* *seed gatherer*, *πανεργος* *all-working*, *γλωσσοκομον* *tongue-case*, and *παμπολυς* *all-many*. The similar attempts of some, at analysing phrases, or idiomatical expressions, in their version, which are but a looser sort of composition, fall under the same denomination. Both the above methods, though differing greatly from each other, are occasionally patronised, as literal, by the same persons. There is a third particular, which is considered as perhaps more essential to this mode of interpreting, than either of the former, and which consists in tracing, as nearly as possible, in the version, the construction and arrangement of the original. This, if not carried to excess, is less exceptionable than either of the former.

§ 29. But it deserves our notice, that translators attempting, in

this way, to keep closely to the letter, have sometimes failed, through their attending more to words and particles, considered separately, than to the combination and construction of the whole sentence. Thus, the words of our Lord *, Πας γαρ ὁ αἰτων λαμβανει, και ὁ ζητων ευρισκει, as rendered in the common translation, *For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth*; err in this very way. Ὁ ζητων ευρισκει, taken by itself as a separate sentence, cannot be better rendered than *he that seeketh, findeth*. But in this passage it is only a clause of a sentence. The words πας γαρ, wherewith the sentence begins, relate equally to both clauses. The version here given, *For whosoever asketh, obtaineth; whosoever seeketh, findeth*, is, in fact, therefore, more close to the letter as well as to the sense: for, by the syntactic order, the second clause evidently is πας ὁ ζητων ευρισκει. The Vulgate is both literal and just, *Omnis enim qui petit, accipit; et qui quærit, invenit*. Here *omnis*, like πας, belongs to both members. Had our translators, in the same manner, said, *Every one that asketh, receiveth; and that seeketh, findeth*; leaving out the pronoun *he*, they would have done justice both to the form and to the sense. But they have chosen rather to follow Beza, who says, *Quisquis enim petit, accipit; et qui quærit, invenit*; where, though the second member is the same as in the Vulgate, the expression in the Gospel is in effect differently translated, as *quisquis* cannot, like *omnis*, be supplied before *qui*. I acknowledge that there is not a material difference in meaning. Only the second clause in Beza is expressed more weakly, and appears not to affirm so universally as the first clause. The clause, as expressed in Greek, has no such appearance.

§ 30. For a similar reason, the words, ὅτι ὁ σκολιζ αὐτων ε τελευτα, και το πυρ ε σβεννυται, Mark ix. 44. 46. 48. are, in my opinion, more strictly rendered, *where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched*, than as in the common version, *the fire is not quenched*. The manner in which the clauses are here connected, rendered the repetition of the pronoun in the second clause unnecessary, because in Greek it is in such cases understood as repeated. Whereas in English, when *the fire* is said, the pronoun cannot be understood. It is excluded by the article, which is never by us joined with the possessive pronoun. Could we, with propriety, imitate the Greek manner entirely, making the personal pronoun supply the possessive, and saying, *where the worm of them dieth not, and the fire is not quenched*, the pronoun might be understood in English as well as in Greek. But such an idiom with us would be harsh and unnatural. It gives an additional probability to this explanation, that in the passage in the Old Testament referred to, Isa. lxvi. 24. it is expressly *their fire* as well as *their*

* Matt. vii. 8. See the note on that verse.

their worm. In Hebrew the affixes are never left to be supplied. This remark regards only the exhibition of the construction, for the sense is not affected by the difference.

§ 31. The words of John, Ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην δικαίος ἐστὶ, καθὼς ἐκεῖνος δικαίος ἐστὶ, I John iii. 7. are, in my judgment, more literally rendered, *He that doth righteousness is righteous, even as God is righteous*, than as it stands in the English translation, *even as he is righteous*. The English pronoun *he* does not correspond to the Greek *κεῖνος* so situated. In English the sentence appears to most readers a mere identical proposition; in Greek it has no such appearance, *κεῖνος* plainly referring us to a remote antecedent. As no pronoun in our language will here answer the purpose, the only proper recourse is to the noun whose place it occupies. The intention of the three examples just now given, is to show that, when the construction of the sentence is taken into the account, that is found a more literal (if by this be meant *closer*) translation, which, to a superficial view, appears less so.

§ 32. I shall here take notice of another case in which we may translate literally, nay, justly and perspicuously, and yet fail greatly in respect of energy. This arises from not attending to the minute, but often important differences in structure, between the language of the original and that of the version. Of many such differences between Greek and English, I shall mention at present only one. We find it necessary to introduce some of the personal pronouns almost as often as we introduce a verb. Not only does our idiom require this, but our want of inflections constrains us to take this method for conveying the meaning. In the ancient languages this is quite unnecessary, as the inflection of the verb, in almost every case, virtually expresses the pronoun. There are certain cases, nevertheless, wherein the pronoun is also employed in those languages. But in those cases it has, for the most part, an emphasis, which the corresponding pronoun with us, because equally necessary in every case, is not fitted for expressing. Thus our Lord says to his disciples, John xv. 16. Οὐχ ἡμεῖς σε ἐξελέξασθε, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐξελέξαμην ἡμᾶς, which is rendered in the common version, *You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you*. This version is at once literal, just, and perspicuous; yet it has not the energy of the original. The stress laid on *ἡμεῖς* and *ἐγὼ*, which are here contrasted with manifest intention, because the words are otherwise superfluous, is but feebly, if at all, represented by the pronouns *ye* and *I*, which are, in English, necessary attendants on the verbs. Our translators could not have rendered differently, had the words been Οὐ με ἐξελέξασθε, ἀλλ' ἐξελέξαμην ἡμᾶς. Yet every reader of taste will perceive that this expression is not nearly so emphatical. I might add that such a reader will be sensible, that even so slight a circumstance as beginning the sentence with the negative particle, adds to the emphasis, and that ἡμεῖς &
would

would not have been so expressive as *οχι υμεις*. To do justice, therefore, to the energy, as well as to the sense of the original, it is necessary, in modern languages, to give the sentence a different turn. The Port Royal, and after them Simon, and other French translators, have done this successfully by rendering it, *Ce n'est pas vous qui m'avez choisi, mais c'est moi qui vous ai choisi*. The like turn has been given by some very properly to the words in English, *It was not you who chose me, but it was I who chose you*.

I recollect one instance in the Old Testament, wherein our translators have taken this method. Joseph, after he had discovered himself to his brethren, observing that the remembrance of their guilt overwhelmed them with terror and confusion; in order to compose their spirits, says to them, Gen. xlv. 8. *It was not you that sent me hither, but God*. The expression in the Greek translation is perfectly similar to that above quoted from the Gospel. *Οχι υμεις με απισωλακατε ωδε, αλλ', η ε̄ Θεος*. In the original Hebrew it is not less so: *הנהני האלהים לא אתם שליחתי*. I do not say, however, that the pronoun, when mentioned, is in every case emphatical, or that, in every case, it would be proper to deviate from the more simple manner of translating.

§ 33. Thus much shall suffice for what regards those leading rules in translating, which may be judged necessary for securing propriety, perspicuity, and energy; and, as far as possible, in a consistency with these, for doing justice to the particular manner of the author translated; and for bestowing on the whole that simple kind of decoration, which is suited to its character. This finishes the first part of this Dissertation relating to the matter or principal qualities to be attended to in translating.

P A R T II.

The Readings of the Original here followed.

I SHALL now subjoin a few remarks on the readings, where there is, in the original, a diversity of reading, which are here preferred.

Were it in our power to recur to the autographies of the sacred penmen, that is, to the manuscripts written by themselves, or by those whom they employed to whom they dictated, and whose work they supervised, there could be no question that we ought to recur to them, as the only infallible standards of divine truth. But those identical writings, it is acknowledged on all hands, are nowhere now to be found. What we have, in their
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stead, are the copies of copies (through how many successions, it is impossible to say), which were originally taken from those autographies. Now, though Christians are generally agreed in ascribing infallibility to the sacred penmen, no Christian society, or individual, that I know, has ever yet ascribed infallibility to the copiers of the New Testament. Indeed, some Christians appear absurd enough to admit thus much in favour of those who have transcribed the Old Testament; about which they seem to imagine that Providence has been more solicitous than about the New. For, in regard to the New Testament, nothing of this kind has ever been advanced. Now, what has been said of the transcribers of the New Testament may, with equal certainty, be affirmed of the editors and printers. It is, nevertheless, true, that since the invention of printing, we have greater security than formerly, against that incorrectness which multiplies the diversities of reading; inasmuch as now, a whole printed edition, consisting of many thousand copies, is not exposed to so many errors, as a single written copy was before. But this invention is comparatively modern. Besides, the effect it had, in point of correctness, was only to check the progress, or more properly, to prevent the encrease of the evil, by giving little scope for new variations. But it could have no retrospective effect in rectifying those already produced.

§ 2. It behoved the first editors of the New Testament in print, to employ the manuscripts of which they were possessed, with all their imperfections. And who will pretend that Cardinal Ximenes, Erasmus, Robert Stephens, and the other early publishers of the New Testament, to whom the republic of letters is indeed much indebted, were under an infallible direction in the choice of manuscripts, or in the choice of readings in those passages wherein their copies differed from one another? That they were not all under infallible guidance, we have ocular demonstration, as, by comparing them, we see that, in many instances, they differ among themselves. And if only one was infallibly directed, which of them, shall we say, was favoured with this honourable distinction? But, in fact, though there are many well-meaning persons, who appear dissatisfied with the bare mention of various readings of the sacred text, and much more with the adoption of any reading to which they have not been accustomed, there is none who has yet ventured to ascribe infallibility, or inspiration, to any succession of copiers, editors, or printers. Yet, without this, to what purpose complain? Is it possible to dissemble a circumstance clear as day, that different copies read some things differently? a circumstance of which every person who, with but a moderate share of knowledge, will take the trouble to reflect, must be convinced that it was inevitable: Or, if it were possible to dissemble it, ought this truth to be dissembled?

bled? If, in any instance wherein the copies differ, there appear, upon enquiry, sufficient reason to believe, that the reading of one copy, or number of copies, is the dictate of inspiration, and that the reading of the rest, though the same with that of the printed edition most in use, is not, will the cause of truth be better served by dissimulation, in adhering to a maxim of policy, merely human, or by conveying, in simplicity, to the best of our power, the genuine sense of the Spirit? The former method favours too much of those pious frauds which, though excellent props to superstition in ignorant and barbarous ages, ought never to be employed in the service of true religion. Their assistance she never needs, and disdains to use. Let us then conclude, that as the sacred writings have been immensely multiplied, by the copies which have been taken from the original manuscripts, and by the transcripts successively made from the copies; the intrusion of mistakes into the manuscripts, and thence into the printed editions, was, without a chain of miracles, absolutely unavoidable.

§ 3. It may be thought that the transmission, through so many ages, merely by transcribing, in order to supply the place of those copies which, from time to time, have been destroyed or lost, must have, long before now, greatly corrupted the text, and involved the whole in uncertainty. Yet, in fact, the danger here is not near so great as at first it would appear. The multiplication of the copies, the very circumstance which occasions the increase of the evil, has, in a great measure, as it began very early, brought its own remedy along with it, namely, the opportunity it affords, of collating those which have been made from different ancient exemplars. For, let it be observed, that different transcribers from a correct standard, rarely fall into the same errors. If, therefore, which is highly probable, as almost all those writings were originally intended for the use of multitudes, several copies were made directly from the writings of the sacred penmen, those transcripts, when the common archetype was lost, would serve, when collated, to correct one another; and, in like manner, the copies taken from one would serve to correct the copies taken from another. There are several considerations, arising from external circumstances, from which, among the different readings of different manuscripts, the preference may, with probability, be determined; such are the comparative antiquity, number, and apparent accuracy of the copies themselves. There are considerations, also, arising from internal qualities in the readings compared; such as, conformity to the grammatical construction, to the common idiom of the language, to the special idiom of the Hellenists, to the manner of the writer, and to the scope of the context. Need I subjoin the judgments that may be formed, by a small change in the pointing, or even in dividing the words? for in these things the critic is entitled to some latitude,

tude, as, in the most ancient manuscripts there were neither points nor accents, and hardly a division of the words.

Next to the aid of manuscripts, is that of the Greek commentators, who give us, in their commentaries, the text as they found it at the time; and, next to this, we have that of ancient translations. I do not mean the aid they give for discovering the import of the original terms; for in this respect, modern versions may be equally profitable; but their leading to the discovery of a different reading in the manuscripts from which they were made. In this way, modern versions are of no use to the critic, the world being still in possession of their originals. Next to ancient translations, though very far from being of equal weight, are the quotations made by the fathers, and early ecclesiastical writers. Of the degrees of regard due respectively to the several assistances above named, it would be superfluous here to discourse, after what has been written by Walton, Mill, Wetstein, Simon, Michaelis, Kennicott, and many others. As we can ascribe to no manuscript, edition, or translation, absolute perfection, we ought to follow none of them implicitly. As little ought we to reject the aid of any. On these principles I have proceeded in this version. Even the English translators have not scrupled, in a few instances, to prefer a manuscript reading to that of the printed editions, and the reading of the Vulgate to that of the Greek. Of the former, I remember two examples* in the Gospels, wherein our translators have adopted a reading different from the reading of the common Greek, and also different from that of the Vulgate; and not a few †, wherein they have preferred the latter to the former, sometimes, in my opinion, rashly. The passages are mentioned in the margin; the reader may compare them at his leisure, and consult the notes relating to them, subjoined to this translation.

§ 4. Bengelius, though he consulted manuscripts, declares that he has followed none in the edition he has given of the New Testament, unless where they supported the reading of some one, at least, of the printed editions. "This," says Boyer ‡, "is the greatest deference that was ever paid to the press." But, with all due respect to the judgment of that worthy and learned printer, I do not think it evidence of a deference to the press, but of an extravagant deference to the first editors of the sacred books in print. The Scriptures of the New Testament had been conveyed by manuscript for about fourteen hundred years before the art of printing existed. As it has never been pretended that
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* Matt. x. 10. John xviii. 20.

† Matt. xii. 14. xxv. 39. xxvi. 15. Mark vi. 56. Luke i. 38. ii. 22. xi. 13. John xvi. 2. xviii. 1. 15.

‡ Preface to his Critical Conjectures.

the first printers, or the first publishers were inspired, or ought to be put on the footing of prophets, we conclude, that if their editions contain things not warranted by the manuscripts or ancient versions then extant, such things must be erroneous, or at least apocryphal. And, if every thing they contain may be found in some manuscripts or versions of an older date, though not in all, our giving such a preference to the readings copied into the printed editions can proceed from nothing but a blind deference to the judgment of those editors, as always selecting the best. Whether they merited this distinction, the judicious and impartial will judge. But no reasonable person can hesitate a moment to pronounce, that if, of all the readings they had met with, they had selected the worst, the press would have conveyed them down to us with equal fidelity. We may then have a prejudice in favour of the printed editions, because we are accustomed to them, but have no valid reason for preferring them to manuscripts, unless it arise from a well-founded preference of the first editors of the New Testament, to all other Scriptural critics, as men who had the best means of knowing what was preferable in the manuscripts, and who were the most capable of making a proper choice. But hardly will either be admitted by those who are acquainted with the state of this species of literature, at that time, and since.

§ 5. Though not the first published, the first prepared for publication was the Complutensian Polyglot, by Cardinal Ximenes, a Spaniard. The sentence formerly quoted from him, relating to the place he had assigned the Vulgate in his edition, between the Hebrew and the Greek, and his indecent comparison of its appearance there, to our Lord crucified between the two malefactors, do not serve to raise our opinion, either of his judgment or of his impartiality. He boasted of the use he had made of the Vatican, and other manuscripts of great antiquity, as to which Wetstein is not singular in expressing doubts of his veracity.

Erasmus is considered as the second editor. His New Testament was published, but not printed, before the Complutensian. He made use of some manuscripts of Basil, and others, which he had collected in different parts; but he was so little scrupulous, in regard to the text, that what was illegible in the only Greek copy, he seems to have had of the Apocalypse he supplied, by translating back into Greek from the Vulgate. He published several editions of this work, the two or three last of which he brought to a greater conformity to the Complutensian printed at Alcala, than his three first were.

The third editor of note, (for I pass over those who did little other than republish either Ximenes or Erasmus), was Robert Stephens. He allowed himself, in a great measure, to be directed by the two former editors; but not without using, on several occasions,

occasions, the readings which he found in some of the best manuscripts he had collected. Many of the later editions of the New Testament are formed from some of his.

Beza, indeed, who was himself possessed of some valuable manuscripts, and was supplied by Henry Stephens, with the various readings which had been collected by his father, sometimes introduced them into the text. But his choice was directed by no principle of criticism. His great rule of preference, (as might be expected from the manner in which he conducted his translation), was conformity to his own theological system. This led him to introduce variations, sometimes on the authority of a single manuscript of little or no account, sometimes without even that, in so much, that several of his alterations must be considered as conjectural. Yet his edition has been much followed by Protestants. Curcellus * complains of him for having, by his own acknowledgment, suppressed many readings he was possessed of. Simon takes notice of the same thing †. And, it must be owned, that Beza's conduct, in other particulars, gives ground to suspect, that his impartiality in a matter of this kind was not to be relied on.

The only other editor I know, who has had recourse to guessing, for the improvement of the text, is the English translator in 1729, often before mentioned. He has, along with his version, republished the Greek text, corrected, as he pretends, from authentic manuscripts. It does not, however, appear, that he has been guided by critical principles, in judging of manuscripts, or of the preference due to particular readings. His chief rule seems to have been their conformity to his own notions, which has led him to employ a boldness in correcting altogether unwarrantable.

§ 6. What follows, may serve as evidence of this. Dr Mill was so much pleased with a correction proposed by Bentley ‡, as to say, “*Mihi tantopere placet hæc lectio, ut absque unanimi codicum in altera ista lectione consensu, genuinam eam intrepide pronunciarem;*” to which our editor gives this brief and contemptuous reply, “*As if there was any manuscript so old as COMMON SENSE.*” The greatest regard is doubtless due to *common sense*; but, where the subject is matter of fact, the proper province of common sense lies in comparing and judging the proofs brought before it, not in supplying from invention any deficiency in these. Common sense, or rather reason, is the judge in the trial. Manuscripts, versions, quotations, &c. are the testimonies.

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* Pref. to his edition of the N. T. Nescio quo consilio, plurimas quas præ manibus habebat, publico inviderit.

† Hist. Crit. du N. T. lib. ii. cap. 29.

‡ The passage on which the correction was proposed, is Gal. iv. 25.

timonies. It would be a bad scheme in civil matters to supersede the examination of witnesses, on pretence that the sagacity of the judge rendered it unnecessary. Yet it might be pretended, that his penetration is such, that he can discover at a glance the truth or the falsity of the charge, from the bare physiognomy of the parties. But can ye imagine, that people would think their lives, liberties, and properties, secure in a country where this were the method of trial? Or will this method, think ye, be found to answer better in critical than in judicial matters? If, under the name of COMMON SENSE, we substitute the critic's fancy, in the room of testimony and all external evidence, we shall find that we have established a test of criticism which is infinitely various, not in different sects only, but in different individuals. The common sense of the aforesaid English editor, and the common sense of Beza, (yet neither of them was destitute of this quality), would, I am afraid, have not very often coincided.

§ 7. Shall we then set aside reason or common sense in such inquiries? On the contrary, no step can properly be taken without it. The judge is necessary in the trial; so are the witnesses: but there will be an end of all fairness, and an introduction to the most arbitrary proceedings, if the former be made to supply the place of both. In cases of this kind, we ought always to remember that the question, wherever any doubt arises, is a question of fact, not a question of right, or of abstract truth. It is, 'What was said;' not 'What should have been said;' or 'What we ourselves would have said,' had we been in the author's place. This is what we never mistake in the explanation of any pagan writer, or of any modern, but are very apt to mistake in the explanation of the Bible. If a Christian of judgment and knowledge were translating the Alcoran, there would be no risk of his confounding things so manifestly distinct. The reason is, such a translator's concern would only be to give the meaning of his author, without either enquiring or minding whether it were agreeable or contrary to his own sentiments.

Whereas, it is a thousand to one that the Christian, of whatever denomination he be, has, previously to his entering on the interpretation, gotten a set of opinions concerning those points about which Scripture is conversant. As these opinions have acquired a certain firmness through habit, and as a believer in Christianity cannot consistently maintain tenets which he sees to be repugnant to the doctrines contained in Scripture, he will find it easier, unless possessed of an uncommon share of candour and discernment, to bring, by his ingenuity, especially when aided by conjectural emendations, the dictates of revelation to a conformity to his opinions, than to bring his opinions to a conformity to the dictates of revelation. This tendency is the real cause of so much straining as is sometimes to be found in the manner of criticizing

criticizing holy writ; straining, let me add, to a degree which we never see exemplified in interpreting any classical author. In the latter we are comparatively little interested, and are therefore ready to admit, on many occasions, that such are the sentiments expressed in his writings, though very different from our sentiments. But as Christians will not admit this with regard to the Bible, they have often no other resource, but either to wrest its words or to change their own opinions. Which of these ways will be oftener taken it is not difficult to say.

§ 8. I have often wished (if such a person could be found) that an infidel of sufficient learning, penetration, coolness, and candour, would, merely for the sake of illustrating what must be allowed to be curious pieces of ancient literature, undertake the translation of the sacred books. Such a man would have no bias upon his mind to induce him to wrest the words, in order to make them speak his own sentiments. And if he had the genuine spirit of the philosopher, historian, or antiquary, he would be solicitous to exhibit the manners, opinions, customs, and reasonings of those early ages fairly, as he found them, without adding any thing of his own, either to exalt or to depress the original. I should not think it impossible to find so much fairness in a Christian, who having resided long in India, and understood their sacred language, should undertake to translate to us the Scriptures of the Bramins; but such impartiality in an infidel living in a Christian country, would be, I fear, a chimerical expectation.

There is, however, I acknowledge, a considerable difference in the cases. We view with different eyes the opinions of remote ages and distant nations, from those wherewith we contemplate the sentiments of the times in which, and the people amongst whom we live. The observation of our Lord, Mat. xii. 30. holds invariably, *He who is not for us, is against us; and he who gathereth not with us, scattereth.* We find no examples of neutrality in this cause. Whoever is not a friend is an enemy; and for this reason, without any violation of charity, we may conclude that the interpretation of Scripture is safer in the hands of the bigotted sectary, than in those of the opinionative infidel, whose understanding is blinded by the most inflexible and the most unjust of all passions, an inveterate contempt. Hatred, when alone, may be prevailed on to enquire, and in consequence of enquiry, may be surmounted; but when hatred is accompanied with contempt, it spurns enquiry as ridiculous.

§ 9 But, it may be said, though this may be justly applied to the confirmed infidel, it is not applicable to the sceptic, who, because he finds difficulties on both sides of the question which he is not able to surmount, is perplexed with doubts in relation to it. I am sensible of the difference, and readily admit that what

I said of the infidel does not apply to the last mentioned character. At the same time I must observe, that those just now described appear to be a very small number, and are not the people whom the world at present commonly calls sceptics. This, on the contrary, like the term freethinker, is become merely a softer and more fashionable name for infidel; for, on all those points wherein the sceptics of the age differ from Christians, they will be found to be full as dogmatical as the most tenacious of their adversaries*. Such, at least, is the manner of those who, in modern Europe, affect to be considered as philosophical sceptics.

§ 10. But, to return to the consideration of the first printed editions, from which it may be thought I have digressed too far: what has been said sufficiently shews that they are not entitled to more credit than is due to the manuscripts from which they were compiled. Nobody ascribes inspiration, or any supernatural direction to the first editors. And as to advantages merely natural, they were not on an equal footing with the critics of after-times. The most valuable manuscripts, far from being generally known, remained scattered throughout the world. A few might fall under the notice of one curious enquirer, another few under that of another. But there had not been any number of them yet collated, and consequently their various readings had not been collected and published. Nay, that the judgment of those editors, concerning the antiquity and correctness of the manuscripts which they used, cannot be implicitly relied on, may warrantably be concluded from this circumstance, that this species of criticism was but in its infancy, and that even learned men had not

* The only exception which has appeared in this age (if we can account one an exception who has done so much to undermine in others a belief, with which at times he seems himself to have been strongly impressed) is that eminent but anomalous genius, Rousseau. He had the sensibility to feel strongly, if I may so express myself, the force of the internal evidence of our religion resulting from the character, the life, and the death of its Author, the purity and the sublimity of his instructions; he had the sagacity to discern, and the candour to acknowledge, that the methods employed by infidels in accounting for these things are frivolous, and, to every rational enquirer, unsatisfactory. At the same time, through the unhappy influence of philosophical prejudices, insensible of the force of the external evidence of prophecy and miracles, he did not scruple to treat every plea of this kind as absurd, employing against the same religion, even the poorest cavils that are anywhere to be found in the writings of infidels. Nay, for this purpose, he mustered up a world of objections, without ever discovering that he mistook the subject of dispute, and confounded the doctrine of particular sects or denominations of Christians with the doctrine of Christ. The articles against which his artillery is generally pointed, are the comments of later ages, and not the pure dictates of holy writ. See the character of this extraordinary man (whom I here consider only as a sceptic) as delineated by the masterly pen of Dr Beattie. *Essay on Truth, Part III. ch. 2.*

not then, as now, the necessary means of qualifying themselves for judging of the antiquity and correctness of manuscripts. Besides, those publishers themselves were not unanimous. Nor were the alterations made by those of them who were posterior in time, always for the better. "I am amazed," says Michælis *, very justly, "when I hear some vindicate our common readings, as if the editors had been inspired by the Holy Ghost."

Is it possible then to assign a satisfactory reason for the determination of Bengelius, not to admit any reading which had not the support of some former printed edition? "Ne syllabam quidem, etiamsi mille MSS. mille critici juberent, antehac [in editionibus] non receptam, adducar ut recipiam †." He has not indeed confined himself, in his choice of readings, to any one edition, but has excluded entirely from his text, those readings which, however well supported, no preceding editor had adopted. This rule which he laid down to himself, is manifestly indefensible, inasmuch as the authority of the printed editions must ultimately rest on that of the manuscripts from which they are taken. Whereas it can give no additional value to the manuscripts, that some of the first publishers have thought fit to prefer them, perhaps injudiciously, to others; or, to speak more properly, have thought fit to copy them as the best they had. Their merit depends entirely on the evidences we have of their own antiquity, accuracy, &c. For none, surely, will be hardy enough to say, that errors, by being printed, will be converted into truths.

§ 11. The only cause which I can assign for the resolution taken by Bengelius, though of no weight in the scales of criticism and philosophy, may merit some regard, viewed in a prudential and political light. The printed copies are in every body's hands; the manuscripts are known to very few: and though the easy multiplication of the copies, by the press, will not be considered, by any person who reflects, as adding any authority to the manuscripts from which they were taken, it has nevertheless, the same effect on the generality of mankind. Custom, the duration and the extent of their reception, are powerful supports with the majority of readers. The reason, therefore, which has influenced that learned editor, is, at bottom, I suppose, the same that influenced Jerom, when revising the old Latin version, not to correct every thing which he was sensible stood in need of correction, that he might not, by the number and boldness of his alterations, scandalize the people. But this is a motive of a kind totally different from those which arise from critical considerations, and ought not to be confounded with them.

§ 12. I do not mean to say, that this is a motive to which no regard

* Introd. Lect. sect. 34.

† Prodromus.

regard should be shown. There are two cases in which, in my opinion, it ought to determine the preference; first, when the arguments in favour of one reading, appear exactly balanced by those in favour of another; secondly, when the difference in reading cannot be said to affect either the sense or the perspicuity of the sentence. In the former case, when no better rule of decision can be discovered, it is but reasonable that custom should be allowed to decide. In the latter, as we ought to avoid, especially in a version, introducing alterations of no significance, it might be justly accounted trifling, to take notice of such differences. In other cases we ought to be determined by the rules of criticism; that is, in other words, by the evidence impartially examined. As to which, I shall only add, that though much regard is due to the number of manuscripts, editions, versions, &c. yet, in ascertaining the preference, we ought not to be determined solely by the circumstance of number. The testimony of a few credible witnesses, outweighs that of many who are of doubtful character. Besides, there are generally internal marks of credibility or incredibility, in the thing testified, which ought always to have some influence on the decision.

§ 13. At the same time, I cannot help disapproving the admission of any correction (where the expression, as it stands in the text, is not downright nonsense), merely on conjecture: for, were such a method of correcting to be generally adopted, no bound could be set to the freedom which would be used with sacred writ. We should very soon see it a perfect Babel in language, as various in its style, in different editions, as are the dialects of our different sects and parties. This is an extreme which, if it should prevail, would be of much more pernicious consequence than the other extreme, of adhering implicitly and inflexibly, with or without reason, to whatever we find in the common edition. We know the worst of this error already; and we can say with assurance, that though the common editions are not perfect, there is no mistake in them of such a nature, as materially to affect either the doctrines to be believed, or the duties to be practised by a Christian. The worst consequences, which the blunders of transcribers have occasioned, are their hurting sometimes the perspicuity, sometimes the credibility of holy writ, affording a handle to the objections of infidels, and thereby weakening the evidences of religion. But as to the extreme of correcting on mere conjecture, its tendency is manifestly to throw every thing loose, and to leave all at the mercy of system builders, and framers of hypotheses: for who shall give law to the licentiousness of guessing?

It is not enough to answer, that the classics have sometimes been corrected on conjecture. The cases are not parallel. A freedom may be taken with the latter with approbation, which cannot,

cannot, with propriety, be taken with the former*. Houbigant, though a critic of eminence in Oriental literature, and a good translator, has, in my judgment, taken most unjustifiable liberties in

* Part I. § 21. Since these Dissertations were written, I have seen Dr Geddis' PROSPECTUS, wherein, among many things which I entirely approve, I observed the following words, p 55 which appear to stand in direct contradiction to the opinion given above: "When the corruptions of the text cannot be removed, either by the collation of manuscripts, or the aid of versions, internal analogy, or external testimony, the last resource is conjectural criticism." In opposition to this doctrine, he produces a popular objection, which he examines and answers. And in this answer, he goes still further, affirming that there are cases in which the text may be restored by *mere critical conjecture*. I have attentively considered his answer, and am led by it to regret, that, through the imperfection of all languages, ancient and modern, it often happens, that writers agree in sentiments who differ in words, and agree in words who differ in sentiments. Though that author and I have, on this head, expressed ourselves very differently, I am apt to conclude, from the explanation he has given, the instances he has produced, and the canons he has laid down, that the difference between us is mostly, if not entirely, verbal. It lies chiefly in the sense affixed to the word *conjecture*. He has applied it to cases to which I should not think it applicable. When any passage contains in itself such indications as are always accounted sufficient evidence of a particular alteration it has undergone, I never call the discovery of that alteration conjecture.

Now this is precisely the case in some of the instances given by Dr Geddis. When, in one edition of the English Bible we read *ad affliction to my bonds*, how do we reason from it? We perceive at once that *ad* is not English, neither is *affliction*. Hence we conclude with perfect assurance, that this is not the true reading, or the reading intended by the translators. A very little attention shews us, that if, without altering the order of the letters, we take the *d* from the beginning of *affliction*, and annex it to *ad* immediately preceding, which is the smallest alteration possible, the expression is just in itself, and the meaning is suited to the context. As it stands, it is nonsense. No evidence can be more convincing. We may venture to say, that if there were fifty other editions of the English Bible at hand, no reasonable person would think of consulting any of them for further satisfaction. Now I submit it to this critic himself, whether to say of any thing, "It is a matter of the utmost certainty," and to say, "It is a mere conjecture," be not considered as rather opposite in signification than coincident. There are some other of the learned gentleman's examples, in which there is hardly more scope for conjecture than in that now examined; such as that wherein *retired*, which is no word, is used for *retired* (a word remarkably similar), and that wherein *well*, which in that place has no meaning, is used for *dwell*. In all such cases, we are determined by the internal evidence resulting from the similarity of the letters, from the scope of the place, and from the construction of the words. In a few of the cases put, there is, I own, something of conjecture; but the correction is not merely conjectural. Of this kind is that *versed in the politer of learning*, where *parts* or *branches*, or some word of like signification, must be supplied. If it be asked, What then ought to be denominated a matter of mere conjecture? I answer, the reader will find an example of this in § 14. to which I refer him. We have but too many examples in some late critical productions of great name,

in his conjectural emendations, and has been but too much followed by critics, commentators, or paraphrasts amongst ourselves. I am far from thinking that, in some of his guesses, he may not be right; it is, however, much more probable, that in the greater part of them, he is wrong.

A mere conjecture may be mentioned in a note; but if, without the authority of copies, translations, or ancient ecclesiastical writers, it may be admitted into the text, there is an end of all reliance on the Scriptures as the dictates of the divine Spirit. Manuscripts, ancient translations, the readings of the most early commentators are, like the witnesses in a judicial process, direct evidence in this matter. The reasonings of conjecturers are but like the speeches of the pleaders. To receive on the credit of a sagacious conjecture, a reading not absolutely necessary to the construction, and quite unsupported by positive evidence, appears not less incongruous, than it would be, in a trial, to return a verdict founded on the pleading of a plausible speaker, not only without proof, but in direct opposition to it. For let it be observed that the copies, ancient versions, and quotations, which are conformable to the common reading, are positive evidence in its favour, and therefore against the conjecture. And even if the readings of the passage be various, there is, though less, still some weight

name, wherein the authors, without any warrant from manuscripts or versions, and without any reason from the scope of the place, or the import of the passage, are perpetually proposing emendations on the text, and that by transposing, changing, adding or dismissing, not only words, but clauses, when the passage does not, as it stands, perfectly suit their notions.

That the text has sometimes been interpolated, and otherwise corrupted by transcribers and interpreters, cannot be questioned. Of this it is doubtless the critic's business to clear it as much as possible. But we ought ever to remember, that the greater part of those corruptions were originally no other than conjectural corrections. And if we go to work in the same way, with such freedom of guessing as has sometimes been employed, it is ten to one that we ourselves corrupt the text instead of mending it, and that we serve only to furnish more work for future critics. I observe in the Monthly Review [August 1786] of Reed's late edition of Shakespeare, in a note on the expression *knowledge ill inhabited*, which has given great plague to the critics, the following remark — "At all events, we beg leave to enter our protest against putting *inhibit* into the text. How many plausible conjectures, which their ill-advised predecessors (former publishers) had advanced into the body of the page, have the late editors, in consequence of their more extensive researches, been obliged to degrade to their proper place, the margin? Can they then be too scrupulous in admitting their own corrections?" Upon the whole, from the way wherein Dr Geddis qualifies his sentiments, I am convinced, that the difference between him and me on this article is more in the words than in the thought. His verdict in regard to every one of the particular cases, supposed by him, is unexceptionable; but his manner of expressing the general position is, in my opinion, unguarded, and consequently may mislead.

weight in their evidence against a reading merely conjectural and consequently, destitute of external support, and different from them all. It must, however, be acknowledged, that the variety itself, if it affect some of the oldest manuscripts and translations, is a presumption that the place has been early corrupted in transcribing.

§ 14. I cannot avoid, here, taking notice of a correction, merely conjectural, proposed by the late Dr Kennicott, a man to whose pious and useful labours, the learned in general, and the students of the divine oracles in particular, are under the greatest obligations. The correction he proposes *, is on these words, בַּמָּתוֹ קָבְרוּ אֶת רְשָׁעִים קָבְרוּ וְאֶת עֲשִׂיר E. T. *And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death*, Isa. liii. 9. This ingenious critic supposes, that the words קָבְרוּ and בַּמָּתוֹ have, by some means or other, changed places. He would have them, therefore, transposed, or rather restored, each to its proper place, in consequence of which the import will be (I give it in his own words), *And he was taken up with wicked men in his death, and with a rich man was his sepulchre*. He adds: "Since the preceding parts of the prophecy speak so indisputably of the sufferings and death of the Messiah, these words seem evidently meant, as descriptive of the Messiah's being put to death in company with wicked men, and making his grave, or sepulchre (not with rich men, but) with one rich man."

Now, let it be observed, that of all the vast number of manuscripts which that gentleman had collated, not one was found to favour this arrangement; that neither the Septuagint nor any other old translation, is conformable to it, that no ancient author, known to us, in any language, quotes the words, so arranged, either from the original, or from any version; and consequently, that we cannot consider the conjecture otherwise, than as opposed by such a cloud of witnesses, as in enquiries of this kind, must be accounted strong positive evidence. Had the words, as they are read in Scripture, been ungrammatical, so as to yield no meaning, that we could discover, and had the transposition of the two words added both sense and grammar to the sentence, and that in perfect consistency with the scope of the context, I should have readily admitted, that the criticism stood on a firmer foundation than mere conjecture, and that the external proofs, from testimony, might be counterbalanced by the intrinsic evidence arising from the subject. But this is not pretended here. To be associated with the rich in death, is equally grammatical, and equally intelligible, as to be associated with the wicked; the like may be said in regard to burial. Where then is the occasion for a change? The only answer that can be given, is certainly a very bad one.

The occasion is, that the words may be adjusted to an event which, in our opinion, is the fulfilment of the prophecy.

But, if such liberties may be taken with the prophets, there will be no difficulty in obtaining from them proofs in support of any interpretation. The learned Doctor takes notice, that the preceding part of this chapter speaks indisputably of the sufferings and death of the Messiah. I am as much convinced as any man, that the subject of the prophecy is as he represents it; but to say that it is indisputably so, seems to insinuate that it is universally admitted. Now this is far from being the fact. It is disputed by the whole Jewish nation, and is allowed by some Christian expositors, to be only, in a secondary sense, prophetic of Christ. Suppose a Christian, after the passage shall have been in the Christian Bibles new modelled in the way proposed, to urge it on a Jew, as an argument from prophecy, that Jesus, the son of Mary, is the person in whom the prediction was fulfilled, and therefore the Messiah; in as much as the words exactly represent what, in so signal a manner, happened to him—he suffered with malefactors, and was buried in a rich man's sepulchre; would not the other have reason to retort, 'Ye Christians have a wonderful dexterity in managing the argument from prophecy; ye first, by changing and transposing the prophet's words, accommodating them to your purpose, make him say, what we have direct evidence that he never said; and then ye have the confidence to argue, this must infallibly be the event intended by the prophet, it so exactly answers the description. Ye yourselves make the prophecy resemble the event which ye would have to be predicted by it, and then ye reason from the resemblance, that this is the completion of the prophecy.'

Let us judge equitably of men of all denominations. Should we discover that the Masorets had made so free with the declaration of any prophet, in order to adapt it to what they take to be the accomplishment, would we hesitate a moment to call the words so metamorphosed a corruption of the sacred text? In an enlightened age, to recur to such expedients will be always found to hurt true religion instead of promoting it. The detection of them, in a few instances, brings a suspicion on the cause they were intended to serve, and would go far to discredit the argument from prophecy altogether. I cannot conclude this remark, without adding, that this is almost the only instance wherein I differ in critical sentiments from that excellent author, from whose labours, I acknowledge with gratitude, I have reaped much pleasure and instruction.

§ 13. To conclude what relates to various readings; those variations, which do not affect either the sense or the connection, I take no notice of, because the much greater part of them would occasion no difference in translating; and even of the few of these

these which might admit some difference, the difference is more in words than in meaning. Again, such variations as even alter the sense, but are not tolerably supported by either external or internal evidence, especially when the common reading has nothing in it apparently irrational or unsuitable to the context, I have not judged necessary to mention. Those, on the contrary, which not only in some degree affect the sense, but, from their own intrinsic evidence, or from the respectable support of manuscripts and versions, have divided the critics about their authenticity, I have taken care to specify. When the evidence in their favour appeared to me clearly to preponderate, I have admitted them into the text, and assigned my reason in the notes. Wherever the matter seemed dubious, I have preferred the common reading, and suggested, in the notes, what may be advanced in favour of the other. When the difference lay in the rejection of a clause commonly received, though the probability were against its admission, yet, if the sentence or clause were remarkable, and if it neither conveyed a sentiment unsuitable to the general scope, nor brought obscurity on the context, I have judged it better to retain it, than to shock many readers by the dismissal of what they have been accustomed to read in their Bible. At the same time, to distinguish such clauses, as of doubtful authority, I inclose them in crotchets. Of this the doxology, as it is called, in the Lord's prayer, is an example. In other cases, I have not scrupled to omit what did not appear sufficiently supported.

PART III.

The Dialect employed.

As to what concerns the language of this version, I have not much to add to the explanations I have given of my sentiments on this article, in the latter part of the preceding Dissertation, and the first part of the present. When the common translation was made, and (which is still earlier) when the English liturgy was composed, the reigning dialect was not entirely the same with that which prevails at present. Now, as the dialect, which then obtained, does very rarely, even to the readers of this age, either injure the sense, or affect the perspicuity, I have judged it proper, in a great measure, to retain it. The differences are neither great nor numerous. The third person singular of the present of the verb terminates in the syllable *eth*, in the old dialect, not in the letter *s*, as in that now current. The participles are
very

very rarely contracted; nor is there ever any elision of the vowels. Indeed, these elisions, though not entirely laid aside, are become much less frequent now, than they were about the beginning of the last century. The difference is, in itself, inconsiderable; yet, as all ranks and denominations of Christians are, from the use of either the Bible, or the Book of Common Prayer, or both, habituated to this dialect, and as it has contracted a dignity favourable to seriousness, from its appropriation to sacred purposes, it is, I think, in a version of any part of holy writ, entitled to be preferred to the modern dialect.

§ 2. The gayer part of mankind will doubtless think, that there is more vivacity in our common speech, as, by retrenching a few unnecessary vowels, the expression is shortened, and the sentiment conveyed with greater quickness. But vivacity is not the character of the language of the sacred penmen. Gravity here, or even solemnity, if not carried to excess, is much more suitable. "I bid this man," says the centurion, in the anonymous translation, Matt. viii. 9. "Go, and he's gone; another, "Come, and he's here; and to my servant, Do this, and it is "done." And in the parallel place in Luke, ch. vii. 6. "Lord, "don't give yourself the trouble of coming; I don't deserve you "should honour my house with your presence." There are, I believe, not a few who would prefer this manner to that of the common version, as being much smarter, as well as more genteel. Surely, if that interpreter had given the smallest attention to uniformity, he would never have rendered *αμην αμην λεγω υμιν*, as he sometimes does, by the antiquated phrase, *Verily, verily, I say unto you*. It would have been but of a piece with many passages of his version, to employ the more modish, and more gentlemanlike asseveration, "Upon my honour." With those who can relish things sacred in this dress (disguise rather), I should think it in vain to dispute.

§ 3. Another criterion of that solemn dialect, is the recourse, when an individual is addressed, to the singular number of the second personal pronoun *thou* and *thee*, and consequently to the second person singular of the verb, which being, in common language, supplied by the plural, is in a manner obsolete. This also is, from Scriptural use, and the constant use of it in worship, in the British dominions, both by those of the establishment, and by dissenters, universally intelligible, and now considered as the proper dialect of religion. Immediately after the Reformation, the like mode, in using the pronoun, was adopted by all Protestant translators into French, Italian and German, as well as into English. But as, in Roman Catholic countries, those translations were of no authority, and as the Scriptures are read in their churches, and their devotions and ceremonies performed in a language not understood by the people; the customs of dissenters, as

all Protestants are in those countries, could not introduce into the language of religion, so great a singularity of idiom. And as there was nothing to recommend this manner to the people, but several things to prejudice them against it, we do not find that it has been employed by any late Popish translators into French.

What tended to prejudice them against it, is, first, the general disuse of it in the ordinary intercourse of men; and, secondly, the consideration that the few exceptions from this disuse, in common life, instead of shewing respect or reverence, suggests always either pity or contempt; no person being ever addressed in this way, but one greatly inferior, or a child. This being the case, and they not having, like us, a solemn, to counterbalance the familiar use, the practice of Protestants would rather encrease than diminish their dislike of it. For these reasons, the use of the singular pronoun, in adoration, has the same effect nearly on them, which the contrary use of the plural has on us. To a French Catholic, *Tu es notre Dieu, et nous te benirons*, and to an English Protestant, *You are our God, and we will bless you*, equally betray an indecent familiarity*. In consequence of this difference in the prevailing usages, it must be acknowledged, that French Romanists have a plausible pretext for using the plural. We have, however, a real advantage in our manner, especially in worship. Theirs, it is true, in consequence of the prevalent use, has nothing in it disrespectful or indecent; but this is merely a negative commendation: ours, on account of the peculiarity of its appropriation in religious subjects, is eminently serious and affecting. It has, besides, more precision. In worship, it is a more explicit declaration of the unity of the Godhead; and even when, in holy writ, addressed to a creature, it serves to remove at least

* The way in which *Saci*, who appears to have been a pious worthy man, translates from the Vulgate the Lord's prayer, rendered literally from French into English, is a striking example of the difference of manner: "Our Father who are in heaven, let your name be sanctified, let your reign arrive, let your will be done," &c. Yet the earlier Popish translators chose to use the singular number as well as the reformed. It had been the universal practice of the ancients, Greeks, Romans, and Orientals. It was used in the English translation of Rheims, though composed by Papists in opposition to the Protestant version then commonly received. In the latter versions of French Protestants, this use of the singular number of the second person is given up entirely, except in addresses to God; the formularies read in their meetings having, in this particular, established among them a different usage. Beaufobre and Lefant [see Preface Generale sur le Nouveau Testament] strenuously maintain the propriety of their not using the singular of the second personal pronoun, except in worship. I admit their arguments to be conclusive with respect to French; but, for the reasons above mentioned, they are inconclusive applied to English. Yet in this some English translators have followed the French manner, but not uniformly.

least one ambiguous circumstance, consequent on modern use, which does not rightly distinguish what is said to one from what is said to many. And though the scope of the place often shew the distinction, it does not always.

§ 4. A few other particulars of the ancient dialect I have also retained, especially in those instances wherein, without hurting perspicuity, they appeared to give greater precision; but those, on the contrary, which might, in some instances, darken the expression, or render it equivocal, I have rejected altogether. For I consider no quality of elocution as more essential than perspicuity, and nothing more conducive to this, than as much uniformity and precision as the language will admit in the application of words. For this reason, though I have retained *whether* for which of two, *whoso* for whoever, and a few others little used at present, I have not employed *which*, as in the old dialect, for who, or whom, *his* or *her* for its, *that* for that which, or what. For these, though they do not often occasion ambiguity, sometimes occasion it; and there is no way of preventing doubt in every case, but by observing uniformity, when practicable, in all cases. In such an expression, for example, as that of the apostle Peter, 1 Ep. i. 23. *Being born again by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever*; if the relative *which* were applied, indiscriminately, to persons or to things, it might be questioned, whether what is affirmed, be affirmed of the word of God, or of God himself. But if, according to present use, it be confined to things, there is no question at all.

§ 5. Another point, in which the Scriptural differs from the modern dialect, is in the manner sometimes used in expressing the future. In all predictions, prophecies or authoritative declarations, the auxiliary *shall* is used, where, in common language, it would now be *will*. This method, as adding weight to what is said, I always adopt, unless when it is liable to be equivocally interpreted, and seems to represent moral agents as acting through necessity, or by compulsion. In the graver sorts of poetry, the same use is made of the auxiliary *shall*. As to the prepositions, I observed, in the preceding Dissertation *, that the present use gives them more precision, and so occasions fewer ambiguities, than the use which prevailed formerly. I have, therefore, given it the preference. There is one case however wherein I always observe the old method. *Called of God, chosen of God*, and other the like phrases, are, for an obvious reason, more agreeable to Christian ears, than if we were to prefix to the name of God the preposition *by*. The pronouns *mine* and *thine*, I have also, sometimes, after the ancient manner, in order to avoid a disagreeable hiatus, substituted for *my* and *thy*.

§ 6. To the foregoing remarks on the subject of dialect, I shall subjoin a few things on the manner of rendering proper names.

UPON

Upon the revival of letters in the West, Pagnin first, and after him some other translators, through an affectation of accuracy in things of no moment, so justly censured by Jerom, seem to have considered it as a vast improvement, to convey, as nearly as possible, in the letters of another language, the very sounds of the Hebrew and Syriac names which occur in Scripture. Hence the names of some of the most eminent personages in the Old Testament, were, by this new dialect, so much metamorphosed, that those who were accustomed to the ancient translation, could not, at first hearing, recognize the persons with whose history they had been long acquainted. The *Heva* of the Vulgate was transformed into *Chauva*, the *Isaia* into *Jesabiabu*, the *Jeremia* into *Irmeiabu*, and the *Ezechiel* into *Jechezechel*, and similar changes were made on many others. In this Pagnin soon had, if not followers, at least imitators. The trifling innovations made by him, after his manner, have served as an example to others to innovate also after theirs. Junius and Tremellius, though they say, with Pagnin, *Chauva*, do not adopt his *Jesabiabu*, *Irmeiabu*, and *Jechezechel*; but they give us what is no better of their own, *Fischabja*, *Firmeja*, and *Jechezkel*. Munster's deviations are less considerable, and Castalio went no further (except in transforming the name of God into *Javo*), than to give a Latin termination to the names formerly used, that he might thereby render them declinable.

§ 7. A deviation purely of this last kind, as it served to prevent ambiguities, otherwise inevitable, in the Latin, where there was no ambiguity in the original, did, in my opinion, admit a good apology. For, what was expressed in Hebrew, by the aid of the *status constructus*, as their grammarians call it, or by prepositions, was expressed with equal clearness, in Latin, by means of declension; whereas, by making the names indeclinable, in this language, that advantage had been lost, in regard to many names; and ambiguities, of which there was not a trace in the original, introduced into the translation. The declension of proper names was not, however, equally essential to perspicuity in Greek as in Latin. Their want of cases, the Greeks could supply by the cases of the article, which the idiom of their tongue permitted them to prefix. But the Latins had no article. It was, therefore, very injudicious in the first Latin translators to imitate the Seventy in this particular; the more so, as it had been the common practice of Latin authors, to decline the foreign names they adopted, in order the more effectually to fit them for use in their tongue. Thus they said, *Hannibal Hannibalis*, *Juba Jubæ*, and *Hanno Hannonis*. The inconveniences of the other manner appear from many equivocal passages in the Vulgate, which, without some previous knowledge of the subject, it would

be difficult to understand*. Castalio, in like manner, introduced into his version patronymics formed on the Grecian model, as *Jacobida* and *Davidides*, in which, as he has not been followed, we may conclude that he is generally condemned; and, in my opinion, not undeservedly, because the departure from the Hebrew idiom, in this instance, is both unnecessary and affected.

§ 8. But, though it be excusable to alter the names in common use, so far as to make them admit inflections in languages which use inflections, since this alteration answers a necessary purpose; to alter them, for the sake of bringing them nearer the ancient orthography, or for the sake of assisting us to produce a sound in pronouncing them, that may resemble the sound of the ancient names, is no better than arrant pedantry. The use of proper names is, as that of appellatives, to serve as signs, for recalling to the mind what is signified by them. When this purpose is attained, their end is answered. Now, as it is use alone which can convert a sound into a sign, a word that has been long used (whether a proper name or an appellative) as the sign of person or thing, genus, species, or individual, must be preferable to a new invented, and therefore unauthorised sound. If there is generally in proper names a greater resemblance to the original words than in appellatives, this difference nowise affects the argument. Appellatives are the signs of species and genera, with the more considerable part of which the people are acquainted in all civilized countries. Common things have consequently names in all languages; and the names in one language have often no affinity to those in another. Proper names are the signs of individuals, known originally only in the neighbourhood of the place of their existence, whence the name is transferred with the knowledge of the individual into other languages.

But the introduction of the name is not because of any peculiar propriety in the sound for signifying what is meant by it; but merely because, when the language we write does not supply a suitable term, this is the easiest and most natural expedient. It is in this way also we often provide appellatives, when the thing spoken of, which sometimes happens, has no name in our native idiom. But when an individual thing is of a nature to be un-

versally

* Several instances occur in the prophetic benediction which Moses gave to the twelve tribes, immediately before his death, Deut. xxxiii. In verse 4. *Legem præcepit nobis Moyses, hæreditatem multitudinis Jacob.* To one unacquainted with Scripture, it would not be obvious that *Moses* here is in the nominative, and *Jacob* in the genitive. Hardly could it be suspected, that in the following verses, 8. *Levi quoque ait*; 12. *Et Benjamin ait* (and so of the rest), the names are in the dative. The form of the expression in Latin could not fail to lead an ordinary reader to understand them as in the nominative. Yet nothing can be more unequivocal than the words in Hebrew.

verfally known, and to have a name in every language, as the fun, the moon, and the earth, we never, in tranflating from an ancient tongue, think of adopting the name we find there, but always give our own. Yet the things now mentioned are as really individuals, as are Peter, James, and John. And when, in the cafe of appellatives, we have been obliged at firft to recur for a name, to the language whence we drew our knowledge of the thing, we never think afterwards of reforming the term, becaufe not fo clofely formed on the original, as it might have been. It has, by its currency, produced that affociation which confers on it the power of a fign, and this is all that the original term itfelf ever had, or could have. Who would think of reforming flail into *flagel*, meffenger into *meffager*, and nurse into *nourrice*, that they may be nearer the firft to the Latin, or perhaps the German, and the fecond and third to the French originals?

§ 9. Befides, in tranflating Hebrew names, the attempt was the more vain, as little or nothing was known about their pronounciation. The manner of pronouncing the confonants is judged of very differently by the critics; and as to the vowels, who has not heard what contests they have occafioned among the learned? But what rendered this attempt, at giving the exact pronounciation, completely ridiculous is, that it was made in Latin, a dead language, of whose pronounciation alfo we have no ftandard, and in the fpeaking or reading of which, every different nation follows a different rule. Harmony among themfelves, therefore, was not to be expected in men who had taken this whim. Accordingly, when they once began to innovate, every one innovated after his own fafhion, and had a lift of names peculiar to himfelf. This, with reasonable people, has fufficiently expofed the folly of the conceit.

§ 10. Now, though our tranflators have not made the violent ftretches made by Pagnin and others, for the fake of adjusting the names to the original founds, and have not diftressed our organs of fpeech with a collifion of letters hardly utterable; there is one article on which I do not think them entirely without blame. The names of the fame perfons, and in effect the fame names, are fometimes rendered differently by them in the New Testament, from what they had been rendered in the Old; and that on account of a very inconfiderable difference in the fpeeling, or perhaps only in the termination in Hebrew and in Greek. By this the fenfe has been injured to ordinary readers, who are more generally ignorant than we are apt to imagine, of the perfons in the Old Testament, meant by the names in the New. Now this is a fpecies of *μικρολογία*, from which the authors of the Vulgate were free.

The old Italic had been made from the Greek of the Seventy. The names by confequence were more accommodated to the

Greek orthography than to the Hebrew. But as that was a matter of no consequence, when Jerom undertook to translate from the Hebrew, he did not think it expedient to make any changes in the proper names to which the people had been habituated from their infancy. He knew that this might have led some readers into mistakes, and, as appearing awkward and affected, would be disagreeable to others: at the same time there was no conceivable advantage from it to compensate these inconveniences. For, to tell the Latin reader more exactly how the Hebrew proper names sounded (if that could have been done), was of no more significance to him, than to acquaint him with the sound of their appellatives. He therefore judged rightly, in preserving in the Old Testament, though he translated from the Hebrew, the names to which the people were accustomed, as *Elias*, and *Elifeus*, and *Eldras*, and *Nebuchodonosor*, which were formed immediately from the Greek. By this means there was an uniformity in the manner of translating both Testaments. The Prophets, and other eminent ancients, were not distinguished by one name in one part of the sacred text, and by another in the other. Whereas the attempt at tracing servilely the letter in each part, has given us two sets of names for the same persons, of which the inconveniences are glaring, but the advantages invisible.

§ 11. It may be thought indeed a matter of little consequence, and that the names, if not the same, do at least so closely resemble, that they can hardly be mistaken for the names of different persons. But I have had occasion to discover that many of the unlearned, though neither ignorant nor deficient in understanding, know not that *Elias*, so often mentioned in the New Testament, is the *Elijah* of the Old, that *Elifeus* is *Elisha*, that *Osee* is *Hosea*, and that the *Jesus*, mentioned once in the Acts, ch. vii. 45. and once in the Epistle to the Hebrews, ch. iv. 8. is *Joshua*. Had the names been totally different in the original, there might have been some reason for adopting this method. The old Oriental names are often of use for pointing out the founders of nations, families, and tribes, and the more recent Greek names serve to connect those early notices with the later accounts of Greek and Roman historians. If they had, therefore, in the translation of the Old Testament, given, as in the original, the name *Mizraim* to Egypt, *Aram* to Syria, and *Javan* to Greece, much might have been urged in defence of this manner. But when all the difference in the word results from an insignificant alteration in the spelling, in order to accommodate the Hebrew name to Grecian ears; to consider them on that account as different names, and translate them differently, does not appear susceptible of a rational apology.

What should we think of a translator of Polybius, for example,

ple, who should always call Carthage *Karchedon*, and Hannibal *Annibas*, because the words of his author are *Καρχηδών* and *Αννίβας*, or, to come nearer home, should, in translating from French into English, call London *Londres*, and the Hague *La Haye*. It can be ascribed solely to the almost irresistible influence of example, that our translators, who were eminent for their discernment as well as their learning, have been drawn into this frivolous innovation. At the same time their want of uniformity in using this method, seems to betray a consciousness of some impropriety in it, and that it tended unnecessarily to darken what in itself is perfectly clear. Accordingly, they have not thought it advisable to exhibit the names in most frequent use, differently in different parts of Scripture, or even differently from the names by which the persons are known in profane history. Thus he whom they have called Moses in the New Testament, is not in the Old Testament made *Mosheb*, nor Solomon *Sbelomeb*; nor is Artaxerxes rendered *Artachsbasta*, nor Cyrus *Cborefb*, agreeably to the Hebrew orthography, though the names of the two last mentioned, are not derived to us from the New Testament, but from pagan historians.

§ 12. Not that I think it of any moment whether the names be derived from the Greek, or from the Hebrew, or from any other language. The matters of consequence here are only these two. First, to take the name in most current use, whether it be formed from the Hebrew, from the Greek, or from the Latin; secondly, to use the same name in both Testaments, when the difference made on it in the two languages, is merely such a change in the spelling and termination, as commonly takes place in transplanting a word from one tongue into another. Nothing can be more vain than the attempt to bring us, in pronouncing names, to a stronger resemblance to the original sounds. Were this, as it is not, an object deserving the attention of an interpreter, it were easy to show that the methods employed for this purpose, have often had the contrary effect. We have in this mostly followed German and Dutch linguists.

Admitting that they came near the truth, according to their rule of pronouncing, which is the utmost they can ask, the powers of the same nominal letters are different in the different languages spoken at present in Europe; and we, by following their spelling, even when they were in the right, have departed farther from the original sound than we were before. The consonant *j*, sounds in German like our *y* in the word *year*, *sch* with them sounds like our *sh*, like the French *ch*, and like the Italian *sc*, when it immediately precedes *i* or *e*; whereas *sch* with us has generally the same sound with *sh*, and the consonant *j* the same with *g* before *i* or *e*. Besides, the letters which with us have different sounds in different situations, we have reason to believe, were sounded uniformly

uniformly in ancient languages, or, at least, did not undergo alterations correspondent to ours. Thus the brook called *Kidron*, in the common version in the Old Testament, is, for the sake, I suppose, of a closer conformity to the Greek, called *Cedron* in the New. Yet the *c* in our language, in this situation, is sounded exactly as the *s*, a sound which we have good ground to think that the corresponding letter in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, never had.

§ 13. The rules, therefore, which I have followed in expressing proper names, are these: First, when the name of the same person or thing is, in the common translation, both in the Old Testament and in the New, expressed in the same manner, whether it be derived from the Hebrew or from the Greek, I uniformly employ it, because in that case it has always the sanction of good use. Thus *Moses* and *Aaron*, *David* and *Solomon*, *Jerusalem* and *Jericho*, *Bethlehem* and *Jordan*, and many others remain in the places of which they have had immemorial possession; though of these *Moses* and *Solomon* are directly from the Greek, the rest from the Hebrew. Secondly, when the name of the same person or thing is expressed, in the common translation, differently in the Old Testament and in the New (the difference being such as results from adapting words of one language to the articulation of another), I have, except in a very few cases, preferred the word used in the Old Testament. This does not proceed from the desire of coming nearer the pronunciation of the Hebrew root: for that is a matter of no consequence; but from the desire of preventing, as far as possible, all mistakes in regard to the persons or things spoken of. It is from the Old Testament, that we have commonly what is known of the individuals mentioned in it, and referred to in the New. By naming them differently, there is a danger lest the person or thing alluded to be mistaken.

For this reason, I say *Elijab*, not *Elias*; *Elisba*, not *Elisens*; *Isaiab*, not *Esaias*; *Kidron*, not *Cedron*. For this reason, also, in the catalogues of our Lord's progenitors, both in Matthew and in Luke, I have given the names as they are spelt in the common version of the Old Testament. From this rule I admit some exceptions. In a few instances the thing mentioned is better known, either by what is said of it in the New Testament, or by the information we derive from Pagan authors, than by what we find in the Old. In this case, the name, in the New Testament, has a greater currency than that used in the Old, and consequently, according to my notion of what ought to regulate our choice, is entitled to the preference. For this reason, I say *Sarepta* and *Sidon*, not *Zarephath* and *Zidon*; as the former names are rendered, by classical use, as well as that of the New Testament, more familiar than the latter. Thirdly, when the same name is given, by

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the sacred writers, in their own language, to different persons, which the English translators have rendered differently in the different applications, I have judged it reasonable to adopt this distinction, made by our old interpreters, as conducing to perspicuity. The name of Jacob's fourth son is the same with that of two of the Apostles. But as the first rule obliges me to give the Old Testament name *Judab* to the Patriarch, I have reserved the term *Judas*, as used in the New, for the two Apostles. This also suits universal and present use: for we never call the Patriarch Judas, or any of the Apostles Judah. The proper name of our Lord is the same with that of *Joshua*, who is, in the Septuagint, always called *Ἰησους*, and is twice so named in the New Testament. Every body must be sensible of the expediency of confining the Old Testament name to the captain of the host of Israel, and the other to the Messiah. There can be no doubt that the name of Aaron's sister, and that of our Lord's mother, were originally the same. The former is called, in the Septuagint, *Μαριαμ*, the name also given to the latter by the Evangelist Luke. The other Evangelists commonly say, *Μαρια*. But as use with us has appropriated *Miriam* to the first, and *Mary* to the second, it could answer no valuable purpose to confound them. The name of the father of the twelve tribes is, in the Oriental dialects, the same with that of one of the sons of Zebedee, and that of the son of Alphaeus. A small distinction is, indeed, made by the Evangelists, who add a Greek termination to the Hebrew name, when they apply it to the Apostles, which, when they apply it to the Patriarch, they never do. If our translators had copied as minutely, in this instance, as they have done in some others, the Patriarch they would indeed have named *Jacob*, and each of the two Apostles *Jacobus*. However, as in naming the two last, they have thought fit to substitute *James*, which use also has confirmed, I have preserved this distinction.

§ 14. Upon the whole, in all that concerns proper names, I have conformed to the judicious rule of king James the first, more strictly, I suppose, than those translators to whom it was recommended: "The names of the Prophets, and the holy writers, with the other names in the text, are to be retained, as near as may be, according as they are vulgarly used."

PART IV.

The outward Form of the Version.

I AM now to offer a few things on the form in which this translation is exhibited. It is well known, that the division of the books of holy writ, into chapters and verses, does not proceed
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from the inspired writers, but is a contrivance of a much later date. Even the punctuation, for distinguishing the sentences from one another, and dividing every sentence into its constituent members and clauses, though a more ancient invention, was, for many ages, except by grammarians and rhetoricians, hardly ever used in transcribing; infomuch, that whatever depends merely on the division of sentences, on points, aspirations, and accents, cannot be said to rest ultimately, as the words themselves do, upon the authority of the sacred penmen. These particulars give free scope for the sagacity of criticism, and unrestrained exercise to the talent of investigating; inasmuch, as in none of these points is there any ground for the plea of inspiration.

§ 2. As to the division into chapters and verses, we know that the present is not that which obtained in primitive ages, and that even the earliest division is not derived from the Apostles, but from some of their first commentators, who, for the conveniency of readers, contrived this method. The division into chapters that now universally prevails in Europe, derived its origin from Cardinal Caro, who lived in the twelfth century: the subdivision into verses is of no older date than the middle of the sixteenth century, and was the invention of Robert Stevens. That there are many advantages which result from so minute a partition of the sacred oracles, cannot be denied. The facility with which any place, in consequence of this method, is pointed out by the writer, and found by the reader, the easy recourse it gives, in consulting commentators, to the passage whereof the explanation is wanted, the aid it has afforded to the compilers of concordances, which are of considerable assistance in the study of Scripture; these, and many other accommodations, have accrued from this contrivance.

§ 3. It is not however without its inconveniencies. This manner of mincing a connected work into short sentences detached from one another, not barely in appearance, by their being ranked under separate numbers, and by the breaks in the lines, but in effect, by the influence which the text, thus parcelled out, has insensibly had on copiers and translators, both in pointing and in translating, is not well suited to the species of composition which obtains in all the sacred books, except the Psalms and the Book of Proverbs. To the epistolary and argumentative style it is extremely ill adapted, as has been well evinced by Mr Locke*; neither does it suit the historical. There are inconveniencies which would result from this way of dividing, even if executed in the best manner possible; but though I am unwilling to detract from the merit of an expedient, which has been productive

* *Essay for the understanding of St Paul's Epistles*, prefixed to his paraphrase and notes on some of the Epistles.

judive of some good consequences, I cannot help observing that the inventors have been far too hasty in conducting the execution.

The subject is sometimes interrupted by the division into chapters. Of this I might produce many examples, but, for brevity's sake, shall mention only a few. The last verse of the fifteenth chapter of Matthew is much more closely connected with what follows in the sixteenth, than with what precedes. In like manner, the last verse of the nineteenth chapter, *Many shall be first that are last, and last that are first*, ought not to be disjoined, (I say not from the subsequent chapter, but even) from the subsequent paragraph, which contains the parable of the labourers hired to work in the vineyard, brought merely in illustration of that sentiment, and beginning and ending with it. The first verse of the fifth chapter of Mark is much more properly joined to the concluding paragraph of the fourth chapter, as it shews the completeness of the miracle there related, than to what follows in the fifth. The like may be remarked of the first verse of the ninth chapter. Of the division into verses, it may be observed, that it often occasions an unnatural separation of the members of the same sentence *; nay, sometimes, which is worse, the same verse comprehends a part of two different sentences.

That this division should often have a bad effect upon translators is inevitable. First, by attending narrowly to the verses, an interpreter runs the risk of overlooking the right, and adopting a wrong division of the sentences. Of this I shall give one remarkable example from the gospel of John, ch. x. 14, 15. Our Lord says, in one of his discourses, *Εγω ειμι ο ποιμην ο καλος; και γνωσκω τα εμα, και γνωσκομαι υπο των εμων, καθως γνωσκει με ο πατηρ, και εγω γνωσκω τον πατερα; και την ψυχην μου τιθημι υπερ των προβατων.* When the sentence is thus pointed, as it manifestly ought to be, and exhibited unbroken by the division into verses, no person can doubt that the following version is equally close to the letter and to the sense. *I am the good Shepherd; I both know my own, and am known by them, even as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father; and I lay down my life for the sheep.* But its being divided into two sentences, and put into separate verses, has occasioned the disjointed and improper version given in the common translation. 14. *I am the good Shepherd and know my sheep; and am known of mine.* 15. *As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep.* In this artificial distribution, which seems to have originated from Beza, (for he acknowledges that before him, the fifteenth verse included

* In Matt. xi. 2. we have a verse without a verb, and ending with a comma.

included only the last member, *and I lay down, &c.*) the second sentence is an abrupt, and totally unconnected interruption of what is affirmed in the preceding words, and in the following. Whereas, taking the words as they stand naturally, it is an illustration by similitude quite in our Lord's manner, of what he had affirmed in the foregoing words. But though the translator should not be misled in this manner, a desire of preserving, in every verse of his translation, all that is found in the corresponding verse of his original, that he may adjust the one to the other, and give verse for verse, may oblige him to give the words a more unnatural arrangement in his own language, than he would have thought of doing, if there had been no such division into verses, and he had been left to regulate himself solely by the sense.

§ 4. Influenced by these considerations, I have determined neither entirely to reject the common division, nor to adopt it in the manner which is usually done. To reject it entirely, would be to give up one of the greatest conveniencies we have in the use of any version, for every purpose of occasional consultation and examination, as well as for comparing it with the original and with other versions. Nor is it enough that a more commodious division than the present may be devised, which shall answer all the useful purposes of the common version without its inconveniencies. Still there are some advantages which a new division could not have, at least for many centuries. The common division, such as it is, has prevailed universally, and does prevail, not in this kingdom only, but throughout all Christendom. Concordances in different languages, commentaries, versions, paraphrases; all theological works, critical, polemical, devotional, practical, in their order of commenting on Scripture, and in all their references to Scripture, regulate themselves by it. If we would not then have a new version rendered in a great measure useless, to those who read the old, or even the original, in the form wherein it is now invariably printed, or who have recourse to any of the helps above mentioned, we are constrained to adopt, in some shape or other, the old division.

§ 5. For these reasons, I have judged it necessary to retain it; but, at the same time, in order to avoid the disadvantages attending it, I have followed the method taken by some other editors, and confined it to the margin. This answers sufficiently all the purposes of reference and comparison, without tending so directly to interrupt the reader, and divert him from perceiving the natural connection of the things treated. I have also adopted such a new division into sections and paragraphs, as appeared to me better suited than the former both to the subject of these histories, and to the manner of treating it. Nothing surely can be more incongruous, than to cut down a coherent narrative into shreds,
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and give it the appearance of a collection of aphorisms. This, therefore, I have carefully avoided. The sections are, one with another, nearly equal to two chapters; a few of them more, but many less. In making this division, I have been determined, partly by the sense, and partly by the size. In every section, I have included such a portion of Scripture as seemed proper to be read at one time by those who regularly devote a part of every day to this truly Christian exercise. To make all the portions of equal length, or nearly so, was utterly incompatible with a proper regard to the sense. I have avoided breaking off in the middle of a distinct story, parable, conversation, or even discourse, delivered in continuance.

The length of three of the longest sections in this work was occasioned by the resolution not to disjoin the parts of one continued discourse. The sections I allude to are *the sermon on the mount*, and *the prophecy on Olivet*, as recorded by Mathew, together with our Lord's *valedictory consolations* to his disciples, as related by John. The first occupies three ordinary chapters, the second two long ones, and the third four short chapters. But, though I have avoided making a separation, where the scope of the place requires unity, I could not, in a consistency with any regard to size, allot a separate section to every separate incident, parable, conversation or miracle. When these, therefore, are briefly related, insomuch that two or more of them can be included in a section of moderate length, I have separated them only by paragraphs. The length of the paragraph is determined merely by the sense. Accordingly, some of them contain no more than a verse of the common division, and others little less than a chapter. One parable makes one paragraph. When an explanation is given separately, the explanation makes another. When it follows immediately, and is expressed very briefly, both are included in one. Likewise one miracle makes one paragraph; but when the narrative is interrupted, and another miracle intervenes, as happens in the story of the daughter of Jairus, more paragraphs are requisite. When the transition, in respect of the sense, seems to require a distinction more strongly marked, it has been judged expedient to begin the next paragraph with a word in capitals.

§ 6. It was not thought necessary to number the paragraphs, as this way is now, unless in particular cases, and for special purposes, rather unusual, and as all the use of reference and quotation may be sufficiently answered by the old division on the margin. In the larger distribution into sections, I have, according to the most general custom, both numbered and titled them. But as to this method of dividing, I will not pretend that it is not, in a good measure, arbitrary, and that it might not, with equal propriety, have been conducted otherwise. As it was necessary

to comprehend distinct things in the same section, there was no clear rule by which one could, in all cases, be directed where to make the separation. It was indeed evident, that wherever it could occasion an unseasonable interruption in narration, dialogue or argument, it was improper; and that this was all that could be ascertained with precision. The titles of the sections I have made as brief as possible, that they may be the more easily remembered; and have, for this purpose, employed words, as we find some employed in the rubric of the common prayer, which have not been admitted into the text. To these I have added, in the same taste, the contents of the section, avoiding minuteness, and giving only such hints of the principal matters, as may assist the reader to recal them to his remembrance, and may enable him at first glance to discover whether a passage he is looking for, be in the section or not. I have endeavoured to avoid the fault of those who make the contents of the chapters supply, in some degree, a commentary, limiting the sense of Scripture by their own ideas. Those who have not dared to make so free with the text, have thought themselves entitled to make free with these abridgments of their own framing. To insert thus, without hesitation, into the contexts prefixed to the several chapters, and thereby insinuate, under the shelter of inspiration, doubtful meanings which favour their own prepossessions, I cannot help considering as one way of handling the word of God deceitfully. I have therefore avoided throwing any thing into those summaries which could be called explanatory, and have, besides, thought it better to assign them a separate place in this work, where the reader may consult them, when he chuses, than to intermix them with the truths we have directly from the sacred writers.

§ 7. Most translators have found it necessary to supply some words for the sake of perspicuity, and for accommodating the expression to the idiom of the language into which the version is made, who, at the same time, to avoid even the appearance of assuming an undue authority to themselves, have visibly distinguished the words supplied from the rest of the sentence. Thus the English translators, after Beza and others, always put the words in Italics by which an ellipsis in the original, that does not suit our idiom, is filled up. Though I approve their motives in using this method, as they are strong indications of fairness and attention to accuracy, I cannot help thinking that, in the execution, they have sometimes carried it to excess. In consequence of the structure of the original languages, several things are distinctly, though implicitly expressed, which have no explicit signs in the sentence. The personal pronouns, for example, both in power and in number, are as clearly, though virtually, expressed in their tongue by the verb alone, as they are in ours by a separate

rate sign. Thus *amo*, in Latin, is not less full and expressive than *I love* in English, or *amavistis* than *ye have loved*. And it would be exceedingly improper to say that in the former language there is an ellipsis of the pronoun, since the verb actually expresses it. For *amo* can be said of none but the first person singular, and *amavistis* of none but the second person plural. The like holds in other instances. The adjective sometimes includes the power of the substantive. *Bonus* is a good man, *bona* a good woman, and *bonum* a good thing. Yet to mark an ellipsis arising from such a want as that of a word corresponding to *man*, *woman*, and *thing*, in the above expressions, the Italic character has sometimes been introduced by our translators.

§ 8. I remember, that when I first observed this distinction of character in the English Bible, being then a school-boy, I asked my elder brother, who had been at college, the reason of the difference. He told me that the words in Italics were words to which there was nothing in the original that corresponded. This made me take greater notice of the difference afterwards, and often attempt to read, passing over those words entirely. As this sometimes succeeded, without any appearance of deficiency in the sentence, I could not be satisfied of the propriety of some of the insertions. These words particularly attracted my attention, Matt. xxiv. 40, 41. *Two women shall be grinding at the mill*, where the word *women* is in Italics. I could not conceive where the occasion was for inserting this word. Could it be more improper to say barely, *two shall be grinding at the mill*, than to say, as in the former verse, *two shall be in the field*, without limiting it to either sex? And since the evangelist expressed both in the same manner, was any person entitled to make a difference? On having recourse again for information, I was answered that the evangelist had not expressed them both in the same manner; that, on the contrary, the first, as written by him, could be understood only of men, the second only of women; as all the words susceptible of gender were in the fortieth verse in the masculine, and in the forty-first in the feminine. I understood the answer, having before that time learnt as much Latin as sufficiently shewed me the effect produced by the gender on the sense. What then appeared to me unaccountable in the translators was, first, their putting the word *women* in Italics, since, though it had not a particular word corresponding to it, it was clearly comprehended in the other words of the passage; and, secondly, their not adding *men* in the fortieth verse, because, by these two successive verses, the one in the masculine, the other in the feminine gender, it appeared the manifest intention of the author to acquaint us, that both sexes would be involved in the calamities of the times spoken of.

This is but one instance of many which might be given to shew

shew how little dependence we can have on those marks; and that if the unlearned were to judge of the perspicuity of the original (as I once did) from the additions which it seems by the common version to have required, their judgment would be both unfavourable and erroneous. The original has, in many cases, a perspicuity as well as energy, which the ablest interpreters find it difficult to convey into their versions. The evangelist John says of our Lord, ch. i. 11. *εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθε, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτοῦ οὐ παρέλαβον*. I have expressed the sentiment, but not so forcibly, in this manner: *He came to his own land, and his own people did not receive him*. On the principles on which the English translation is conducted, the words *land* and *people* ought to be visibly distinguished, as having no corresponding names in the original. That the old interpreters would have judged so, we may fairly conclude from their not admitting them, or any thing equivalent, into their version. Yet that their version is, on this account, less explicit than the original, cannot be doubted by those that understand Greek, who must be sensible, that by the bare change of gender in the pronoun, the purport of those names is conveyed with the greatest clearness. See the note on that passage in the Gospel.

§ 9. Our translators have not however observed uniformly their manner of distinguishing by the aid of Italics. Indeed, if they had, their work must have made a very motley appearance. On many occasions, the Hebrew or Greek name requires more than one word in our language to express a meaning which it often bears, and which alone suits the context. There was no reason, in rendering *γλῶσσα*, (1 Cor. xiv. 2.) to put *unknown* in Italics before the word *tongue*, a strange or unknown tongue being one very common signification of the word in the best authors. *πνευματα* (1 Cor. xiv. 12.) is very properly rendered *spiritual gifts*; it means no less in the apostle Paul's language; but there was no propriety in distinguishing the word *gifts* by the Italic letter; for *πνευματα*, a substantive, can in no instance be rendered barely by the adjective *spiritual*. Sometimes the word in Italics is a mere intruder, to which there is not any thing in the import of the original, any more than in the expression, either explicitly or implicitly corresponding; the sense which in effect it alters, being both clear and complete without it. For an example of this, I shall recur to a passage on which I had occasion formerly to remark*, “The just shall live by faith; but if *any man* draw back”—where *any man* is foisted into the text, in violation of the rules of interpreting, which compel us to admit the third personal pronoun *he* as clearly, though virtually, expressed by the verb. I do not remember such another instance in the English translation

* Diss. X. Part V. § 10.

translation, though I had occasion to observe something still more flagrant, in the version of the Old Testament by Junius and Tremellius*.

§ 10. It must be acknowledged, however, that the insertion of a word, or of a few words, is sometimes necessary, or at least convenient, for giving a sufficiency of light to a sentence. For let it be observed, that this is not attempting to give more perspicuity to the sacred writings in the translation, than was given them by the inspired penmen in the original. The contemporaries, particularly Hellenist Jews, readers of the original, had many advantages, which, with all our assistances, we cannot attain. Incidental allusions to rites, customs, facts, at that time recent and well known, now little known, and known only to a few, render some such expedient extremely proper. There are many things which it would have been superfluous in them to mention, which it may nevertheless be necessary for us to suggest. The use of this expedient has accordingly never been considered as beyond the legitimate province of the translator. It is a liberty indeed which ought to be taken with discretion, and never but when the truth of what is supplied, and its appositeness, are both unquestionable. When I recur to this method, which is but seldom, I distinguish the words inserted by enclosing them in crotchets.

§ 11. It is proper to add a few things on the use I have made of the margin. And first of the side margin. One use has been already mentioned, to wit, for marking the chapters and verses of the common division. Beside these, and a little further from the text, I have noted, in the outer margin, the parallel places in the other Gospels, the passages of the Old Testament quoted or alluded to, and also the places in Scripture, and those in the apocryphal writings, where the same sentiment occurs, or the like incident is related. In this manner I have endeavoured to avoid the opposite extremes into which editors have fallen, either of crowding the margin with references to places whose only resemblance was in the use of a similar phrase or identical expression, or of overlooking those passages wherein there is a material coincidence in the thought. To prevent, as much as possible, the confusion arising from too many references and figures in the margin, and at the same time to omit nothing useful, I have, at the beginning of every paragraph, referred first to the parallel places, when there are such places, in the other Gospels. As generally the resemblance or coincidence affects more than one verse, nay, sometimes runs through the whole of a paragraph, I have made the reference to the first verse of the corresponding
passage

* Diff. X. Part V. § 4.

passage serve for a reference to the whole ; and, in order to distinguish such a reference from that to a single verse or sentence, I have marked the former by a point at the upper corner of the figure, the latter by a point at the lower corner, as is usual at the end of a sentence. I have adopted the same method in references to the Old Testament, to mark the difference between those where one verse only is quoted or alluded to, and those wherein the allusion is to two or more in succession.—These are the only purposes to which I have appropriated the side-margin.

To give there a literal version of the peculiarities of idiom, whether Hebraisms or Grecisms, of the original, and all the possible ways in which the words may otherwise be rendered, has never appeared to me an object deserving a tenth part of the attention and time which it requires from a translator. To the learned, such information is of no significancy. To those who are just beginning the study of the language, it may indeed give a little assistance. To those who understand only the language of the translation, it is, in my judgment, rather prejudicial than useful, suggesting doubts which readers of this stamp are not qualified for solving, and which often a little knowledge in philology would entirely dissipate. All that is requisite is, where there is a real ambiguity in the text, to consider it in the notes. As therefore the only valuable purpose that such marginal information can answer, is to beginners in the study of the sacred languages, and as that purpose so little coincides with the design of a translation of the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, I could not discover the smallest propriety in giving it a place in this work.

§ 12. The foot-margin I have reserved for different purposes ; first, for the explanation of such appellatives as do not admit a proper translation into our language, and as, by consequence, render it necessary for the translator to retain the original term. This I did not consider as a proper subject for the notes, which are reserved chiefly for what requires criticism and argument ; whereas all the explanations requisite in the margin, are commonly such as do not admit a question among the learned. Brief explanations, such as those here meant, may be justly considered as essential to every translation into which there is a necessity of introducing foreign words. The terms which require such explanations, to wit, the names of peculiar offices, sects, festivals, ceremonies, coins, measures, and the like, were considered formerly *. Of certain terms, however, which come under some of these denominations, I have not judged it necessary to give any marginal explanation. The reason is, as they frequently occur in the sacred books, what is mentioned there concerning them, sufficiently

* Diff. VIII.

sufficiently explains the import of the words. The distinction of Pharisee and Sadducee, we learn chiefly from the Gospel itself; and in the Old Testament, we are made acquainted with the sabbath, circumcision, and passover.

Those things which stand most in need of a marginal explanation, are offices, coins, measures, and such peculiarities in dress as their phylacteries and tufts or tassels at the corners of their mantles. In like manner, their division of time, even when it does not occasion the introduction of exotic terms, is apt to mislead the unlearned, as it differs widely from the division which obtains with us. Thus we should not readily take the third hour of the day to mean nine o'clock in the morning, or the sixth hour to mean noon. Further, when to Hebrew or Syriac expressions an explanation is subjoined in the text, as is given of the words, *Talitba cumi, immanuel, ephphatha*, and of our Lord's exclamation on the cross, there is no occasion for the aid of the margin. When no explanation is given in the text, as in the case of the word *hosanna*, I have supplied it on the margin. Of the etymological signification of proper names, I have given an account only when there is in the text an allusion to their etymology, in which case, to know the primitive import of the term is necessary for understanding the allusion.

§ 13. There is only one other use to which I have applied the foot-margin. The Greek word *κυριος* was employed by the Seventy, not only for rendering the Hebrew word *adon*, that is, *lord* or *master*, but also to supply the word *JEHOVAH*, which was used by the Jews as the proper name of God, but which a species of superstition, that by degrees came generally to prevail among them, hindered them from transplanting into the Greek language. As the name *Jehovah*, therefore, was peculiarly appropriated to God; and, as the Hebrew *adon* and the Greek *kyrios*, like the Latin *dominus*, and the English *lord*, are merely appellatives, and used promiscuously of God, angels and men, I thought it not improper, when a passage in the New Testament is quoted or introduced from the Old, wherein the word rendered in Greek *kyrios*, is in Hebrew *Jehovah*, to mark this name in the margin. At the same time let it be observed, that I have made no difference in the text of the version, in as much as no difference is made in the text of the evangelists my original, but have used the common English name *Lord* in addressing God, where they have employed the common Greek name *kyrios*.

P A R T V.

The Notes.

I SHALL now conclude with laying a few things before the reader, for opening more fully my design in the notes subjoined to this version. I have, in the title, denominated them critical and explanatory; *explanatory*, to point out the principal intention of them, which is to throw light upon the text, where it seems needful for the discovery of the direct and grammatical meaning; *critical*, to denote the means principally employed for this purpose, to wit, the rules of criticism on manuscripts and versions, in what concerns language, style and idiom. I have called them *notes* rather than annotations, to suggest that, as much as possible, I have studied brevity, and avoided expatiating on any topic. For this reason, when the import of the text is so evident as to need no illustration, I have purposely avoided diverting the reader's attention, by an unnecessary display of quotations from ancient authors, sacred or profane. As I would withhold nothing of real utility, I recur to classical authority, when it appears necessary, but not when a recourse to it might be charged with ostentation. A commentary was not intended, and therefore any thing like a continued explanation of the text is not to be expected. The criticisms and remarks here offered are properly *scholia*, or glosses on passages of doubtful or difficult interpretation, and not comments. The author is to be considered as merely a *scholiast*, not a commentator. Thus much may suffice as to the general design. In regard to some things, it will be proper to be more particular.

§ 2. From the short account of my plan here given, it may naturally and justly be inferred, that I have shunned entirely the discussion of abstract theological questions, which have afforded inexhaustible matter of contention, not in the schools only, but in the church, and have been the principal subject of many commentaries of great name. To avoid controversy of every kind is, I acknowledge, not to be attempted by one who, in his remarks on Scripture, often finds himself obliged to support controverted interpretations of passages concerning the sense of which there are various opinions. But questions of this kind, though sometimes related to, are hardly ever coincident with the speculative points of polemic theology. The latter are but deduced, and for the most part indirectly, from the former. Even controvertists have sometimes the candour (though a class of men not remarkable for candour) to admit the justness of a grammatical interpretation which appears to favour an antagonist;

no doubt believing, that the deduction made by him from the text, may be eluded otherwise than by a different version.—But my reasons for keeping as clear as possible of all scholastic disputes are the following :

§ 3. First, if, in such a work as this, a man were disposed to admit them, it is impossible to say how far they would, or should carry him. The different questions which have been agitated, have all, as parts of the same system, some connection, natural or artificial, among themselves. The explanation and defence of one draws in, almost necessarily, the explanation and defence of another on which it depends. Besides, those conversant in systematic divinity, scarcely read a verse in the Gospel, which they do not imagine capable of being employed plausibly, or which, perhaps, they have not seen or heard employed, either in defending, or in attacking some of their dogmas. Whichsoever of these be the case, the staunch polemic finds himself equally obliged, for what he reckons the cause of truth, to discuss the controversy. I know no way so proper for escaping such endless embarrassments, as to make it a rule to admit no questions but those which serve to evince either the authentic reading, or the just rendering of the text.

§ 4. My second reason is, I have not known any interpreter who has meddled with controversy, whose translation is not very sensibly injured by it. Disputation is a species of combat; the desire of victory is natural to combatants. and is commonly, the further they engage, found to become the more ardent. Will the fairness and impartiality of a professed disputant, who being, at the same time, a translator, has, in some measure, in the latter capacity, the moulding of the arguments to which, in the former, he must recur, be deemed, in the office of translating, greatly to be depended on? A man, however honest in his intentions, ought not to trust himself in such a case. Under so powerful a temptation, it is often impossible to preserve the judgment unbiassed, though the will should remain uncorrupted. And I am strongly inclined to think that, if Beza had not accompanied his translation with his controversial commentary, he would not have been capable of such flagrant wresting of the words, and perversion of the sense of his author, as he is sometimes justly chargeable with. But in rendering a passage in the version to be presently converted into an argument in the annotations, it was not easy for a translator of so great ardour, to refrain from giving it the turn that would best suit the purpose, of which, as annotator, he never lost sight, and for which both version and commentary seem to have been undertaken, the defence of the theology of his party.

§ 5. My third reason for declining all such disputes, is, because the much greater part of them, even those which are treated by

the disputants on both sides as very important, have long appeared to me in no other light than that of the foolish questions which the apostle warns Titus to avoid as unprofitable and vain, ch. iii. 9. or of the profane babblings and oppositions of science, falsely so called, against which he repeatedly cautioned Timothy, 1 Ep. i. 4. vi. 20. 2 Ep. ii. 23. If we may judge of them by their effects, as of the tree by its fruits, we shall certainly be led to this conclusion. For, from the marks which the apostle has given of the *logomachies*, or strifes of words, then beginning to prevail, we have the utmost reason to conclude, that a great proportion of our scholastic disputes come under the same denomination. What character has he given of the vain janglings of his day, which is wanting in those of ours? Do not the latter gender contention as successfully as ever the former did? Cannot we say, with as much truth of these, as Paul did of those, *whereof cometh envy, strife, revilings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds?* Do our babblings any more than theirs minister godly edifying? Do they not, on the contrary, with equal speed, when they are encouraged, encrease unto more ungodliness? Have our polemic divines, by their abstruse researches and metaphysical refinements, contributed to the advancement of charity, love to God, and love to man? Yet this is, in religion, the great end of all; for charity is the end of the commandment, and the bond of perfectness. These questions I leave with every considerate reader. The proper answers will, with the aid of a little experience and reflection, be so quickly suggested to him, that he will need no prompter.

§ 6 Lastly, though I am far from putting all questions in theology on a level, the province of the translator, and that of the controvertist are so distinct, and the talents requisite in the one so different from those requisite in the other, that it appears much better to keep them separate. I have therefore in this work, confined myself entirely to the former.

§ 7 Further, I do not attempt, in the notes, to remove every kind of textuary difficulty in the books here translated; such, for example, as arise from apparent contradictions in the accounts of the different evangelists, or from the supposed contradiction of contemporary authors, or such as are merely chronological or geographical. Not that I consider these, like the dogmas of the controvertist, as without the sphere of a critic on the sacred text; not that I make it, as in the former case, a rule to exclude them, if any thing new and satisfactory should occur to me to offer; but because, on most questions of this nature, all the methods of solution known to me, are either trite or unsatisfactory. Much has been written for solving the difficulty arising from the different accounts given of our Lord's genealogy by Matthew and Luke; and different hypotheses have been framed for this purpose.

pose. Though I do not pretend to have reached certainty on this question, I incline most to the opinion of those who make the one account the pedigree of Joseph, the other that of Mary. But having nothing to advance which has not been already said over and over by others, and the evidence not being such as to put the matter beyond doubt, I see no occasion for a note barely to tell my opinion, which is entitled to no regard from the reader, unless so far as it is supported by evidence.

For similar reasons, I have avoided entering upon the examination of the difficulties occasioned by the different accounts given of our Lord's resurrection, and his appearances to his disciples after it. On some of these points there is a danger lest an interpreter be too hasty in deciding. A judgment rashly formed may give his mind such a bias as shall affect his translation, and lead him to make stretches in support of his opinion, which the laws of criticism do not warrant. I acknowledge, on the other hand, that there are instances wherein a small variation, very detestable in the pointing, or in rendering a particular expression, may totally remove a difficulty or apparent contradiction. In such a case, it would be both uncandid and injudicious, not to give that, of all the interpretations whereof the words are susceptible, which is attended with the least difficulty; and, if the interpretation be uncommon, to assign the reasons in the notes. But, to do violence to the rules of construction, and distort the words, for the sake of producing the solution of a difficulty, is, in effect, to substitute our own conjectures for the word of God, and thus to put off human conceit for celestial verity. It is far better to leave the matter as we found it. In solving difficulties to which we find ourselves unequal, future expositors may be more successful.

§ 8. One great fault, far too common with scriptural critics, is, that they would be thought to know every thing: and they are but too prone to think so concerning themselves. This tends to retard (instead of accelerating) their progress in true knowledge. Men are unwilling to part with what they fancy they have gotten a sure hold of, or to be easily stript of what has cost them time and painful study to acquire. Custom soon supplies the place of argument; and what at first may have appeared to be reason, settles into prejudice. It is necessary, in our present state, that habit should have influence even on our opinions. But it is particularly fortunate when the habit, in matters of judgment, extends not barely to the conclusions, but to the premises; not to the opinions only, but to the reasons on which we have founded them. When this is the case, we experience all the advantages derived from an habitual association, without much danger of bigotry or blind attachment. Now it is well known, that opinions hastily formed, preclude all the advantage which may afterwards redound from better information. The truth of this
remark

remark is, even in the ordinary affairs of life, too well seen and felt in its unhappy consequences, every day.

§ 9. Again, I have, in these notes, avoided meddling with questions relating to the order in which the different miracles were performed, and the discourses spoken, and also settling the doubts which have been raised concerning the identity or diversity of some of the facts and speeches recorded by the different Evangelists. I have shunned, in like manner, all enquiry about the time occupied by our Lord's ministry, and about several other historical questions which have been much canvassed. I do not say that such enquiries are useless. A connection with the evidence of other points, which may be of great importance, may confer on some of them a consequence, much beyond what at first we should be apt to imagine. But, in general, I do not hesitate to affirm, that though I have occasionally attended to such enquiries, I have not been able to discover that their consequence is so great as some seem to make it. They are still, upon the whole, rather curious than useful. Besides, on the greater part of them, little is to be expected beyond uncertainty and doubt.

Some people have so strong a propensity to form fixt opinions on every subject to which they turn their thoughts, that their mind will brook no delay. They cannot bear to doubt or hesitate. Suspense in judging is to them more insufferable than the manifest hazard of judging wrong: and therefore, when they have not sufficient evidence they will form an opinion from what they have, be it ever so little; or even from their own conjectures, without any evidence at all. Now, to believe without proper evidence, and to doubt when we have evidence sufficient, are equally the effects, not of the strength, but of the weakness of the understanding. In questions, therefore, which have appeared to me either unimportant, or of very dubious solution, I have thought it better to be silent, than to amuse the reader with those remarks in which I have myself found no satisfaction. In a very few cases, however, I have, in some measure, departed from this rule; and, in order to prevent the reader from being misled in a matter of consequence, by explanations more specious than solid, have even attempted to refute those solutions given by others, which appeared to pervert the sense, though I had nothing satisfactory of my own to substitute in their place*. Having said thus much of the purposes for which the notes are not, it is proper now, to mention those for which they are, intended.

§ 10. First, then, as was hinted before, such different readings as affect the sense, and are tolerably supported by manuscripts, versions, or their own intrinsic evidence, insomuch, that the judgments of the learned are divided concerning them, are commonly given

* See the note on Mark x. 30.

given in the notes ; their evidence briefly stated, and the reason assigned for the reading adopted in the translation. In this I carefully avoid all minuteness, having no intention to usurp the province, or supersede the labours, of those who have, with so much laudable care and diligence, collected those variations, and thereby facilitated the work of other critics. Indeed, as the variations are comparatively few, which are entitled to a place here ; and as in those few I do not enter into particulars, but only give what appears the result of the evidence on both sides, I cannot be said, in any respect, to interfere with the departments of such critics as Mill and Wettstein. The little which occurs here ought, on the contrary, to serve as a spur to the learned reader, to the more assiduous study of this important branch of sacred literature. In like manner, variations of consequence, affecting the sense, in versions of such venerable antiquity as the Syriac and the Vulgate, though not accompanied with correspondent readings in any Greek copies, are not often passed over unobserved. In all dubious cases, I give my reason for the reading preferred in this translation, whether it be the common reading or not ; and, after mentioning the other, with what may be urged in its favour, leave the reader to his choice.

§ 11. The other, and the principal end of these notes, is to assign the reasons for the way wherein the words or sentences of the original are rendered in this translation. As it would have been improper, because unnecessary, to give a reason for the manner wherein every word, or even sentence is translated, I shall here mention the particular cases in which it has been judged expedient to offer something in the notes in vindication of the version. The first is, when the rendering given to the words does not coincide in meaning with that of the common version. Where the difference is manifestly and only in expression, to make remarks must generally appear superfluous ; the matter ought to be left to the taste and discernment of the reader. To attempt a defence of every alteration of this kind, would both extend the notes to an unmeasurable length, and render them, for the most part, very insignificant.

But, secondly, there are a few instances wherein all the difference in the version may, in fact, be merely verbal, though not manifestly so ; and therefore as to the generality of readers, they will at first appear to affect the sense, it may be of consequence to take notice of them. The difference between sound and sense, the words and the meaning, though clearly founded in the nature of things, is not always so obvious as we should imagine. That, in language, the connection between the sign and the thing signified, is merely artificial, cannot admit a question. Yet, the tendency of the mind, when much habituated to particular sounds, as the signs of certain conceptions, is to put both on the footing
of

of things naturally connected. In consequence of this, a difference only in expression may appear to alter the sentiment, or, at least very much to enervate and obscure it. For this reason, in a few cases wherein the change made on the place is, in effect, merely verbal, I have, to obviate mistakes, and to show, that in alterations even of this kind, I have been determined by reasons which appear to me weighty, attempted a brief illustration in the notes.

Thirdly, in certain cases wherein there is no difference between the common translation and the present, either in thought or in expression, but wherein both differ from that of other respectable interpreters, or wherein the common version has been combated by the learned critics, I have assigned my reasons for concurring with the English translators, and for not being determined by such criticisms, though ingenious, and though supported by writers of character. This is the more necessary, as there has been of late, both abroad and at home, a profusion of criticisms on the sacred text; and many new versions have been attempted, especially in France and England. As these must be supposed to have had some influence on critical readers, it would have been improper to overlook entirely their remarks. Such, therefore, as seem to be of moment, and have come to my knowledge, or occurred to my memory, I have occasionally taken notice of. This I have done, with a view sometimes to confirm their reasoning, sometimes to confute it, or at least, to show that it is not so decisive as a sanguine philologist (for even philologists are sometimes sanguine in deciding) is apt to imagine. In this article, the learned reader will find many omissions, arising partly from forgetfulness, and partly from the different judgments which are inevitably formed, by different persons, concerning the importance of particular criticisms. When the decision of any point may be said to depend, in whole or in part, on what has been discussed in the Preliminary Dissertations, I always, to avoid repetitions, refer to the paragraph or paragraphs of the Dissertation, where such a discussion is to be found.

§ 12. Another purpose for which I have sometimes employed the notes, is the explanation of a name or word which, though from scriptural use it be familiar to our ears, has little currency in conversation, because rarely or never applied to any common subject. Of this kind are the words *parable*, *publican*, *scribe*, of which I have attempted an explanation in the notes: add to these all the terms, which, though current in conversation, have something peculiar in their scriptural application. I have generally avoided employing words in meanings which they never bear in ordinary use. As it is from the prevailing use that words, as signs, may be said to originate, and by it that their import is ascertained, such peculiarities rarely fail to create some obscurity.

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There are, nevertheless, instances in all languages, in which, on certain subjects, (for religion is not singular in this) common terms have something peculiar in their application. In such cases, we cannot avoid the peculiarity of meaning, without having recourse to circumlocution, or such other expedients as would injure the simplicity of the expression, and give the appearance of affectation to the language. When, therefore, I have thought it necessary to employ such words, I have endeavoured to ascertain the scriptural acceptation in the notes; or, if the explanation has been anticipated in these Dissertations, I have referred to the place. Of such peculiarities, which are far from being numerous in this version, the following will serve as examples:

The first shall be the word *lawyer*, which I have, after the old translators, retained as the version of *νομικος*; not that it entirely answers in the Gospel to the English use, but because it has what I may call an analogical propriety, and bears nearly the same relation to their word *νομος*, that the word *lawyer* bears to our word *law*. The deviation from common use is at most not greater than that of the words *patron* and *client* in the translation of any Roman historian. Some, indeed, have chosen to render *νομικος* *scribe*, and others, for the same reason, to render *γραμματικος* *lawyer*, because in one instance, a person called *νομικος* in one Gospel, Mat. xxii. 35. is named in another *γραμματικος*, Mark xii. 28. But this argument is not conclusive. *Jonathan, David's uncle*, we are told, 1 Chron. xxvii. 32. *was a counsellor, a wise man, and a scribe*. Can we infer from this, that these are synonymous words? The contrary, I think, may be concluded with much greater reason. If then, Jonathan had been called by one historian barely a *counsellor*, and by another barely a *scribe*, it would not have been just to infer that *counsellor* and *scribe*, though both, in this instance, applicable to the same person, are words of the same import. Yet the argument is no better in the present case. That there is, however, an affinity in their significations can hardly be doubted, as both belonged to the literary profession, which was not very extensive among the Jews. But that they are not entirely coincident, may be inferred from a passage in Luke, ch. xi. 45. where we are informed that our Lord, after severely censuring the practices of the Scribes, *γραμματικος*, and Pharisees, is addressed in this manner by one of the *νομικοι*, who happened to be present, *Master, thus saying, thou reproachest us also*. That the reproach extended to them he infers from the thing said, *thus saying*, but there had been no occasion for inference, if they had been addressed by their common appellation, and if *scribe* and *lawyer* had meant the same thing. Neither, in that case, could he have said *us also*, that is, *us* as well as those whom thou hast named, the Scribes and Pharisees. Our Lord's reply makes it, if possible, still more evident, that though what he had said did indeed


indeed comprehend them, the title which he had used did not necessarily imply so much. *Wo unto YOU ALSO, ye lawyers,* ΚΑΙ ὙΜΙΝ τοῖς νομικοῖς καὶ, Luke xi. 46. which could not have been so expressed, if the denunciation immediately preceding had been addressed to them by name. Others think νομικὸς equivalent to νομοδιδασκαλὸς, rendering both *Doctor of the law*. But as we have not sufficient evidence that there is in these a perfect coincidence in meaning, and as they are differently rendered in the Syriac version, it is better to preserve the distinction which the original makes, at least in the names.

Another example of a small deviation from familiar language, is in the word *sinner*, which in common use, is applicable to every rational being not morally perfect, but frequently in Scripture denotes a person of a profligate life. Now, as the frequency of this application, and the nature of the occurrences, remove all doubt as to the meaning, it may be considered as one of those Hebrew idioms, which it is proper in a translator to preserve. Neither *desert* nor *wilderness* exactly corresponds to ἐρημος in the New Testament; but they are near enough to answer the purpose better than a periphrasis. The like may be said of *neighbour*, which, in familiar language, is never used with so great latitude as in holy writ. And, in general, when words in scriptural use are accompanied with perspicuity, they ought to be preferred to words in greater currency, which are not used in the common translation; and that even though the import of these more familiar words should be sufficiently apposite. It is for this reason alone, that in relation to human characters, we should reckon it more suitable to the language of the Spirit, to say *righteous* than *virtuous*, *just* than *honest*.

§ 13. The only other use I have made of the notes, and that but seldom, is to remark passingly what may serve either to illustrate the character of the style of those writings or to display the spirit which every where animates them: for in these we discover the intrinsic evidences they carry of a divine original. This has induced me sometimes to take notice also of the moral lessons to which some things naturally lead the attention of the serious reader. There is not on this ground the same hazard, as on the speculative questions of school-divinity, of rousing even among Christians a whole host of opponents, or stirring up unedifying and undeterminable disputes. Practical observations, though too little minded, are hardly ever controverted. Besides, they are not of that kind of questions which genders strife, but are most evidently of that which ministers godly edifying. On this article some will think that I have been too sparing. But, in my judgment, it is only in very particular cases, that the introduction of such hints is pertinent in a scholiast. When the scope of the text is manifestly practical, it is enough that we attend to
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the sacred authors. To enforce what they say by obtruding on the reader remarks to the same purpose, might appear a superfluous, or even officious, interruption. The effect is fully as bad when the observation, however good in itself, appears far-fetched: for the best things do not answer out of place. Perhaps the least exceptionable account that can be given of such remarks as are at once pertinent and efficacious, is, that they arise naturally, though not obviously, out of the subject.

§ 14. To conclude; as I do not think it the best way of giving an impartial hearing to the sacred authors, to interrupt the reading of them every moment, for the sake of consulting either the glosses or the annotations of expositors, I have avoided offering any temptation to this practice, having placed the notes at the end. When a portion of Scripture, such as one of the sections of this version, is intended to be read, it is better to read it to an end without interruption. The scope of the whole is in this way more clearly perceived, as well as the connection of the parts. Whereas, when the reader finds the text and the notes on the same page, and under his eye at once, the latter tend, too evidently, to awake his curiosity, and, before he has proceeded in the former far enough to have a distinct view of the scope of the passage, to call off his attention; but when they are separated, as in this work, it may be supposed, that a reader will finish at least a paragraph, before he turn over to a distant part of the book. This method gives this advantage even to the notes, if judicious, that as the argument there used in favour of a particular reading, or of a particular rendering of a sentence, is often drawn from the scope and connection of the place, he will be better qualified to judge of the justness of the criticism. It ought always to be remembered that an acquaintance with the text is the principal object. Recourse to the notes may be had only occasionally, as a man when he meets with some difficulty, and is at a loss how to determine, recurs to the judgment of a friend. For the same reason I have also avoided inserting any marks in the texts referring to them. The reference is sufficiently ascertained in the notes themselves, by the common marks of chapter and verse.









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